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

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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PREFACE

Probably every writer who attempts a psychological analysis of society finds himself baffled by the complexity and ramifications of the subject. His effort, no matter how limited its initial scope, presently takes him far afield, so that he inevitably faces the alternative of skimming lightly over the surface of the whole domain, or penetrating it more thoroughly at the sacrifice of comprehensiveness. It is partly for this reason, no doubt, that books on social psychology are characterized by such conspicuous differences of treatment. Not only do they present conflicts of theory; they exhibit an astonishing disagreement in the range of special topics chosen for discussion. Some are essentially sociological in their point of view, and employ psychological concepts only as a foundation, or scaffolding, or occasional tools of construction. One of the leading works on the subject analyzes at painstaking length the fundamental social reactions of the individual, but says little about social institutions. Some attach profound explanatory importance to concepts of instinct and imitation; others minimize their significance. Numerous topics which are considered exhaustively in one are omitted altogether in another. Hence the writer who proposes to add to the list of systematic expositions of social psychology finds himself agreeably free to follow his own bent, but also somewhat uncomfortably lacking authoritative guidance.

On the whole, however, we may discern certain important trends which tend to give definitive form to the subject. One is the penetrating analysis of the mind of the

28871

individual in order to determine the sources of social relationship. Second, the emphasis upon instinct is diminishing, especially in the consideration of human society, and there is increasing recognition of the far-reaching significance of processes of learning. Third, we may observe a gradual concurrence in the topical lines of treatment. Certain traditional ideas are becoming firmly established, and certain newer ones appear to have come to stay. For the present, therefore, the task of social psychology is partly that of synthesis and organization, and such is the purpose of this book. Its aim is to give an elementary but comprehensive and systematic presentation of social consciousness and social behavior.

Its distinctive features, in the opinion of the writer, are its explicit statement of the nature of higher and lower levels of social process, and its emphasis upon thought as a supremely important social function. With regard to the concept of instinct, this seems still to have a place in the psychology of human society. The controversy over it, indeed, appears to be largely due to the ambiguity of the term. If it is taken to signify a complicated series of reflexes, unlearned but accurately adapted to a particular type of situation, its application hardly extends to human experience. If, however, it is used to indicate certain inborn emotional interests and dispositions to learn the essential ways of human life—and such is one of its traditional meanings—we may continue to employ it in exposition of the nature of human behavior. In any case we should beware of the critical assumption that instinct and learning are not only antithetical terms but mutually exclusive processes. Here as elsewhere nature combines that which we separate by logical abstraction.

As to the social function of thought, it is puzzling to observe how lightly most writers appear to estimate its

social value, or how determinedly they attempt to reduce it to mechanical association of ideas or even to an accumulation of psychophysical reflexes. Some ignore it altogether; others take little account of it except to note its "rationalizations." In view of the profoundly pervasive part played by reflection in the organization and development of society this inadequate recognition can hardly be justified. The explanatory importance of thought surely deserves more respectful consideration. Along with our analysis and criticism, let us not lose sight of the fact that thinking, in various forms running all the way from simple representative imagery and reflective judgment to the tremendous constructions of contemporary science, has been the leading agency of social progress.

At a time when social psychology, like other branches of the general subject, is growing rapidly along lines of experimental and statistical investigation, not to mention physiological and pathological inquiry, case histories, and the like, there remains a need, I suppose, for repeated systematic restatements of the subject-matter covering the whole field. If it is not to become hopelessly bifurcated as an esoteric scientific discipline on the one hand, and a mass of popular trivialities and superstitions on the other, there must be persistent literary effort to present its principal features in readable and reliable form. I have been guided at many points by the technical investigations, and have made such use of their results as I could in my exposition, but my main purpose has been to give the elementary student and general reader a comprehensive account which he can understand, an account which may serve as a background for appreciation of the strictly scientific advances of the subject.

The book owes much to the texts on social psychology by Ross, McDougall, Gault, Allport, Dunlap, Bernard,

and others. My debt is greatest to McDougall and Allport, who seem to me conjointly, in spite of their radical differences of opinion, to have thrown most light on the subject. I have tried to weave their ideas into a unitary synthesis of my own.

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CONTENTS

PART I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	Definition, Scope, and Relations	3
II.	The Mental Basis of Society	19
III.	Social Instinct	38
IV.	Social Learning	67
V.	Imitation and Suggestion	87
VI.	Social Thought	106
VII.	Social Motives	128

PART II. INDIVIDUALITY

VIII.	Personality	151
IX.	Race, Sex, and Family Inheritance	182
X.	Leadership	204
XI.	Maladjustment	223

PART III. THE SOCIAL ORDER

XII.	Class, Crowd, and Organization	245
XIII.	Custom and Fashion	266
XIV.	Morals and Manners	284
XV.	Social Control	303
XVI.	Social Conflict	331
XVII.	Social Progress	350

PART IV. APPENDICES ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS

XVIII.	Speech and Laughter	373
XIX.	Play, Art, and Music	384
XX.	Religion and Philanthropy	394
XXI.	Patriotism, Nationalism, and Internationalism	402
	Questions and Exercises	411
	Index	433

PART I

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER I

DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND RELATIONS

Subject Matter and Definitions.—Man, as was observed long ago, is essentially a social animal. Like most of nature's creatures he passes his days in conscious relation to others of his kind. By inborn disposition and imitative habit he belongs to groups in which he lives and moves and has his being. Family, friends, church, club, business and professional associations determine to an overwhelming extent the character of his daily life. Almost everything he does has explicit or implicit reference to someone else; astonishingly few indeed are the actions which may be understood apart from such reference. Not only his conflicts and coöperations but also his apparently self-centered performances, such as dressing, eating, and reading, ordinarily involve associates, real or imaginary, present or prospective. One peruses a book, for example, with a subconscious feeling of being addressed by the author, or writes pages to a distant acquaintance, or to an actual or fancied public. A cry of pain usually has some social tinge of appeal; a laugh expresses sympathetic enjoyment, or embarrassment, or ridicule. So, too, work and play, education, art, worship, all are normally conducted with more or less awareness of and relation to our fellow men.

Social psychology has been well defined as "the scientific study of the social nature and reactions of the mind."[1] In other words, it attempts to describe and explain social

[1] Bogardus, *Social Psychology*, p. 14.

behavior in terms of mental processes. It shows precisely what mental traits are included in the term "social," how these traits are produced by various causes, and how they give rise to various forms of social activity. In its widest scope it comprehends "the study of both the social aspects of the individual mind, and the mental aspects of association." [2]

This double objective is found in all the more important treatments of the subject. There is a difference of emphasis, however. Some writers assume, with comparatively little analysis, an equipment of social tendencies within the individual, and proceed to exhibit group phenomena as the expression of these tendencies. Thus in some of the earlier discussions the principle of imitativeness was taken as the explanation of the most varied forms of social behavior. Latterly a more complex mental outfit has been postulated, but still in many instances the writer's effort is mainly to present the facts of group behavior rather than to make an analytic study of the mental principles underlying these facts. Such a study constitutes the other and perhaps the dominating psychological trend within the subject. Here the central aim is to discover in the nature of the individual the sources of his social reactions. Accordingly, Allport defines social psychology as "the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; and which describes the consciousness of the individual in so far as it is a consciousness of social objects and social relations." [3]

The distinction between the two points of view and directions of emphasis is not merely verbal. In psychologizing upon the phenomena of the crowd and mob, for

[2] Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 4. [3] Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 12.

example, one may describe the emotional and violent behavior, the abeyance of reason, the quick shifts of attention, and so on, with no more explanation than a reference to "suggestion" as the underlying cause, and only casual or illustrative indication of the individual member of the group. On the other hand, one may inquire closely into the psychophysical traits of the individual which give rise to such mass action, and so may obtain a profounder understanding of the fact. Similarly many other features of social life may be presented objectively with more or less psychological flavor in the account, or may be traced to their roots in the nature of the individual. Of course any really scientific statement combines the two methods in some degree.

The contemporary movement in social psychology began by paying special attention to the inborn traits of animal and human nature on which the social life of a species is based. Much of this life, indeed, must be regarded as fundamentally instinctive, for though the precise meaning of the term "instinct" is still in question, it is none the less certain that social dispositions and tendencies are to some extent innate. In mankind they are subjected to a long process of education, both casual and deliberate, which serves further to socialize the individual. Hence the task of social psychology is not only to discover the fundamental factors of society in the constitution of the mind, but also to show how these are developed into the modes of civilization. According to McDougall's profound conception, "social psychology has to show how, given the native propensities and capacities of the individual human mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their development and operation in the individual." And again, "the fundamental problem of

social psychology is the moralization of the individual by the society in which he is born as a creature in which the non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altruistic tendencies."[4] Accordingly the psychologist is interested especially in the social influences which are brought to bear casually or deliberately upon the individual with the effect of determining his behavior.

Let us understand, then, that social psychology studies the traits of mind which underlie social life, describes them in detail, explains them by reference to heredity and environment, ascertains the laws of their operation in groups, and is thus enabled to some extent to predict and control behavior. The study concerns itself chiefly with mankind, but finds in the social life of lower animals many interesting and significant phenomena which afford clues to the understanding of their overlord. To put the matter concretely, the psychologist here investigates the innate propensities and acquired habits which relate living creatures to one another as members of groups. He examines such traits as pugnacity, family affection, domination and obedience, spontaneous association and reflective organization, examines them in their primitive and developed forms, and reveals their operation in the complex life of civilized man. In this way he obtains a better understanding of society, of the behavior of crowds, audiences, and legislative assemblies, of fashion, custom, and public sentiment, of political, industrial, and religious movements, than would otherwise be possible. He treats all social activity as the expression of individual traits which are themselves products of heredity and environmental influence.

The Study of Society.—Social psychology is the culminating phase of a long development of reflection upon the

[4] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1917, p. 18.

nature of society, a development which has included mythology, proverbial morality, ethics, history, political science, economics, and sociology as its principal stages and departments. Since it is always profitable to view a subject in its historical perspective, let us note briefly a few leading features of this development.

We find little scientific inquiry into the essential nature of society before the beginning of the last century. The earliest reflections upon it were mainly mythological and religious; they were concerned with the mystery of its origin and with pressing problems of everyday social life. They are interesting, however, as revealing the power of imagination in this field, and also here and there a subtle understanding of human nature.[5] The superhuman ancestry of the tribe, its origin in some generative process of nature, its solidarity in relation to its deities and its neighbors, its methods of protecting and sustaining itself by placating its gods or magically controlling the mysterious forces of nature—such notions were woven into the mental fabric of primitive man. At a later stage ancient literature is sprinkled with observations about human nature, and there is an abundance of discourse concerning good and bad conduct. The moral wisdom of antiquity is imperishable. It is a striking fact that whereas our natural science for the most part is of very recent origin, the moral truths by which we live were discovered and clearly enunciated thousands of years ago. On the whole, however, the ancient point of view was distinctly unscientific. Religious or moral purpose forestalled any purely intellectual description and explanation of the facts.

The development of ethics has pointed toward social psychology. Beginning with thoughtful inquiry into the

[5] Is the myth of the sowing of the dragon's teeth, from which sprang armed men, a forecast of the idea that society is essentially pugnacious?

nature of good and evil, and the significance of moral distinctions which were observed to be widely variant among different peoples, the study led through a wilderness of speculation and controversy to a scientific definition of moral consciousness in mental terms, and the discovery of its basis in social relations. Incidental to this development was that impressive series of literary efforts to depict an ideal society—Plato's *Republic*, St. Augustine's *City of God*, Bacon's *Atlantis*, More's *Utopia*, and others, magnificent pictures of a supposedly perfect social order.

The social sciences also present a background for the psychological analysis of society. History has always been enlivened by appreciation of the mental relationships which have motivated the social drama of the past. Treatises on government, from Aristotle's *Politics* down, have necessarily taken account of the social constitution of the mind. Economics has likewise shown a psychological cast in its emphasis upon desires, arising in a group environment, as the causes of behavior and basis of economic relations.

Sociology has exhibited from the outset a pronounced psychological trend. In the systematic foundation of this subject the leading writers, August Comte and Herbert Spencer, explicitly acknowledged the part played by the mind in the constitution of the social order. Comte regarded sociology as the crowning achievement of the long development of science which began centuries ago with mathematics, and passed successively through astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, to the investigation and reconstruction of human society. Further, by distinguishing science from prescientific modes of explanation, *i.e.* the reference of occurrences to supernatural beings and mysterious forces, he indicated clearly the

proper direction of intellectual advance. His general prescription of scientific method, namely, empirical investigation, formulation of regular sequences of fact as "laws of nature," and explanation of phenomena in terms of these laws, applies to the study of society as well as to other fields of science.

According to Spencer's comprehensive theory, human society forms a part of the evolutionary process. It began with the family, developed numerous modes of religious, political, military, and economic association, becoming more and more complex, until it attained its present huge and intricate organization. All this took place in conformity with the fundamental principles of nature, the same principles which explain the evolution of the stars, the solar system, this planet, and the various species of creatures which live on it. Though his account of the details of the process is inadequate, and his utterances about its social trend often express his own moral convictions rather than logical inferences from the facts of nature, nevertheless his impressive idea of social evolution as accelerated by scientific intelligence remains a guiding light for all time.

Later writers, following these leads, developed sociology as an inductive science. Society was seen to be composed of individuals and groups whose behavior could be described and explained on evolutionary principles. Physical and biological concepts, *e.g.* "equilibrium," "organism," "adaptation," served analogically to clarify scientific understanding of social conditions and processes. Generally speaking, however, the account has never been entirely objective. The rôle played by mental factors in the organization of society has been observed from the outset. Instinctive impulses, desires and aversions, emotions and ideas have been acknowledged to be the causes

of social behavior, and the study as a whole has shown a distinctly psychological trend. As Ellwood puts it, "From Comte down, most sociologists have recognized that *it is the psychic element which constitutes the social.*" [6]

Taken as a whole, therefore, the study of society has tended to establish three principles which we must regard as fundamentally important for social psychology: first, that social relationships, processes, and institutions are a part of the order of nature, and as such may be understood by the scientific intelligence without the aid of supernatural or metaphysical ideas; second, that these relationships, processes, and institutions are essentially mental in character, *i.e.* that they are constituted by the individual's consciousness of his fellows; and third, that a clearer understanding of mental facts and laws will result in an improvement of social life.

As McDougall points out, the development of a scientific comprehension of society has been delayed by the failure of current psychology to supply the concepts needed for the task.[7] The mental functions which fundamentally determine social behavior are the instincts and emotions, and these are the ones which are most difficult to study, and consequently are least clearly understood. Hence a common-sense psychology of feelings and impulses observable in everyday life had to serve, a psychology essentially sound and generally correct in its utterances, but limited to practical needs and not sufficiently exact for the purposes of social science. Moreover, the "intellectualist presupposition" that man is primarily a rational being, which prevailed during most of the last three centuries and was inherited by contemporary psychology, made it easy to interpret social

[6] Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 6.
[7] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Chap. I.

behavior as due principally to reflective intelligence, and to regard society in its various forms as a device deliberately adopted for the purpose of obtaining happiness. Not until the development of biology brought other aspects of human nature into the foreground was the way paved for advance. Once begun, this development gradually affected psychology and, by its explication of the subrational processes of mind, threw new light upon the whole range of the social sciences.

In short, while the consideration of society has been tinged from the outset with appreciation of its mental character, there has been up to very recent times no adequate comprehension of the mental facts and laws which constitute it. The rapid development of social psychology which has lately taken place has sprung from a fresh and penetrating analysis of the motive forces of the mind.

Relations to Other Sciences.—Let us next observe the connection of social psychology with the system of sciences. These are essentially interrelated, and accordingly the one which takes conscious behavior for its special field finds that it must form its conceptions in the light of knowledge derived from other branches of learning. Even the sciences of inorganic nature offer or at least suggest occasional aid, since the factors of soil, topography, and climate unquestionably have some influence upon human behavior. The Northerner differs from the Southerner both in Europe and in America; the mountaineer has social habits not quite like those of the plainsman; rocky hillsides and fertile prairies produce distinguishable types of social character in their inhabitants. In such cases the differences are no doubt traceable mainly to heredity and to social traditions, but in some degree they are due to external nature which affects the

conscious, and perhaps even more the subconscious, functions of the mind, and which thus modifies social reactions.

Such relationships are slight, however, in comparison with those pertaining to the biological and social sciences. From biology the conceptions of heredity, instinct, the organism, adaptation, and survival have passed easily into psychology because of their obvious appropriateness for describing and explaining the mental life of the individual and society. Mental traits are inherited; they appear as specific instincts, and in more general forms as intellectual capacity and emotional tendency. The mind is organic, *i.e.* a unity of interacting and coöperative parts. That society is likewise essentially organic has been a presupposition for most sociological writers. Further, the biological conception of consciousness represents it as individually and socially adaptive in function, a means of adjusting the individual or group to environment, and thus insuring survival. These and other ideas about the development of living creatures and evolution of species serve as a framework for the edifice of social psychology.[8]

Zoölogy shows the simple or complex family and community life of lower species of animals, operating in ways which are analogous to those of mankind. Physiology, too, is helpful in this as in other branches of psychology. Since our mental processes are correlated with the functions of the bodily organism, a precise knowledge of the latter often throws light on the former. Pleasure and displeasure, fear and anger, avidity and disgust, elation and depression, pride and humility are inseparable from cer-

[8] Baldwin emphasizes the difference between the biological and socio-psychological processes and ends. "Biological struggle is the means of *selection for purposes of life in a physical and vital environment.* . . . Social rivalry, on the other hand, is *the means of selection for mental and moral purposes in the environment of a social order.*" (*The Individual and Society*, p. 115.) This difference must be acknowledged, yet the processes are continuous, and the ends to some extent identical.

tain activities of the neuro-muscular system. To a considerable extent the motivation of behavior has its primary roots in the functions of nutrition, digestion, and sex. Especially important in this connection are the glandular functions which subtly determine the mental traits of mood, disposition, and temperament, with their outward expression in social life. A lack of balance in the secretion of the thyroid gland, for example, may turn a normal person into a difficult social problem.

The relation of social psychology to the other social sciences is naturally close. Sociology, economics, and political science provide abundant material for psychological interpretation. Much early social psychology, in fact, was little more than sociology restated in a crudely and superficially psychological manner. With the advance of the subject it continues to draw heavily upon the objective data of the social sciences, and at the same time to supply the interpretation which is requisite for a complete understanding of the facts. History reveals the predominating sentiments of mankind. Industrial statistics are illuminated by a knowledge of economic motives. Abstractly the difference between sociology and social psychology is that the former is concerned objectively with groups, whereas the latter studies the subjective characteristics of the individual member of the group. But in actual practice this distinction has never been maintained. Sociology has always had a psychological complexion, and social psychology has always talked about the expressions of social consciousness in group behavior. Since race hatred, religious devotion, industrial tyranny and coöperation, patriotic loyalty, imperialistic aggression, and the surging spirit of freedom are at the same time objective and subjective facts, these twin sciences obviously must continue to go hand in hand.

The bearing of our subject on ethics is peculiarly significant. Ethical reflection is concerned with human behavior as right or wrong, with the true meaning of these terms, with the definition of ideals, and the evaluation of conduct in relation to them. It is a "normative" science, whereas social psychology is descriptive, *i.e.* it describes and explains conduct without passing judgment upon its moral character. It tells us how and why we think and feel and act as members of groups rather than how we ought to behave. A necessary condition of scientific investigation, indeed, is that the investigator ignore for the time the moral value of his subject matter, and confine his attention exclusively to its factual character. Thus the crime of a lawless mob and the constructive philanthropy of a charitable society are equally interesting and valuable as data for science, though in point of moral worth they are poles apart. Yet ethics has always based itself to some extent upon empirical observations of human nature, and the best ethics has been most thorough and accurate in this respect. Conversely, too, one cannot study social behavior without meeting moral questions. The activities which constitute social life, work and play, domestic and civic relations, business competition, education, worship, and so on, inevitably present problems of what is right or wrong, and why. So natural is it to approve or condemn in considering these matters that we do not easily maintain the scientific point of view, but shift to that of moral judgment upon the slightest provocation.

Though social psychology does not itself make moral evaluations, it nevertheless performs a most important service in establishing a sound basis for them. It tells us what the facts of the matter really are, and so lessens that pervasive evil of moral regulation, the failure to

square with human nature. Ethics has too often formulated its precepts without due regard for the facts of human nature, and has enunciated its principles without considering adequately whether mankind could reasonably be expected to conform to them, or whether its ideal as presented was really attainable. Especially in matters of everyday, practical morality do we need a sound understanding of the motives which actually produce human behavior. Problems of domestic life and of the education of youth call for a profounder knowledge of sex instinct than is common. The avoidance of industrial disputes depends upon a clear comprehension of conflicting interests, and of natural tendencies to domination, obedience, and coöperation. Warfare can be prevented only as we grasp its causes which operate in the mind itself, the aims of economic competition, the lust for conquest and its prizes, the natural inflammability of public sentiment, the pride in political supremacy; and deal directly with them. All governments need to know as intimately as possible the mind of the governed. Hence in all fields of social readjustment, psychology can do the most valuable service by ascertaining the facts and formulating the principles of human nature with which ethical conceptions must ultimately be squared.

Ethical problems thus lie in the background of social psychology. But still further, and more fundamentally for our thinking, we find the latter related to certain philosophical questions with which the human mind has concerned itself for ages. Is human society the goal of the evolutionary process, the fulfillment of cosmic purpose, toward which all nature has been unconsciously striving? Is it not only dominated superficially by human aims, but also subtly guided in its internal workings by a supreme idea, aristocratic or democratic in its ultimate

significance, which remains mostly inscrutable to us but which we also in some degree apprehend? Or is the social order a mechanical product, simply the most complex arrangement of elements in nature, elements helpless in themselves and moving blindly according to equally blind and immutable laws? Or is it neither purposively nor mechanically lawful, but mainly a matter of chance, a chaotic churning of casual human results? To these queries we have no scientific answer. Our task is to clarify the facts as much as possible, and incidentally perhaps to enable the thoughtful student to solve the profounder puzzles for himself with that rational faith which is an essential character of all philosophy.

Psychological Scope and Method.—Social psychology is the study of individual consciousness and behavior as they relate to other individuals, and also of the behavior of groups. Hence it has close linkages with comparative, genetic, educational, abnormal, and other special branches of psychology. The investigation of animal mentality, of the reactions of single creatures and the concerted and organized action of swarms and herds, throws light upon the social relationships of man, as does the study of the mental traits of infancy, childhood, and youth. Here as elsewhere experimental and statistical methods often serve to clarify the facts. How the individual will react to certain social conditions can sometimes be ascertained only by actual trial and exact enumeration or other record of results. Whether, for example, college youth will maintain a better social order under conditions of freedom or of surveillance and discipline needs to be determined by methodical experiment rather than by prejudice.

Especially significant is the relation of our subject to abnormal psychology. The mentally "abnormal" is sim-

ply a departure from the common modes of social behavior, a departure more or less extensive and perhaps dangerous, but constituted out of the same elements as ordinary reactions. There is no sharp line of distinction, strictly speaking, between the healthy and the unhealthy mind. The same general mental processes, the same mental laws, are operative in both. Mental disorders, both the psycho-neuroses and the more serious forms of insanity are modes of thought and feeling and action which effectually interfere with harmonious social relations. Inability to sustain such relations is their characteristic symptom. Accordingly the social traits of the individual may sometimes be discerned most clearly in their exaggerated, defective, or perverse forms. Social psychology is often illuminated by the study of particular cases of a pathological sort. An "inferiority complex," when brought to light, may reveal principles of motivation extending far beyond the particular type of case in which it appears.[9]

It is equally true, of course, that the interpretation of the abnormal must always be in terms of the normal, as divergent therefrom but composed of the same elements. Also, the understanding of the behavior of others, whether normal or abnormal, depends upon the introspection of the observer. Since social relations are mental, their meaning can be known only by experiencing them, either actually or through sympathetic imagination. Individual desires and antagonisms, the panic of a crowd and the lofty sentiment of an organized group, are understood by the student only as he realizes in his own mind how persons feel or think when they act in that way.

[9] It is therefore appropriate that the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* should yoke the two subjects together. We must, however, beware of the easy inference that mental abnormalities are universally prevalent. An over-enthusiastic psycho-analyst is prone to discover sex and inferiority complexes in everybody.

Fortunately the minds of the observer and the observed are sufficiently alike so that interpretation takes place with assurance, often instantly. Yet there is a peculiar danger in the process, namely that of attributing to other creatures without discrimination precisely the same kind of mental content as we ourselves happen to have in observing them. Thus the ascription of rational intelligence to lower animals, and of base motives to human beings, are common errors. Much current psycho-analysis, with its alleged rationalizations and shady desires, is of this fallacious sort.

A further question concerns the theoretical and practical aspects of our subject. As presented in this book it will be a systematic statement of general principles, with illustrative reference to actual types of experience. Science, however, aims at control of nature. It describes and explains facts for the intellectual satisfaction of understanding them, but also deals with the practical problems of human life. So the psychology of social relations has for its ultimate task the removal or correction of certain individual states of mind and participation in the work of social reconstruction. Personal and collective maladjustments of many kinds, such as childhood timidity and bumptiousness, industrial conflict and the menace of war, may be dealt with more wisely and effectively in the light of psychological principles. Admittedly our science needs much firmer establishment before it can supersede traditional wisdom and individual common sense, but we may expect it in the future, and indeed in some degree at present, to assume this function.

CHAPTER II

THE MENTAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Social Consciousness.—Social relations are mental relations; they have their roots in the mind of the individual. This ever-recurring theme of social psychology confronts us at the outset with the question, What type or types of mental process are fundamental in this respect? What special mental functions give rise to the manifold and varied order of society? What is "social consciousness" in its very essence?

It is a natural tendency of thought to simplify and unify the facts with which it deals by showing that they may all be regarded as expressions of some one fundamental principle. Accordingly the writers who have given a psychological account of the nature of society have usually presupposed that its ways are due primarily to some one kind of mental process. Furthermore, since the mind has several principal types of operation, there has been much difference of opinion as to what is basic for society. Various theories have emphasized the function of intelligence, or feeling, or will, as affording the central explanatory concept of social psychology. The "social mind" has been regarded as fundamentally perceptual and rational, or as a matter of feelings and emotions, or as the development of instinctive and acquired impulses and desires. Sympathy, "consciousness of kind," the "herd instinct," have been some of the leading candidates for psychological preferment.

Reflection shows, however, that if we take the term

"social" generically, as we should, to signify all kinds of conscious relationship between living creatures, there is no one special kind of mental process which is distinctively fundamental in this respect. Intelligence has social character in so far as it perceives associates, or represents them in memory or imagination, or makes rational plans with regard to them. There is, in fact, no more fundamentally social aspect of consciousness than its perception or representation of the living beings by whom, from the beginning of his life, the individual is surrounded. Merely to perceive them is usually to establish a social relationship of some sort—acquaintance, recognition, indifference, or avoidance. Feeling and emotion have social character in so far as they give affective tone to these perceptual and ideational relationships. Sympathy and antipathy, love and hatred, anger, jealousy, admiration, and a host of other agreeable and disagreeable qualities obviously help to constitute the character of society. Likewise we find sociality in the active features of mental life, in the instincts, the imitative tendencies, the impulsive and deliberate volitions which characterize living creatures. These are called into play by associates, and have conscious reference to them.

In short, any kind of consciousness which relates one living being to another must be regarded as social. Much of the writing on this subject has mistakenly limited the meaning of the term "social" to the common thoughts, feelings, and actions of groups. If we take it to include all kinds of interstimulation and response, we see the difficulty of reducing them to a common denominator.

Yet such a denominator exists. Though there is no special type of conscious process which is distinctively social, we may designate abstractly a certain pervasive and essential characteristic of social consciousness. When

we look at or act toward living creatures, it is with a different feeling from that which ordinarily accompanies our dealing with inanimate things. It is a peculiar mental set, a feeling-attitude rather than an idea, usually marginal or subconscious, but occasionally appearing with reflective explicitness. Our conscious relations to inanimate objects show approximations to it now and then, as in the child's earnest play with dolls, the impatient kick with which we rebuke a chair that perversely opposes us in the dark, the affectionate care of a fine tool or machine, the personal name bestowed upon an automobile, and so on. These instances exhibit some measure of social feeling, an artificial but psychologically genuine ascription of life to the thing, a pretended vivifying or humanizing of it not essentially different from our attitudes toward animal pets and human kind. The quality grades up in clearness to the most intelligent awareness of the thoughts and feelings of our associates.[1]

Almost from the outset of the individual life, consciousness is predominantly social. Difference of attitudes toward living creatures and non-living things appears within the first year, and thereafter the mind is developed genetically in conscious relation to other individuals. The earliest desires, food and shelter, are satisfied by the mother. Needs are met, pain is relieved, play is provided, instruction given, by other members of the little group in which the baby finds himself. Beyond the family circle the organized membership of school, church, shop, club, and the casual associations of everyday life, extend the

[1] This conscious attitude in human beings has been termed the "ejection" of the self. If we do not confuse it with a reflective process of ideation, we can perhaps safely attribute it to the higher orders of animals, which certainly distinguish in some way between living and non-living things. Whether the creatures which live in swarms, *e.g.* species of fish and insects, have any social consciousness sufficiently definite to talk about we do not know. With regard to them social psychology must be purely objective or "behavioristic."

range and enrich the content of social consciousness. Step by step the individual advances together with others whom he constantly acknowledges as companions, friends, superiors and inferiors, helpers, enemies, objects of admiration and contempt. Thus social attitudes of one sort and another are almost incessant. To be alone physically, and still more to be alone mentally, *i.e.* quite unconscious of one's fellows, is the exception rather than the rule of human experience and most animal existence.

Let us compare with this view two others which have played important parts in the development of social psychology. One is the notable doctrine of Professor Giddings concerning the basic principle of social life and organization. He says, "The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another similar being as of like kind with itself." [2] Such consciousness he asserts to be operative at all levels of social evolution. By it living creatures distinguish the animate from the inanimate, and discern the different species of animal life. In reflective development it constitutes the nations, classes, parties, and sects of human society. Upon it as a basis are organized the various motives, political, economic, and religious, which give rise to social institutions and social phenomena. "It acts in many ways, and all the conduct that we can properly call social is determined by it."

That we have here an exceedingly important mental fact cannot be questioned, yet we can hardly accept it as performing the fundamental function attributed to it. Such perception of the resemblance of others to the percipient, though undoubtedly present in human beings,

[2] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 18.

can scarcely be attributed to the mental capacity of lower animals. These lack a sufficient degree of self-consciousness or representative imagery of themselves to afford a comparison. Awareness of the creatures which surround them may comprehend vaguely their all-alikeness, but certainly not their similarity to the perceiver. It is psychologically absurd, indeed, to suppose that a fish or an insect, or even a bird, has any consciousness of likeness to the rest of the flock or swarm. It is noteworthy, too, that creatures which sustain social relations toward one another are often so unlike in appearance and behavior that the only "kind" of which they can be conscious consists simply of life and movement. This is true, for example, of the adults and the young of most species, and of the different creatures which depend or prey upon one another. Moreover, the consciousness of kind, regarded as a process of intelligence, is not dynamic enough to play the social part assigned to it. Only as it is combined with affective and impulsive factors does it serve to explain social phenomena.

In short, social consciousness means simply consciousness of associates of any kind, the behavior of which stimulates more or less intelligent and emotional reactions. Genuine consciousness of kind, as Giddings defines it, belongs only to creatures having highly evolved mentality. Gregarious behavior does not necessarily involve it.

The other view which we may consider briefly by way of comparison, regards *sympathy* as the essential factor of sociality, the mental cement which binds the members of society together. According to this theory the psychophysical organism of gregarious creatures is so constituted that their perception of the behavior of others, especially their own kind, tends to induce automatically an affective state of mind similar to that of the creature

observed.[3] This principle finds innumerable illustrations in animal and human groups. It is alleged to explain the concerted action of flocks and herds, the waves of excitement which sweep over communities, and also much disintegrated social responsiveness of individuals. A basic form of it is the maternal sensitiveness to the well-being or suffering of offspring. Social organization and coöperation of all sorts constantly depend upon it.

That the social order is based on sympathetic feeling has been the conclusion of so many psychological and ethical observers that we may accept the idea as an approximation to the truth. If we understand the term sympathy to mean any *feeling-with-another*—not only sympathetic pain and sorrow, but sympathetic joy, anger, fear, admiration, reverence, and so on—it undoubtedly represents a profoundly important social trait. Particularly significant is its connotation of affective tone as well as cognitive content in social consciousness. The latter is usually agreeable or disagreeable. Indeed, the affective character of pleasantness and unpleasantness ordinarily determines the development of social relations quite as fundamentally as do the operations of intelligence. It is the business of the intellect to promote satisfaction, and social satisfaction is essentially sympathetic.

The variety of social relations is so great, however, that it is straining the term sympathy to make it all-inclusive. Social consciousness displays a multitude of diverse attitudes, including deep and varied antipathies, such as race and class hatred, which express themselves in forms of behavior that we must call generically social. Hence we are on firmer psychological ground if we say that social consciousness is any consciousness which has reference to

[3] This of course does not imply "consciousness of kind," but only a common kind of consciousness.

associates, and that such consciousness is at the same time more or less cognitive, affective, and active.

But the simple fact that social consciousness is consciousness of associates manifestly does not carry us very far. A more important phase of this matter presents itself in the question whether there are certain kinds of conscious relationship which are biologically fundamental for any social order. The principal claimants for this distinction, in addition to gregariousness, are the inborn tendencies of pugnacity and fear, self-assertion and submission, sex and maternal care. These mental seedlings appear to have branched out into the manifold activities which constitute society. The problem of their number and nature will meet us in the following chapter. Here it is sufficient to presuppose that at the basis of social order there are a few such original impulses, which in the course of time have evolved into the infinitely complex system of social relationships that constantly confronts us.

A further introductory question has reference to the principal kinds of mental function which produce social order. Earlier speculation held that this order is the work of *rational intelligence* or reflective thought, the deliberate calculation of the advantageous modes of collective life. Subsequent observation of the prevalence of processes of *imitation* in groups led to emphasis upon this function as most explanatory of social stability and development. More recently the concept of *instinct* has come into the foreground of theory with regard to the basis of society. According to this view social phenomena are the outgrowth of various inborn social dispositions. The uncritical use of the term instinct, however, produced a reaction toward concepts of *learning* as constituting the most adequate explanation of the facts. At the present time social psychology aims to discover in detail the processes

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by which individuals acquire social habits. These processes are partly accidental, partly imitative and reflective. Thus the general trend of thought in the field has been somewhat circular, or rather spiral; the earlier rationalistic point of view recurs, but on a higher, more distinctly scientific plane.

Levels of Social Life and Organization.—We may obtain a convenient preliminary view of the mental nature of society by synthesizing the foregoing ideas as follows. The ways of social life are partly inborn and partly learned. Nature provides the individual with an equipment of conscious tendencies which in their original and developed forms constitute his relationships to those around him. The basic level is that of instincts, such as feeding, fighting, fleeing from danger, mating, caring for the young, gathering in groups, leading and following, tendencies which in their earliest manifestations are explained by the inherited connections of the nervous system. They are more or less conscious, and possibly in some degree are even purposive, though involving little or no awareness of ultimate ends. Their distinguishing characteristic is that they work automatically, but they may be modified extensively by accident and intelligence. They embrace the entire social life of most species. In man and the higher animals they are less definite, and from the outset are subject to processes of learning which impart to them their particular social form. Underlying and permeating this form, however, there is always the specific drive of instinct.

Above this level rise three higher ones of learning. Social behavior is explained in part as the fortuitous discovery of agreeable or disagreeable modes of action. Random or calculated effort results in pleasure or pain, and is thereafter repeated or inhibited until it becomes a habit

or is eradicated from the system of behavior. Somehow there is a mental synthesis of action with consequent satisfaction which establishes a basis for recurrence, so that casual experience of an agreeable sort may produce addiction to a particular sport, or a habit of reading, or even a choice of an occupation. Counterwise, the painful outcome of an unsocial act tends to prevent its repetition. Thus selfishness is checked by thought of punishment, or awkwardness by fear of ridicule.

The next level of social relationship may be designated by the conventional term "imitation," using this broadly to include intellectual copying, sympathetic emotion, and response to suggestion. Some animal species behave in ways which are apparently imitative, such as the migration of birds and the stampedes of cattle. Since the propensity to do as is done by our neighbors and leaders is certainly inborn, we may if we please postulate an "instinct to imitate," but we should not lose sight of the differences between this type of reaction and those on the lower levels. Imitation involves more explicit apprehension of the meaning of the imitated act, and is also a much more variable function. Whereas instincts are relatively specific, imitation ranges all the way from similar muscular movements to the elaborate copying of complex performances, from smiling to adopting a national constitution. In human society it takes innumerable forms of domestic and scholastic instruction, and in one way or another constitutes most of the ordinary process of education. Working always on a basis of instinct it produces the phenomena of fashion, custom, and tradition. Perhaps more than any other principle it serves to explain the intricate complexities of human behavior.

The upper story of the social edifice is that of reflective intelligence, or "reason." On this level social relation-

ships are *thought out* before taking actual form, difficulties are met in advance, problems are solved by protracted consideration. Representative imagery of social situations takes the place of blind tendency and perceived example, and greatly facilitates adjustment by short-circuiting the slow process of trial and error, and by avoiding bad modes of imitation. General ideas of conduct are formed, and become reliable guides in particular situations. Processes of analysis and synthesis point to causes and effects, showing what may be expected to occur as the natural consequences of behavior. To some small extent the rational tendencies of the social mind assume inductive forms comparable to those which characterize the physical sciences, *i.e.* systematic social investigations and experiments. In all this we must of course recognize an innate capacity for thought, and also a propensity for the imitative acceptance of ideas. But the function is not properly an instinct, nor is it merely imitative. It involves an independent activity of the mind, namely, the intellectual analysis and synthesis involved in judgment and inference. Except possibly in most rudimentary form it takes place only in the human mind, and here perhaps less frequently than we should expect. Its power is as great, however, as its ordinary use is slight.

The main levels of social consciousness and behavior may therefore be differentiated as (1) that which is innate, (2) what is learned through accidental experience of pleasure and pain, (3) the imitation of others, and (4) reflective thought. It must be acknowledged that the term "levels" is not precisely correct, since the different types of process shade into one another. Imitativeness is an inborn trait, and at times it approaches the form of reasoning. We occasionally learn quite as much from the casual effects of thinking as from its logical conclusions.

On the whole, however, these mental modes are sufficiently distinguishable to afford a helpful view of the psychical structure of society.

In the lower orders of life, as has been pointed out, the innate functions are stereotyped in their operation. The creature flies, burrows, mates, preys, and so on, by an inner necessity which works with almost mechanical regularity. Alteration of behavior through experience is minimal. The higher we ascend in the evolutionary scale, the less rigid the characteristic activities appear, the more subject to direction and modification by intelligence. In the lower species the young are almost fully matured at birth; in the higher they learn to some extent the ways of their kind. In man the period of childhood is immensely prolonged, with corresponding development of imitative and rational sociality. Hence in the life of the individual, and infinitely more in the age-long evolution of the race, inborn propensities and capacities assume acquired forms. Civilization is the imitative and reflective outgrowth of innate tendency. Thus animal pugnacity becomes athletic or commercial competition, parental tenderness gives rise to philanthropic care of the sick and the poor, curiosity unfolds into science, and so on. Accordingly the problem of the social psychologist is in part that of analyzing the complexities of civilized life along the lines which we have indicated.

Social Motives.—The question why a particular social act, relation, or institution is what it is, always has a double answer. Its special form is due to inborn nervous organization and acquired habit, perhaps also to factors of imitation and reflection. Its general character and "drive," however, are the expression of an underlying *motive* which is thus directed into some channel of chance or intelligence. Accordingly our study of the mental basis

of society must include some account of the nature of social motivation.

What is a "motive"? By this term we mean any mental interest, impulse, or desire, which acts as a source of energy to produce behavior. It involves a more or less definite aim, a more or less intense feeling or emotion with regard to this aim, and a more or less powerful tendency to action. The basic motives of life are found in the needs of the body, which by their discomfort or prospective satisfaction set the muscular system into operation. Biologically fundamental are the impulses of hunger and sex. Desires for bodily comfort, for warmth and shelter, for rest and activity, likewise play a considerable part in producing specific types of behavior. So, too, the motives of group association, of care of the young, of domination, and of display are deeply rooted in the nature of the individual. In most creatures they express themselves through mechanisms of action which are mainly instinctive. On a higher level of intelligence they develop civilized and cultured forms of expression, the elaborate usages and institutions of social life. Permeating our work and our play, our domestic and public life, our association in clubs and in churches, are certain powerful interests and urges which constitute our essential nature.

These interests of life center in material things, persons, and ideas, and form complex systems of emotional dispositions and tendencies to action with reference to these centers. Pride in the possession of an automobile, love of a child, hatred of an enemy, zeal for a philanthropic cause, devotion to a political principle, are illustrations. Such a system is called a *sentiment*. It expresses itself in various ways according to the special conditions which call it into operation. The sentiment of chivalry, or patriotism, or reverence comprises a wide variety of attitudes and

deeds appropriate to its particular character. Social relations and institutions are to a great extent the product of such sentiments, which supply the motivation of all kinds of behavior.

There is one sentiment which possesses special significance for social psychology, namely, that which centers in the self. The sentiment of *self-regard* combines self-confidence and self-distrust, ambition, pride, humility, shame, and other emotions, in a compound which produces resultant types of behavior corresponding to particular social stimuli or situations. Such self-regard is the most powerful determinant of action. The desire for conspicuous success, the aspiration to power or purity of character, the self-condemnation consequent upon conscious wrong-doing, will drive an individual to lengths of performance which are tragic or sublime. The feelings of superiority and inferiority are the source of some of the most characteristic social behavior of the individual. "Personality" is composed of traits of action synthesized and unified in the self-regarding sentiment. The interplay of personalities gives us the everyday occurrences of human society.

Subconscious Motives; the "Unconscious Mind."—Social relations are to a great extent *subconscious*. Their meaning, in the circle of the mind's contents, is marginal rather than focal; that is to say, we feel rather than clearly perceive the ties which link us to others, though such feeling is none the less forceful because of its vagueness. Instinctive impulses are blind, but urgent. The significance of an example is only dimly apprehended, yet it serves to stimulate action. Motives are notoriously so unclear that often we cannot say precisely what it is that moves us. Likes and dislikes, fears, ambitions, desires, work subtly and powerfully below the surface of mental

life. The perception of a compliment or a slur, the sympathetic sharing of a friend's mood, the tactful adjustment of a difficult social situation, come from sources outside the focus of attention. What our real sentiments toward others are we hardly know until some critical occurrence brings them to the light of clear reflection. The general psychological truth that "meaning," both intellectual and affective, resides in the penumbra of the conscious field applies of course to social life. The flickering attention moves from one concrete detail to another and for the most part does not illuminate this meaningful background.

Moreover, certain interests of life may be so hidden, or intentionally suppressed, that they cannot enter the circle of reflective illumination. Everybody knows what it is to be unable to recall a fact, perhaps a name, which he knows perfectly well, but which obstinately sticks to its "dissociated" location just when we want it. Yet in its very retreat it contributes to our feeling of personal acquaintance. So, too, where ideas and emotions are frowned upon by social conventionality or are resolutely excluded from thought for moral reasons, they may nevertheless strongly affect social behavior in indirect ways. Thus a personal antipathy which we refuse to acknowledge, or a lingering tinge of embarrassment dating back to an almost forgotten *faux pas*, mysteriously prevents us from joining a group which includes a particular individual. Covert ambition sometimes works out in deeds which bear no obvious relation to it. Everyday experience offers frequent illustrations of subconsciousness as dissociated mental process.

The records of mental pathology contain innumerable instances of queer social behavior thus motivated by a dissociated interest. Mental abnormalities often take distinctly social form—odd actions in relation to other

people of which the doer is apparently unconscious or for which he can give no good reason, so that the psychiatrist is confronted by the problem of discovering their hidden source. When found, it proves to be subconscious in the dissociative meaning of the term. For example, a mysterious repugnance to white clothing may be the outgrowth of a long-forgotten fright at a playful "ghost"; or a hysterical paralysis of the arm may express an unacknowledged unwillingness to do one's duty.

These dissociated motives lie so completely out of the reach of awareness that they have led to the psychological fiction of an "unconscious mind." This concept, which is highly popular and also has emphatic psychiatrical support, depicts consciousness as only a subordinate part of the mind, the larger and more important part of which is unconscious. From this capacious reservoir of impulses and emotions, primitive tendencies and past experiences, comes the motivation of behavior. According to Freudian theory and its development by disciples, there is an essential conflict between the desires of the unconscious mind and the repressive forces of civilization. For the more orthodox Freudians repressed sex instinct, for others a thwarted tendency to self-assertion, is the tap root of social life, though there is more or less play of lesser motives. Whatever the discountenanced desire, it seeks expression in various indirect ways. In ordinary life slips of speech, quirks of action, bits of forgetfulness, dreams and reveries are the subtle revelation of covert wishes. Psychopathic disorders likewise consist of symptoms of repressed impulses and emotions. On a still larger scale the institutions and practices of civilization itself, of art and religion running all the way from primitive myth, ritual, totem, and taboo to the most elaborate products of contemporary culture are the "sublimated" performances

of the unconscious mind. Their explanation is always to be found by "psycho-analysis" in some mental process of which, as such, the subject is unaware.

At first acquaintance this idea is plausible enough, if one is not repelled by its prevalent emphasis upon sex; and the literary development of it is for a multitude of readers quite fascinating. Yet psychologists who were educated in an older tradition are for the most part disinclined to accept it, and for several reasons. In the first place it does not really *explain* the facts. By definition it lies beyond the reach of introspective observation, hence its existence remains permanently hypothetical. It is an essentially mysterious entity to which any content can be ascribed without the possibility of empirical verification. Secondly, its alleged character as explicitly described seems to imply that it is not really unconscious at all—(Just what, in clear language, is an "unconscious desire"?)—but rather conscious in its own dim or dark uncanny fashion. Third, the facts to which it is applied can be satisfactorily explained in terms of marginal or dissociated mental processes of the kinds indicated above, or in some cases perhaps by the mere mechanism of the nervous system.[4]

Whatever the value of the concept of an unconscious mind, the fact remains that motives of social behavior are largely subconscious. In the complexity of the mind's contents they often escape clear apprehension, or are distinctly cut off from the rest of the mental life. A firm grasp of this fact is important for the understanding of social psychology.

Group-Mind and Social Intelligence.—The term "group-mind" has played a conspicuous literary part in

[4] For a fuller discussion of the concept of subconsciousness see the writer's *Applied Psychology*, Chap. III.

the development of social psychology. Unfortunately it has often been used without clear definition, and sometimes with a signification which is quite unscientific. Many writers have maintained that a social group has an inclusive mind, which is not the mere sum of individual minds, but possesses its own higher unity of conscious life, comprehending and transcending the individuals which compose it. This superindividual mentality is supposed to have purposes and passions of which its components are at best only partially or dimly aware. It manifests itself in various ways, ranging from the tumultuous rage of a crowd or the fervor of a religious assemblage to the steady discipline of an army and the development of a nation through centuries. Like an invisible personality the "spirit of the group" broods over the doings of the members, or sweeps them into its own vast accomplishments. Obviously this transcendent selfhood is not an empirical fact. It is a "metaphysical" concept in the sense that it designates something which is essentially a product of interpretation, and which we cannot empirically verify. Such a higher reality there may be; numerous considerations point toward it more or less plausibly. The analogy of the biological organism, with its diversely functioning parts constituting a living and purposive unity, is suggestive even though logically inconclusive. Idealistic philosophy has occasionally cast the idea in a comprehensive form both intellectually dignified and religiously impressive. Poetically it lends itself to fascinating rhapsodical treatment. Since, however, it lies beyond the range of empirical verification it does not belong to a scientific account of society.

Strictly speaking, the "group-mind" means in the first place simply *the common feelings, impulses, and ideas of the group*. Crowds are moved by fear, audiences laugh in

unison, organized and unorganized bodies of all sorts display enthusiasms and prejudices in which individuals resemble one another quite as much as they do in physical traits. Much college spirit is little more than concerted admiration, antagonism, and noise. In so far the mind of the group is nothing but the arithmetical sum of its component units.

Secondly, the term signifies *the individual consciousness of belonging to the group.* This is more than mere common feeling; it includes the reënforcement and direction which come from awareness of group support, knowledge of organic relationships, and the feeling of duty. So the teacher has a group-mind with reference to her pupils, and the military officer in relation to his command. One is not precisely the same person after joining a society as he was before. Membership in an organization carries with it more or less modification of behavior. The important point to observe in any case is that the individual mind is extensively affected by its felt linkages to others.[5]

In its cognitive aspect the group-mindedness of the individual may be termed his *social intelligence.* This concept, to which we are thus led in concluding our long discussion of the mental basis of society, is especially fundamental for social psychology. It signifies one's ability to perceive social relationships, to make effective adjustments to social conditions, and to control the social reactions of others. Emerging from a background of in-born nature, it is developed by experience and training into various forms and degrees of social versatility and accomplishment. In its higher stages of perfection it involves not only a quick intuition of the meaning of a social situation, but also a rational understanding of it,

[5] For more extended discussions of this concept see Allport, *Social Psychology,* pp. 4–10, and McDougall, *The Group Mind,* Chap. I, also Chap. XIII, *infra.*

and a more or less elaborate set of social concepts applicable to social problems. Its essential function is the direction of behavior in relation to associates. As instinct and feeling are the dynamics of social life, social intelligence is the guide.

Social psychology, then, attempts to describe the mental aspect of association, and to explain social phenomena in terms of the laws of the mind, as empirically ascertained. Following the lines of analysis indicated in the foregoing pages, let us consider first the innate tendencies which make for social life and organization.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL INSTINCT

The Nature of Instinct.—Underlying all behavior there are certain inborn capacities and tendencies of one sort and another, powers of perception, emotional dispositions, and propensities to action, which constitute the warp, so to speak, upon which the woof of experience is woven. In their active aspect such innate traits are commonly termed *instincts*, and it has long been held by psychologists that we cannot understand the complex phenomena of mental life without observing clearly their instinctive basis. This general principle applies of course to the field of social psychology.

The ordinary use of the term "instinct" is broad. It covers, in fact, almost any kind of unreflective act, both those which are due to innate endowment and also many which clearly are acquired through experience. Thus a person is sometimes said to have acted instinctively when his behavior was merely unpremeditated; and writers occasionally refer to political and religious instincts where the designated facts are unmistakably products of learning. A stricter usage is now becoming settled in psychology, namely, the sort of action which is (1) in some respects distinctly innate as contrasted with that which is learned; (2) somewhat specific, *i.e.* comprises in its original form a definite coördination of movements having a special aim or kind of usefulness; (3) more complicated than a reflex, such as heart-beat, winking, swallowing, and the like. This definition ordinarily carries with it the

further qualifications that instincts are more clearly conscious and less mechanical than reflexes. Though no sharp line can be drawn between the realm of instinct and the adjacent ones of reflex action on the one hand, and the more general mental activities of imitation and reflective thought on the other, the intermediate range is sufficiently distinct to merit a name of its own.

Just what forms of behavior are comprised within it? The list of instincts in animals and in man is long, and there is much difference of opinion as to what it properly includes. Confining our attention to those upon which there is most agreement, we may conveniently distinguish three principal classes. One is composed of those which express the needs of the body, for example, eating and drinking, spitting out disagreeable food, the cat's face-washing, the dog's scratching, and the monkey's search for vermin. With them we may include such activities as the infant's spontaneous kicking and squirming, the bird's singing, the rooster's crowing, and the like, which have tonic effect upon the organism. Some of these are scarcely more than compound reflexes, and perhaps hardly deserve the title of instinct.

A second group relates the individual to his physical environment. Here we may place the movements of grasping and lifting to the mouth, crawling, walking, and flying, activities of curiosity and exploration, shrinking from loud noises, manipulation of small objects, and on a higher level the bird's nest-building, the squirrel's nut-hoarding, the dog's burying a bone, and the beaver's amazingly ingenious construction of a dam. In many cases the particular form of an instinct of this group is peculiar to certain species, for example, the shrike's impaling its victim on a thorn, and the desert rat's barricade of cactus-spines around the mouth of its burrow.

The third class, which is especially important for our purposes, consists of responses to other living creatures. Here belong such tendencies as herding, fighting, mating, parental care, display, domination and submission, jealousy, vindictiveness, teasing, and a host of emotional derivatives of these, such as awe, admiration, bashfulness, shame, scorn, rivalry, and the like. The social life of most species of animals consists of a few kinds of instinctive processes. That of man is an elaborate development of learning based on inborn tendencies.

It is important to observe that not all instincts are of precisely the same type. The term is applied to (1) protracted chains and complex combinations of reflex movements, such as chewing and swallowing, crawling, laughing, and the elaborate mechanisms of insect life; (2) the universal interests of living creatures or of particular species, *e.g.* sex, parental care, escape from or destruction of enemies, construction of a dwelling, hoarding of food, and so on. Instincts of the second type are more variable in their operation, but their primary manifestations, like the instincts of the first type, are organizations of reflexes. At one extreme, therefore, we have mere reflex mechanism, and at the other waves of emotion with comparatively little useful coördination of movement.[1]

[1] The wide range of forms of behavior to which the name "instinct" has historically been applied, and which are certainly in some degree innate, makes it difficult to formulate a satisfactory definition. McDougall's careful statement is "an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive and to pay attention to any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which find expression in a specific mode of behavior in relation to that object." (*Outline of Psychology*, p. 110.) We may accept this with the understanding that instincts differ widely in the extent, intensity, and complexity of their cognitive, affective, and active features.

The same writer also gives us an important list of fundamental instincts. Taking as criteria the appearance of the behavior well down in the evolutionary scale of life, and its susceptibility to pathological exaggeration in man, he finds these basic instincts to be thirteen in number, namely: food-seeking, repulsion, fighting, escape, self-assertion, submission, gregariousness, mating, parental care, acquisitiveness, constructiveness, curiosity, and appeal.

The relation of instinct to reflex action needs further explication. It is clear that an instinctive process is made up of elementary movements which are of a reflex pattern, and that in many cases it is hardly more than a "chain-reflex," each element of which automatically touches off the next one in the series. So the bee goes through its round of honey-making activities; and the nest-building bird seizes a twig or a piece of grass, flies with it to the chosen tree-crotch, weaves it into the nest, and goes away for another bit of material. Likewise it might seem that all instinctive performances of hunting and feeding, mating and rearing progeny, solitary burrowing and coöperative building, can be regarded as nothing more than chains of reflex movements. But the matter is really not quite so simple. An instinct, upon close examination, turns out to be not merely a mechanical sequence of bits of behavior, but rather a process of using these toward an end. The relation between the part processes is not purely automatic, but shows purposive organization; it is modified according to the needs of the situation in respect to its end. So the whole operation has a variant character, though the outcome will be the same, namely, the death of the victim, the escape from the enemy, the construction of the nest, or the rearing of the brood. It is as though there were a "teleological factor," a conscious or subconscious purpose at work, which somehow adapted the available means to itself. Just how to conceive this factor is a puzzling psychological problem, but we can hardly fail to see that it governs the whole process. Whether the purposive control is present from the outset in some degree, or is gradually acquired through experience and is purely a product of learning, is a question which we may defer for the moment. In any case an instinct is modifiable without entirely losing its innate character.

The physiological basis of instinct is located in the synapses or points of connection between neurones, and in the glandular mechanisms of the body which govern both mental and physical reaction. By native endowment these innate features of the organism are ready for use at birth, or become so after a period of inner maturing which is entirely or mainly independent of experience. According to the prevalent psychological view of instinct as the basis of human life, the responses of food-taking and repulsion are the first to appear, fear and appeal are displayed within a few weeks, curiosity within a year, tendencies to manipulation, construction, and collection develop from time to time, new forms of self-assertion occasionally make their social début, and sex interest manifests itself following the onset of puberty. Nature provides in advance certain paths for the transmission of currents of nervous energy, and internal stimulations which coöperate with external ones, and which facilitate specific reactions instrumental to the welfare of the organism or the perpetuation of the species.

Instincts are therefore to be regarded as biologically useful. The behavior of fighting, hoarding, mating, protecting the young, and so on, serves to adapt the creature to its environment, to preserve its life, or to insure the reproduction and continuance of its kind. In some cases we do not see any considerable utility in the performance—Woodworth mentions the rooster's crowing as an example—but probably there is always some direct or indirect benefit to the individual or the species, if no more than the agreeable tonic of effective bodily function, or a resultant safety through herding.[2]

Conscious Aspects of Instinct.—What are the mental processes which accompany instinctive action? This

[2] Of course the operation of an instinct in a particular instance may be harmful, as when hunger leads to over-eating, or acquisitiveness takes the form of theft.

question is significant for social psychology, even though the answer is inevitably somewhat speculative, and we must constantly be on our guard against the psychological fallacy of attributing to other creatures the reflective contents of our own minds.

In the first place, the consciousness which characterizes instinct is more or less *impulsive*. The fleeing animal is an embodied urge of fear. The setting hen, as James remarks, *must* squat on her fascinating nestful of eggs until they hatch. Who has not felt the overwhelming desire to master an obstreperous opponent, or the irresistible momentum of curiosity thrusting toward its unseen goal? Especially does the restraint of instinct cause it to respond with increased energy. We may interpret this energy as the working of a metaphysical life-force, or describe it more scientifically as the complex of sensations coming from the muscular system, but whatever the nature of the drive, it characterizes instinctive behavior. Instincts, in a word, are *dynamic*.

Closely related to this impulsiveness of instinct is its affective and emotional character. When the stimulus is felt the creature is uncomfortable unless it reacts, and it experiences satisfaction in its activity. Varying forms of emotion seem to follow in some degree directly upon the stimulus, and to be increased by their own outward expression, as when the act of yielding makes one feel more submissive, or the effort of searching accentuates inquisitiveness. If the action is frustrated, the ineffective effort tends to intensify the emotional stir within the body. Physiologically it would appear that in so far as the released energies do not find sufficient outlet in external movement, they spread through the bodily organism, modifying the internal muscular and glandular processes in ways which are felt *in toto* as the emotion. At the same

time these processes automatically facilitate the appropriate reaction. There is a remarkable correspondence, as McDougall has shown, between the fundamental instincts, as forms of overt behavior, and certain emotions. Thus fear is the characteristic accompaniment of fleeing, disgust is coupled with repulsion, humility with submission, and so on. In many instances the same word indicates both the specific emotion and the type of behavior, *e.g.* curiosity, reproach, and bashfulness. Evidently emotion is normally a part of the total instinctive process.

The cognitive aspect of instinct presents a peculiar difficulty. The reaction is touched off by a sense-perceptual or imaginative stimulus, by something which the creature perceives or which, in the higher species, is represented in the form of a memory image, as that of an absent enemy. This perception is ordinarily instantaneous, and the question whether the animal consciously apprehends the *meaning* of the object to which it thus reacts is exceedingly puzzling. To take a concrete illustration Lloyd Morgan observed a moor-chick which had swam but never had dived, and which in fact he had never succeeded in stimulating to exercise its diving instinct, instantly dive and swim under water to an overhanging bank when a barking puppy suddenly appeared on the edge of the pool.[3] Was the stimulus here merely the visual and auditory sensation, or was there in addition a thrill of "danger" meaning which helped to precipitate the response? Morgan's own conception is that instinct operates in the first instance mechanically, and acquires meaning through repeated experience. Others are inclined to believe that there is "instinctive perception," involving in its first occurrence component factors of more or less conscious meaning, a mental inheritance as genuine as the

[3] *Instinct and Experience*, p. 4.

physiological inheritance of nervous function. This view obviously presupposes the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, an idea not at present in very good biological standing; and it may also be regarded as a contemporary recurrence of the doctrine of "innate ideas," that philosophical ghost supposed to have been long ago laid to rest forever. While we cannot exclude this as a possible hypothesis, we must not forget that conscious meaning is commonly held by psychologists to be entirely a product of the past experience of the individual.

A further difficulty appears in the question whether an instinctive action is *consciously purposive*. Does the furred or feathered nest-builder desire and design to raise a family, or the migrating seal intelligently intend to revisit the distant spot where its fishy food is to be found? How much awareness of the future is there in the incessant labor of the ant, or the squirrel's hoarding of nuts? In most animals the purposiveness is doubtless of very short conscious range. The creature has little prevision of the outcome of its behavior, and still less of an idea of the ultimate aims of its own nature, the development of the individual and the survival of the species. Of the more immediate aim there is perhaps some comprehension, though the first operation of an instinct can hardly have more than a sense of spatial direction unless there is some inheritance of meaning. Instinctive behavior becomes increasingly purposive as accumulated experience imparts to it a basis of expectancy; but only in the higher species, and possibly in mankind alone, is there any extensive forecast of the future.[4]

[4] The instinctive reaction to subtle stimuli or to a complicated situation is sometimes so quick and accurate that it has been attributed by Bergson and others to a peculiar mental function of "intuition," essentially different from ordinary perception. This faculty is supposed to be innate, intelligent, and purposive. Most psychologists, however, regard the quickness and precision of such perception as due either to the mechanical functioning of inborn nervous connections, or to the summed-up results of past experience.

The Modification of Instinct.—Instinctive behavior continually undergoes modification and development, gaining on the one hand the increased facility of habit, and on the other various forms of adaptation to special conditions of environment. Such alteration is much less in the lower orders of animal life than in the higher, but even in the former the inborn mechanism shows occasional change due to experience. To mention a striking illustration, one of the solitary wasps described by the Peckhams always leaves its prey at the mouth of its hole and makes a preliminary entrance before dragging the victim in. The observers moved the prey a little distance away while the wasp was in its burrow. When it emerged it dragged the prey to the mouth of the hole again, dropped it, and again went inside. The process was repeated many times in the most automatic fashion until suddenly there was a change. The wasp dragged its victim to the opening—and down into the burrow. "Oh, admirable coöperation of Intelligence with Instinct! After so many repetitions of the unintelligent instinctive routine, a little spark of Intelligence at last stirs, breaks through, and gives to Instinct just that help without which Instinct would so often fail. . . . In this, as in so many other instances, the animal shows itself capable of omitting a phase, or of going back and repeating a phase, of varying in many other ways the usual sequence of actions and of adapting them to unusual circumstances." [5]

In the higher animals the initial form of instinct is simpler, and accordingly susceptible of a wide variety of modifications as the creature accidentally or intelligently learns how to act in a given situation. The drive and general character of the performance are innate; the particular form is largely acquired. As a result the process

[5] McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 89.

is continually branching out in new forms which differ considerably from one another. The fear reaction is inborn, but what a long and devious course it travels from the fear of a loud sound, or of pain, or of a natural enemy, to the fear of audiences, the fear of failure, and the fear of the Lord which is the beginning of wisdom. Or in the case of pugnacity, from the angry destruction of a foe to good-natured rivalry in athletic sport, or competition in business, or the deliberate imposition of a legal penalty upon a criminal. Similarly, self-assertion develops from the mastery of little things and the simple command of other individuals to the planning and execution of complicated enterprises, and the direction of great organizations.

The inhibitory mode of alteration is especially significant, both because of the social need of restraint of instinct, and because of the peculiar consequences which sometimes follow such restraint. According to Professor James, an instinct which does not receive appropriate expression when it ripens in the nervous system, or when it is blocked in its primitive effort, tends to atrophy. As evidence of this principle he offers the illustration of a dog which never buried anything because its first attempt, on a carpeted floor, was unsuccessful. In a similar way it appears that children who are prevented from playing may suffer loss of the normal play interest. Any experience of futility of an action or pain in its consequences tends, according to the associative mechanism of the mind, to lessen in some degree its impulsiveness on later occasions. Accordingly, unsocial manifestations of instinct are ever being ironed out of the pattern of life.

Inhibition is not always so conclusive, however. The apparent disappearance of a repressed instinct may be somewhat deceptive. Failing in its normal line of gratification it may seek another, perhaps hardly recognizable as

its expression, but nevertheless serving to discharge the inner tendency. Thus a frustrated bent for learning may concern itself inconspicuously with the study of little matters of everyday life; or an ungratified desire for children seeks an outlet in philanthropic activity in behalf of orphans. In the case of the sex and self-assertive instincts repression sometimes leads to the strangest behavior, symbolic of the original interest, as though a concealed intelligence were trying subtly to evade restraint and direct the drive into an appropriate channel. The symptoms characterizing certain mental disorders seem to be explainable in this way. Works of art and forms of religious worship are perhaps occasionally subject to similar interpretation.

The development of instinct comprises both its extension to new objects or stimuli and also changes in behavior. These are of wide variety. The emotional aspect is least subject to modification; being composed mainly of sensations of automatic vascular and muscular processes, it is modifiable only in its intensity and duration. Anger, fear, disgust, wonder, and the other fundamental emotions remain essentially the same, however enhanced or subdued by social culture. Their various combinations such as shame, indignation, awe, and the like possess distinct individual character, but like their elementary constituents remain substantially the same, whatever their objects.[6] As a whole, however, the instinctive process is subject to extensive alteration.

An important question which presents itself in this connection is whether the acquired modifications of instinct in one generation become instinctive in the next. Are inborn tendencies due in some measure to the ac-

[6] McDougall gives an elaborate analysis of these complex forms. See *Social Psychology*, Chap. V.

quisition of habits by ancestors, who learned through accident or intelligence how to act under given conditions, and who transmitted their cumulative experience to posterity in this automatic form? To this question most biologists give a negative answer. The prevalent scientific view regards instinct as derived from an original differentiation of the germ plasm, and as unchanged from generation to generation except through similar differentiation. If this is true, what an individual learns never becomes instinctive in his descendants. Only as a disposition or capacity happens to occur in him by an original variation of his psychophysical constitution is it passed on to his progeny. There is some statistical and experimental evidence, it should be acknowledged, which seems to point toward the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Rats and other creatures have been taught simple modifications of their natural behavior, slight traces of which modifications, according to the observers, appeared in their descendants. It is also asserted, on the basis of racing statistics, that the progeny of race horses which have been taken from the track for breeding purposes are in general slightly slower than those bred from parents actively engaged in racing—as though the characteristic energy and lethargy of these conditions were transmitted to offspring. The evidence is not conclusive, however, and the orthodox biological opinion with regard to the question is negative.

Let us consider the significance of this matter for social psychology. At first sight it seems a misfortune that children cannot inherit the full benefit of their parents' experience, and that each succeeding generation must be taught laboriously, over and over again, what its predecessors have learned. But when we reflect that if the effects of this learning were transmitted by heredity they

would include not only wisdom and good habits, but errors, superstitions, evil knowledge, and bad practices as well, we find ourselves reconciled to nature's method. Since the individual inherits capacities and tendencies which may be specifically adapted to a changing environment, and since, moreover, many modes of behavior which he might have inherited may be taught him in better form, it is doubtless just as well, both for him and for society, that he does not carry from the outset a larger burden of the acquisitions of the past. Whatever special forms of behavior we might wish him to have inherited may also be learned, and it is well that a multitude of bad traits are permanently eliminated by death. On the whole, creatures are adequately fitted by heredity for dealing with the conditions of life—this general truth remains, however numerous its exceptions. As environment changes, new instincts may appear, or increasing intelligence will serve to perfect social relations. Learning may in fact not only conform to, but actually modify in important ways, the environment itself.

Instinct and Learning.—The foregoing discussion has emphasized the fact that what we term instinctive action is usually complicated with the effects of experience. The particular ways in which instincts are modified by processes of learning will be set forth explicitly in the following chapter. Here we proceed to consider a more abstract and fundamental question, namely, whether an action thus modified can properly be called an instinct. Hitherto we have assumed that inborn tendencies persist throughout extensive processes of modification, but the matter is much in dispute.

So long as we confine our attention to the lower orders of animal nature there is no doubt about the prevalence of instinct. The lives of these creatures are made up of

a few kinds of behavior, for which they are innately endowed with an appropriate nervous mechanism. The modifications which take place at this level are so simple and of such minor importance that we may ignore them. As we ascend in the evolutionary scale, however, we find that the number of nerve connections increases tremendously, and that the possibilities of behavior become correspondingly varied. In the upper orders the animal, instead of being limited to a narrow range of action, has a much wider field but must learn to some extent just what to do. Through blind effort, with consequent success or failure, or through some process of instruction, it perfects its response to suit its needs. Careful observation of chickens shows that their first attempts at pecking are often inaccurate, and that only gradually do they acquire precision. Similarly the early movements of kittens and puppies are inept and fumbling; their primitive reactions lack the accuracy which characterizes the lower stages of evolutionary development, and gain this only by practice. When we come to mankind it would seem that he always has to be taught. Infinitely diverse are his modes of behavior, but apparently they are all learned.

But what, then, becomes of our definition of instinct as an inborn type of action? Is it true, as James declared, that man has a full complement of animal instincts and some distinctively human ones in addition? Or should we rather say that instinct lessens in the upper ranks of nature's children, until it disappears, or all but disappears, in the human species?

The usual answer to such questions is that on the higher levels and especially in man the instinctive equipment for life is genuinely present but "loosely organized." [7]

[7] *E.g.* Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 112.

Human instincts, it is said, are vague tendencies which require the aid of experience in order to function with precision, but which nevertheless are innately established in the organism and are ready in some degree for action. They are not only possibilities of behavior, but are especially favorable conditions for specific forms of it. Physiologically they consist of systematic but imperfectly integrated synaptic connections between neurones, loose systems which are preformed and ready to function, but which need practice in order to function efficiently. In the case of chickens the tendency to peck is inborn, and the coördination of reflex muscular movements involved in the operation is fairly well though not perfectly organized from the outset. On a higher level, the instinct of an animal to hunt its prey produces at first a more inept but nevertheless a rapidly improving performance. Similarly we may say, according to this view, that human acquisitiveness is an innate tendency, showing itself early in fumbling efforts to reach and grasp and hold on to objects, and later taking certain customary and complicated forms, particularly the pursuit of wealth. Thus, according to the traditional psychological view, learning gives direction and elaboration to vague inborn propensities.[8]

There are two principal criticisms of this view. The first is that in human beings the traits in question are so loosely integrated and variable that they cannot properly be called instincts, if we use the term to indicate a *specific* type of behavior. Reflex responses to stimuli are indubitably inborn, but the more complicated motor coördina-

[8] Yerkes and Bloomfield found that kittens, though they did not at first pay any attention to mice, soon developed a disposition to attack and kill them. The investigators regarded the process as the maturing of an instinct to kill. Other observers and critics have interpreted the facts as simply a process of learning. See Dashiell, *Fundamentals of Objective Psychology*, pp. 191 f.

tions of the sort termed instincts are obviously products of learning. Their form is so largely due to cultivation that whatever innate organization they possess may be disregarded. Nor do they have the distinctness which instincts, according to definition, should display; rather do they shade into one another. Self-assertion merges with pugnacity, or protection, or curiosity, or acquisitiveness. Precisely the same behavior, in fact, may be called appropriately by two or more instinct-names, since it may have several purposes or functions. Furthermore, every trait has numerous subordinate forms. There are many kinds of pugnacity and of parental care. The fear of ghosts is so different from the fear of disgrace that we ought not to regard them as expressions of the same innate tendency. On these counts it is asserted that the alleged instincts are merely convenient terms of classification by which we group together, for our own logical purposes, reactions of various kinds. They are helpful descriptive labels, not explanatory principles of nature.[9]

In the second place, the common doctrine of instinct is criticized for making unscientific use of the terms "force" and "tendency." An instinct, let us remember, is an innate coördination of movement of a complex type. A tendency, scientifically speaking, is nothing but an actual movement in its primary stage. If such specific coördinations are not found in mankind—as it is maintained they are not—then we have no right to talk about tendencies toward them. As for "instinct-forces," the critic reminds us that the term "force," in scientific

[9] These difficulties are so great that Dunlap proposes to replace the concept of instinct, for the purposes of social psychology, with that of *desire*. McDougall comments that the fundamental desires are instincts under another name, since desire has an inborn basis. Similarly we may say that the conceptual synthesis of reflex, learning, and "drive," which the thoroughgoing disbelievers in human instinct substitute for the latter, comes very close in some cases to the idea which they reject. The "drive" has a somewhat definite direction.

usage, signifies here an elsewhere a definite sequence of conditions and consequences. Since instinctive behavior means only that in response to particular stimuli a creature reacts in certain ways, nothing is gained by attributing its action to a mysteriously innate set of specialized energies. Such "metaphysical" explanations, we are told, are abhorrent to science.

The most trenchant attack upon the traditional view of instinct is Allport's masterly effort to reduce all human behavior to basic reflexes, modified and complicated through experience.[10] The details of this theory will be presented more fully in the following chapter. Here it is sufficient to state a single illustration. An angry child makes random movements of arms and legs which may be called struggle reflexes, movements which discharge emotional energy, though without conscious aim. Incidentally he learns that such movements produce an agreeable change of treatment, in other words he discovers that a kick or a blow serves a purpose. Thereafter he *fights*. And the fighting reaction, though checked under some conditions, especially in the home, is nevertheless extended to an ever-increasing variety of situations and stimuli, including many kinds of interference with his activities. Also the movements which constitute it are varied and complicated by intelligent direction, so that he fights with weapons, or with words, or with actions of buying and selling. There is no "instinct of pugnacity" in all this, but only a gradual enlargement of learning. Other alleged instincts in human beings are likewise traceable to elementary reflexes, developed into purposive coordinations through practical experience.

The above lines of criticism lead to the same pragmatic conclusion. Not only does the concept of instinct, as

[10] *Social Psychology*, Chap. III.

applied to human beings, falsify the facts and obscure them with words; it also retards practical knowledge and control. Far more important is it to discover the precise conditions under which a reaction takes place than merely to give it a specific name. Instead of referring the child's behavior of running away to a mysterious force of self-assertion, or an equally mysterious tendency to exploration, in the presence of which we are likely to feel rather helpless, we should look for the particular circumstances which lead to his running away, and alter his incipient waywardness by changing these. Instead of resigning ourselves to war as an inevitable expression of the fighting instinct in man, we ought to study pertinaciously the actual causes of war, and do away with them. The more we regard human conduct as predetermined within the organism, the more we will tend to discourage education and interfere with progress. Hence it is said that if social psychology is to become a practical science, instrumental to human welfare, it must abandon the concept of instinct.

The controversy over instinct has made it clear that man is predominantly a learner. We must acknowledge that human behavior, in its actual form, is a complicated set of acquired habits, gradually superposed upon a comparatively simple basis of native reactions. How much of the traditional doctrine of instinct remains, in the light of this truth, it is not easy to say. Before relegating it entire to the limbo of discarded theory, however, we need further information and reflection upon the following points. First, are there in the infant and growing child coördinated movements, too complicated to be called reflexes and apparently exhibiting some degree of conscious purpose, which take place, even though ineptly, without having been learned? If so, they are

instincts, and later developments based upon them may properly be called instinctive. In order to prove his case the upholder of the traditional view must show that such purposively coördinated reactions are primitive facts. Secondly, and more profoundly, does the combination of reflexes in learning follow predetermined lines of development? Does the learning process itself take place in specific directions or channels for which the accidents of experience do not provide an adequate explanation? Are habits, as McDougall says, always formed in the service of instincts? To apply a concrete illustration, when two children of the same parents display a lifelong difference of characteristic behavior, the one docile and retiring, the other active and masterful, ought we to regard this difference simply as an accumulated product of casual satisfactions, or rather as due to a difference of inborn tendencies which manifest themselves in determinate directions and selectively make use of environmental conditions?

Such questions cannot be answered with absolute certainty. We must avoid on the one hand the uncritical assumption that detailed or highly specific forms of behavior are innate, and on the other the hasty conclusion, to which the critics seem often to have jumped, that because such traits are learned they are therefore entirely without an instinctive basis. A middle course between these extremes is somewhat dogmatically maintained in this book. It will be assumed that the traditional theory is correct in some degree, that there are loosely coördinated movements of a purposive character due to synaptic conditions which are inborn in human beings, and that learning follows lines of instinctive tendency. If this is true it is obviously important to know not only what instincts underlie the social order, but also how they may

best be dealt with educationally for the welfare of the individual and of society.

Let us acknowledge frankly that if the term instinct is held to signify a highly coördinated and specific type of reaction, performed with approximate accuracy from the outset, it does not apply in any considerable degree to mankind. If, however, we take it to mean a spontaneous interest in a certain kind of object, with more or less definite response to its presence, and the development of emotion in relation to it, then the concept holds good for humanity. Especially is it to be observed that the emotions are naturally attached to certain kinds of creature, or situation, or relationship. Time and experience may be necessary in order to exhibit this attachment, but its invariable appearance bears witness to its fundamentally innate character. On this theory learning perfects what is already in some degree implicit in the organism.

It is also important to bear in mind that in this sense of the term instincts equalize rather than differentiate individuals. Everyone has much the same sort of instinctive equipment for life, differing in the relative strength of the various tendencies, it is true, but nevertheless constituting a common basis of human nature to which the processes of education may be applied. We all have innate fears and animosities, propensities to domination and to submission, acquisitive and constructive desires, solitary and coöperative inclinations. On this foundation the superstructure of society is reared. Without it a social order would be impossible.

Instinct and Social Culture.—The social behavior of animals is predominantly instinctive. Most species are equipped at birth or soon afterward for their characteristic reactions toward other creatures. There is a brief period of immaturity, and then the individual performs

with little or no preliminary learning the few functions which constitute its social life. This is most conspicuous in the social organization of some species of insects. Here an elaborate division of function is transmitted from generation to generation by instinct. The group constructs its dwelling, guards it, makes repairs, gathers food, stores it away, rears its young, and does numerous other services to the social order with a precision and refinement of individual adjustment which no other society attains. There is no social evolution, however. When the group reaches a certain size it subdivides, or discharges an offshoot society which repeats identically the whole process.[11]

Flocks, herds, and packs of animals show social instincts, though not a high degree of organization. In addition to gregariousness there is specific leadership in some cases, and rarely a slight division of labor. In many species social relations are restricted to the family, and casual contacts with other creatures. These take place in ways mostly predetermined by inborn nature. The mother cat suckles her kittens, shelters them, carries them in her mouth, and even teaches them to catch mice, all because of an inner necessity of her being.

In man, as we have seen, the evolution of general intelligence greatly reduces the original definiteness of his instincts, while it interweaves or merges them in his behavior, and extends widely their field of operation. From primitive reactions of a vague or somewhat specialized sort develop varied responses which carry the root meaning. Much modified and complicated by experience, they yet retain something of their original character, and to them we must accordingly attribute fundamental value for civilization. Culture is an outgrowth of instinct.

[11] Read, for example, William Beebe's account of the amazingly intricate organization of the army ants. *Edge of the Jungle*, Chap. III.

Let us note a few illustrations. Curiosity points toward learning, science and philosophy; parental care toward the care of the sick, toward charity and philanthropy; pugnacity toward commercial competition, athletic sport, and the punishment of crime; acquisitiveness toward the institution of property; constructiveness toward art and industrial enterprises; submission and fear toward law-abiding citizenship and religion; disgust lends its force to the rejection of what conflicts with our ideals of decency and righteousness; self-assertion gives added impetus to our efforts in any direction. Some contemporary writers find in sex instinct the primal force of living nature which, by diverse transformations, becomes the idealism of civilization. All institutions, schools, colleges, and universities, hospitals and asylums, stores and factories, railroads and shipping, political governments and religious organizations, have their origin in some innate tendency of the human will. Of course the instinctive roots in any particular case are more complex than these simple assertions would indicate. Many instincts are at work at the same time in war, in education, in industry, in government, and in religion. These institutions also owe their form to imitation and to reflective thought. But in the last analysis the varied activities of human culture, however much directed by conventionality, custom, and higher intelligence, rise from sources which are inborn.

A glance at a daily newspaper shows clearly that whatever appeals to public interest does so by virtue of one or another of these motive forces. Accidents, crimes, births and deaths, marriages, the comedy and tragedy of domestic life, discoveries, commercial ventures, sport, legislation, international relations, all interest us because they touch inner springs of pity, pugnacity, curiosity, sex, and

the like. How unfailingly fascinating to the public are the divorce trials of contemporary celebrities, dramas of sex, self-assertion, and pugnacity, effectively presented under glaring headlines on the front page. "Comic strips" hold their infertile acreage largely because they cast in humorous form the familiar impulses of domestic bickering, baffled ambition, and so on; though in fairness it should be added that some of these pictures, in spite of their crudity, make strong appeal to the reader's sentiments of friendship and parental tenderness. Consider also the pages about sports. We may ask what difference it makes whether an individual beats another in some futile performance of athletics, but to the normal mind at a certain stage of development the question is as absurd as, in Professor James' illustration, it would be to ask the broody hen why she loves to sit on her eggs. Sport appeals to the fighting instinct.

To attribute such interests entirely to the formal and informal instruction which society imposes upon the plastic mind of childhood is, according to the view maintained in this book, to ignore their deeper motivation. Education works upon a basis of original nature; it gives precise direction to tendencies which in themselves are imperfectly formed. Only as it develops some instinctive potency or satisfies some instinctive need can it produce lasting results.

The Principal Social Instincts.—All instincts have direct or indirect social value, or are occasionally manifested under social conditions. Some are more essentially social, however, in that they consist of responses to the presence or behavior of other individuals. Most noteworthy in this respect are gregariousness, domination and submission, pugnacity, sex, and parental care. These are the principal roots from which group life develops, and

to which casual learning and methodical instruction give specific direction. Let us consider them briefly.

Gregariousness.—The desire to be with others, especially one's own kind, and the active seeking of such society, are all but universal. If denied satisfaction, this instinct produces an intolerable lonesomeness and even a tendency toward pathological states of mind. The gregarious inclination has been explained by Giddings and others as nothing more than a habit, due to the fact that the young of a species are brought up in close association with their parents and with one another. To believers in instinct the varied facts of group association seem to reach beyond this explanation. The natural herding of animals and the voluntary gathering of human beings implies an inborn liking for such experience. To an instinctive desire of this sort McDougall attributes in part the contemporary flocking to towns and cities, in numbers far exceeding economic demands. Likewise persons of the same occupation prefer to live in the same locality. Gregariousness also helps to explain the formation of fraternal and professional associations, and attendence at school, church, and places of amusement. All coöperative enterprises depend upon it to a considerable extent. No doubt its manifestations are learned, but the learning itself may be regarded as the development of an innate disposition.

It would seem that there is an equally instinctive desire to be alone, exhibited less conspicuously, of course, but asserting itself under certain conditions just as strongly as does gregariousness. Many species of animals are solitary in their mode of life, and personal differences in this respect are so great as to suggest that the "solitary soul" forms its habit of withdrawal from fellowship on the basis of original nature.

Domination and Submission.—Instinctive impulses of domination manifest themselves in relation both to things and to other living creatures. When opposed, this instinct produces increased and persistent effort, such as pushing, holding, reiteration, and on a higher level of intelligence more subtle methods of manipulation and control. All individuals have it in some degree, but most conspicuously it characterizes the commanding personality, and the executive leaders of society. In conjunction with constructiveness it produces the great achievements which geniuses have performed single-handed, and the organized enterprises which leaders have compelled their fellows to undertake with them. In large or small ways it runs its path of accomplishment throughout all daily life. Wherever two wills meet in opposition, it leads to struggle and victory. Selfishly or unwisely exercised it is perhaps the most prevalent source of unhappiness in human experience. The domineering manner, the insistence upon "having one's own way," inevitably of course in conflict with persons of more or less similar disposition, is the cause of friction and rupture in all the close associations of life. It embitters or shatters innumerable households, produces tyranny in all the political associations of mankind, and when exercised through organized institutions as in the spread of empire and the competition of industrial interests, it results in social tragedies on the largest scale. At the same time we must acknowledge that civilization owes most to its operation in the individuals and groups who identified themselves with some ideal and pressed forward to its realization.

Submission is equally instinctive. We do not so readily perceive that human beings and other creatures like to yield, to accept leadership, and to obey orders, just as naturally as to assert themselves, yet such is the case.

Domestic harmony depends upon the paradoxical phenomenon of mutual submissiveness. Effective organization owes its strength to this tendency as well as to its counterpart. Religion idealizes it in the teaching of man's littleness before his gods and the humility of worship. It is basic in political association; and in the spirit of obedience to law it takes a form which is indispensable to civilization.

Psycho-analysis has uncovered a multitude of facts showing the abnormal and pathological working of these twin instincts. Particularly interesting are the "inferiority complex" which results from baffled self-assertion, and the "mechanisms" of compensation and defense by which the individual tries in shrewd and subtle ways to escape the humiliating consciousness of inferiority, and to maintain appreciation of his own importance. Pretense of ill health, exaggeration of trifling misfortunes, the exhibition of weakness as an appeal for pity, the "rationalizing" of failure by absurd excuses, these are among the methods by which the self-assertive instinct pervertedly derives satisfaction. From this root, perhaps even more than from that of sex interest, come the nervous disorders which afflict mankind.

Pugnacity manifests itself when any strong desire is frustrated. Except as restrained by fear it appears immediately in response to interference with any self-assertive function. Its original form of physical attack with nature's weapons of tooth and claw becomes replaced by more complicated and subtle methods, and ultimately by the most destructive inventions of science, but throughout its evolution its essential purpose remains that of disabling opponents. It has been concurrently the burden and the glory of history, producing endless suffering, and also the social solidarity which underlies human culture.

It has insured domestic safety, and while sacrificing innumerable lives to unworthy causes has established government and social protection. It is a source or at least a coöperant mental factor in productive competition and in the punishment of wrong-doing. As a breeder of the virtues of courage, obedience, and the subordination of selfish to larger social interests it takes a foremost place among the forces of civilization. There is reason for holding, as some writers do, that the weakening of it by education predetermines a people to social decay. In its organized form of modern warfare, however, it threatens civilization itself. Society faces the necessity of finding ways of exercising it without incurring its evils. For this purpose its derivative modes of subduing nature to human aims, of attack upon injustice, of harmless competition and rivalry in sport, are most promising.

The instinct of *sex* is nature's provision for the procreation of the race. Though differing somewhat as a mental trait in the male and female, it operates essentially as interest in the opposite sex, and as behavior which leads eventually to copulation. In many species of animals it takes the preparatory form of courtship and coquetry. Primary manifestations of it appear in early childhood, but it does not mature until adolescence, when it becomes a dominant interest of life. Its motive power continues for many years. The varied drama of sex passion exceeds in interest every other topic, furnishes the theme of endless literature, and draws into its service the church, the school, and the court of law. Its tremendous force and the dangers attaching to it have led society through the long course of evolution to impose upon it many controls, permissions and prohibitions, in conformity with which it has assumed a wide variety of conventional manifestations. So its subtle energy spreads throughout everyday

life. Attitudes and practices which at first sight seem to have nothing to do with it are nevertheless outgrowths of it. Under suppression it seeks new outlets and finds expression in strange forms of behavior. The pathological phenomena of sex bear witness to its unyielding insistence, and its odd ways of extending itself into the different departments of life. According to Freudian theory its "sublimation" has produced the most important cultural achievements of the race, and though this doctrine is grossly exaggerated there can be no doubt that it contains a significant truth. The actual development of art and religion in the individual are closely connected with the stirring of sex instinct.

Parental Care.—The nourishment and protection of progeny begin with the specialized maternal responses of nursing and shielding. In man the development of such care leads to varied behavior on the part of both parents and is extended over a much prolonged period. As a socializing agent indeed, the child is unique and supreme. His needs produce parental coöperation, the extension of the instinctive care by each parent to the other, and the thorough absorption of the same point of view in society at large. No appeal excites quicker sympathy or receives more generous response than that which is concerned with the helplessness or suffering of childhood. Children themselves acquire the modes of parental care imitatively, in relation to dolls, animal pets, and other children, and do so with a readiness which suggests that the nerve connections underlying parental behavior, as in the case of sex, undergo a premature development of function. The childless often seek surrogates for this demand upon their attention and sympathy. Ingrained in the social order, the instinct is given still wider play, resulting in many different forms of philanthropy. Treatment of the sick, relief

of the poor, public education, humanitarianism in business and in government, all flow from the same original source. The chivalry of men and the tenderness of women are expressions of an inborn tendency toward compassionate care.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL LEARNING

The Social Function of Learning.—According to the biological and psychological doctrine stated in the preceding chapter, the lower orders of animal life have inborn nervous connections which from the outset result in specific and effective modes of behavior, accompanied by comparatively simple processes of consciousness, and subject only to slight modification. In the higher species the course of evolution has produced a greatly increased complexity of structure and function, but has done so at the expense of instinct, which has lost in some degree its directness and certainty as the possibilities of response to stimuli have become varied. In mankind we find few if any instinctive reactions of the types which characterize the lower animals. His "instincts" are vague desires and inept strivings. Sometimes they seem to aim straight at a goal but usually rather to work by "trial and error" until they attain success, and are set in the nervous system as results of learning. Their further development is guided by the general intelligence which corresponds to the intricate complexity of his nervous connections. This learning process is based on an elementary organization of nerve paths, and it conforms to certain inborn emotional tendencies, hence we may properly regard it as fundamentally instinctive. The original neuro-muscular coördinations, imperfect though they are, subserve purposes which branch out with increasing scope and amplification of detail to include the varied interests of civilization.

At the same time we must acknowledge, as was said above, that man is essentially a learner. It has been a cardinal error of much psychological theory, in its application to human problems, to emphasize unduly the innate tendencies of human nature, and to ignore their susceptibility to modification. One would infer from the more extreme statements that it is practically impossible to change them, that it is hopeless for society to try to lessen in any considerable measure individual waywardness, crime, ruthless competition in industry, tyranny in government, and the devastating passion of war, because these admittedly have an instinctive basis. Some writers explicitly advocate leaving inborn inclinations to find their natural modes of expression instead of endeavoring to educate them in any special ways, and more particularly instead of subjecting them to restraint. The fact that a desire is generically instinctive is taken as a sufficient justification for letting it alone, confident that "Nature is right," and that any effort to repress it will tend to give it a perverted and unhealthy form. Even when the theory stops short of this practical inference, it too often contents itself with enumerating the various instincts which underlie human behavior, and fails to make clear the extent to which this behavior is explained by environmental conditions.

There is reason, therefore, for a careful consideration of the process of learning as a basic concept of social psychology. While we cannot accept the extreme "environmentalist" statements now current, statements which would relegate instinct to the shelf of intellectual antiquities, and which magnify the possibilities of training without recognizing its inevitable limitations, we must nevertheless acknowledge that an understanding of the modes of learning is just as important for our study as is

that of original nature. Human society is an outgrowth of instinct, but is also a complex product of education.

The Nature of Learning.—Since the concept of learning is so important for social psychology, let us look in detail at the nature of the process. This begins with the application of a response to a new object or situation, or with some change in an old response. In so far as the reaction is effective it tends to become established in the organism and repeated on occasion; in so far as it is inept it tends to be eliminated. Learning has therefore been well defined as "the modification of the reactions of an organism through experience."[1] The term is applied both to the process of modification and to its permanent results. The latter appear explicitly as new modes of behavior; but underlying these there are organic changes which may not reveal themselves for a long time. The profoundest learning is that of general ideas which may have little or no immediate expression, but which nevertheless constitute character and eventually pass into conduct.

The application of an old response to a new situation or object occurs in several different ways. The perception which touches off the response may become so particularized that a part, perhaps a mere detail of the original object or situation, serves as a sufficient stimulus to produce the reaction. Thus dislike of a person becomes dislike of every feature of his personality, his face, tone of voice, habits of behavior, any one of which causes an expression of disgust. Further, a response is extended from one thing to others which resemble it; differences are ignored, and the similar object is seized or avoided, perhaps after an instant's hesitation. So we treat alike on first acquaintance all those who belong to a given

[1] Colvin, *The Learning Process*, p. 1. "Modification" may be understood to include both the selection and establishment of a response, and a change in one already partly established.

class, as clergymen or tramps. It would seem indeed that we learn automatically, at least in many cases, to make the same response to anything closely associated with or "conditioning" the original stimulus, as when maternal tenderness reaches from the child to his clothes and toys. According to the same principle, fear of effects becomes fear of causes, reverence is felt for the accessories of worship, and in general imitative actions presently take place upon verbal command as well as upon example. In creatures which are mentally capable of representative imagery, the primary perceptions are replaced by memory images, which are equally effective in exciting reaction. The mere thought of something disgusting may produce incipient nausea, stories of human suffering bring compassionate action, and so on.

The responses themselves are likewise modified in a variety of ways. They may be simplified or complicated, intensified or inhibited. Superfluous details are omitted, as when formal greetings are abbreviated; or secondary ones are added, as in the development of ritual. Especially important for social psychology is the inhibitory mode, since the life of society constantly involves an incalculable number of inhibitions. From the outset children have to be taught not to act in numerous ways to which their spontaneous nature inclines them. Over-eating, noisy disturbance, playing with dangerous tools, selfishness, prying curiosity, and the like, must be checked for the welfare of the individual himself or for the peace of mind of others. This may be accomplished either directly by prohibition and punishment, or indirectly through turning attention to safer matters. Pain and fear are of course nature's powerful inhibiters of response, but the same effect may often be better attained by creating new aims which withdraw interest and energy from what is un-

desirable. In either case the result is that an automatic tendency to suppress certain inclinations becomes ingrained in the psychophysical constitution of the individual.[2]

The fundamental modes of learning are thus the selection of appropriate responses and the elimination of inappropriate ones. But the process is more than selection and elimination. It ordinarily involves some degree of *integration*, or the combining of elementary units of behavior in a unitary synthesis. So muscular movements are combined in the acquisition of an act of skill, and items of verbal meaning are synthesized in the understanding of a sentence. In some cases integration takes place slowly, step by step, as each successive unit is added to the response. In others there seems to be a sudden unifying of the items of behavior or of intelligence, as when the student of a foreign language unexpectedly finds himself on a higher level of ability to comprehend its speech and to express his own thought in its phrases. Both physical and intellectual learning show this characteristic feature of relating separate details in a new unity of skill or insight. Such integration presents the principal psychological problem of learning. Does the process take place purely by chance, or through some mechanism of the nervous system, or is it due to some kind of purposive control? Whatever the psychological answer to this question, which we need not discuss here, the fact remains that learning often produces a new and

[2] It is to be noted, however, that in the case of strong emotional impulses resting on instinct, sheer suppression is difficult if not impossible. Some kind of active expression is requisite; the energy of the natural reaction must be discharged in behavior of some sort. Excessively repressed fear or grief leads to neurotic disorders. Baffled self-assertion turns to perverse obstinacy, or to a subtly self-assertive humility. It is especially desirable in such instances that inhibition should proceed from a positive effort in another direction, preferably a "sublimation" of the impulse into some idealistic form.

higher type of response. This means in the field of social phenomena new insights into complex social relationships, for example the working of an organization, and tactful leadership which harmonizes different interests.

Through repetition the newly acquired responses become *habits*. According to the prevalent theory, the synaptic connections between neurones are rendered more permeable by currents of nerve energy, so that the various bits of learning are continually settling in the organism. The result is increased facility of action and diminished consciousness of its detail. Habit is easy and pleasant; when we depart from habitual ways we are likely to feel uncomfortable.

The prevalence of habit in everyday individual and social life is obvious. Its momentum carries us along paths of inevitable routine, while it also constitutes the firm basis of volition. It determines our speech, our dress, our manners, so that we can hardly escape its subtle constraint. Day by day we weave fibers of habit into the fabric of character. In Professor James' metaphor it is "the enormous fly-wheel of society," the revolution of which gives stability to all our social machinery.[3] It fixes occupational classes and social stratifications. Spreading imitatively from one generation to the next it produces tradition and custom. The ways of elders are copied by childhood and youth, and take root quickly as habits which are passed on by example to successors. Morals are social habits, usually possessing a traditional flavor of religious sanctity, and comporting to a considerable extent with the evolutionary conditions of social life.[4]

[3] *Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 121, 122. The whole passage should be read.

[4] We may also note in this connection that habit shows a dangerous facility in making itself an end rather than a means. Thus the traits of neatness, industriousness, and thrift may become an insufferable tyranny, degenerating

The process of learning, in all of its fundamental modes of selection, inhibition, integration, and habit, is sometimes almost unconscious. Slight alterations of behavior take place automatically in response to environmental conditions, and "set" in the nervous system before we are aware of what has happened. Little improvements in social responsiveness, like improvements in skill in playing games, come as if by accident; and unfortunately the same is true of mistakes and defects. The reaction in any case produces synaptic changes which tend to facilitate repetition. In general, however, learning involves a considerable degree of consciousness, and in human beings it is predominantly purposive. Only as the learner grasps more or less clearly the *meaning* of the learned fact, or develops it in relation to an aim, does he really learn. Thus the process shades up to the most intricate operations of the intellect. One learns most effectively by penetrating study, by deliberate reflection, by methodical investigation and experiment.

We may therefore conveniently distinguish, as we have already done in Chapter II, three levels of learning, namely, a basic one of relatively mechanical nature, secondly, that of imitation, and thirdly, the process of reflective analysis and synthesis. In the first case the acquisition comes through experience, the meaning of which is barely perceived, but which nevertheless produces appropriate changes in the nervous system; in the

into a deadening mechanism, and obscuring the very aims to which they should be instrumental. Customs which originally had rational significance sometimes lose this and assume the status of social ends, as meaningless as they are imperative. Ways of government, of education, and of commerce come to be regarded as essentially unalterable, and demand servile obedience irrespective of their usefulness. The case is sometimes similar with religion, where a punctilious regularity of the formalities of worship is practised without any desire for spiritual communion or upbuilding. Graham Wallas, in discussing the social importance of habit, wisely repeats Plato's warning against cultivating it without "philosophy," *i.e.* without the tempering, modifying influence of reflective thought. (*The Great Society*, Chap. V.)

second it is due to the comprehension of an example which takes ideomotor effect; and in the third it results from mentally isolating the elements of a complex situation and re-synthesizing them by imagination in new relations which have bearing upon a practical difficulty or an intellectual problem. Thus a child learns to talk (1) by random babbling, which sets certain vocal articulations in the nervous system, (2) by imitating words used by other persons, and (3) by thoughtfully selecting particular words and putting them together in sentences. So too one may discover an automobile route by accident, or by following a guide, or by consulting a map. Very frequently an act of learning involves all three of these types of process at the same time.

General Conditions of Learning.—Efficient learning depends upon various conditions, among which we should note the following as especially important. (1) The basic one, of course, is the intelligence of the learner. Physiologically this signifies the number and character of nervous connections already established in the organism, either by original nature or by previous experience. All learning consists of reactions which are, so to speak, grafted on preëxisting connections. The latter may be the comparatively simple mechanism of sensori-motor response, or the more subtle and complex connections which underlie the intellectual, emotional, and volitional functions. (2) Peculiarly important also is the learner's *attitude* or direction of will in the matter. Much may be accomplished by appropriate methods of instruction, but in the last analysis the extent and depth of learning depends on the individual's interest and desire to learn. This may relate itself simply to a particular kind of fact or subject, or more generally to everything possessing intellectual significance. The scholarly mind is intellectually voracious

and omnivorous. (3) Learning depends on the vividness, the intensity, and the affective tone of the stimulus as given by the matter and method of instruction. Clearness and force of presentation take automatic effect. The matter to be learned may be either agreeable or disagreeable, but if it is the latter, the process of learning needs some powerful motive, such as the desire for an end toward which it is a means, or the fear-compulsion exercised by a disciplinary martinet, or love of a winning personality which inspires to effort. In general we learn most easily what pleases us, and from those whom we like, because these conditions are most favorable to attention. Fear sometimes plays an indispensable part in the process, however, since it tends reflexly to focus attention upon what is to be learned, and thus to produce sharpness of outline. (4) Learning should be *active*. Passivity in the process makes it superficial. In mankind, as in the lower animals, the motor mechanism is so fundamental for life that the comprehension and retention of experience depends upon the use of it. The reaction may be only that of speech, but in any case we grasp facts most readily by doing something in relation to them. Hence also repetition tends to deepen learning, and conversely the disuse or neglect of an acquisition means unlearning it. Regular practice gives the best results. (5) Satisfaction with the outcome of an act of learning somehow strengthens the nervous connections which underlie it, and the subsequent inclination toward it, whereas dissatisfaction acts as an inhibiter of later performance. Learning ought to be as pleasant as possible, in part easy, and when difficult rewarded by the consciousness of success. Failure, except where there is strong positive motivation, works to prevent later attainment.

The application of these principles in the field of social

education is perhaps sufficiently obvious. The whole history of social training, beginning with the practices of primitive peoples in imposing tribal customs upon youth, shows constantly the superior acquisitions and accomplishments of the intellectually gifted, the cogency of induced aims, especially the desire to be and do like the elders, the effectiveness of skillful instruction, of active practice and performance, and of rewards and punishments.

Social Conditioning.—The elementary modes and general conditions of learning just described enter into and help to constitute the process on all levels. Perhaps indeed the phenomena of the higher levels present only more or less complicated accumulations of the processes of the lowest one. In the following pages let us consider in some detail the psychological theory which would reduce all social behavior to certain basic elements and mechanical principles of development. Such theory is obviously in line with the aim and method of natural science, which always seeks to simplify explanation, and to understand phenomena in terms of elementary facts and universal laws. Contemporary psychology, with its concepts of reflex action and conditioning process, apparently has the requisite resources for accomplishing this scientific task in the field of social life. Just how does it propose to do this, and to what extent is the effort successful?

The most carefully formulated statement of the theory is that of Professor Allport.[5] According to it, the human being has six kinds of "prepotent reflex," namely, starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger movements, responses to stimulation of the sensitive zones of the body, and sex reactions. These are accompanied or reinforced by affective and emotional processes which

[5] *Social Psychology*, Chap. III.

give them power or "drive." They are modified in two general ways, (1) the extension of the range and complexity of stimuli capable of exciting the response, and (2) the refinement and specialization of the response itself. The original stimuli are not specifically social, but they become "conditioned," *i.e.* supplemented and replaced by a wide variety of distinctly social ones, especially language, to which response is made with an ever-increasing variety and complexity of modification. Since the success of such a conditioned reaction facilitates its repetition, and its failure tends to inhibit it, the individual constantly learns from experience how to meet new situations. Out of such experience also develops purpose, since memory becomes a conditioning stimulus which points toward possible action. Eventually the most deliberate forms of social behavior and the most complex social institutions result from the conditioned reflexes of the organism.

For example, reflex withdrawing leads to retreat from various kinds of dangerous or unpleasant situations, to the reactions of shame, and to much moral self-restraint. Rejection, which originates as a food response, is ultimately applied to dirt, to persons, and to ideas. Struggling becomes fighting, in all its innumerable single and collective forms, including not only personal combat and war, but litigation, commercial competition, and athletic sport. Hunger ever satisfies itself with new foods and drives humanity to the most elaborate devices of food production. Sensitive zone stimulations, *e.g.* of the cheeks and arm pits, are conditioned by the persons who pat or stroke or tickle, so that the pleasure or pain of the original stimulation becomes liking or disliking of associates, and of those who resemble them. Sex reactions, which are fundamentally responses to the stimuli of internal secretions, are related to other beings by conditioning processes

of social education, and give rise not only to procreation and the family, but also by idealistic sublimation to various forms of moral and artistic culture.

The more elaborate development of these processes takes place in mankind through the instrumentality of *thought*, which is essentially a subtle kind of behavior consisting especially of silent speech, representative and symbolic of objects not present to sense perception and of past or future action. The socialization of behavior is accomplished largely by thinking of its relation to other individuals and acting accordingly. The outcome of the whole process is a set of "habit systems," infinitely diverse and elaborate in detail, of which the most important are the following: "flight, escape, concealment, modesty, shyness, providing and wearing clothes, habitation, fighting, resentment, repulsion, cleanliness, rivalry, yielding, eating, drinking, food-getting activities, responses to tickling and amusement, aesthetic and play attitudes, chivalry, courtship, coyness, mating, caressing and fondling, maternal and paternal behavior, filial behavior and other family responses, manipulation, locomotion, developed vocalization, talking, reading, writing, curiosity, hunting, hoarding, constructing, imitating, domineering, self-assertion, submission, sympathetic behavior, response to approval and disapproval, learning of a trade or profession. These include the activities which are of major importance for the existence both of the individual and the social group. Being rooted in mechanisms which originally dominated in competition for final common paths, they retain as habits the domination of mature behavior. We may call them *prepotent habits*." [6] They are not instincts, but are distinctly products of learning.

The foregoing theory is captivating in its simplicity of

[6] Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 80.

outline and its obvious alignment with the general principles of science. Before accepting it as a final statement, however, let us note certain points of possible criticism.

We may pass lightly over the question whether the list of elementary reflexes is adequate. Perhaps others should be added, particularly vocalization; but this detail is relatively insignificant. Also the minimizing of the process of imitation, which has played so important a part in the historical development of social theory, may be disregarded since imitation, like thinking, may theoretically be reduced to the given explanatory terms. The main questions are: (1) Does mankind, like subhuman creatures, make unlearned responses more complicated than reflexes, responses already somewhat highly integrated, of which his subsequent life may be regarded as a development? (2) Does this development therefore follow selective lines which are somehow implicit in the organism by inborn nature? (3) Is the conditioning of responses itself subordinate to the principle of purposive control? (4) Is such purposiveness, in part, originally social?

An adequate discussion of these highly controversial questions is impossible here. The position taken in this book may be restated dogmatically as follows. There are in human beings certain inborn systems of nervous connection which are loosely organized. They are too complicated to be termed reflexes, and they have definite functional characters which run through their development. Reflexes of the "prepotent" sort are partial or limited expressions of these instincts, and learning conforms to their specific functional aims. It is true that social life is predominantly a product of education, but it is equally true that the process of learning follows innate social interests. Propensities to avoid danger, to disable enemies, to dominate, to submit, and so on, are our hu-

man as they are our animal inheritance. We learn in large measure both what to avoid and how to avoid it, how to command and when to yield, but this learning implies urges which are inborn. The very process of conditioning depends on and is accomplished through an interest which from the outset possesses some degree of preparatory and purposive organization. Some of these interests are distinctly social.[7]

Social Learning in Animals.—Animal behavior, for the most part, is aimed directly at food and shelter, escape from or destruction of enemies, the accomplishment of sexual union and parenthood, and the satisfaction of play. The various activities comprised in this summary are mainly expressions of instinctive nature, and are modified only to a slight extent by experience. Such modifications as occur take the form of habitual selection of feeding grounds and associates, habitual avoidance of danger, and primary modes of perceptual and motor integration in fighting, building, and other characteristic traits. In social situations the creature learns to pay attention to or to ignore those which cross its path, to attack a victim or to flee from a foe, and so on.

In certain of the higher species there is a considerable amount of coöperative construction, protection, play, and other social behavior, which is partially learned. The phenomena of animal training show not only acquired obedience to human command and response to subtle suggestion, but in some cases a remarkable development of intelligent coöperation. The performances of watch-dogs, and of hunting and shepherd dogs, are perhaps the most

[7] We cannot but admire the ingenuity and the logical consistency of Allport's account of the development of social habits from elementary reflexes. Yet we may question whether these reflexes are not incipient expressions of instinct, and whether the "prepotent habits" could be acquired so easily were it not for their innate factors of organized preparation and tendency.

conspicuous illustrations. The puppy which brings a stick for a playful tussle, or for a game of throw-and-catch, exhibits social learning. Apes in captivity sometimes develop an almost personal complexity and refinement of social relationships with their keepers and with one another. While their actions are fundamentally the expression of inborn nature, the precise form which they assume is due in some measure to experience.

The process of learning in animals follows mainly the mode of what is somewhat ineptly called "trial and error." More precisely, we may say that an animal makes responses which are random or mechanical rather than intelligent, but which result in satisfaction or pain. These results may be the natural consequences of the actions, or rewards and punishments administered by other creatures, including man. The association of the affective outcome with the recurrent impulse tends to repetition or inhibition of the action. In this way a rat learns the right way through a maze, a dog happens to find and thereafter uses the latch which releases it from an inclosure, any animal avoids the spot where it has been frightened, wild fowl flock to game refuges, many species may be trained to perform useful or amusing tricks. In all these cases the fundamental principle is the same: comfort and suffering, usually the outcome of automatic or haphazard reaction to stimuli, stamp their simple lessons into the nervous system, and the creature learns accordingly.[8]

[8] Innumerable laboratory experiments upon various species of animals have clarified the details of the process of learning, but since these experiments have been aimed almost exclusively at reactions to hunger and pain rather than to social situations, they have little direct significance for social psychology. Also, in drawing inferences about animal intelligence from the ordinary type of psychological experiment, we should bear in mind that a creature's responses in a laboratory may not afford a true picture of its behavior in its natural habitat. Undoubtedly in many cases the unfamiliar conditions accentuate the random character of its action. We need more studies of animal learning, especially that of the young, in the natural environment and in matters of its social life. These are of course very hard to obtain.

While it is generally true that the initial steps of animal learning are haphazard, and the meaning of what is learned is not understood apart from its pleasure-pain significance, we may note that the most intelligent species show something like analytic comprehension of social situations and purposes, in the light of which they make adjustments of behavior. Certainly this is characteristic of the more intelligent dogs, and of monkeys and apes which have come into the range of scientific observation. Thus a watch-dog will discriminate between a friend and a possible enemy of his master, and will act accordingly.[9] Various species practice what is obviously deception, feigning death or helplessness, or assuming sex attitudes, in order to distract attention from themselves, or their young, or the food which they proceed to steal. However much these performances may be attributed to instinct, we can hardly deny that they involve a measure of intelligent adaptation to particular conditions. The social life of most animals, however, shows only the most rudimentary forms of intelligence.

Social Learning in Mankind.—The reactions of a newborn infant can hardly be termed social. They are mostly visceral and vegetative, mere reflex responses to outer and inner stimulation. In a few weeks the baby begins to show unmistakable signs of social perception. It recognizes associates, evinces social desires, and manifests social reactions. It demands attention lustily, and displays angry resentment against restraint. Professor Watson tells us that the primitive emotions of babyhood are fear, rage, and love. These are originally excited by

[9] A friend of the writer punished his hunting dog, which had refused to retrieve under difficult conditions, by persistently ignoring it. Within a short time the dog, whenever its master appeared, rushed around excitedly, seized any loose object which it happened to find, and carried it to him. It had learned its lesson.

certain stimuli, especially loud noises, lack of physical support, the hampering of bodily movement, and the pleasant stimulation of the sensitive areas or "erogenous zones" of the body. They continually become attached to new objects, persons, and situations, and detached from old ones, "reconditioned and unconditioned," settling all the while as positive or negative social habits of childhood, youth, and maturity. Watson maintains that too much physical restraint of the natural movements of the infant, especially one of irritable nervous constitution, is likely to result in habitual social irritability and anger. Too much physical cuddling and petting tend to produce a disposition excessively inclined to sexuality. Early implanting of fear leads to lifelong timidity. Conversely, the proper treatment of infancy in these respects lays a solid foundation for happy social life.

An especially important phase of the socializing process is the increasingly intelligent and subtle perception of "social cues," *i.e.* facial expressions, gestures, words, which possess social significance. These cues become attached to reactions according to the general laws of associative conditioning, while the reactions themselves continually undergo modification, complication, and inhibition. The outcome is an infinitely elaborate system of communication-signs and responses which constitute a large part of daily life.

Particularly noteworthy, too, is the learning of self-restraint. From the outset the child naturally seeks to accomplish its desires without regard to their effect upon others, and expresses disappointment by angry cries. Consequently it has to learn a multitude of social "don'ts," "mustn'ts," and "can'ts," which are more or less requisite for social harmony. Since our civilization involves innumerable taboos and prohibitions of many sorts, the

individual needs to acquire early a basis of self-control in these matters. Annoyance of others, bad manners at the table, dangerous play, and the like have to be promptly checked. Occasionally it should be punished in order to establish the proper positive and negative responses in the nervous system. The profoundly puzzling questions when and how to punish children appropriately need not detain us here. The point to observe is that in any case social learning necessarily assumes a good many negative forms instrumental to later self-restraint.

Like other animals, the human species learns primarily through accidental pleasure and pain, and through random trial and error. Unlike them, it facilitates this process enormously by methods of imitation and reflective analysis. Something of the original random character remains in the use of these methods, however. Imitation is commonly a somewhat automatic response, and thinking is for the most part experimental. Mankind proceeds rather uncertainly, at best, in his modification of social arrangements. Nevertheless the mental functions of imitation and thought short-circuit the tedious delay of haphazard effort, and also reduce greatly its waste of energy and resources. Postponing the explicit examination of these functions to subsequent chapters, let us observe here their general bearing on the development of social order.

In the evolution of man beyond the lower orders of animal life, there appears a remarkable difference as regards the prolongation of the dependence of the young upon their elders. Whereas in most species of animals the period of immaturity is brief, human infancy is prolonged through childhood and youth to the extent of many years. Even after physiological maturity is attained, the individual ordinarily continues for several years in a relation of

social dependence within his family. This unique extension of babyhood has been evolved in order that he may learn the complex ways of society, and acquire the permanent, organized interests and habits which he needs for participation in the civilized life of mankind. Under present educational conditions the period often protracts itself to the age of twenty-five or even further, that the learner may complete his professional preparation for the future. The process is both formal and informal, the result of casual association as well as the routine of the school, and it involves not only intellectual development but an emotional and volitional organization of life. Physiologically it implies that the nervous system is attaining a complexity of systematic inner connections tremendously greater than that of any subhuman species. Socially it signifies the inculcation of moral sentiments and practices which differentiate man from the brutes.[10]

From the outset the child learns the ways of affection, sympathy, pity, protection, coöperation, obedience to authority, and respect for common interests. He learns these in varying degrees, to be sure, and never perfectly, but he learns them sufficiently to guide him in subsequent life. The lessons of experience in home and school imprint themselves more or less indelibly upon his mind. Day by day, year by year, he acquires the attitudes, points of view, valuations, and habits which will enable him to adapt himself to his social environment, and to meet new situations with intelligence instead of with blind struggle. In consequence of this biological differentiation, man has not only individual superiority to other animals, and an infinitely more complex social life, but also the possibility of further individual and social development.

[10] This is the phase of evolutionary theory which John Fiske termed "the meaning of infancy." See *The Destiny of Man*, p. 66.

Hence comes the potency of education as a solvent of social problems. Facing continually as we do the various maladjustments of society, the economic injustices, class conflicts, and international antagonisms, we see that the sole preventive for them is the proper instruction of childhood and youth. Social evils can be avoided by the inculcation of sound ideals and moral discipline. Whatever we desire to produce in society at large lies implicit in the prolonged period of dependence through which the human offspring passes. Children can be educated for democracy as well as for aristocracy, for cooperation as well as for competition. The social commonwealth which we regard as ideal is to be sought only along the highways of education.

While much social teaching has been crude and ill devised, it has been for the most part sound in principle and sufficient to impress important social truths and habits upon the younger generation. With the increasing complexity and plasticity of society, however, there has come increasing need of clear social aims and expert methods of instruction. The world-society of today shows a vital need of new social purposes and a more scientific practice of social education.

CHAPTER V

IMITATION AND SUGGESTION

The Imitative Level of Social Behavior.—Innate tendencies, as we have seen, range from simple, relatively unconscious activities of a reflex pattern, such as winking and sneezing, to complicated performances of hunting, fighting, breeding, constructing, and communicating. The former are the more mechanical, though they are subject to modification and may become consciously purposive. The latter are more variable. While they depend upon inborn impulse, the special form which they assume is due to environmental causes and training. How one responds to an anger-provoking stimulus depends not only upon innate pugnacity and habit, but upon example and precept, or upon reflective thought. Acquisitiveness begins by taking possession of anything which happens to catch the fancy; in time it comes to collect playthings, postage stamps, and pictures, to save money, and to follow well-defined economic paths of investment.

This variable direction of an instinctive drive is especially characteristic of mankind. Other animals act according to the inborn ways of their species, and learn only in a slight degree how to adapt themselves to circumstances. In human beings the course of evolution has produced "general intelligence," or the complex functional retention of past experience, and in consequence a highly differentiated and plastic mechanism of action. Insects do only a few things, though they do these by necessity and with precision. Man can do an infinite variety of

things, but he has to learn how. Hence humanity undergoes a prolonged period of education at home, in school, perhaps also in church and shop, and certainly in society at large, during which instinctive tendencies are subjected to control and take definite form in relation to their social environment. The result is a complexity of life found nowhere else among nature's creatures.

The intelligent direction of innate tendencies into particular channels of behavior follows certain principles which we may regard psychologically as constituting a distinctly higher level of social organization. Centrally important among them is the principle of *imitation*, which in its various manifestations serves to explain a large part of the social life of mankind. Primarily, imitation is behavior which consciously repeats or copies other behavior. As a cognitive function it consists of *intuitive perception* which apprehends in some degree the meaning of the imitated action, or the accompanying mental processes of the agent. In its affective aspect it appears as the *sympathy* which binds the members of society together as by a pervasive mental cement. The stimulation of imitative responses takes the form not only of explicit example, but often that of more subtle *suggestion*, such as a verbal or other hint which touches off a reaction-copy. These principles assume widely different particular forms, and apply to all sorts of deeds, emotions, and ideas. They are obviously more general than instincts; whereas the latter are somewhat specific, imitation and suggestion are infinitely variable in their operation.

The prevalence and power of imitative modes in society has long been apparent to reflective observers. "The main force which molds and fashions men in society as we now see it," says Bagehot, "is unconscious

imitation. . . . The more acknowledged causes, such as change of climate, alteration of political institutions, progress of science, act principally through this cause." [1] According to Tarde, the laws of imitation are to sociology "what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics." [2] The doctrines of these writers, extended and popularized by numerous followers, have until recently dominated the field of social psychology, and have been supplemented rather than replaced by later concepts of innate social tendency. Even McDougall, protagonist of instinct, observes that "imitation is the prime condition of all collective mental life." [3]

To some small extent imitation characterizes the life of animals. All sorts of flocks, herds, and swarms act in uniform ways, for example the group flight of birds, which proceed from a basis of instinct but are touched off by the perception of the behavior of leaders. Whether the training of the young involves imitative features of any considerable importance is doubtful, though it is possible that in some species certain fundamental reactions, such as running, flying, catching prey, and the like, are facilitated slightly by observation of example. It has been shown experimentally that the song of birds may be modified in this way, that is to say, by placing them when young among birds having a different song. On the other hand, the efforts of experimenters to show monkeys how to perform simple acts, such as using a hooked stick to reach food, are reported as having failed to take effect. Apparently imitation through sensory perception is extremely limited, perhaps mainly to the border line cases of vocalization and locomotion, and probably

[1] *Physics and Politics*, 1869, p. 97. [2] *Social Laws*, 1890, pp. 38, 39.
[3] *Social Psychology*, 1907, p. 326.

also in most instances to the example of the creature's own kind. In general animals lack sufficient intelligence to perceive the significance of the behavior of others. Their lives run in currents of instinct, modified by accidents of experience, and deepened by habit.

Human life, on the contrary, is thoroughly permeated by imitation. Thus children copy their parents and older children in the home, then their teachers and associates in school and the larger circles of daily life. Dress, personal adornment, forms of speech, reading, games, and so on, all are reflections of what is observed in others. We choose our food and drink by imitation, our churches and our doctors, our occupations and our recreations. Crime is largely imitative, especially in the young. Fads, fashions, crazes, run through society as fire sweeps over a prairie, with everybody doing the futile thing for no better reason than that "everybody's doing it." Conventional usages have their day of imitative acceptance, and quietly disappear because they are no longer done. Custom and tradition are more enduring; they may be regarded as the persistent imitation of the past. So pervasive are the operations of this principle that, as McDougall observes, if the children of two different peoples, as the French and the English, were exchanged in infancy and reared in each other's culture, their inborn capacities and tendencies would be shaped in accordance with this culture, and the latter would be continued substantially without change, though in a few generations the native stock would have vanished from the land.

As has often been remarked, imitation performs in society the double service of conservation and progress. On the one hand, it preserves the ways of the past and perpetuates what is valuable in culture. The distinguishing behavior of any people is mostly an accumulation of

custom and tradition; its education, commerce and politics, its art and science and religion, as well as its unorganized practices of daily life, are carried along mainly by imitation. The primary concern of most persons, leaders and followers in any matter of importance, is to maintain the *status quo*. On the other hand, it is the same function which seizes what is new, discards in its favor what is outgrown, and so enables civilization to advance. Human progress is primarily due to the inventions and discoveries of a few geniuses, whose better ways are eventually copied by society.

The Nature and Causes of Imitation.—The term imitation is commonly applied both to the copying of behavior and to the acceptance of ideas. In any case, it properly implies some degree of conscious apprehension of the significance of the imitated act or thought. Strictly speaking, there is no completely unconscious imitation, though often the apprehension of the example is so subconscious, and the reaction so instantaneous, that the imitator is hardly aware of what he is doing. In its simplest form it is illustrated by the responsive pucker of the mouth to a friendly smile, or the epidemic of coughing which occasionally takes place in an audience, acts which are hardly more than unconscious reflexes. Slightly above this level is the absent-minded glance at one's watch, or the equally automatic humming of a tune, which follows some casual bit of visual or auditory experience. Everyday observation of those with whom we are intimately associated continually produces slight imitative modifications of voice and manner, perhaps concurrently with deliberate divergencies in these respects. The mere perception of another's behavior seems to tend automatically, unless inhibited, to induce reproduction of it. We laugh or weep, effervesce or restrain

ourselves, after the manner of those whom we most frequently observe. From such simple and mechanical responses the processes of imitation shade up to the most reflective copying of the thoughts and ways of others.

There is at present among certain psychologists a critical tendency to reject imitativeness as an explanatory principle of behavior. Thus Allport says, "Psychologists today are fairly well agreed that the term imitation is little more than an inexact expression for the similarities observed in the behavior of different individuals." [4] The grounds for such rejection appear to be mainly two: first, the fact that the term comprises such a wide variety of special types that it lacks precisely distinctive meaning; and second, that any specific case can be analyzed into processes of conditioning.

In reply to these criticisms it may be said that all forms of imitation possess a common character which is essential, namely, the conscious perception of the example, followed by the similar behavior. This peculiar linkage of perception and response is a definite relation, however diversely exhibited in experience. With regard to the reduction of imitative actions to simple processes of reflex-conditioning, we should not lose sight of the signficance of the complex synthesis which is involved. Without doubt the elementary movements which constitute an imitative act are first made as reflexes. But when they are organized and touched off by the perception of an example, the response has a new generic character.[5]

[4] *Social Psychology*, p. 239.

[5] The thoughtful student of this matter will understand that the logical issue involved here is the familiar one of mechanism versus purposiveness. Are purposive reactions simply mechanistic compounds of simple elements, or are the latter the materials which are occasionally used in new combinations by an essentially purposive being? As this controversy is some thousands of years old, it is probably unwise to be very dogmatic on either side. Here I would merely remark that the mechanistic interpretation of behavior is, after all, largely an assumption. It is a paradoxical fact that the principle of absolute

Special importance attaches to the "circular" reaction, such as the baby's babbling, or repeated blows of a drumstick or hammer, or the rhythmic movements of dancing. These responses are rudimentary forms of self-imitation. The sound of the voice, the felt or seen stroke, the conscious movement of the limbs, are both the effects of effort and the stimuli of repetition. In this way the organism becomes habituated to the reaction, so that it responds the more readily to the example of someone else. Strictly speaking, we can imitate only those actions whose elements we have already acquired, or whose meaning we understand through our own experience. Yet our apprehension of the example raises the process above the level of mere reflex or habit to that of imitation.

Human imitation is ordinarily purposive; we intentionally copy the behavior of those around us, either in order to accomplish a particular aim or because the mode happens to please us. The highest development of the function is distinctly rational. Here the imitator grasps a purpose, reflects upon its value, considers methods of execution, and in general thinks his way along to the attainment of the end. The thoughtful choice of what to imitate and how to reach the goal constitutes both individual perfection and social progress. Yet the process, however rational, never entirely dispenses with the method of trial and error. Imitation is always more or less experimental, and is guided by results.

If we ask *why* human beings imitate one another, the answer is found along several different lines. It is hardly

mechanism is now being qualified in the very fields of science, namely, those of inorganic nature, where it formerly flourished. Along with all the regularity of the natural order, a pervasive character of indeterminiteness is being acknowledged, a fundamental variableness which is apparently irreducible to mechanistic terms. Why psychologists should accept mechanism as an absolutely valid principle at this time is a puzzling question.

satisfactory to attribute the fact to a single instinct, since it takes place in such infinitely various forms. As a matter of precision it is better to restrict the term "instinct" to more specific types of behavior. The imitative tendency frequently operates on the basis of some instinct, to which it gives particular form, as when one copies modes of fighting or building or hunting. And it is itself innate in the sense that according to the fundamental nature of the nervous system the perception of behavior, unless inhibited, leads through associatory and motor pathways to similar activity in the percipient. This is a phase of the general principle of ideomotor action, which may be regarded by reason of its universality as an inborn trait, though it should be differentiated from the more specific innate tendencies toward certain kinds of action.

Biologically the value of imitation is obvious. Not only is it a relatively easy and pleasurable kind of activity; on the whole it makes for safety and survival. In general it follows the example of the more mature, whose ways have become adjusted to the conditions of life. As was pointed out above, it carries along the steady practices of human life, while at the same time it is sufficiently plastic or variable to apprehend new modes of behavior and to facilitate adaptation to new conditions.

Imitativeness is further ingrained in individuals by the disposition of society to repress originality. The group does not usually like to have its members display much indifference to its traditional and characteristic ways. Novel behavior is reproved, by ridicule if it is harmless, by punishment if dangerous. The mere fact that an action is unusual tends to excite suspicion and disapprobation. Seldom do our associates fail to notice and criticize our conduct which differs from their own. This disposition

doubtless has its roots in a biological provision of nature, which secures group solidarity by outlawing centrifugal tendencies. How quickly we observe and deride idiosyncrasies of dress and speech! What a fault it is to be out of style or behind the times! With what seriousness the college insists that every freshman shall wear a green cap, and rebukes the student who fails to support its athletic and other social enterprises! This stereotyping of the individual is often absurd, and sometimes even harmful, yet it is an expression of a deeply rooted biological principle.

Intuition.—Imitation, strictly speaking, is the active copying of a perceived example. As such it involves the mental function of perception. In other words, it depends on the apprehension, in some degree, of the *meaning* of what is imitated. This apprehension is essentially the first step in the process, and may be regarded as intellectual imitation of a primary sort. The meaning may include the purpose of the act, or its causes, or simply its details, but in any case it gives direction and form to the imitative response. In the field with which we are concerned, *i.e.* that of social perception, the apprehension is so subtle and penetrating in its revelation of the mind of others that we may appropriately designate it by a special term, which in fact has often been applied to it, namely "intuition." At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that generically it is a form of perception.

Social reactions, not only of the imitative kind, but many other kinds as well, depend upon intuition. Consider, for example, how quickly we are aware whether a person agrees or disagrees with us. An infant learns, before it can talk, to interpret the expression of its mother's face, and to modify its behavior in the elementary ways of persistence and restraint. So, too, the parent divines the mind of a child, and the teacher that of the

pupil. Public speakers know what it is to sense the unexpressed approval or disapproval of an audience; a subtle something so intangible that it seems almost atmospheric makes itself felt. "Mind reading" is not the miraculous gift of a few; it is a performance which every one of us does all the time. A slight change of facial expression, inflection of voice, a hardly noticeable pause in speech, scores of such inconspicuous signs enable us to tell what is going on in the mind of the person observed.[6] Doctors and clergymen sometimes seem to have an uncanny power of reading these signs. Good salesmen can discern the thoughts of customers, politicians are sensitive to the opinions of their followers, administrators of human affairs in all fields are successful somewhat in proportion as they exercise their powers of intuition. Women are supposed to possess the faculty in higher degree than men, and undoubtedly do have quicker and better social perceptions in some respects, but the process is found in both sexes and in every walk in life.

Intuition has been regarded by some as a peculiar, almost supernatural faculty. As a matter of fact it is fundamentally like all perception, *i.e.* it is the interpretation of sensory stimuli. Its peculiarity lies in its quickness and subtlety. The puzzling question about it is, How does the perceiver discern the significance of the signs? Where does he get his interpretation, and how does he bring it to bear on the case so accurately? Perhaps the possession of appropriate social meanings, naturally attached to particular bits of behavior, is explained in part by heredity, so that we are innately gifted in some measure with the power of social intuition. But this power for the most part is certainly the product of environment and training.

[6] Dress may be suggestive in this respect. "I see thy pride," says Plato to Diogenes, "through the holes in thy cloak."

The "meaning" of a fact usually consists of past experiences, all that we have learned about it, subconsciously retained and brought to bear on subsequent presentations. So one learns what action-signs signify in their causes and consequences, and his learning often enables him to interpret instantly and accurately the meaning of observed behavior. Psychologists do not believe that the mind reader has any distinctly different faculty from those possessed by the rest of us. He has simply a more cultivated, and perhaps originally more sensitive, function of social perception.

The cultivation of intuitive power is manifestly important. Failure to recognize how our associates feel and think is the partial cause of immeasurable social friction. Discernment of their thoughts prevents antagonism and gives command of situations. To understand motives is often to forgive blunders. If we took more pains to see what lies behind the queer performance which we hastily condemn, we would usually be more inclined to take part in it, to help and direct rather than to oppose. Hence by forming the habit of paying attention to the meaning of behavior, one gains social influence. Intuition is cultivated by the reflective observance of significant behavior-signs, by withholding action until we have given our minds time to reproduce the essential content of the other person's mind. The attitude of inquiry about this content automatically induces the desired information. Of course it is possible to overdo such a habit, like other excellent practices, with resulting loss of spontaneity and the development of a reptilian subtlety which repels healthy human nature. Intuition is not identical with sympathy. One may understand a motive without sympathizing with it. The shrewd insight into surrounding mental conditions may be turned to evil account, and may become the

instrument of self-seeking. Nevertheless intuition is normally sympathetic. Most of us would profit, and ultimately society could be benefited, by improved intuitive ability.

Sympathy.—This term means literally "feeling with." In its narrower usage it denotes pity or tenderness toward suffering; more broadly it includes any emotion which the observer has in common with the observed. Thus there is not only sympathetic pain and sorrow, but also sympathetic joy, fear, anger, curiosity, hope, ambition, and the like. Any emotion may be communicated to others by expressive behavior, the perception of which tends automatically to reproduce its accompanying feeling in the percipient. Bodily movements, words, even a slight inflection of the voice or droop of the head, may suffice to set the psychophysical mechanism of sympathy in operation. The process is often so instantaneous and unreflective as to seem the work of instinct. The wide variety of its forms, however, prevents us from regarding it as a specific innate tendency, though it is possible that some of its simpler manifestations are inborn. In general it depends in some degree upon experience which supplies the meaning of the observed behavior.

The beginnings of sympathy are found far down in the scale of animal life, especially in group emotions such as fear and anger, and in maternal responsiveness to the behavior of the young. Its range here is limited to a few primary emotions, and to kindred. For the most part animals do not show the slightest sympathy with other species. Only a few of the more intelligent, especially dogs and apes, seem to exhibit any trace of sympathetic apprehension reaching beyond their own kind.

In human life the operation of sympathy is extended tremendously by comprehension of the meaning of what is

observed. This comprehension is of course due to experience. We are enabled to appreciate sympathetically the emotion of another person in a particular situation because we have been in that situation and have felt likewise. Thus children reflect the sympathy of their parents, and learn in their early group associations to interpret and respond to the behavior of others with appropriate feeling. In ever widening circles the principle of sympathetic response reaches outward far beyond the family and immediate social environment, and may ultimately embrace multitudes with whom one has not the slightest personal acquaintance. We may genuinely sympathize with sufferers from famine in a distant land, or with the aspirations of revolutionists seeking to overthrow a tyrannical government. On the other hand, one's sympathies may be suppressed by intelligence, or blunted by frequent experience. Increased communication floods us with the depiction of distress, and brings such overwhelming demands for sympathy, demands which we cannot possibly meet, that we inevitably tend to become calloused to them. The outcome is a selective sympathy, wide or narrow according to individual conditions. Persons differ, probably in their inborn capacity and certainly in the effects of experience, as to the range and intensity of their sympathetic emotions.

Sympathy is not essentially a moral trait. Indeed it may take seriously objectionable forms. In the first place it may follow an unhealthy direction, as the sharing of what is salacious. Second, it occasionally runs to excess in the attempt to give consolation. Children are sometimes injured by an exaggerated display of concern over their trivial misfortunes, which leads them to magnify these so that they lose sturdiness of character. Neurotic persons are apt to demand and to receive more com-

passion from friends than is good for them or than their troubles really deserve. Lack of sympathy is not infrequently the best treatment for many of us. Third, the mere feeling is not in itself praiseworthy; it should lead to appropriate action. Some individuals cultivate a mawkish sympathy with every bit of trouble or suffering which they happen to meet, or of which they remotely hear, but consistently fail to do anything about it. The emotion itself gives them a peculiar kind of satisfaction, as contemptible as it is futile.

But while sympathy is not essentially virtuous, and is susceptible of abuse, its supreme social value cannot be questioned. As many writers have observed, it is the cement which unifies a group. In the personal relationships of the home, in the school, the factory, and elsewhere, sound appreciation of the feelings of others is the basis of coöperation and correction of behavior. Teachers know that efficiency of instruction depends upon sympathy with the pupil quite as much as upon knowledge of subject-matter and pedagogical technique. What others do in response to our efforts to direct them is conditioned upon our understanding of their emotional attitudes, their conscious limitations, their striving and suffering. All government needs a sympathetic comprehension of the mind of the governed. Everywhere social harmony, justice, and progress are based on sympathy. The grievous troubles which afflict society—political tyranny, class prejudice, industrial antagonism—are largely due to the lack of it.

The fact that sympathy normally accompanies an intelligent understanding of its object suggests that the path of attainment of it in society is that of education. And this is true. The spread of learning, the development of science and organization, the extension of aesthetic

culture, carry the potency of harmonizing the social order. Yet they are insufficient in themselves; indeed it would almost seem, in the lurid light of the events of recent years, as though the unprecedented advance and dissemination of knowledge has been accompanied by a compensatory loss of human sympathy. Culture may be divisive, as the world has learned to its cost. If world-wide sympathy is to be attained—and this, by the way, is much more important than world-wide organization—the forces of education must be put in the service of a humanitarian idealism.

In conclusion let us note that we do not merely sympathize with others, or passively wait for them to sympathize with us. We actively seek sympathy. It is natural to desire that our associates enjoy what we enjoy, and sorrow with us in our misfortunes. Children display "active sympathy," as McDougall terms it, most conspicuously in their imperious demands upon the interest of their elders. We must perforce attend to their concerns, inspect and approve their labor, participate in their play, be pleased with what pleases them, and pour the balm of mental healing upon their bruises. But the same trait is found in all of us. How eagerly we report our successes to our friends, and look for consolation in our distress. Individuals differ greatly, it is true, in their manifestation of this trait. Some simply cannot suffer or be joyous alone; they have to spread the infection of their own feeling all around them.[7] Such evoking of sympathy is doubtless a form of egoism, but it has the important effect of producing altruistic feeling in others. It cultivates in society the common emotions which make life worth while.

[7] Barrie's young Scotchman comes to mind, who could not but tell everyone he met of his acceptance by the girl of his choice. "Janet will hae me!"

Suggestion.—The processes which we have just considered, namely, imitation, intuition, and sympathy, often take place in response to stimuli of an inconspicuous or marginal sort, mere touches of experience which produce reactions because they operate upon active psychophysical systems in the constitution of the individual. The example followed, the meaningful behavior which is intuitively comprehended and which stirs compassion, present themselves to consciousness in partial or fragmentary ways. Such a stimulus is called a *suggestion.* This term commonly signifies a hint, a somewhat subtle influence upon the observer's mind. A suggestion is ordinarily accepted without reflection, and takes effect because of its subconscious bearings. It works mechanically through the marginal region of consciousness, or in abnormal cases through some "dissociated" mental center, but always through some mechanism of the nervous system, and so gives rise to movement or belief. There are many special kinds of suggestion, but the distinguishing features of the process in any case are first, that the meaning of the stimulus is not explicit, and second, that its effectiveness depends upon some inborn or acquired tendency to reaction which involves this meaning.[8]

Many of the stimuli which affect our minds are in some degree suggestive; in fact the process proves upon examination to be prevalent throughout daily life. The following are typical illustrations. The panicky behavior of a few in a crowd automatically spreads panic among others

[8] Definitions of suggestion vary widely. Titchener defines it as "any stimulus, external or internal, accompanied or unaccompanied by consciousness, which touches off a determining tendency" (*A Textbook of Psychology*, p. 450). McDougall calls it "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance" (*Social Psychology*, 1907, p. 96). The point to be emphasized is that the process is essentially one of stimulating the mind's subconscious mechanism of belief or action.

by its suggestion of danger. We obey commands, partly perhaps because of habit, but also of a subconscious assurance that by doing so we avoid trouble. So also we grant a request because it suggests a need—or our own characteristic generosity. The example of the eminent is highly effective in stimulating latent faculties in the rest of us. When it was reported that the wife of the President of the United States liked a particular shade of blue, there followed an epidemic of blue dress goods throughout the length and breadth of the land. Clothing itself is sometimes suggestive, signifying age, sex, and occupation. Jokes owe their appeal to a half-concealed "point"; sarcasm stings us subtly with its painful meaning which is quite different from the literal significance of the words. How the suggestion of the religious altar differs from that of the theatrical stage! Advertising is a huge field of suggestion, since its devices cleverly turn our needs, or habits of thrift, or love of elegance, into channels of purchase. Thus the marketman decorates his display with red, white, and blue paper, and the maker of automobiles shows a picture of laughing children enjoying his kind of car, hoping thus to direct our inner forces of patriotism or domestic affection toward his goods. Last but not least, we cannot fail to observe the continuous and contumacious suggestions of war in which many newspapers wantonly indulge—items about arms and fleets and camps, about our national vulnerability and the dark designs of other governments, craftily calculated to stir emotions of fear and anger within us. In this as in other cases, the mind is too likely to accept the suggestion without adequate reason, and gradually to assume a bellicose attitude toward other nations. In all these and innumerable other instances, the suggestive fact brings to mind some idea or tendency to action not obviously or commonly or necessarily implied by it.

Everybody is more or less suggestible, especially with respect to recognized authority or prestige in any field. Hence the policeman, the judge, the clergyman, the doctor, the scientist, easily compel us to accept what they say. In so far as the mind is blank, either by fatigue or fear, or by lack of information, it tends to be impressed suggestively by whatever touches it. The tired man is less able to resist vicious allurement. During the great war, multitudes of persons were so terrified as to be an easy prey to the most absurd rumors. Propaganda succeeds because it reaches minds which are unprepared to meet it critically. Children are especially suggestible since their physical inferiority and ignorance make them yield to the authority of adults. On the other hand, both in children and in older people, we find that suggestion sometimes takes effect in just the opposite way from what was intended. This is the phenomenon of "counter-suggestibility" which conspicuously characterizes some "cranky" individuals, and occurs in all of us under certain conditions.

Hypnotism is the great field of abnormal suggestion, since its artificial enhancement of the authority of the hypnotist and suppression of the independent and critical mental processes of the subject afford the most favorable conditions for the production of phenomena. Accordingly the hypnotized person accepts almost any suggestion given to him, no matter how ludicrous his response may be. For example, he will impersonate a prima donna or imitate a locomotive, if the part is assigned, with faithful execution of details. Only when the suggestion runs counter to some deeply ingrained habit or lesson of early moral training, as in the case of crime, does he effectively resist it. Abnormal suggestibility is a matter of degrees, and shades imperceptibly away from the normal forms. Many

instances of unexpected performance, obviously irrational, are explained as due to the fact that the person was "half-hypnotized."

"Social suggestion" is simply individual suggestion repeated many times in a group, so that the single member receives and transmits it frequently. This occurs most conspicuously in crowds and assemblies, patriotic meetings, religious congregations, and the like. But the same phenomenon characterizes classes, occupational groups, and society at large. It ranges all the way from vague rumor or blind terror to the cold prejudice of a social caste. Organization limits and intensifies it, giving it a definite, authoritative form, as in the creeds of churches and the platforms of political parties. It is greatly facilitated by modern agencies of communication, particularly newspapers, but the casual word of mouth is quite sufficient to spread it effectively. Methodically directed, it too often becomes "propaganda," an insidious practice which has increased to alarming proportions in recent years. Social suggestion may be wisely guided, however, in the interests of humanity and progress. But wherever found, it depends on two fundamental conditions, the real or assumed prestige of its source, and the mental susceptibility of the "suggestee."

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL THOUGHT

The Social Function of Thought.—The highest level of social behavior is that of thought, or the guidance of action by reflection. Early theory of the origin and development of society regarded this as primarily a rational process. In its profoundest and most comprehensive form this theory conceived the social order, like the rest of the world order, as a product of divine reason, working unconsciously in the minds of animals, and coming to consciousness in mankind. Later rationalism, with less breadth and profundity but sharper point, maintained that human conduct is due to the calculation of pleasures and pains; that society results from the discovery that collective ways are on the whole happier than a solitary mode of life. Many forms of social behavior, as commonly observed, are sufficiently thoughtful to present grounds for such speculation; and the rationalistic account, while occasionally extravagant in its detailed explanation of particular matters, is not without a considerable measure of truth. In this chapter we want to ascertain how and to what extent social action is guided by thinking.

Let us consider some of the phenomena which illustrate the social function of thought. In the life of society, as in that of the individual, thinking takes place in relation to difficulties which call for readjustment and problems which demand solution. To begin with, the natural environment of group existence is full of obstacles to be overcome, dangers and discomforts to be averted, climatic,

geographical, and geological conditions which trouble society or even threaten it with dissolution if it does not meet and master them intelligently. Just now, in the region where this is written, for example, many minds are puzzling over the problem of obtaining a sufficient water supply to carry a parched countryside through its long dry season, and thus to maintain the huge agricultural development requisite for a rapidly growing population. Such needs, with their various ramifications in social life, call for individual and collective thinking having as its purpose the welfare of society.

Perhaps more incessant and threatening are the internal disturbances with which society must reason—conditions of disease, of poverty, of crime, of economic injustice, of political tyranny, of religious dissent.[1] Clashes of custom and the age-long conflict between new purpose and old habit, between the surging spirit of youth and the established practices of its elders, seek readjustment through the processes of thought. The pages of current literature bear witness to the constant effort to use reason in stabilizing and developing the social order. While it is doubtless true that most persons think about these matters only as their personal lives are affected, the collective total of such thought is enormous. And the tale of its problems is lengthened by the external conflicts of society, new culture contacts produced by travel and by literary communication, new conflicts due to economic, political, and religious penetration of other lands. Though compar-

[1] By way of specific illustration, note the current concern of society over the increase of crimes of violence in cities, the merits of individual candidates and the political issues which they represent, the interest of churches through their missions in the contemporary chaos in China, and similar questions which thrust themselves upon the thoughtful citizen. The first of these involves problems of the control of the sale of fire arms, registration of automobiles, limitations of legal defense on the part of those accused, appropriate methods of punishment, and so on, problems which can be solved only by the most painstaking study.

atively few individuals contribute much constructive thinking to the solution of social problems, and the rest simply follow in the wake of their reflection, all are directly or indirectly involved in the process. Even though the mass of society does little thinking that reaches beyond its immediate personal interests, nevertheless its sentiments, opinions, and prejudices must be taken into account.

Intelligence is nature's highest evolutionary attainment, its most effective device for maintaining and developing the welfare of living creatures; and accordingly the rational reflection of the most intelligent minds gives the best direction to society. In view of this truth, it is astonishing to observe the social resistance which reason meets in its effort to point out better methods of conducting social life. We should perhaps expect that a new idea would be welcomed, examined with sympathy and hope, perfected in detail, and utilized as promptly as possible. Instead of this, what we ordinarily see is that such an idea has to run a gauntlet of the most unsympathetic and unintelligent opposition. The proposal of it is promptly met with unreflective antagonism. Whatever merits it possesses are likely to be obscured in a fog of misunderstanding, and with the weight of numbers against it, hardy must it be to survive. Probably it is well that new entrants in the field of ideas, as in that of organic nature, should struggle for existence and prove their right to take part in human affairs; yet it is perplexing to note how blindly a deliberative body composed of intelligent persons will oppose suggestions of progress. Legislatures, college faculties, and church councils offer plenty of illustration. The student in a later day, receiving these ideas as a matter of course, and looking back down the perspective of years or centuries during which they have

validated themselves, wonders how intelligent men of an earlier time could have been so blind to what was obviously true. Prejudice and intolerance have played such a dominating part in the history of culture! Thought as well as action has its fixed habits, and these habits are sometimes very bad. Reasoning may be logical, and yet, because it starts from wrong premises, it may lead to untruth, and to social conflict. Religious authority has been especially given to condemning whatever did not agree with its own theological premises, because of the supreme importance of the individual and social issues supposedly at stake, but the same strange antagonism to new ideas is found in other social institutions. Perhaps, as we have said, it is well that novel conceptions should have to fight for recognition, since otherwise society would be the prey of every plausible whim. But certainly the pages of history are conspicuously filled with the names of great men who suffered for their originality of thought.

Fortunately the very opposition which independent thought encounters tends to provoke it to further effort. Disapproval, censorship, even persecution usually fail to suppress the new idea. Attempts at suppression merely serve to make the objectionable thinking more persistent and subtle. Ecclesiastical opposition to the doctrine of evolution did not succeed in blocking its onward march, and presumably the legislative proscription to which it is now being subjected in several states will prove equally futile. New concepts of social order infiltrate the public mind in spite of official condemnation, and even modify in some degree the opinions of the very persons who oppose them. How much governmental regulation of industry has come from legislators who were vociferously opposed to socialism! Whatever essential truth there is in a new idea demands recognition, and sooner or later

compels acceptance. So the conservative order gradually gives way, and society, often in spite of stupid, obstinate resistance, makes progress.[2]

General Characteristics of the Thought Process.—Introspectively considered, this process is composed of mental imagery and kinaesthetic sensations, especially those of speech, representing objects not present, situations which have passed, conditions not yet realized, implicit relations among things and persons and events. But thinking is more than mere representative imagery and motor tendency. Objectively regarded, it is a method of dealing with difficulties, obstacles, problems. It arises when the mind meets some dissatisfaction or baffle-ment upon which past experience can be brought to bear. Then it analyzes and relates the matter to ideas which give clarification or control. Thus it always has an aim or purpose, more or less clearly conceived; we do not pursue any course of thought for long unless there is a reason for doing so. With a problem in mind the thinker proceeds by a series of ideas having illuminative relation to it, and ends when some real or apparent solution is reached. The ideas come to mind according to the principles of association. Their conscious form is that of fragmentary images and slight muscular movements, sketchy bits of consciousness which serve to convey intelligent "meaning" with reference to the subject in question. This meaning or significant content of the idea is derived from experience, and functions more or less sub-

[2] Colleges and universities, as well as other social institutions offer excellent illustrations of the difficulty of promoting rational reform. Yet an observer looking back over a period of years sees the eventual triumph of many an idea which was emphatically rejected at its first presentation. Student election of subjects, modification of curricular requirements, discontinuance of compulsory attendance at religious worship, are examples. Moreover, changes which were accepted quickly and without critical condemnation often tended to produce administrative chaos. Intellectual struggle seems to be needed for social evolution.

consciously to guide the course of thought. Upon its fullness and relevancy depends success in thinking.

The essential function of the thought process is *judgment*, a subject-predicate relationship of some sort ascribed to the matter under consideration. We think by describing, by qualifying, by comparing, by evaluating, by imagining causes and effects. These relations are extensions or new applications of past experience. Our stock of ideas is a storehouse from which we take the items most useful for our purposes, and which we enlarge by this use. In its highest form thinking becomes *reasoning* or *inference*, the derivation of a fact from other facts, or more formally the extraction of a conclusion from its premises. In this process some particular detail of the matter is analytically singled out, its significance is perceived, and an inference is drawn from it. Reasoning always makes explicit or implicit use of general or abstract ideas. It finds something to be true because of its inclusion in a more comprehensive conception, that is to say, it proceeds *deductively* from given premises to their implications; or it takes the path of *induction*, examining the facts of experience in order to ascertain their general character, especially as items of cause and effect. The outcome in either case is an exact and systematic view of the subject, a view which puts facts in their proper places with reference to one another. This is *science*, the rational function of which is to ascertain the laws of nature, to explain facts in terms of these laws, and thereby to devise practical arrangements which work with the certainty of nature itself.

Thought is essentially instrumental. It tells us how to get what we desire rather than what the desire shall be. When it appears to establish objectives, to accept this or reject that aim, it does this only in the service of some

deeper tendency or interest, perhaps ultimately some instinct. Thinking about our purposes brings to light what we really want by virtue of our emotional and forceful nature. To quote Hume again, "Reason is the slave of the Passions." And in the same connection we should observe that thought, as Professor Dewey often reminds us, is experimental. That is to say, it consists in trying to find by imagination something which fits a felt need. Even its most orderly procedure, such as mathematical calculation, is the search for something unknown, the logical arrangement of ideas in order to see if they lead to the solution of a problem. Usually we think in a wayward, haphazard manner, trying this or that idea, following its direction or dismissing it in favor of some other according as it seems to serve our purpose or to amount to nothing.

The tendency to think is inborn. The human mind naturally functions in the way just described. Hence the process may be regarded as instinctive, in the broader usage of the term, though strictly speaking it is not a specific instinct according to the definition adopted in this book. It ranges all the way from mere casual imagery of persons and things, fancy and day-dream, to the rigorous methods of the mathematical sciences. Everybody thinks, but not many think very continuously or consistently. The random flow of associative imagery is pleasant, and the ordinary course of events calls for no painstaking reflection. Systematic reasoning, on the other hand, is hard work, and most of us are inclined to avoid it except as some imperative need forces it upon us. At best we do it rather ineptly. Most thinking is concerned with the minor matters of daily life, and consists in jumping at conclusions.

Stages of Development.—Thinking of a rudimentary kind probably takes place in the higher species of animals.

Their behavior for the most part is highly specialized and mechanized by instinct, and is modified only by the casual effects, pleasurable or painful, which tend to facilitate or to inhibit repetition of an act. They meet new and baffling conditions with random movements, blind, unthinking efforts to escape the difficulty. But occasionally, for example in the process of hunting, their action may be interpreted as involving representative imagery, and so approaching the function of thought. Perhaps the domestic dog and cat guide their wanderings likewise. Possibly the bird and animal leaders of flocks and herds perform some rudimentary thinking in directing migration or seeking seasonal feeding grounds. At best, however, this is limited to simple associative imagery with resultant ideomotor process.

Reasoning, in the proper meaning of the term, lies beyond their mental powers. The familiar stories of animal reasoning can hardly be credited by the psychologist who understands the nature of the function. When the facts are stated precisely, the occurrence can usually be explained more simply as the operation of instinct, or of mental association below the level of conscious inference. Köhler's experiments with apes produced instances in which the creatures appeared laboriously to analyze a situation and relate its elements in devising a new method of obtaining food, for example, by piling boxes on one another, but the process was always exceedingly elementary in comparison with human thinking. In general it is a safe assumption that the animal mind lacks the power deliberately to analyze and resynthesize, still more to abstract and compare, disregarding the irrelevant and fixing attention on the essential, so as to take the mental step of genuine inference. As Professor Jastrow remarks, if animals could reason effectively, they would

certainly not lead the stereotyped, blundering, and submissive lives which nature and man impose upon them.

Thinking appears early in the experience of the child, in fact before it can talk, in relation to food, toys, and associates. The varied incidents of daily life bring to mind what is needed, recall the past as bearing on the present, and thus engender self-guidance by reflection. The little one forms primary ideas or concepts of family, of playmates, of school, and other matters of practical import. The process is greatly facilitated by speech, since the word is a concrete embodiment or symbol of an idea, and serves as a center around which to gather an ever-increasing wealth of meaning. Children learn to think largely by talking. Conversation is a constant stimulus to the imagination. Education tends to regulate the function, and inculcates, though not so much as it might, the mental habit of orderly, systematic reflection. Tasks of observation and memory, appeals to the imagination, problems of everyday life, discussion and argument about common things, all help to develop the power of thought. The main purpose of education throughout its whole course ought to be increasingly that of teaching the child how to think.

The spontaneous thinking of childhood is of course full of uncriticized fancy and lacking in logic. Hence too often it is repressed by elders. Infantile speculation about things meets with ridicule, and venturesome cogitation concerning social matters encounters stern reproof. In consequence the small thinker learns to keep his thoughts to himself, or worse, to tread in unthinking ways of docile subservience. Even where he escapes this discouragement his thinking is too commonly frustrated by the willingness of adults to solve his problems for him. Altogether it is not surprising that in many cases he grows up without the ability or in-

clination to deal reflectively with the difficulties which confront him. He has been taught to respect the reasons of his elders rather than to evaluate them or to think independently.

It is because of such defective training as well as native inferiority of intelligence that many persons cannot perceive rational relationships or discriminate correctly between good and bad reasons. At bottom, however, individual differences in this respect are inborn. Simple tests sometimes reveal astonishing inability to grasp rational connections, an apparently hopeless incompetence in using the abstract ideas which are involved in reasoning.[3] Many minds work in characteristically sublogical and illogical ways; their attempts to explain or argue are always confused. Fortunately the practical wisdom requisite in life does not depend exclusively upon facility in abstract reasoning or verbal argument. "Good judgment" is a product of experience, and may be applied intuitively to new situations. One may know a fact without knowing just how or why he knows it, and may act successfully upon the basis of such knowledge. It was a wise piece of advice which was given to a young colonial administrator by a veteran in the service, "Announce your decisions, but not your reasons. Your decisions are likely to be right, but your reasons are equally likely to be wrong." In other words, thinking may be pragmatically sound without being strictly logical in its conscious form.

Whether logically minded or not, the individual ac-

[3] Common forms of test consist in asking which of several reasons for an assertion is the correct one, or which of several inferences from a given fact is sound. For example: Do we have a legislature because the people must be ruled, or because it insures truly representative government, or because there are too many persons to meet and make their own laws? Or, if Thomas is taller than Henry, is it true that Henry is taller than Thomas, or as tall as Thomas, or not as tall as Thomas? In fairness, however, one should perhaps add that verbal puzzles of this sort are sometimes more confusing than practical problems involving the same principles would be.

quires an equipment of social concepts which he continually applies. His estimate of his fellows, his understanding of his town and state and nation, his conception of what is just and honorable, his views on the social implications of his business and his religion, all serve to guide his everyday life. Most persons do not think very deeply, but they constantly use their rough and ready ideas to direct their steps in work and play and association with their fellow men. Always in the background of the mind, giving meaning to perceptions, are the concepts of individual nature and social relations which they have casually acquired. These concepts may be unformulated and inaccurate, hasty generalizations, wooden prejudices, fuzzy sentiments, but they are none the less vital in their relation to the problems of social experience. How much political action may ultimately depend on the idea of the English or the Japanese developed in the mind of an American child! Or upon his notion that certain studies are useless, or certain recreations improper, or that manual labor is degrading, or that religion is irrational.

Constructive thinking of an intellectual or practical sort, thinking which combines good judgment with logical reasoning, is the characteristic trait of leaders in all fields. Inventors, discoverers, statesmen, generals, as well as the great artists and scientists, all owe their preëminence in part to their ability to form ideas which reach effectively beyond the present situation. Progress in civilization originates in the mind of the genius, whose flashes of insight illuminate the path for the rest of society. The source and method of this insight are something of a mystery, but it always involves the process of thought, usually hard, persistent thought.

Perversions of Thought.—We cannot but observe that thinking, the function of which is to give right guidance,

has a habit of going wrong. Nature's most effective instrument for perfecting social relations often works in an astonishingly blundering manner. The tale of its misdirection is long and varied, running all the way from slight casual errors of memory and imagination to the delirium of fever and the crazy ratiocination of the insane mind. The life of mankind at all times has been highly charged with absurd ideas and erratic inferences. Wallas comments on the fact that anthropology shows among primitive peoples such ghastly performances due to reasoning, for example "the killing and eating of a well-loved king because Reason indicated that in that way alone could the strength of the tribe be preserved."[4] Unsound analogies and covert assumptions have destroyed the happiness and caused the death of multitudes, have slain the innocent and subjected countless victims to suffering and degradation. Politics, law, and religion offer innumerable illustrations of the human tendency to guide conduct by bad reasons. How pitilessly rational were the leaders of the French Revolution! What injustice is wrought by the shrewd abuse of legal technicalities! How fine-spun and yet how futile are many historic systems of theology! How cleverly superstition has always supported itself by argument, the fallacies of which have often been more easily felt than exposed!

We need not concern ourselves in detail with the abundance of historical and pathological evidence in this matter, nor with the various fallacies which are enumerated in textbooks on logic. There are two forms of bad thinking, however, the frequency of which in everyday life entitles them to special mention, namely, day-dreaming and "rationalization." The former is not necessarily per-

[4] *The Great Society*, p. 224. See also Professor Jastrow's chapter on "The Natural History of Analogy" in *Fact and Fable in Psychology*.

nicious, of course; it may indeed be exceedingly helpful. Society owes much to its dreamers whose thought escaped from the ruts of social life, and whose intuitive fancy depicted ways of social betterment. But the practice of day-dreaming is often a questionable withdrawal from reality, a somewhat weak refusal to face facts, and a worthless substitute for action. Even when it keeps clear of indecency and vindictiveness it merits condemnation as futile. Its characteristic forms of imaginary self-assertion, exaltation of one's social position, glorious triumphs without effort, and the like, only deepen the conscious inferiority from which they spring. Children occasionally acquire habits of this sort which seriously interfere with practical accomplishment. In older persons day-dreaming sometimes assumes pathological proportions unfitting them for the duties and requirements of social life.

The term "rationalization" is currently used to signify the fabrication of reasons, more or less unsound, to support and justify one's opinions and deeds.[5] Thus a child, asked why he committed some misdemeanor, can usually give a plausible excuse even though he did not think of it prior to the act. The inquisition naturally starts in his mind a process of rational association which serves the general purpose of argument. So every one of us has a stock of good intentions, philanthropic principles, and special considerations, with which we apologize for our weak or stupid or selfish behavior. We dawdle over our work because we are not feeling well, or fear to make mistakes in it. We refuse to contribute to a charity lest it demoralize the recipient. We say unpleasant things from a conscien-

[5] It is unfortunate that the verb "rationalize," which has had a quite different and much more respectable significance in the history of thought, should have acquired its present disreputable meaning. The current usage is so well established, however, that we can hardly avoid accepting it. But let us not forget that the word still properly means the intellectual act and process of rendering experience rationally intelligible.

tious desire to tell the truth; and remain silent when we hear someone calumniated because we do not want to stir up trouble. The hollowness of such excuses is usually apparent, yet we constantly make use of them in order to avoid social disapproval or to maintain self-respect. The rationalizer may even cultivate a fictitious sincerity in such matters by adducing moral principles in support of his position. Some "conscientious objectors" to military service are of this sort.

The rationalizing function is a response, be it noted, to social pressure. Mental pathology shows many instances of this truth which throw light upon the general problem of human motivation. Patients with nervous disorders sometimes give the most subtly absurd justification for their queer performances. The insane occasionally display baffling skill in accusative or defensive reasoning, and are uncannily clever in proving themselves the victims of persecution. Hypnotized subjects invent rational explanations of ridiculous acts done under hypnotic compulsion. Wherever a reason is demanded the mind instantly summons its argumentative resources and puts its behavior in the best possible light.

Rationalization as an effect of moral pressure is found on a larger scale in the pretense of philanthropy made by governments in apology for autocratic and tyrannical acts. Territorial greed is an extension of the blessings of civilization to less fortunate peoples. Military brutality is the necessary maintenance of order. Pecuniary wastefulness is beneficent liberality; and so on. Industrial injustice likewise extenuates itself by alleging economic necessity, freedom of contract, and refusal to submit to arbitrary dictation. The illusory fairness of the "open shop" and the professed ideals of union labor have occasionally served to gloss intolerable evils.

The roots of rationalization are found both in the inborn tendency to attain satisfaction by thinking, and also in the lessons of respect for reasons which are inculcated in childhood. The importance of argumentative support for assertions has been impressed upon us from our earliest years of social intercourse, hence we automatically resort to it when our behavior is called in question.

Individual and Collective Methods.—What is the most effective method of thinking about social problems? How may thought provide the best guidance for groups, which for the most part seem to be struggling or drifting along rather blindly, with much waste of time, effort, and happiness?

In answer we must acknowledge, first, that advance is initiated by individual thinkers, persons of extraordinary insight and reasoning power. These blaze the way forward, sometimes at great cost to themselves. In the last analysis a social problem is always solved by a particular student of it. Such a one analyzes it, grasps its essential details and difficulties, relates them to appropriate concepts, and by the exercise of superior imagination projects a solution. But of course this process is likely to be more or less inept or one-sided, to ignore relevant considerations, and to issue in ideas which cannot stand the social strain to which they will inevitably be subjected. Solitary thinking too easily falls into ruts, or becomes merely the amplification of prejudice. Few are the persons who can dispassionately revolve a social problem in their minds, viewing it from all angles, and evolve a socially satisfactory solution. Hence those who have responsibility for the guidance of society ordinarily make use of official or unofficial advisers whose counsel supplements or corrects their own cogitations. Executives in different fields wisely consult other persons before decid-

ing on a course of action. Political history shows somber figures who, through increasing distrust of those around them, tended more and more to depend solely upon their own reflection, only to learn that no matter how conscientious it might be, it failed to give satisfaction or to meet the needs of the time.[6] Others have succeeded largely because they guided their own thought by the suggestion of associates. It is generally true, however, that although the executive helps himself in this way, the ideas upon which he finally settles are his own.

While the more profound consideration of social questions takes place primarily in the minds of a few leaders, practical ideas are often best evolved in small groups. Legislatures, councils, faculties, boards of trustees and directors, and everywhere committees innumerable, all have the function of thinking collectively in the interest of a larger constituency. Proceeding by discussion and argument they excogitate working ideas of the matters entrusted to their care, presenting their various aspects, analyzing causes, formulating purposes and methods, estimating probable consequences. In this process the members of a deliberative body correct and supplement one another. Divided as they are by different interests, traditional views and acquired opinions, party loyalties, and the like, there is manifest need of such coöperation. A group of counsellors tends to exhaust the subject under consideration even though it exhausts itself in the effort. Assuming that it is properly constituted, its deliberation cannot go far wrong. The outcome is more likely to represent public opinion and to conduce to social welfare than the reflections of a single thinker.

On the other hand, let us not forget that the most original thought is solitary. Somehow the presence and

[6] President Wilson was perhaps of this type.

participation of others in a discussion exercises an inhibitive influence upon the more subtle processes of mental association. The interstimulation in a deliberative group increases the breadth rather than the depth of ideas; it tends to interfere with the more penetrating operations of the mind. The outcome may be practically adjusted to the conflicting needs of society, but it is often so affected by compromise that it fails to go to the heart of the matter, or to be permanently satisfactory. The most effective committee work is often that which perfects an idea engendered by solitary reflection.[7]

Least efficacious is the thinking of a large group, especially a public assembly. Here the consciousness of social environment, and the necessity of keeping pace with the procedure of the meeting, almost inevitably interfere with the reasoning function of the mind. Hence good judgment, exact discrimination, and fair evaluation are largely lacking. Precision of inference yields to persuasiveness and the feeling of social pressure. Since the average person is convinced by emotional appeal quite as much as by rational argument, and since uncritical prejudice may often be cleverly bent in a desired direction, the large assembly is the appropriate field for the oratorical demagogue. Speakers seek to sway the emotions rather than to convince the reason, to secure majority approval rather than to clarify the truth. Human beings are by nature so submissive to numbers and responsive to speech that the critical powers of the mind are at a disadvantage under crowd

[7] It has been shown experimentally that a group which devotes itself coöperatively to certain kinds of thought-task accomplishes more than even the best individuals in the group. (See, for example, G. B. Watson, "Do Groups Think More Efficiently Than Individuals?" *Jour. of Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Oct.–Dec., 1928.) This is especially true when the rational operations run on a relatively low level of association, as in word-building. Where the task involves penetrating insight and abstract reasoning the group environment often tends to interfere with individual efficiency. (Cf. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 262–278.) Individuals differ in this respect however.

conditions. Even the more intelligent listeners sometimes find that arguments which impressed them in public address lose their cogency upon a little subsequent reflection.

The public assembly has an important function, however, namely, that of controlling the thinking of its leaders. Though it seldom originates any ideas of much significance, it nevertheless expresses the sentiments to which social thought must be adjusted. It thinks best when it votes on proposals which have been formulated by competent committees.

Social Science.—The ordinary process of guiding social affairs is somewhat haphazard. It is more or less thoughtful, but it lacks clear objectives and systematic method; it endeavors rather to meet present exigencies than to attain ultimate ends. As practised on a huge scale in the political development of the British Empire it has been called "muddling through," and the term aptly describes the process of social direction in lesser matters. At its best it is quite effective. It may not only have the highest of motives, but it may be characterized by a good deal of perspicacity, sympathy, and tact. When perplexing problems present themselves, and the remoter goal is not clearly seen, the best one can do is to take one reasonable step at a time in the direction which seems safest. Mistakes will be made, of course, but they will be the more easily remedied than where they are parts of extensive plans. So, little by little, with perhaps an occasional false step and certainly with much inconsistency of action, the social order will forge ahead. Human wisdom will doubtless never completely outgrow this method.

At the same time we cannot but recognize the need of a more distinctly scientific guidance of society. Let us consider what this means. Is there any good reason why

many of our social problems, for example those of taxation, of crime, and of poverty, should not be dealt with as are the medical problems of disease or the engineering problems of irrigation? Why should not society put its difficulties into the hands of experts, scientifically rather than politically trained, to analyze and solve for the good of the whole social body? Plato conceived something like this thousands of years ago, and many reflective students of society since his time have more or less clearly imagined it. The question becomes especially acute at the present time when society has so thoroughly outgrown its traditional guidance and finds itself perplexed and helpless.

As Dewey has pointed out, the one unquestionable general advance which civilization has made in the last century is that of natural science, especially in its experimental aspects. We may distrust the development of politics, of religion, of art, but nobody who knows what laboratory science has accomplished can look upon it with similar distrust. On the other hand, the outstanding and lamentable failures which we constantly face are those of the social order. Why not, then, subject social questions to the spirit and method of natural science? Let it use its intellectual resources, its statistical measures and experimental practice, in discovering the causes of social maladjustment and formulating remedies. Let it deal with suffering and injustice as the physicist and the biologist deal with problems in their fields. Just as the mysteries of animate and inanimate nature are clarified, as the natural obstacles of mankind are overcome, as the processes of natural selection of plants and animals are perfected through artificial selection, as epidemics are prevented and disease is eliminated, so the more distinctly social problems of contemporary life may conceivably be solved,

and the evolution of society greatly advanced. In such rational treatment lies the greatest hope and promise for the future.

This thought is peculiarly important, as Dewey shows, in relation to the contemporary development of democracy. If the latter is not to lapse into government by mediocrity, tending toward covert tyranny or chaos, but is to become a dominant feature of social evolution, it must make use of the best intelligence at its disposal. Experts it must use, or perish. And this implies that education must be adapted to train the citizen to appreciate the value of scientific method and to accept its guidance in the affairs of his social life. He must be educated to think scientifically for himself, so far as his natural ability permits, and beyond his own limitations to entrust his interests to those who are scientifically more competent. Social science, now unfortunately so restricted and academic a pursuit, must become the ingrained political habit of society.

That there are serious obstacles in the way of this rational idealism cannot be denied. We must acknowledge the undeveloped condition of the social sciences, their lack of certainty comparable to that of the natural sciences, the disagreement of authorities, and the resulting difficulty of finding reliable guidance. Society, too, is essentially conservative, it distrusts new ideas and new methods, and often extends this distrust to the "theorist," no matter how learned he may be. It is unwilling to have its familiar ways disturbed, and prefers to continue practices which are admittedly unsatisfactory rather than to try others. Also it looks with disfavor upon the application of experimental method to human problems. The material for experimentation in other sciences is of negligible value, but human life and happiness are not, and

to treat them experimentally seems ruthless.[8] Most persons, not having been trained in scientific method, doubtless want the immediate assurance of a law rather than the confessed uncertainty of an experiment. Altogether, the requisite point of view on the part of the public and the scientific means of accomplishment are not easily attained.

These difficulties are not insuperable. The existing vague and chaotic mass of social science is gradually gaining precision and systematic certainty, so that its laws may be effectively applied by those who understand them. Society may conceivably be educated to respect science in this field as in others, and to make further use of the method by which it has already made great contributions to human culture. In order to bring society to this point of view, however, there must be extensive and radical changes in our educational system.

In concluding this subject, let us observe again that thought determines the means rather than the ends of action. It tells us how to accomplish our aims rather than what these aims shall be. This is true of social as of individual thinking. Accordingly the resources of science may be employed indifferently by aristocracy and by democracy, by autocrats and by liberals. Both may use it to obtain ends which are in themselves quite opposed. In the social conflict which is constantly going on, neither side can afford to neglect the instrumentality of scientific thought. We have long been accustomed to think that the evolutionary process will take care of human society, but we have not so clearly perceived that the rate and

[8] Arrowsmith, in Sinclair Lewis' novel, faced this difficulty when he proposed to withhold his newly discovered serum from a part of the plague-stricken population. Scientific method called for just this discrimination, yet to some of his associates it seemed barbarous to deliberately let helpless victims die when their lives might possibly be saved.

success of its operation will depend in some degree upon the contribution of human intelligence to the process. Possibly also its ultimate direction is not predetermined, and the question whether the social outcome shall be democratic or aristocratic will depend upon which tendency makes the more thorough use of social science.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL MOTIVES

The Nature of Motivation.—We have now considered the various types of mental process which produce the special forms of society. At bottom, nature provides for social arrangements by inborn systematic connections of neurones which function automatically, with a minimum of consciousness. On this basis there develop modifications of social behavior, first by the accidents of experience, subsequently by increasing application of conscious intelligence. The processes of learning, by which reflexes and instincts are adapted to the special conditions of environment and individual need, range upward through various forms of automatic and deliberate imitation to the most complicated reasonings about causes and effects, values, and ideals. Thus by degrees vague feelings and blind drives become appreciative intelligence and purposive intent.

It is evident, however, that the preceding account does not fully answer the question, *Why* does the individual behave in social ways? Instinct, imitation, and reflection produce the forms of behavior, but they do not tell us just why the behavior takes place. Their operation depends upon some underlying and pervading *motivation*. Just what is the nature of this source of action which initiates instinctive and imitative impulses, and which reason seeks to satisfy?

The inquiry as to the essential nature of motivation may be answered by saying (1) that it is found in a

preparatory idea of the end to be attained by the act; or (2) in some prospective satisfaction attaching to the end, or pleasure in the act itself, or discomfort in the agent's present condition; or (3) that action is itself an ultimate fact—that there are original *urges* which constitute life. The persistence of these three answers in the history of thought probably signifies that each of them contains some truth. Motives, we may presuppose, are essentially dynamic, are more or less intelligent, and are affectively toned. There is therefore ground for saying that all action originates in mental processes which are characterized both by aims and by pleasant or unpleasant feeling. In so far as behavior rises above the level of purely mechanical reaction to physical stimuli it proceeds from affective states of mind relating to the object aimed at, or the effort to reach it, or existing conditions. Pain, discomfort, dissatisfaction, dislike are negative aspects of this truth, while contentment, approval, and anticipated satisfaction are positive phases. Whenever we are uncomfortable, physically or mentally ill at ease, we seek to relieve ourselves. Whatever we desire stimulates within us an unrest for which it offers a relief.[1]

In order to avoid some traditional objections to the foregoing view, let us observe the following qualifications of it. (1) The motivating feeling and idea which

[1] Those who dissent from this view tell us that action is explained fundamentally by the essential urges or desires of life. These may be regarded as instinctive or as acquired drives, but they are not constituted by feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness, which are accessory rather than indispensable features of them. The position taken above is that such drives or desires are essentially characterized by discomfort or dissatisfaction with the present, and by a prospect of relief or satisfaction in the attainment of the end. From the outset life is made up of experiences of escape from pain, and striving for enjoyment, aiming more or less intelligently at certain goals, but always feeling some degree of pleasure or displeasure. We may readily accept the theory that life is essentially dynamic, adding only that we always seem to find in the urgency of action at least a slight tinge of affection. The more habitual an action becomes, the less clearly it displays this affective character. Checking an urge ordinarily intensifies its affective tone.

give rise to an act are often subconscious. They may work as the vaguest kind of discomfort or anticipated relief, or may be so completely dissociated from the normal stream of conscious processes that one is not aware of them at all. (2) The position does not signify that one has to have a conscious aim at "pleasure" before he can act. Present discomfort is often the main factor; under such conditions one reacts automatically toward an end without necessarily discerning any agreeableness in it. (3) This is not a low characterization of human nature. Refined, idealistic pursuits are included in it, as well as the more distinctly animal satisfactions. (4) Neither is it an accusation of essential selfishness. Social satisfactions of a sympathetic sort are among the very strongest motives. (5) The theory is simply a psychological account of mental motivation, not a substitute for the physical explanation of muscular movement, nor an ethical theory of conduct. These problems it leaves entirely open.

Recent psychology, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, has laid increased emphasis upon the subconscious nature of motivation. It has always been recognized, of course, that vague feelings and unclear aims take important effect in conduct, and that the real reasons for an action are often dimly felt rather than clearly apprehended. Pathological cases brought to light the fact that desires lying quite outside the scope of normal awareness may yet be the determining causes of behavior. Further study has shown us that to a considerable extent the same principle applies to normal life, and especially to social relations. The aims and affective reactions of our psycho-physical nature are often submerged deeply below the surface of conscious life. One feels an irresistible urge, or an inexplicable antipathy, the ultimate basis of

which is the subconscious persistence of some strongly affective experience, perhaps of the remote past. Whether this should be regarded as a condition of the nervous system or as part of an "unconscious mind" we need not inquire here. The truth in either case is that the motivation of behavior is subconscious.

Our presupposition in what follows, then, is that social behavior always has a basic motivation which is at the same time dynamic, cognitive, or ideational, and affectively toned, though these characteristics vary greatly in degree. Such motivation gives rise to impulsive action and underlies the formation of habit. It also provides an explanation of the more complex pursuits of life, and especially of the development of human society. The latter, to put the matter simply, is what men and women individually and collectively like to make it. Let us particularly observe that the systematic structure of society represents an accumulation of what has been taken by the group as most, even though imperfectly, satisfactory. In the large as in the small affairs of social life, the motives of action are found in more or less systematic likes and dislikes which are due in part to original nature and in part to education.

Social Sentiments.—The mental functions which we have been considering might conceivably work in a casual way, without continuity or consistency, and might produce quite discrepant effects at different times. If such were the case, an individual would act now fearfully and now fearlessly, would be both cruel and compassionate, would imitate and counter-imitate, would indulge impulse and practise deliberation, all in a random and incalculable manner. In some degree this sort of chaos actually appears in the social life around us, and if not excessive it imparts interest and the charm of novelty

to experience. On the whole, however, we find social life orderly and consistent. The order may be unsatisfactory and the consistency exasperating, but at least we know about what to expect of individuals and groups under given conditions. Any society, from the herd, the family, and the simple friendship, to the huge city, the state, and the nation, shows not only a variety of active relationships but a *steadiness* of behavior. Instead of a flux of emotional responses, we observe a good deal of regularity.

This orderliness of social life is of course largely a matter of habit. But its basis is not mere habit, and it involves and depends upon systematic modes of mental functioning which we need to examine more thoroughly. It signifies that the individual reacts in the same way to different objects, and in different ways to the same object, yet always with more or less consistency, or identity of underlying principle. Such pervasive principles may often be designated as mood, disposition, temperament, and character. These however involve a more abstract and fundamental concept, namely, that of "sentiment." This concept has gained psychological currency of late, and it throws much light on the phenomena of society.[2]

A sentiment, in the current psychological use of the term, is a set of mental functions—ideas, feelings, and tendencies to action, all related consistently to some object and to one another. In other words, it is an organized system of mental reactions, somewhat complex and permanent, with a particular thing or person or idea, or a group or class of objects, as the center of the system. It involves several and perhaps many ways of looking

[2] For a more extensive statement of the bearing of the concept upon social psychology, see McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Chaps. V–VIII.

at and dealing with its central object, but on the whole they are harmonious ways. Perhaps the most familiar illustration is the maternal sentiment which centers in and develops around the child. It shows a wide variety of affectionate, fearful, protective, corrective, and other manifestations. Its various expressions are not only appropriate to special conditions, they are consistent and mutually supplementary in the rearing of the child. Similarly the patriotic sentiment involves pride, pugnacity, obedience, coöperation, and the like. Chivalry, professional idealism, devotion to art, to science, and to religion, offer further illustrations. In any such case we find a set of varied reactions, spontaneous or habitual, possessing a definite unity.[3]

In their intellectual aspect sentiments consist of ideas and give rise to judgments. They are essentially affective, however, and always express approval or disapproval of their objects. Their basis in the nervous system is presumably an intricate elaboration of synaptic connections between groups of neurones, relating the glandular and muscular processes which underlie the affective and emotional reactions. Expression of them tends to take the form of habit. But they are not mere habit mechanisms, touched off by a sensory or other stimulus. They constitute perceptions of the *meaning* of situations, and so must be regarded as modes of intelligence. Thus the sentiment of courtesy to strangers leads us to pause and proffer assistance to an automobilist in trouble by the roadside; and the chivalric sentiment causes the voter to vote for a minimum wage for women. In such cases in-

[3] The terms sentiment and sentimental frequently have in common usage the connotation of superficiality of emotion, which is not a feature of the psychological definition. Common parlance is nearer to the latter when it employs the term sentiment to indicate judgments of approval or disapproval, as when one says, "Those are my sentiments."

stinct may provide the general direction and the drive, but the precise form of expression is due to more or less intelligent comprehension of the matter, based on previous experience. Sentiments accordingly afford ways of dealing with new situations in the light of their apprehended meaning. They are motivating sources of behavior.

These organized mental systems function to a great extent below the threshold of awareness. They supply the energetic motives of volition, but often keep them so obscure that we can hardly discern their precise nature. Sometimes only an irresistible impulse or a blind feeling of self-restraint indicates their operation. In general they are "marginal" functions. The self-respect which effectually prevents one from doing something disgraceful need not appear explicitly in consciousness. Parental love produces daily an abundance of devoted service quite without reflection. So too the sentiment of artistic workmanship may express itself in the most careful attention to detail but without conscious formulation of its own idealism. Patriotism in its best form votes and pays taxes with no wordy declarations about itself. The individual does these things not because he stops to consider his position or ideals as parent or artist or citizen, and certainly not as mere automatic habit. The performance is more than such mechanism, yet its motivation does not rise above the threshold.[4]

The power of subconscious sentiments reveals itself most interestingly in those inner conflicts which rend the happiness of life to shreds, and sometimes lead to tragedy. When, for example, a new love encroaches upon an old

[4] Observe also the familiar fact that when we try to elicit from others, or even from ourselves, the reasons for an act, it frequently happens that they elude us, and that secondary or even untrue ones present themselves persistently before the real ones come to light. The evasion or falsification is not intentional. The fact is that the actual motives often lie largely beyond the region of clear introspection.

one which yet refuses to give way, or when fresh religious insight finds itself opposed to family tradition, or when some ardent desire runs counter to the deeply rooted teaching of childhood, or when the memory of a painful or shameful occurrence lives on beneath the surface of experience without being reflectively integrated in the personality, we observe as a result the most poignant distress or perhaps some puzzling quirk of behavior. The diverse interests conduct a subconscious battle. The forces of conflicting sentiments are pitted against each other in the dark. The motives which are regarded as wrong are resolutely suppressed, but decline to yield, and seek new indirect or symbolic modes of expression. In extreme cases they become quite detached from the rest of the mind, so that one is completely unconscious of them, while continuing to release themselves in odd and unintelligible actions. Thus a sudden stroke of hysterical blindness may signify a covert unwillingness to see a disagreeable fact. Recurrent nausea may be due not merely to undigested food, but to an undigested experience, of which the self is in this way symbolically evacuated. At their worst such cases need expert psychoanalysis and therapeutic treatment. Ordinarily the conflict is consciously settled by some mental adjustment which is sufficient for the requirements of life.

Manifestations of Sentiment.—Let us look in some detail at the various ways in which sentiments manifest themselves in everyday life. One is their influence upon judgment. That opinions are colored by feelings, that even intellectual considerations fall in line with prejudices, are everyday truths which psychology confirms. Whether a thing is called beautiful or ugly, whether a new idea is regarded as true or false, depends upon the sentiments of the individual making the pronouncement. Likes and

dislikes of books, of art, of people, issue from a well-established background of sentiment. If any object comes within the range of such a sentiment, as when a person of cultivated aesthetic taste looks at a picture, or a politically minded reader notes a bit of new legislation, approval or disapproval follows promptly. Novel scientific theories—those of biological selection and physical relativity are prominent illustrations—have been received by well-trained scientists with jangling voices. The utterances of judges in court with regard to cases involving communistic and anarchistic views present striking differences which can be explained only on the basis of varying political and economic sentiments, matters which run deeper than judicial training. Similarly striking variations of judicial pronouncement concerning the principle of alimony may be attributed to underlying differences in the sentiment of chivalry. The numerous instances of Supreme Court decisions by a five-four majority leave no doubt as to the operation of something beside the strictly intellectual apprehension of facts and principles.[5]

Further, we find that sentiments determine *attitudes*. These are modes of emotional regard for objects, and motor "sets" or slight, tentative reactions toward them.

[5] A most interesting illustration of this general truth is found in the astonishing conflict of opinion concerning the fairness of a recent murder-trial. The accused men, who were of foreign birth, held radical political theories, a fact which was repeatedly emphasized during the trial and the subsequent proceedings. The case attracted world-wide attention, and elicited expressions of profound disagreement not only among the laity, including distinguished teachers, clergymen, editors, and other leaders in various walks of life, but also the legal profession. Two eminent professors of law, members of leading law faculties, published reviews of the case which were in diametric opposition. The position and character of the spokesmen on each side were sufficient guarantees of intelligence and sincerity, hence we must infer that their respective conclusions were due in some degree to differing sentiments with regard to radicalism, freedom of speech, legal technicalities, the reliability of court procedure, and so on. The men were convicted and finally executed, by processes which many intelligent observers approved as properly sustaining the dignity of the court and the state, but which many others, equally intelligent, will always look upon with sadness and horror as deliberate judicial murder.

An attitude of curiosity, of credulity, of obstinacy, of helpfulness, of approval, or of indignation is explained physiologically as due to systematic cortical connections, somewhat inclusive in their scope, partly energized and ready to function in overt behavior. Outwardly they may take the form of a mere look, inflection of voice, posture, and gesture. Such attitudes often arise from underlying mental conditions which are deeply rooted and comprehensive. They are external and visible yet bafflingly subtle signs of profoundly important mental traits. The sentiments which produce them are felt intuitively, but because they do not take more complete expression they escape formal recognition. Social attitudes are sometimes the hardest conditions to deal with, in that, while they do not pass fully into action, they have sufficient depth and force to constitute significant behavior. An attitude of distrust, of insubordination, of superciliousness or condescension may, without becoming a flagrant offense, yet create an insuperable social difficulty. Mutual attitudes of dislike and suspicion between teachers and pupils, or of tyranny and rebelliousness between employers and employees, make coöperation impossible.[6] The marital disharmony which produces divorce is quite as much a matter of intolerable attitudes as of legally culpable actions. Attitudes of suspicion and belligerency on the part of governments present more difficult political problems than do breaches of international law.

"Social prejudices" are sentiments of sympathy with or antagonism toward individuals and groups, sentiments

[6] Attitudes between closely associated individuals, for example brothers and sisters or husbands and wives, are often such as to make it almost impossible for one to *teach* the other anything. Since the normal relationship is one of equality, pride automatically rebels against taking a position of apparent inferiority.

formed uncritically and issuing in specific attitudes. Race, national, and class prejudices are important illustrations. Such sentiments are products of special kinds of cultural environment, and are acquired by casual imitation and instruction. They tend to operate without reflection, to ignore facts, to repel correct information, and to oppose blindly whatever runs counter to their own emotional bias. Some of our most difficult social problems are due to them. They are often rooted so deeply as to be quite beyond the reach of argument, or possibility of extirpation. Thus it was found by a university instructor in a course on social relations, a course expressly designed to replace racial and nationalistic prejudice with scientific information, that though the students passed the examinations satisfactorily, they retained to a great extent their original sentiments. These had been formed in early childhood from casual experiences with individuals of other peoples, and remained in the depths of the mind, untouched by intellectual illumination.

Finally, sentiments constitute the motives of voluntary actions. Every volition, whether spasmodic and unreflective or thoughtful and persistent, issues from some organized mental system. The self, meeting some resistance to the pursuit of its aims, exercises will in overcoming the obstacle. The energy for such effort should not be thought of as arising out of nothing, or coming from a mysterious and indefinable selfhood, but rather as the energy of sentiments, passing from potency to actuality. The major accomplishments of life have their roots in love and ambition, the powerful sentiments of affection for others and of desire for the attainment of some kind of ideal selfhood. Persons of large volitional performance owe this to their affections and their ideals, guided by intelligent principles, which are the summed-

up acquisitions of experience. Volitions of lesser moment likewise proceed from underlying mental systems focussed in desire. Hence the practical psychology of the will consists largely in bringing to bear upon a proposed idea some deeply rooted sentiment which alone can supply the requisite energy of motivation. It is futile to exhort a moral weakling to display strength of will in conquering temptation unless he has sentiments appropriate to the effort. The success of any appeal depends on the existence of a concordant disposition within the individual to whom the appeal is made. The same is true of political and religious exhortation addressed to groups. Votes, contributions, responses of worship, imply appropriate sentiments. The current failure of vociferous efforts to prevent war is due mainly to the persistence of nationalistic and imperialistic sentiments which make against disarmament.

Types of Sentiment; Social Principles.—Sentiments are classified, with reference to their objects, as social, religious, aesthetic, and intellectual. The intellectual sentiments center in ideas, beliefs, and opinions, the concepts and theories of science and philosophy. They manifest themselves as curiosity about these matters, careful observation of facts, the search for explanations, habits of reflection, and an inflexible devotion to truth. Aesthetic sentiments are formed in relation to those scenes of nature and productions of art which we call beautiful or ugly. They underlie the creation and appreciation of beauty, and constitute critical taste. Religious sentiments crystallize around certain natural objects, as the sun, mountains, and rivers, and such things as shrines, temples, sacred books, creeds, and forms of worship. Social sentiments have to do with individuals as members of groups and with group relations. They include the "moral" sentiments which

distinguish between right and wrong in social behavior. These classes frequently overlap, as when reverence for the Divine merges with the acceptance of a creed, or blends with aesthetic admiration of sacred music, or tinges the moral life with a deepened feeling of duty toward fellow men. So too certain social sentiments may be held and exercised as matters of taste, or reflectively intellectualized as principles of conduct.

A second classification, more useful for our purposes, is that which distinguishes sentiments as *concrete* or as *abstract*. The former have as their central objects either particular things or groups and classes of things. The latter have explicit reference to qualities and general characteristics, considered somewhat apart from their concrete bearers. For example, the sentiment of fondness for children may concentrate exclusively on a particular child, or may include children in general, or may refer abstractly to "childhood," *i.e.* the innocence and truthfulness, the spontaneity and candor, which naturally belong to the earlier years of growth. Such pleasing qualities may be abstracted, ignoring their equally natural accompaniments of dirt and naughtiness, and may become conceptual centers of sentimental regard. Similarly we may cleave to a single religious sect, or entertain a catholic sympathy with all religions, or while rejecting all sectarian groups and their creeds we may possess an abstract and reverent belief in the subservience of human beings to a higher power. Our abstract sentiments are distinctly intellectual; they take the form of ideas, more or less detached from concrete facts. Sometimes they are *mere* ideas, tinged with a glow of feeling. Sometimes they are definite and forceful in practical application. Principles of honesty and justice may determine behavior where concrete sentiments fail.

Abstract sentiments are especially important, therefore, in that they constitute the basis of ethical conduct and the guiding lines of social progress. Morals, *i.e.* those forms of behavior which society terms "right," become truly ethical when done in the light of such principles. The ideals of society are formulated by abstract thought and operate in practical ways. Just as mathematical abstractions are sources of power in solving particular problems of mechanics, and in controlling nature for the purposes of increasing production and facilitating communication, so moral abstractions, apprehended by reason, are the requisite means of perfecting civilized life.

Consider the power of "principles." Formulated with some degree of definiteness and identified with the self, they energize human beings so strongly that no effort is too strenuous, no sacrifice too painful, for the accomplishment of what they prescribe, whereas the violation of them brings the severest condemnation. Not only do they serve as convenient classifiers of situations and problems, enabling us to act the more quickly and surely; they also possess a fundamental stability and strength which are needed in meeting emergencies. If worst comes to worst, a man will renounce friends, family, the associations of a lifetime, because of his religious beliefs. The conscientious debtor toils for years to repay pecuniary obligations which he might legally escape through bankruptcy. Some few persons are unfailingly determined to do justice to others, no matter at what cost to themselves, simply because through reflection and practice they have made this principle a vital part of their character, so that it almost automatically controls action. Some are likewise characterized by a constant sentiment of obedience to law, not mere casual conformity to laws which they happen to approve, or which are rigorously enforced, but a thoroughgoing

obedience, excepting only those rare cases in which law violates moral conviction. So an abstract sentiment of honesty or truthfulness or patience, reënforcing habit, will carry one man steadily past pitfalls of deceit, chicanery, and passion, which fatally entrap another. Against large or small temptations, powerful or novel allurements, there is no bulwark like clearly conceived and firmly established principles of conduct.

The reverse side of the picture is the reflective adoption and persistent practice of bad principles, such as unscrupulous self-seeking, deliberate suspicion, and active hatred. This is perhaps not very common in ordinary social life, but wherever it occurs it constitutes a menace to society.[7] Strange to say, these sentiments, which are strongly reprobated in individuals, are accepted as the proper modes of feeling, thinking, and acting among national governments. Political leaders who would not think of basing their private lives on such sentiments entertain them as a matter of course in dealing with other peoples. Blustering accusations and displays of force, employment of spies, support of private cupidity, grasping financial transactions, and theft of territory, are generally regarded as legitimate in international affairs. It is true that the sentiments underlying this behavior operate to some extent in lesser affairs of everyday life, but here they are held somewhat in check by law and public opinion, whereas in international relations they have comparatively free play. World society is in constant peril from the official acceptance of bad social principles.

The gravest danger in the formation of abstract sentiments is not that of malevolence, but rather the tendency to mere verbalism. Emotional approval and disapproval

[7] A couple of collegiate illustrations are sentiments of "fraternity first" and in athletic sport the disposition to win at any cost.

are attached to words instead of to acts. We content ourselves with lip-service while our conduct takes a different course. One praises truth but stoops to a convenient falsehood. Another is deeply affected by instances of suffering but does nothing to relieve them. We prate vociferously about justice and freedom, but practise tyranny in family or school or business associations. The sentimental terms have a pleasant aura which gratifies us more easily than does virtuous action. Tests show, in accordance with common observation, that the ability of children to discriminate with verbal correctness between right and wrong behavior is far from being a reliable indication of their actual conduct. The righteous indignation of some pupils at a teacher's unfairness presents a ludicrous contrast to their own willingness to evade and deceive. So with all of us the accustomed modes of expressing sentiment do not always imply corresponding moral habit.

The Development of Sentiments.—Nature establishes certain sentiments in the individual by instinctive endowment. In many species of animals the various reactions of parental care, for example, appear spontaneously in organic synthesis as soon as the needs of the young call for them. Thus from the outset the mother hen scratches for its chicks, clucks a warning note to them at the sign of danger, and shelters them under her wings. For the most part, however, these systematic reactions are products of growth and cultivation. In part they develop naturally through continued association or repeated contact with their objects; in part they result from some kind of instruction. In the higher species they sometimes attain a considerable complexity of expression. An intelligent dog shows toward its master obedience, expectation of food, playfulness, loyal defense against enemies, coöperation in hunting or in herding, and so on.

Human sentiments are likewise the outcome of a long period of development which combines natural growth with methodical learning. The protracted period of dependence through which the child passes is, as we have already noted, nature's evolutionary device to elevate instinctive tendencies to a higher social plane. Reactions, with their accompanying ideas and emotions, are systematically organized around certain objects having permanent significance. The process of education is not simply the acquisition of particular facts or the formation of particular habits, but is the gradual construction of mental systems which constitute "personality" and determine its relation to things and people. Individual development is thus characterized by increase in number and complexity of sentiments, by their growing abstractness and moral cogency, and especially by the increasing dominance of self-consciousness in the process, and the deliberate identification of the self with general principles of conduct.

In the early period of childhood the little learner acquires from authoritative and affectionate elders modes of behavior and of appreciation which constitute the foundation of later character-building. He is taught to do this and not to do that, to call this action good and that bad, and even though at the time he does not understand why, nevertheless he accepts the instruction, and thereby cuts for himself grooves of character which will determine in large measure his subsequent and more intelligent development of sentiments. Thus his life-long attitudes toward things and persons and traits of character, toward tools and machinery, books and pictures and music, toward family and friends and strangers, toward cleanliness, selfishness, and industry, are given an initial slant. If he early learns lessons of duty from example and precept, he will always be the more ready to follow its pointing.

If he is taught to feel antipathy or superiority toward foreigners, it will be hard to overcome this in later years when brought into close association with them, no matter how inappropriate the feeling may be. Primary instruction with regard to wealth and poverty will always subtly influence social attitudes and political opinions, contributions and votes.

The development of abstract sentiments is an extremely important phase of this process. It begins with simple and concrete experiences. Kindness to animals, for instance, is learned initially through treatment of a domestic pet, petting it, feeding it regularly, and refraining from the fascinating experiment of pulling its tail. Such actions have the common designation of being "kind," which the small mind learns also to attribute to other performances as well. The essential resemblance of these various deeds is apprehended intelligently, and the result is a somewhat generalized idea of what kindness toward animals means. Since the same term is applied to relations to other children and older persons, it gains further detachment from particular experiences, and comes to signify certain modes of feeling and action which may be used in new situations. The abstract comprehensiveness of a conception makes it a useful tool with which one is enabled to meet conditions which would otherwise be baffling. The novel application of it is a somewhat experimental performance, of course, and is often inept. Children naturally make ludicrous mistakes [8] in the use of abstract ideas, but their very blunders become through correction sidewise steps toward right thought and action.

The process of developing abstract sentiments is guided

[8] For example, a small acquaintance of the writer, having heard something described as "ugly," grasped the unpleasant significance of the word with hazy correctness, and proceeded to apply it in hit-or-miss fashion to whatever she disliked.

by example and precept. A boy is taught loyalty to friends, or the shamefulness of "quitting" in a contest, by the common talk of his companions and the casual moralizing of his elders, and especially by observation of their behavior in these respects. Punctuality in keeping appointments, thoroughness in performing set tasks, indifference to petty troubles, and ready assistance to those who need it, likewise become abstract virtues by observation and verbal teaching. Reflection upon these matters abstracts their essential character and makes them concepts for original and varied use. Punishment for misbehavior serves to emphasize the moral value and compulsiveness of general principles. The process is of course frequently erratic. A girl's confusion of dignity with superciliousness, or a boy's perverted sentiment of friendship which shields the guilty, are amusing or exasperating errors, yet they offer opportunities for inculcating truer definitions of these qualities of character.

The onset of adolescence is characterized by fresh development of rational power, guiding the instinct of self-assertion, and dwelling with increasing persistence upon the experiences and problems of sex. The latter interest runs a gamut from the highest idealism of companionship, chivalry, and tenderness to the coarsest obscenity and the deepest degradation of vice. Approaching adulthood with its prospect of self-support also gives the mind at this period a serious vocational bent. Hence two of the major sentiments of later years, namely, those of family and occupation, now begin to take definite form. Though subsequent experience will enrich their meaning, it will not as a rule radically change the social attitudes and evaluations which are developed in adolescent years. Work and play, home and friends, selfish enjoyment and sympathetic coöperation, will always retain substantially the

same significance in the individual life. The sentiments woven by experience upon the warp of inheritance at this time bear a permanent pattern.

Of central importance for social life, as we have repeatedly remarked, is the complex sentiment which is organized reflectively around the self as a center. Beginning with the pains and pleasures, the primitive self-assertions and submissions, the desires and gratifications constituting the bodily and social experiences of infancy, it undergoes an elaborate development of inner and outer relationships, acquiring an intricate texture of impulses, emotions, and thoughts, all unified by an ever-recurring awareness of its own being—that self-consciousness which uniquely distinguishes mankind. Name, sex, bodily appearance, and all sorts of social contacts give it special form. Instruction and reflection impart to it preëminently an evaluating function, making its experience pervasively a source of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of pride and shame. To this valuational function its characteristic expressions, such as purposive effort, ambition for power and distinction, self-admiration, pugnacious resentment of injury or insult, pursuit of wealth, artistic creation, and so on, owe their intensity. While it is largely a product of social environment, it also constantly molds this environment to suit itself. In its higher development it involves many subordinate sentiments of the abstract type, especially those moral principles which are requisite for daily life, and with which it identifies itself. The individual becomes in some degree an embodiment of these. Accordingly its constitutional modes of functioning give character to society. The social order is determined by the self-regarding sentiment of its individual members. Our relations to our fellow men express what we think and feel of ourselves.

Human individuality emerges from its long period of development, then, as a hierarchy of sentiments in which self-regard holds the position of supreme authority, while those of family relationships, occupational purposes and associations, citizenship, and religion function in more or less abstract form as leading ministries. Subordinate to them is a multitude of lesser ones, minor systems of thought and feeling, which determine behavior under particular conditions. These systematic interests maintain the order and regularity of individual and social life.

PART II

INDIVIDUALITY

CHAPTER VIII

PERSONALITY

What Is Personality?—Human society is the expression of personality. The great and the small occurrences of everyday social life, the pages of fiction, the drama of history with its alternating struggle and drift, its blended comedy and tragedy, owe their reality and their interest to personal traits. Hence the fundamental thesis of this book, namely, that social psychology is the psychology of the individual in his social relations, implies that an understanding of the subject in its human aspects depends upon a scientific comprehension of that unique fact, the human self.[1]

In its broadest meaning, personality is the whole self, all the experiences and deeds which constitute the individual. In a more limited but more useful application of the term, it consists of certain modes of intelligence, feeling, and action, certain traits of temperament and character, which differentiate every human being from every other one. These traits, such as his quickness of apprehension, the range and intensity of his emotions, the direction of his interests, and the persistent or vacillating activity of his will, give him his peculiar position among his associates. One's personality is his thoughts, his feelings, his acts, or as many of them as we find conveniently to distinguish him from his fellow men.

Following this definitive line we see that personality

[1] As supplementary reading for this chapter, the following discussions are especially helpful. James, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, Chap. XII; McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Chaps. VII, VIII; Allport, *Social Psychology*, Chaps. V, VI; Bernard, *Social Psychology*, Part III.

in its active aspect consists of instinctive and acquired tendencies, impulses and inhibitions, spontaneous desires and settled habits—in fact, innumerable modes of behavior which are partly automatic and partly voluntary. These take highly varied and complex form. As individuals we are our peculiar vivacity or reticence, our punctuality or procrastination, our selfishness or good-fellowship, our retaliation or forgiveness, and so on. Affectively these traits involve corresponding feelings and emotions as constituents of selfhood. We are our joys and sorrows, our loves and hatreds, our ambitions, our pride, scorn, gratitude, and reverence. The more obvious phases of personality, indeed, are expressions of emotional states.

But it is no less true that personality is essentially cognitive. We are literally our perceptions of physical body, clothes, material possessions, our knowledge of relations to family and associates, our thought about aims and ideals. How one's awareness of size or strength or beauty or ugliness—the spectacle which unfailingly confronts one when looking into a mirror—enters into the very warp and woof of self-consciousness! How the acquisition of a new suit of clothes, or a new dress, or even a new hat, temporarily braces the personality in its social intercourse! Even our toys and our tools, our jewelry and our automobiles, become parts of ourselves in the psychological sense that our personalities consist in some degree of frequent and feelingful cognition of them. Deprive us of them, and at once we feel the shock of change within ourselves. The loss of them is the attenuation of our being.

The "social self" is the individual in his social relations. Our conscious and subconscious ties with our parents and our children, our sentiments toward our friends and enemies, our attitudes to superiors and subordinates, our

ways with co-workers, are all so woven into the texture of ourselves that any multiplication or breaking of the strands alters the whole pattern. Who has not felt the personal expansion of being elected to membership in a club? Or the abysmal loneliness which follows the death of some loved one? Further, we evaluate ourselves in terms of what other people think of us—or rather what we believe they think of us—and proceed to act the part. Our pride has a hard time if our fellows do not acknowledge our merits. Our shame lies largely in the fact that other persons know it. Most of our daily thought is about, or at least incidentally involves, our associates and our prospective and retrospective relations to them. Subconsciously, too, we carry almost constantly the feeling of being looked at. Some persons never escape this form of self-consciousness; they always exhibit a pose.

Personality also has conscious extensions into the past and the future. It is constituted by memories and purposes quite as profoundly as by present social relationships and material accessories. We are defined essentially by our past experiences and by aims and ideals, together with the emotions and actions which represent or express them. If any one of us were asked just what he regarded as his "real self," he would upon reflection probably reply, quite sincerely, in idealistic terms. His larger purposes, his ambitions, which he desires resolutely to accomplish and which he feels himself to be faithfully achieving, these he would designate as the fundamental constituents of his true being. To fulfill one's chosen destiny as student, teacher, worker and citizen, husband or wife, father or mother, is one's essential selfhood.

These various aspects of personality are blended in the actual experiences of life. Thus our aim may be that

of getting new clothes in order to enjoy the admiration or envy of others, or the establishing of a home for the sympathetic enjoyment of domestic associations with a family, or the building of an empire which will embrace the destinies of millions. Our purposes involve social relationships; and both the purposive and the social phases of our personality are dependent in some degree upon our physical being and material possessions. When we analyze the complex phenomena of self-consciousness, what we find is a somewhat orderly, somewhat chaotic procession of experiences, cognitive, affective, and active, all relating to things and to our fellow men, in a temporal setting of past, present, and future. These experiences normally have the felt unity of being *ours*.

Still further, every individual is distinguishable by the particular modes or degrees of his intelligence, the precise way in which sense-perception, attention, memory, imagination, judgment, and inference operate within him and manifest themselves outwardly in his behavior. So, too, everyone has his peculiar traits of feeling and emotion, varying in intensity, duration, and prevailing mood. His personality displays characteristic modes of action, such as ease and accuracy of movement, strength and endurance. Volitional differences, *e.g.* persistency and resistance to suggestion, also appear in various degrees. These traits are gradually being subjected to exact measurement by laboratory methods. For the practical purposes of everyday life we ordinarily find it sufficient to define personality roughly by its predominating features, such as quickness or slowness of action, emotional responsiveness, self-assertion, penetrating insight or thoughtfulness, friendliness, conservatism, fixity of moral purpose, and the like. The striking personages of fiction, such as fill the pages of Dickens, for example, are built around such traits.

As we observed in the preceding chapter, the fundamental reactions which constitute social life are organized into sentiments, simple or complex, concrete or abstract, which constantly permeate experience and behavior. Personality may therefore be regarded as composed of sentiments, presenting individual differences of central interest and organization. In some instances life is strongly dominated by a "master sentiment," such as the attainment of wealth, or professional service, or devotion to a child, which subordinates every activity to itself. Master sentiments are the springs from which have come the great accomplishments in history, for example, the extension of an empire or the founding of a religion.

The emotional and active aspects of personality, which are mainly inherited, constitute "temperament." Thus we speak of a person as being temperamentally vivacious or gloomy, impulsive or sluggish, commanding or submissive. The more distinctly acquired traits, especially those of a volitional sort, make up "character." The latter term implies voluntary self-development and moral habit. Both temperament and character are blended with intelligence. Together they give the general form of personality in self-consciousness and observable behavior.

In summary we may schematize the fundamental traits of personality in the following way: [2]

1. Physical traits:
   (a) Structural: size, form, internal constitution;
   (b) Functional: activity, strength, endurance, skill.

[2] The above scheme follows in many particulars the more elaborate one proposed by Allport (*Social Psychology*, p. 103). I have borrowed his terms "expansion" and "reclusion," which indicate the trait of expressing one's opinions and feelings freely on all occasions, and the opposite trait of withdrawing into one's self (*loc. cit.*, pp. 121 f.). Extroversion and introversion are described in a later section of this chapter. Since we are concerned here with psychological fundamentals, the scheme does not include reference to the moral traits, which are of vital significance in the determination of social relations.

2. Intelligence:
   (a) Perception, "insight";
   (b) Memory;
   (c) Constructive imagination;
   (d) Reasoning, problem-solving ability.
3. Emotional traits:
   (a) Variety and breadth of emotion;
   (b) Emotional intensity;
   (c) Persistence or fluctuation of emotions;
   (d) Predominating mood.
4. Self-expression:
   (a) Impulsion—inhibition;
   (b) Self-assertion—submission;
   (c) Expansion—reclusion;
   (d) Extroversion—introversion.

All this, however, may seem to the reader to miss the main point of our inquiry about the nature of personality. What he finds in himself is not only a wealth of varied experiences and particular reactions, but the consciousness that they are all *his own*. "My personality," he may say, "is this conscious self, the 'I' which consciously owns every bit of personal fact. What is this 'I'?"

For psychology, we must acknowledge, the question presents unique difficulty. If we try to fix our attention on this "I" or self-quality, it appears to consist mainly if not exclusively of bodily sensations, located predominantly in the head, throat, and upper trunk, constituents which we are probably unwilling to identify with our real selves. Beyond this basic bodily awareness we find nothing sufficiently definite to afford a satisfactory answer to the question in terms of empirical fact. Apparently there is no distinct "I" apart from the particular processes of cognition, emotion, and will, all of which somehow have a

conscious I-ness. As Hume remarked long ago, "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." He did not doubt, we may be sure, that every one of these perceptions was his, David Hume's; but he made it clear that the self is a pervasive form of experience rather than a distinct and particular item of consciousness. In other words, the self-conscious unity of personality is a comprehensive *idea*, based constantly on bodily feeling, but including an infinite amount of other detail as well. We may say of it, as Paulsen does of the soul, with a touch of that agnosticism which is perhaps the last word of both philosophy and psychology on the subject, that it is "a plurality of psychical experiences comprehended into the unity of consciousness in a manner not further definable."[3] All that psychology can do with it, in any case, is to describe and explain as clearly as possible, in empirical terms, the various forms of experience in which it reveals itself to introspection, and the various kinds of behavior by which it manifests itself to the outer world.

The Basis of Personality.—What are the causal conditions which give rise to personality? Upon what does it depend? This inquiry, like the primary one as to its general nature, calls for a somewhat extensive answer. We recognize two kinds of factors, hereditary and environmental, the causes which lie within and those which take effect from without the individual. Both types appear in various forms. They coöperate in experience, and personality results from their combination.

To begin with, it depends in some degree upon the nerv-

[3] *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 129.

ous system, the inherited complexity and plasticity of which partly determines sense-perception, memory, imagination, and associative thought. That amazingly intricate mechanism of interconnecting neurones, though continually modified by experience, yet retains its basic nature, the number of its elements, its retention of modifications, its facility of reviving connections. Certain phases of personality are produced by the nervous endowment of the individual.

At least equally significant, it appears at present, are the functions of the ductless glands, particularly the thyroid, pituitary, pineal, suprarenal, and the gonads. These glands discharge their secretions directly into the blood stream, and thus affect the nervous and muscular functions. Excess and deficiency of secretion produces notable differences of behavior and determines the general form of many personal traits. Most is known about the thyroid glands, located in the front part of the neck. Their activity regulates temperamental excitability, and modifies the nervous processes underlying intelligence. The pituitary body, at the base of the brain, controls bodily growth. The suprarenal glands, situated above the kidneys, discharge their secretion of adrenalin, which clots the blood and increases blood pressure. The emotional and active effects of this process, especially those of fear and anger, have been studied experimentally in animals. The gonads or sex glands determine not only operations of the reproductive instinct, but also the secondary sexual characters, such as the beard and voice pitch of the male.

A more obvious group of sources is found in those bodily traits which are externally perceivable. Size, strength, beauty or ugliness, all help to constitute the personality, mainly because they constantly suggest social standards

and attitudes, and so take reflective effect in consciousness and behavior. The puny man and the gaunt woman, the mass of athletic muscle, and the comely aspirant toward the moving-picture screen, owe their personal quality, sometimes unhappily, to these visible traits. Out of balance, the latter become sources of pride and shame, of nervous sensitiveness, or superciliousness, or brutality. The acquisition of a scar or the winning of a beauty-contest may be demoralizing experience. No matter how trivial the real significance of a bodily fact, it may gather a halo or penumbra of self-appreciation or depreciation from which the bearer can never escape.

In addition to such structural features, those of physical behavior must likewise be reckoned as factors of personality. Grace or awkwardness of movement, sturdiness of bearing, the sharp or the velvety voice, the ready smile, and the gift of silence—dozens of such items enter into the total composition of personal charm or personal repulsiveness. An individual's own awareness of them tends to accentuate or to correct them, since he cannot fail to notice their social effect. Actors and actresses are only extreme cases of what appears less conspicuously in all of us. We live almost constantly, even if subconsciously, in an atmosphere of being observed. Our minds and our actions are affected by this atmosphere in subtle but important ways.[4]

The sources of personality are found outside as well as within the individual. What one is depends upon the influences of the home, the school, the church, the club, the neighborhood, state, nation, and race to which one belongs. Example does much to produce one's personal

[4] Some persons almost never allow themselves to assume an attitude in private which they would not take in public. Most of us relax somewhat when alone, but if we suddenly discover or even suspect the presence of others, we react instantaneously with an attitudinal bracing of the self.

qualities; rewards and penalties, praise and blame, do perhaps as much more. The spectacle of ruthless ambition or self-sacrificing service, the stimulation of applause and the paralyzing effect of ridicule, the lure of fame and the deterrence of disgrace—many such causes operate continually to give particular form to the self. The solemn fact that we can never escape certain inborn conditions of personality is matched by the equally impressive truth that external factors may permanently embellish or mar it.

Must we acknowledge the operation of a different kind of causal factor, namely, the will itself? Are we masters of our own being in the sense that we can to some extent shape our own personalities independently of native endowment and external conditions? Can we make ourselves what we desire, or is the very desire itself determined by causes such as have been enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs? Since the mechanical functioning of the glands, like that of the muscular reflexes, underlies all the activities of life, partially constituting the alertness, the emotional intensity, the impulses and habits which are fundamental in the individual; since, too, all behavior is the outcome of past experience as well as of present stimulation; are we not compelled to regard personality in all its phases as a complex mechanism? Are not our high purposes, our idealistic endeavors, and our exquisite appreciations, as well as our littleness and our baseness, the necessary effects of certain causes among which the will has no place, or of which it is merely the conscious expression?

To these questions psychology makes no final answer. We know that the conscious relationships which constitute society depend in some degree upon mechanical conditions. Whether this dependence is complete and abso-

lute, or whether the mind is characterized a measure by free activity, we do not know.[5]

The Development of Personality.—The basis of personality is inherited. The particular form which it assumes is due to environmental conditions, with which the hereditary factors are in constant interaction. Its final form is the result of a long development in which there are several stages. Let us note the principal features of this development.

From the outset the infant has a stream of bodily sensations, especially those of muscular movement and of pleasure and pain, which give his conscious life a primary subjectivity. Some are frequent and agreeable, others infrequent but so intense as to fill at the moment his whole conscious being. Hence early in life he begins to differentiate between his own body and what surrounds him. Later he learns to distinguish between living beings which move and lifeless things which do not, and also between persons and other living creatures. The former are constantly about him, they talk to him and minister to his needs. He imitates them, automatically and intentionally; and his own speech, dress, and actions all produce in him a consciousness of kind. So he comes to regard himself as of their sort, even though as yet his self-consciousness consists of nothing more than bodily sensations, the sound of his own name, the possession of his clothing, the gratification or denial of his childish wants, and the execution of the simple purposes which constitute his play.

[5] A thoroughgoing psychological determinism would say that the "will" is only a name for the total determination of an act, or for the consciousness which accompanies it. According to this view a particular volition is due to some preponderant sentiment, often the complex sentiment of self-regard, which sums up a multitude of particular conditions in the individual's past experience and present psycho-physical constitution. The question remains somewhat open, however, whether there is always a predominating sentiment. It may be that personality has critical points of development where the motivating sentiments are so balanced that complete determination is impossible.

Some persons report that their full consciousness of self, or "I-ness," burst upon them in childhood like a sudden flash of light. In most individuals it is a gradual growth, in which a vague feeling of subjective meaning is attached to the words "I," "me," and "my," by abstraction from particular experiences. In any case it becomes a center of conscious regard, the nucleus of a complex sentiment, comprising an infinite wealth of detail Such self-consciousness, constantly present or frequently recurrent, and varying in intensity from dull satisfaction or discomfort to the most painful embarrassment or poignant delight, is the subjective essence of personality.

The self-conscious personality is continually enriched by new experiences. In all its associations it learns not only to act but to evaluate itself afresh. The repeated calling of attention to one's self in the presence of others, the repeated use of one's name in connection with duties, virtues and faults, the acceptance of rewards and punishments, the assimilation of praise and blame as defining the character of the self, the inculcation of personal ideals —at first perhaps hardly more than words, but later appreciated as traits of character—all this in infinite variety enters into the development of self-regard. The play of childhood and youth is the medium of much of this construction and evaluation, as are also the tasks of the household, the school, and gainful industry. All the social relations in which one lives and moves incessantly mold his personality.

According to the theory maintained in this book, innate traits may be sufficiently specialized and powerful to give definite form to personality. The self-assertive, the acquisitive, the gregarious, the highly sexual types owe their social character in some measure to inborn tendencies. Not that these tendencies are inevitably dominant. They

may succumb to adverse conditions of life and of training. But their original strength is such that normally they will exercise a selective function in experience, and will direct action along their own predetermining lines.

The particular features of personality are acquired, by various processes of learning, as further specifications of these original traits. The whole development presents not only a general continuity, but also somewhat distinct stages, each of which comprises certain features of the attainment of social character. Each period has its special importance. Infancy itself undoubtedly has the potency of giving an initial set to lifelong traits. The bestowal of affectionate care upon the babe and its response thereto, the restraint or indulgence of its instinctive impulses of anger and greed, its casual experiences of social stimulation and of solitude, its surroundings of mirth and solemnity, all contribute to the making of personality. The primitive desires and aversions, gratifications and restraints, self-assertions and submissions, leave subconscious traces, permanent and powerful, upon which depend the selection, inhibition, and integration of what follows.

The influence of the home life for the first few years determines in large measure the later development of selfhood. Undue attention to wants, general overstimulation, terrifying shocks, excessive manifestations of affection, unwise indulgences and restraints, may establish in the nervous system emotional tendencies and rational ideas which will never or only with difficulty be out-grown.[6]

[6] It is particularly noteworthy that a childishly intense experience, such as the painful correction of a fault or concentrated attention to a shocking occurrence, may continue to take effect long after it is forgotten. A lady tells me that she was sternly rebuked in childhood for singing an absurd parody of a hymn. The hymn itself was hardly more than a pious jingle, and has long since lost its sanctity for her, yet she cannot now repeat the tabooed words without a guilty feeling. Another traces her lifelong antipathy to meat to an unfortunate accident of her childhood, when she saw the bleeding carcass of an animal.

Conversely, the early lessons of obedience, patience, courage, and cheerfulness, constitute the solid basis of social character.

Before the age of three the child has begun to manifest various distinctly social traits, including an elementary but extremely important imitativeness. These manifestations increase in scope and variety through the next three years—termed by Kirkpatrick the "period of individualization"[7]—with the result of establishing a definite social personality. There have already come awareness of name and appreciation of its family significance. Bodily self-consciousness now is enhanced by a growing understanding of social relationships. Attachments and aversions to particular individuals, simple and concrete ideas of right and wrong behavior, persistence in social desire, acceptance of or resistance to social restraint, all deepen and enrich the consciousness of self. These factors operate both imitatively and with some small measure of reflection, as the mental functions of memory and imagination develop, to make the little person a genuine member of society.

At about the age of six the child emerges from the home and enters the wider and more varied environment of school life. Socially this signifies adjustment to more numerous associates, the learning of new social relationships in work and play, and the inculcation of certain moral ideas. Docility to precept and subservience to the common interests of the schoolroom and yard make possible an elementary training in citizenship. Group and especially team play afford the best medium for lessons of coöperation, helpfulness, and self-restraint in the pursuit of collective aims. Expanding intelligence comprehends something of social order, begins to form generalized

[7] Kirkpatrick, *The Individual in the Making*, Chap. VI.

ideas about group affairs, and reflectively to adopt or reject particular social ideals. Since these years are preeminently favorable to habit-formation, the physiological basis of ideas and ideals now becomes ingrained in the motor tendencies of the nervous system. Later childhood is the appropriate period for the acquisition of many personal habits and mechanisms of behavior which are socially desirable. Modes of speech, cleanliness, skill in athletic sports, and practical arts, afford illustrations of matters which self-consciousness now assimilates as possessing social value. Settled in the physiological organism at this time they are likely to remain permanent traits of personality.

This stage, extending to about the age of twelve, is characterized increasingly by modes of "competitive socialization." [8] As the years of childhood pass we observe the assertion and defense of individuality in the form of conflict with associates—competitive sports, casual fighting, and subtler ways of opposition—and in pugnacious insubordination toward authority. The youngster learns to maintain himself in an environment which he frankly regards as more or less hostile; or, failing in this, to retreat along paths of solitary play and into the milder atmosphere of reading and imaginative reflection. Incidentally a good deal of antagonism toward elders is likely to develop, because of their apparent tyranny and the inadequacy of childish intelligence to understand social requirements. The small insurrectionist demands reasons, refuses to be satisfied with them, and unless handled with sympathy and tact tends to become alienated from older persons. Yet in spite of this rebelliousness the ways of social living may be grounded and hammered into him as habits, if only the process is carried on with sufficient insight to utilize

[8] Kirkpatrick, Chap. VII.

the natural purposiveness of child nature by exhibiting aims and providing tasks which appeal to its interest. The presentation of social ideals which will command enthusiasm, and the inculcation of habits of social behavior in the light of these ideals, are peculiarly desirable educational practices at this time. The remarkable success of the Boy and Girl Scout movements shows what can be done in such directions. Even more important though less conspicuous is the affectionate, methodical training by parents, whose friendly companionship permeates discipline with the effect of diminishing its hardship. The example and coöperation of elders in the work and play of this period are most effective moral forces.

The period of adolescence involves physical and mental changes which are momentous in their social significance. Bodily development attains size and strength or beauty which in one sex give self-conscious power in relation to associates, and in the other constitute an equally self-conscious personal charm. Rational intelligence more and more takes command of life; thinking, even though it is inept and misguided, nevertheless tends to displace the earlier docility or thoughtless will. Reflective purposes of one's own, exalting one's personality, begin to dominate the social scene. If too much thwarted in the pursuit of them the young adolescent runs away, or withdraws into a world of his own fancy, day-dreaming himself into positions of dignity and accomplishment. In any case there is an adoption of new interests in reading and play, and a good deal of imaginative reconstruction of the self and its fortunes. Most youth finishes schooling in the earlier part of this period, and goes to work, incidentally also to learn the ways of industrial society. Some continue through the high school and college, the social customs and atmosphere of which impart to them a definite personal character.

Most important at this time is the development of sex function, since it is accompanied by a broadening and deepening of social interests, and an unfolding of social idealism. Though the main end of the process is the family, its energy and drive spread over a larger circle, its sympathies are extended to groups and classes. Loyalty, chivalry, and philanthropy flourish in the adolescent mind, limited in scope and insight, perhaps, but emotionally intense and sincere. New ideals of companionship appear, both in the tendency of earlier adolescence to form gangs and clubs, and later in personal attraction to individuals of the other sex. These ideals though they may fall to a low moral plane, are susceptible of development into the highest social forms. Devotion to friends, protection of the weak, refinement of social intercourse, now acquire new meaning. Youth thinks more independently and abstractly about social matters, hence the emotional attachments of personal friendships and memberships in organized clubs may be turned to account in forming social ideals and habits of wider significance. Adolescent liking for one another easily becomes sympathetic regard for the same social values and the enthusiastic pursuit of common aims. Power of thought and breadth of altruistic feeling now entitle youth to a larger measure of freedom than has hitherto been feasible.

Incidentally there is in numerous instances a good deal of inner disharmony, conflict between the old and the new in experience, which call for adjustment. Persistent individualism is incompatible with social requirements, or the ways of society fail to satisfy youthful idealism. Through storm and stress, perhaps, the adolescent learns to define himself in relation to the social order, and to guide his actions by his new insight. More or less abstract ideas of truth, justice, honor, and other virtues

may become the most powerful factors of decision, settling as habits of social behavior, and accumulating as "character." [9]

The outcome is that complex being, the main outlines of which were sketched in answer to the question, What is personality? It is partially but almost never completely unified. Inner discord and self-contradiction persist, but there is at least some approximation to unity. Emotional attitudes and ideas, temperamental traits and acquired habits, are organized into predominating sentiments, centering chiefly in the family and occupation in relation to the self. Sometimes a "master sentiment" monopolizes interest, overshadowing all else. Rarely we find the various elements organized with maximum strength into the "great personality," such as illuminates the pages of history and fiction, and which fascinates because of its superior power.

The long years of infancy, childhood, and youth may thus be regarded as nature's preparation of the individual for the social life of maturity. This development varies greatly according to special conditions—the environment of the city and the country, of the large family and the only child, the home of luxurious wealth and that of workaday industry or of poverty—yet through all the infinite variety of social education run certain determining lines of growth, substantially the same for all normal human beings.

Types of Personality.—One of the primary aims of science is to condense description into classification, to ascertain the essential features of phenomena and formulate concise concepts of the groups to which they belong, and thereby to facilitate theoretical and practical dealing

[9] These ideas possess religious as well as moral significance. Some sects meet the personality-needs of this period by practices of "conversion"; others by special instruction and formal adoption into the church.

with them. This aim applies to the study of personality, for although every person is unique, yet he also resembles others in certain respects, and may be classified accordingly. Common observation has its convenient categories of personal character and temperament, *e.g.* good and bad, steady and fickle, impulsive and thoughtful. The ancients endeavored to classify individuals with scientific precision; and there have been many efforts in recent times to accomplish the same purpose. These attempts are all interesting, but for the most part not very helpful. We shall consider briefly some of the leading systems.

In the first place we find many persons exhibiting a predominantly intellectual, or affective, or active nature. To indicate extreme types, one seems like a peripatetic volcano of activity; in another there is a continual welter and flux of emotion; while the cold and subtle intellectuality of a third may strike us as positively reptilian. In less extreme degree, also, one or another of these sorts of mental process may be essential in character. If we compare Presidents Roosevelt and Wilson, for example, we observe that in the former ideas sprouted out of active experience and took immediately practical form, whereas in the latter action issued from reflection much more slowly. The predominating trait influences the others, and gives its own complexion to all phases of personality. Intellect modifies sympathy, or feeling twists thinking, so as to influence all social behavior. Where the predominance is large, we often know what to expect from the individual. Most of us are such mixtures of traits that our actions are rather incalculable. Thoughtfulness shows itself intermittently; or a repressed emotional interest suddenly breaks forth in an astonishing deed.

The so-called "classical" scheme of temperaments, which has come down to us from ancient times, distin-

guished four types, namely, the sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic. The sanguine man or woman is usually cheerful and optimistic, quick but not strong in active response to stimulation, emotionally variable rather than intellectually steady. The choleric person is forceful, commanding, prone to anger, both quick and strong in his reactions, energetic and persistent in daily life. The phlegmatic is unemotional, untroubled by the vicissitudes of experience, slow but powerful in action, an essentially steady sort of individual. The melancholic is moody, inclined to unpleasant emotions, distrustful and critical of others, aesthetically sensitive, with reactions which are relatively slow and weak. Purely typical cases are rare, however. Now and then we observe one in whom the compound of mental features agrees with the scheme; but most persons have inherited such a blend of temperamental traits, and these have been so modified by experience, that exact classification is impossible. The predominating factors seem to depend in some degree upon the period of individual growth or decline. Lotze remarks that life shows a temperamental development from the sanguinity of childhood through the melancholic moods of youth and the choleric intensity of mature years to its phlegmatic end.

Several systems are dichotomous.[10] Thus we have the distinction between the sensory and the motor, or passive and active types (Baldwin). James depicts vividly the differences between the "explosive" and the "obstructed" individuals, and also the contrast between rationalist and empiricist, or tender-minded and tough-minded persons. Ostwald discovered in his study of scientific eminence a

[10] Most of these dichotomies have a general resemblance to one another. The terms tough-minded and tender-minded, empiricist and rationalist, romantic and classic, extrovert and introvert, and other antitheses, possess substantial correspondences of meaning.

profound difference between the "classic" and the "romantic" types, a distinction which applies outside the realm of science as well. The romantic is quick in his adjustments, radical in his opinions, adventurous, eager to express himself in new ways. The classic is relatively slow, calm, addicted to conformity, a conservative by nature. One delights in the novel, the other cleaves to traditional standards. But here again we unfortunately find the facts of personality so complex, in defiance of the simplicity of the scheme, that we are baffled in our efforts at classification. In most of us the romantic and classic strains are so blended that we cannot be said to possess either temperament distinctively. We are romantic in some matters, classic in others. Youth normally shows a romantic interest in all sorts of adventure, maturity a growing conservatism.

Psycho-analytic theory has given us the important distinction between introverts and extroverts. The introverted person is one whose attention is constantly determined by subjective factors, whose experience is continually and strongly tinged with self-consciousness. In common parlance he "cannot get away from himself." Every event reminds him of himself, and he perceives everything in relation to his own purposes and self-appreciation. He makes subtle internal adjustments to social environment. The extrovert, on the other hand, has his attention, thought, emotion, and action determined predominantly by objective facts. He is more spontaneous and unreflective than the introvert. Self-appreciation, approval or condemnation, plays a smaller or a less subtle part in his life. This type is by nature mentally out-reaching, whereas the former is naturally ingrowing in its conscious activity. Both may do the same thing or pass the same judgment, but they will do so for quite dif-

ferent reasons. To borrow an illustration from Jung, the extrovert puts on his overcoat simply because the day is cold; the introvert leaves his off in order to harden himself.[11]

Everyday habits of behavior reveal many such differences. The introvert is more subject to embarrassment and worry; he blushes and broods more than the extrovert. He is also more sensitive and moody, more suspicious, and emotionally obstinate. Likewise he is more bookish, and inclined to solitude both in work and play. Especially characteristic is his habit of day-dreaming, or of excessive deliberation. If he argues, he does so in order to assert himself, whereas the extrovert uses argument in order to establish something objective. So in social and moral matters the extrovert acts in conformity with custom, and judges other people accordingly. The introvert applies independent principles of action, which he identifies with his own personality, and his evaluation of the conduct of others disregards common estimates. One is typically conservative, the other radical, though these tendencies may be suppressed by the influences of surrounding society. In general the steady advances of civilization are due to extrovert leadership; the strikingly new discoveries and novel works of genius come from introverted sources. The two types show diverse forms of abnormality, including insanity.[12]

[11] "At bottom," says Jung, "the introvert is always facing the problem of how libido [*i.e.* purposive life-energy] can be withdrawn from the object, as though an attempted ascendancy on the part of the object had to be frustrated."

[12] The distinction extends into the field of occupational differences. One study of the personal traits of professional nurses indicated that this group is almost exclusively extrovert. Apparently the introvert cannot endure the disagreeable features of training, and especially the subjective reflection of the suffering of patients. Various kinds of solitary, sedentary, and finely detailed tasks seem to belong naturally to introverts. Active, coöperative, and competitive work appeals more to extroverts. Inspectors are usually introvert, foremen and salesmen extrovert, though of course there are numerous exceptions. Some phases of high executive performance call for one type, other phases for its counterpart.

Most persons present a confusing mixture of these opposite traits; they are, to use Professor Conklin's term, "ambiverts." The possession of both characteristics is a matter of degree. Probably human nature conforms in this respect to the curve of normal frequency. The extremes comprise a few individuals of each type. Between these extremes is a mass of human beings who display every shade of ambiversion. In short, such is the complexity of personality that the various classifications which we have mentioned possess only slight diagnostic or practical value. Their application is limited for the most part to extreme or pathological cases.

The Measurement of Personality.—The progress of any science is characterized by a tendency toward mathematical precision, and accordingly the advance of psychology shows persistent efforts to obtain quantitatively exact statements about consciousness and behavior. This is especially true of the study of personality. Its principal aspects, intellectual and temperamental, its fundamental abilities and its attainments of skill, have been investigated by methods which give somewhat accurate results. The work is still in its infancy, but the lines along which it is proceeding are clear. Most has been accomplished in the fields of general and special intelligence, the different degrees of which are found to be measurable with a good deal of certainty. Sensory acuity, the span and fluctuations of attention, the quickness and depth of perception, various traits of memory, imagination, and the higher intellectual processes of judgment and inference, all have passed under the measuring rod. In part these devices of measurement are analytic, that is to say, they resolve the intelligence into its component elementary functions. In part they deal with complex intellectual operations as they manifest themselves in everyday life. The systems

of intelligence tests devised by Binet and Simon for application to school children, and by a group of American psychologists for use in the army, are so familiar to psychology students as to need no detailed explanation here. There are numerous other systems which likewise serve as means of ascertaining intellectual capacity or the extent of learning. While the methods are still crude, and perhaps at best have only a limited applicability, there is increasing refinement in the formulation of them, and genuine usefulness in relation to the problems of school work and vocational selection. The results, though admittedly approximate rather than absolutely exact, are so treated statistically that they constitute a growing science of intelligence.

Most of the emotional traits which underlie temperament can hardly be subjected to exact measurement, partly because the physiological processes which constitute their objective aspect are so hidden or subtle as to escape quantitative determination, partly because the laboratory conditions necessary for investigation are different from the conditions under which emotions naturally appear. Even here, however, it is possible to obtain accurate records of the changes in muscular tension, breathing, and blood pressure, which take place in response to emotional stimulation, such as may be given in the form of significant words, verbal descriptions, or pictures.

The more distinctly motor and volitional aspects of temperament lie within easier scientific reach. Professor Downey has made a promising approach to this subject by devising tests which measure with some precision certain traits of "will-temperament," particularly speed of movement, freedom from inertia, flexibility, motor compulsion, inhibition, coördination of impulses, care of de-

tail, speed of decision, assurance, and resistance to opposition. Some of these qualities are ascertained by examining alterations of handwriting performed under specified conditions. For example, different degrees of coördination are revealed by one's ability to write a name or phrase evenly within a very small space. Freedom from inertia is evinced in the difference between normal speed and that attained by effort. Speed of decision appears in one's selection, from a long list of personal traits, of those which constitute one's own character. Assurance is measured by the tendency to change these self-estimations. The total result is a compact and graphic statement of certain temperamental and characteristic traits which permeate individual life.[13]

Somewhat elaborate tests have been devised for two pairs of personality-traits which have special importance, namely, introversion-extroversion and ascendance (dominance)-submission.[14] The former qualities are ascertained by comprehensive inquiry concerning such symptomatic behavior as readiness to feel hurt by apparent disrespect, suspicion of the motives of others, self-pity, a tendency to become easily confused, radical opinions, habits of introspection, of day-dreaming, of talking to one's self, of absentmindedness, a disposition to shrink from taking initiative and from assuming responsibility, and a habit of working by fits and starts. The trait of ascendance is revealed by such behavior as seeking association with important persons, acting under ordinary conditions in accordance with desire, resisting salesmen effectively, soliciting funds efficiently, quarreling openly, resenting vi-

[13] Downey, *The Will Temperament and Its Testing.* The methods of investigation described in this book show remarkable ingenuity.

[14] See for example the extensive list of test-points indicating introversion presented by Heidbreder, *Jour. of Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XXL, 2. An elaborate and systematic test for ascendance-submission is given by G. W. Allport, *Jour. of Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XXIII, 2.

olation of rights even when trivial, taking the initiative in social gatherings, shouldering responsibility willingly, and the like. Submissiveness is shown in opposite ways. Hence by asking the individual to state whether his actions are habitually, occasionally, or never of one sort or the other the examiner obtains a word-picture which serves not only to classify him, but also to measure the extent of his possession of the trait in question.

Various attempts have been made to ascertain precisely the more distinctly moral qualities of character. For the most part they consist of word-association tests and responses to questions about human conduct. In general the results of these efforts are not very significant, for the reason that what one says about moral situations and problems under test conditions does not necessarily square with his actual performance when facing them. John Smith, when asked what he would do if he discovered that a storekeeper had given him too much change, might return a morally unimpeachable reply, but one not at all in agreement with his probable behavior in the event. Extraordinary conditions and strains of temptation also lie beyond the reach of such tests. Some investigators have devised ingenious methods of eliciting moral self-judgments from the individual without his being aware that he is making them. But there is in these matters almost inevitably something of a parallax between the operations of reflective thought, as expressed in words, and the deeds of actual life.

The most practical and reliable method of ascertaining temperamental and characteristic qualities is that of rating or ranking, by which an individual is placed above or below others, in respect to designated traits, by observers who are well acquainted with him. Cattell found that scientific men agreed closely in their estimates

of the scientific ability of their colleagues, and were even more remarkably unbiassed in their evaluations of their work. Scott adapted the method to use in rating army officers for promotion. A basic scale was constructed by having experienced officers estimate one another with regard to physical bearing, neatness, endurance, qualities of leadership, and the like, and averaging their estimates, so that different degrees of these qualities were each represented by a particular individual. Other officers, candidates for promotion, could then be rated as corresponding to higher or lower degrees of the scale. Where the judges knew their associates intimately, and were not affected, as occasionally happened, by common personal prejudices, the method proved very useful.

In conclusion let us note again the puzzling truth that personality involves a good deal of inner inconsistency. No doubt it is predominantly unitary; that is to say, the traits which manifest themselves under one set of conditions will also appear under other and quite different ones. Thus a person's general intelligence decrees his behavior in any situation. If he is temperamentally thoughtful or courageous, he will exhibit these qualities with a good deal of uniformity throughout his whole life. If he has an honest character, as the Stoics long ago pointed out, he will tend to be honest in all things. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that most personalities are only partially unified, and that their behavior at one time may be noticeably discrepant from that at others. Sometimes we act intelligently, but now and then we make fools of ourselves. In general we may be cautious, but occasionally we like to take a chance. Probity in financial matters under certain conditions seems in some individuals quite compatible with sharp dealing under others. Ultimately, no doubt, these

discrepancies are resolvable into phases of some complex and inclusive unity, but practically they often look like sheer self-contradiction. The measurement of personality should take into account not simply the ordinary manifestations of a particular trait, but also its plasticity or variability under different circumstances. To do this is theoretically within the limits of possible personality measurement, but in point of technique it lies beyond the comparatively simple methods which have been devised. The most that we can claim for the latter is that within their scope they afford a true insight, and give a practical assurance sufficient for ordinary purposes.

External Marks of Personality.—Nobody will question the fact that personality expresses itself outwardly by somewhat consistent behavior. There is also a common belief that it is revealed by certain structural peculiarities such as shape of head, face, and features, color of hair, complexion, and eyes, shape of hand, lines in palm, and the like. This view, which is very old, has been elaborated into great complexity of detail, and has been circulated widely in several systems of "character reading." To some extent it is combined with descriptions of behavior traits, especially handwriting, but for the most part it has to do with conditions which are essentially anatomical. It is popularly current, and is accepted, sometimes in high places, as the basis of such practical matters as the selection of candidates for employment, and the choice of a vocation. It is also interesting as a possible means of diagnosing the temperament of our associates. Let us examine it briefly.

It appears in clear-cut form in connection with the classical scheme of temperaments. Thus the mental traits which characterize the sanguine type are said to accompany certain structural ones, particularly a ruddy

complexion, reddish hair, and blue eyes. According to the speculative physiology of an earlier day the sanguine temperament is due to the predominance of blood over other elements in the physical constitution of the body. The choleric individual has a square and solid jaw, dark complexion, black eyes, and short, curling black hair. The physiological basis of his peculiarities was thought to be the "black bile." The phlegmatic temperament is indicated by a colorless complexion, square face, bluish gray eyes, and fair hair. It comes from a hypothetical secretion called the "phlegm." The external marks of the melancholic are an oval face with thin features, brown hair, and brown or gray eyes. In this case "yellow bile," secreted by the spleen, is the distinguishing physiological factor.

The physiology in this scheme is of course absurd. There is no evidence that the various temperaments are based upon these bodily elements, real or hypothetical. And the external physical descriptions, as related to mental traits, clearly do not hold true for all races. There are sanguine peoples without any of the alleged marks of temperamental sanguinity. They apply most obviously to certain North European stocks, among which they may even seem to distinguish some national groups. Thus the Germans are often regarded as predominantly phlegmatic. Such generalizations have slight value, however. The ethnological composition of most nations is so complex that it comprehends quite different types of individuals. In so far as the latter are of "pure" type, their mental and physical traits often appear to be correlated according to the scheme. But almost everybody has such a mixture of qualities, and these are so modified by environmental influences, that a simple statement of his temperament is impossible.

The same remarks apply to almost all the phrenology and related pseudo-science which are used by professional readers of character. Nature has perhaps correlated certain mental and structural traits, but the correlation is much more complex and subtle than is popularly supposed. The high forehead and the retreating chin, to take two conspicuous illustrations, are less significant of intelligence and timidity than is commonly believed. Many an artist lacks the delicacy of feature which is supposedly indicative of aesthetic interest. Some musicians have blunt fingers. Popular notions ignore negative cases, exaggerate the facts, and thus are carried down a stream of uncritical tradition.[15]

Behavior traits are of course significant, since personality expresses itself somewhat consistently in outward action. The nervous gait, the blustering speech, the furtive glance, and the oily smirk, often reveal qualities which broadly characterize the individual. Particular phases of mental make-up may be glimpsed in the way one cuts food or wraps up a parcel. Handwriting has some significance in this respect, though less than is commonly ascribed to it. Habitual neglect to dot i's and cross t's may conceivably indicate a pervasive carelessness in matters of detail, but whether a fine, concise script be-

[15] The unreliability of external marks of personality, such as constitute the popular systems of character reading, may be shown by methodical examination. In one investigation of this sort the members of a college fraternity, men who lived together and knew one another intimately, estimated certain personality traits of everyone in the group. These judgments were then combined so as to give a definite statement of the personality of each. Secondly, they were inspected by several executives and personnel managers, who were accustomed to forming personal impressions of individual character. The judgments of these men showed less agreement than did those of the students themselves, and in general differed noticeably from the latter. Lastly, an estimate was made by comparing the students' physical traits with the marks indicated in the leading systems of character reading. The result of this estimate was still farther from the students' own judgment. Assuming that the latter was the most accurate, the relative unreliability of casual impressions and of the popular sort of systematic analysis was demonstrated.

tokens an economical disposition, or a large and rounded one generosity, or a bold and slashing one a romantic or a commanding temperament, is not so certain. The alleged science of "graphology" runs into manifold details which are quite without scientific foundation.

It remains true, however, that some observers appear to have an uncanny faculty of discerning personal traits, and the question how they do it is one which psychology should not evade. Its explanation of the phenomenon is twofold. In the first place, there is undoubtedly a quick perception of significant bits of behavior, so instantaneous in its operation that the perceiver hardly knows what produced it. This function is essentially like the swift intuitions which everyone has of meaningful inflections of voice and facial expressions. We do not and perhaps cannot analyze them, yet we comprehend with immediate assurance. In a similar but even more subconsciously directed way the reader of character forms his judgments from inconspicuous details of speech, posture, and gesture. He gains expertness through practice, and though not perfectly reliable is uncommonly penetrating in his intuitions of personality.

Secondly, everybody possesses such a variety of qualities that shrewd observation of casual behavior, supplemented by common sense, need not go far wrong. We are all more or less good-humored, persistent, cautious, economical, loyal to friends, and so on, with corresponding tendencies in opposite directions. The lives of most of us show illustrations of diverse and even contradictory characteristics. Hence the assurance that one is characterized by such and such traits is less significant than it appears.

CHAPTER IX

RACE, SEX, AND FAMILY INHERITANCE

Heredity and Environment.—Human individuality is the resultant of a complex combination of inherited traits and environmental conditions. On the one hand the factors of race, sex, and family inheritance, factors which are primarily matters of innate endowment, determine in some measure the behavior which characterizes the individual. On the other hand the environmental influences of personal association in domestic, political, industrial, and other relations of organized social life combine to make him what he is. These two kinds of causal condition coöperate constantly in various ways and with various degrees of effectiveness. Consciousness of race, sex, and family standing, in relation to associates, constitutes individuality quite as genuinely as do any inborn physiological traits themselves. The social forces of nationality, class or caste, and religion work on a basis of inherited social position.

The question whether hereditary or environmental factors are the more important in determining individuality has received highly controversial answers. Some writers assert that heredity weighs far more than environment, constituting perhaps as much as ninety per cent of the total causation. Others take quite the opposite view, affirming that the inborn basis of individual nature is so general, or so common to humanity, that the particular traits which distinguish one person from another can find their explanation only in the educative influences of social environment. Certain recent utterances of a dogmatic

sort go so far as to maintain that a child can be developed into any sort of individual one pleases, within the limits of native intelligence and physical capacity, by appropriate training.

The position taken in these pages is that any general estimate of the relative importance of hereditary and environmental influences which assigns predominance to either is arbitrary. Each depends upon the other. Hereditary ability and inclination select and to some extent even create their appropriate environment, but they nevertheless require conditions of operation which only environment can produce. Counterwise, environmental conditions do much to constitute individuality, but they do this only where there is native capacity. Individual human nature rests on an inherited basis of reflexes, instincts, and more general capabilities, which in their original manifestation presumably possess some degree of definiteness and peculiar direction. The precise form which these assume or character which they constitute in the individual must be explained by reference to external stimuli, restraints, and social exemplars. Thus inborn powers of artistic expression may remain inconspicuous because uninstructed, or may achieve fame through professional training. Emotional dispositions may develop pathological intensity or conflict in one environment, and habitual balance in another. While we cannot say with final assurance that the coöperative relation of hereditary and environmental influences is the same in all situations or for all individuals, it is wiser to hold that the two sets of factors are in general of equal weight, than to attribute superior efficacy to either.

We are concerned in this chapter with the principal sources of human individuality, and the ways in which they directly and indirectly determine behavior. At bot-

tom, of course, are the inborn anatomical structures and physiological functions belonging to race, sex, and family nature. Superposed upon this basis is the massive accretion of individual habit. The general view of the matter, which will be presented in some detail, is that the native bodily structures and functions, while they do not directly give rise to individual behavior in large measure, do so indirectly in most pervasive and important ways through the coöperation of environmental conditions. Race, sex, and family relationship are at the same time native and environmental factors of individuality.

Race.—There is a popular opinion that the source of many behavior traits is to be found immediately in racial endowment. The white, yellow, brown, and black peoples of the earth are supposed to differ both intellectually and temperamentally because of their inherited nature. Thus a happy-go-lucky disposition is commonly ascribed to the negro, stolidity to the American Indian, a subtle secretiveness to the Oriental, and intelligent ambition to the Caucasian. The finer specifications of the doctrine attribute many particular traits to different nationalities. The German mind is phlegmatic, metaphysical, and fond of music; the French mind, in clear distinction, is sensitive, logical, and emotionally explosive. The English are sanguine and empirical, the Russians moody and mystical. More broadly, the "Nordic" peoples are supposed to exhibit an intelligent and democratic individualism quite in contrast to the subserviency shown by others toward autocratic political and religious authority. Certain popular writers and professional alarmists who are much concerned with racial supremacy have promulgated these ideas widely. Most of this literature is highly speculative and prejudiced. While it contains a modicum of psychological truth, it greatly exaggerates the facts, and derives

a false plausibility from the easy practice of ignoring whatever conflicts with its thesis.

Sound psychological conclusions about racial mentality are extremely difficult to establish.[1] Race, strictly speaking, signifies descent from a single human stock, original, or unmixed with other stocks over a long evolutionary period of time. Such descent is indicated by shape of skull and of face, color of skin, eyes, and hair, and by numerous other anatomical and physiological details. How many primary stocks there are is a fundamental point about which ethnologists are not in agreement. Certainly the races of the earth have become much mixed, and the present racial composition of its peoples is very complex. Every great nation is a compound of different racial strains. This is especially true of the leading civilizations of mankind. The English, French, German, Russian, and other European peoples include a variety of racially distinct and blended types. Hence the concept of "pure" race is an abstraction from the actual facts. Practically, the term means a predominance of certain physical traits, a predominance which is sufficient to distinguish broadly the major racial groups. The psychologist's question, therefore, is whether or to what extent these traits are accompanied by other specific ones of mind and behavior which accordingly in some degree characterize peoples of different racial descent.

In considering this question we must not forget that in any large racial group there is a wide range of individual variations. There are higher and lower degrees of intelligence, quicker and slower modes of emotional responsiveness, forceful and feeble types of action. Both physically and mentally the range between the extremes is far

[1] A scientifically critical consideration of this subject is given by Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, Part II.

greater than the average difference between the groups. Distinctive intellectual and temperamental characteristics are not universal; the most that can safely be said is that they are discernible in a large majority. Hence it is important, in surveying racial character, to ascertain that the individuals included are representative. Observations of selected classes, such as immigrants, or of limited groups under special conditions, may have little significance.

The conspicuous cultural differences, such as characterize the peoples of North and South Europe, various races of the Orient, the negro, and the American Indian, are of course social habits accumulated through long periods of time and transmitted by instruction to each succeeding generation. They are the product of influences of climate, geographical habitat, social environment, and individual genius, rather than of peculiar racial nature. Yet it is equally true that they could not have accumulated if they had not been consistent with and expressive of this nature. Language and literature, art, government, and religion, the music of Italy and of Germany, the Englishman's fondness for outdoor sport, the social customs of Scandinavian and of Slavic peoples, are at least consonant with inborn nature. To some extent they are the expression of broad temperamental traits, racial differences in feeling and emotion, in the joyousness or seriousness of life, in persistence, in pugnacity, in intellectual curiosity. At bottom, perhaps, the contrast between the political and religious individualism and democracy of North European nations and the docility toward authority which characterizes South Europe has its roots in the innate constitution of the mind. For the most part, however, they are products of social tradition.[2]

[2] McDougall speculates on the result of interchanging the children of two nations, such as France and England, and rearing them from infancy in a foreign culture. He surmises that while they would acquire and transmit the

The most distinctly scientific attack upon the problem is the measurement of the intelligence of different racial groups, particularly the children in American schools and the men called by the military draft in the World War.[3] The results of such measurements are especially significant in the case of the negro. In general it appears that the negro child has a lower degree of intelligence than the white child of the same age, and that the retardation increases in the successive school grades. In part this may perhaps be explained as due to inborn limitations and relative incapability of intellectual progress. Probably it is in large part the result of a deepening consciousness of social inferiority, which fundamentally affects the alertness and drive of intelligence.

Similarly, the average intelligence of the negroes in the draft was distinctly lower than that of the whites. But here again, however much we may attribute the facts to native deficiency, we must not ignore environmental conditions. The negro comes in large numbers from homes entirely devoid of intellectual stimulation, from a social background lacking in educational facilities and full of superstition, conditions for which he is not to blame, and which in large measure are inflicted upon him through race prejudice. Their natural effect is to induce a profound feeling of social helplessness. Since there is a will-factor in the actual operation of intelligence, measurement of the latter shows the blighting effect of environment which discourages intellectual effort. Further, it is significant that the northern negro appeared to be distinctly more intelligent than the southern, and even more intelligent

culture of their foster parents without obvious modification, nevertheless such national characteristics as the relative strength of Protestantism and Catholicism would undergo subtle changes in the course of time as a result of the different temperamental qualities of the two peoples. (*The Group Mind*, p. 165.)

[3] For a brief review of some of this material, see Jordan, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. X.

than certain classes of southern whites. This superiority may be explained to some extent as the effect of selection, since those who emigrated to the north were presumably the more enterprising. But it is probable that the difference is due in considerable part to environmental conditions. Unquestionably the social influences brought to bear upon the negro in different sections of the United States vary greatly in their encouragement and discouragement of ambition and initiative.

Measurement of the intelligence of children of various immigrant groups has shown in some instances definite inferiority, in others approximate equality to the native stock. In many cases, of course, ignorance of the English language and unfamiliarity with surrounding social customs and historical tradition constitute handicaps which lessen the significance of the measurements. The children of unskilled industrial immigrants naturally make a poorer showing than do the professional and commercial classes. Oriental children, mostly from families of the latter sort, in certain schools around San Francisco Bay, exhibited under test a general intelligence equal to that of white children in the same region. Altogether we are justified in attaching much more importance to family inheritance and environmental conditions than to racial factors as determinants of individual nature.

It needs special emphasis in this connection that the close association of different races ordinarily involves relationships which profoundly affect personal behavior. Historical conflicts are not forgotten, difference of social position is an ever-present fact, the range of occupations is restricted, and most of all the obvious physical distinctions of skin color and facial feature enter psychologically and socially into the nature of the individual. From these facts and from their social implications he can never es-

cape. Traditional influences early turn the consciousness of bodily difference into racial pride and racial approbrium which constantly manifest themselves in conduct. Hence race prejudice, arrogance and repression, sensitiveness, humility, and hostility, become in varied measure the mental constitution of the child and youth.

Finally, let us inquire whether racial inheritance is perpetually fixed and unchangeable, or is subject to modification in the course of time. Probably the latter, though the process is extremely slow. There is some evidence that physical traits, even the fundamental one of skull proportions, undergo slight alteration in successive generations in response to change of geographical and climatic conditions. Presumably, mental traits conform to the same general principle, that is to say, they are affected by a new physical and cultural environment in such ways as to amount in some small measure to a new mental constitution. Racial temperament may thus suffer, over a period of many centuries, a change of affective complexion as genuine as that of the skin in a new climate. Vital energy may increase or diminish. The average level of intelligence may be raised or lowered. These modifications may take place simply by selection of the slight variations which are always occurring in the evolutionary process, or by the inheritance of acquired mental characteristics, or by both. The second of these alternatives is regarded as biologically improbable; and in any case the total inheritance of new racial quality is so minute as to be practically negligible.

Much greater is the result of racial intermixture. This increases the range of variation, and produces important results which are transmitted by heredity. Most effective, however, in its influence upon individual nature, is the culture which constantly surrounds him.

Sex.—Much of the vast and engrossing subject of sex relationships in society extends beyond our present inquiry. The many social, moral, political, and educational problems of sex lie beside our path. Here we are concerned only with the question to what extent the social behavior of the individual is determined by the fact of sex. In this matter, as in that of race, there are well-established popular ideas, partly right and partly wrong. Popular opinion rightly apprehends in a general way the notable differences of sex behavior, but exaggerates them, and errs also in attributing them directly to inborn conditions of physiological organization and function. For the most part they are consequences of social position, acquired rather than instinctive.

Anatomically and physiologically, it is true, there are many differences between the sexes. In addition to primary sex structures and functions there are numerous secondary ones, such as size, figure, facial features, voice pitch, hair, blood constitution, and a multitude of other details. The female brain, though smaller than that of the male, has the same complexity of organization, and also the same proportional size and weight in relation to the body. Girls differ from boys in rate of growth, sometimes actually exceeding them in stature in late childhood and early adolescence, but falling behind them in the succeeding years.

Turning to the mental traits, we observe certain primary differences of sex mentality. As Dunlap points out,[4] the attitudes of the sexes toward each other differ generically, specifically, and with respect to particular individuals. A man's liking for feminine and a woman's liking for masculine society are different, as are the intenser affections displayed toward persons. The force

[4] *Social Psychology*, Chap. II.

and period of specific sex desire are not the same in man as in woman. Fathers and mothers often show somewhat different attitudes toward their children, especially those of the opposite sex. These differences, which are in part effects of sex imitation, rest on a deeper basis, namely, the innate function of the psycho-physical organism. They give color to a great deal of our social life, sometimes tragically; and occasionally produce forms of behavior which are baffling if not utterly unintelligible to the other sex. Yet we ought not to exaggerate their prevalence, as is done too commonly in the pages of fiction. Most of the mental traits of sex are of a secondary sort.

Some of these secondary traits are cognitive or intellectual, others are affective and emotional, still others are traits of action.[5] As regards the elementary sensory and motor functions, numerous psychological measurements have shown slight and for the most part unimportant differences. In reaction time, accuracy, fatigue, and various kinds of sensory acuity, including sensitivity to pain, these differences are so small as to be in general practically negligible. Outstanding exceptions are the male superiority in gross muscular power (though not endurance), and color blindness, which is two or three times as common among men as among women. In associative processes, likewise, in so far as they are elementary, for example, the reproduction of mere contiguity and succession, the sexes are much alike.

When inquiry rises above this fundamental level, however, significant differences begin to appear. From early school years on, girls display more fluency of speech and a greater regularity of handwriting than do boys. The motor performances of the sexes also tend to take different

[5] For test-results, see Starch, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. V, and Jordan, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. X.

directions, with corresponding differences of skill, though it should be added that the increasing athleticism of women is tending somewhat toward re-alignment with men. Women seem to possess quicker perception, especially in aesthetic and social matters, and certainly exhibit a better reproductive memory. Men appear to have a slower apprehension, but exercise more ingenuity in solving rational problems. The dependence of girls on verbal memory and their reluctance to do independent thinking in their studies, quite in contrast to the habits of boys in these matters, are familiar scholastic phenomena.

Woman's perception, by reason of its quickness and apparent immediacy, has gained the name "intuition," and is sometimes regarded as a unique faculty, distinguishing the feminine mind from the masculine, which is supposed to proceed naturally along lines of logical reflection. As a matter of fact, as we have already noted, intuition is generically nothing but perception in the ordinary psychological significance of the term, *i.e.* the attachment of meaning to a sensory stimulus. In general, perceptual facility depends on past experience of the material under observation. It is possible that in social and especially in sex relations women possess some slight innate superiority of perceptual function, though this is doubtful. Experienced men of affairs manifest it in some measure in their respective fields, as do high-grade mechanics and artists. It is everywhere a matter of degrees, and nowhere is it absolutely unerring.

In almost all traits, we must remember, there is in each sex a wide range of individual variation, in comparison with which the average difference of the sexes is small. According to traditional psychological doctrine, men show a wider range than women; the latter are more "generic." The evidence is inconclusive, however. The

conspicuous fact that most historic genius has been masculine possibly has its explanation in social environment, which has tended to discourage most forms of independent thought and action in women. Experimental investigation of basic traits and school abilities has tended to corroborate the theory, but here again it is possible that masculine superiority is due to energy-factors, such as initiative, persistence, and self-confidence, which in some degree are products of social influence and example. In most competitive matters society expects man to take the lead, and this expectation is reflected in the mental background and drive of both sexes.

With regard to specific interests and ideas, it is obvious that men ordinarily possess more information about certain subjects, particularly political and economic affairs, and machinery, whereas women know more about household matters and social etiquette.[6] These differences, both as information and as underlying interest, represent cultural tradition rather than inborn nature. Under appropriate conditions each sex acquires the special knowledge characteristic of the other. Women become efficient executives, and men expert cooks.

The most significant differences are found in the field of attitudes and emotions. Here the list of major and minor distinctions is almost endless. One which is apparently fundamental is the feminine disposition to attach an essentially and narrowly personal significance to social relationships; whereas men tend either to regard them lightly, or to consider them reflectively in the light of a larger human setting. In consequence women show a

[6] Feminine conversation is mainly about persons,—children, servants, husbands, admirers, friends, rivals—while that of men has to do more with business and professional interests, politics, and recreations. Moore found, by noting scraps of conversation overheard on the street, that there was a striking sex difference in this respect. Most feminine conversation was about men.

more affectionate, men a more rational, loyalty. Woman's service in the home, the business world, and elsewhere, is likely to reveal a personal interest which differentiates it in some degree from that of man. The latter is more inclined to active and extensive social accomplishment by means of organization, in which personalities, even though accentuated, are yet subordinated to a rational scheme. Womankind is more individualistic. In religion one sex displays an interest in theology, and an inclination to organized social effort; the other a more aesthetic appreciation and addiction to formal worship. Morally, women are more subservient to traditional rules, men more disposed to guide themselves by reflective principles. Masculine and feminine conceptions of what is honorable and dishonorable differ in certain respects, particularly in their emphasis upon honesty and chastity. Ideals of rectitude and of accomplishment present points of contrast, as do the respective types of behavior and of character at the other end of the scale. In one sex we find pettiness and frivolity, in the other coarseness and brutality. Here are the shrew and the termagant, there the bully and the beast. Throughout the whole range of social behavior-traits, feminine qualities of tact, delicacy, and charm are set off against masculine power. Permeating clefts of personal valuation, of affective and cognitive habit, run deep.

Especially interesting are the differences of attitude toward the other sex. In addition to the primary differences indicated above, it is noteworthy that each sex seeks, appreciates, and encourages in the other certain traits which are largely lacking or at least less cultivated in its own kind. Women admire the strength and physical accomplishment of men; the latter the beauty and social grace of women. Chivalrous deference and nursing tender-

ness win appropriate responses. While each sex tries to impose its will upon the other, neither seeks to suppress essential characteristics. Sometimes, indeed, we observe a remarkable acceptance of behavior in the opposite sex which would scarcely be tolerated in one's own. Men encourage exhibitions of feminine childishness and helplessness. Women put up with an astonishing amount of masculine roughness.

There is no evidence that the mental traits of the sexes are in any large measure direct effects of the physiological differences of sex organization. Sex mentality for the most part is the product of social environment, which persistently shapes the individual in conformity with social tradition. Both primary and secondary characters have much to do with behavior, it is true, but their influence flows along channels of learning. From the outset the girl and the boy have different standards and ideals of behavior impressed upon them. The girl may take more kindly to her father, but almost inevitably she takes after her mother, and conversely with the boy. On the whole each sex associates more with its own kind, and hence develops a predominant consciousness of kind. The girl acquires a more elaborate set of inhibitions, which limit both her freedom of thought and her spontaneity of action. Traditional modes, and what is more profoundly important, traditionalism as a state of mind, are accepted by her under penalty of severe social disapproval or even ostracism, and become woven into her individuality. Differences of dress, of occupation, of interest and habit are presented to the boy as essential features of his actual and prospective self. The expectations and aspirations of childhood point in different directions. Adolescence heightens and deepens the sex consciousness, and gives sex attitudes a permanent set. In this period, preëmi-

nently, the maturing regard for the other sex is subjected to social control, and compelled to submit to custom and conventionality. Altogether, whatever may be the underlying variance of sex dynamic, the distinctive mental traits and their expression in behavior are mainly the result of influences of social environment.

The foregoing statement may have seemed to overemphasize sex differences, native and acquired. Certainly we should not forget that the nature of both sexes is a predominantly common human nature, and that in most respects the distinctions of thought and feeling and action are slight. In general men and women have similar ideas and emotions, though these may not exhibit precisely the same specifications. Also let us remind ourselves once more that in most respects the range of variation in each sex is great while the average difference between the sexes is small. Bearing these qualifications in mind, we may hold that mentally as well as physically sex is a constituent of individuality.

The slow process of social evolution has tended to give women legal and political, and in some measure economic, equality with men, with the consequence of lessening their distinctive sex consciousness. In further prospect the movement which is somewhat paradoxically termed "feminism" aims to extend economic and social equality in the direction of independence. To the feminist the traditional status of woman appears that of parasitic inferiority, while masculine attitudes are essentially tyrannical; the conventional modes of chivalry but thinly disguise a prevalent injustice. Accordingly it is held that social progress demands the complete liberation of womankind from all masculine domination.

That the accusations of tyranny and injustice are in many cases well founded can hardly be denied. On the

other hand, it is equally clear that women normally exercise a powerful though subtle influence upon society, as well as a considerable personal domination over both men and children. The blend of companionship, deference, and moral control which traditionally constitutes woman's ideal relations to man is sufficiently realized, and sufficiently satisfactory to all concerned, so that it can be neither lightly disregarded nor easily dislodged. We may question whether the modifications of it proposed by feminists can be attained without the sacrifice of distinctive personal traits which possess profound significance for civilization.

Family Inheritance.—Much more significant than race in determining the details of individuality is the compound of factors constituting family inheritance. Racial traits are transmitted primarily through family relationship; and in addition there are many special characteristics which are derived from the same source. Just what we are as persons depends most largely upon what we have inherited from our immediate ancestry, and the influence of family environment. Physiologically, of course, one's inherited equipment of stature, figure, and facial features, of nervous connections constituting intellectual capacity and glandular reactions underlying emotion, constantly determines the development of social relations. Superposed upon this basis is an infinite variety of molding influences due directly and indirectly to family habit and family position. While the individual continually creates his own personality, he does so out of materials and according to forms which are supplied largely by family nature and organization.

Let us analyze this truth in detail. Many investigations have proved that members of the same family display much more similarity in power of intelligence and

characteristic accomplishment than do unrelated persons. Galton showed statistically that eminence runs in families, and counterwise that the non-eminent have few distinguished relatives. Woods discovered that the more powerful royal personages belonged to a few family stocks, particularly those of Frederick the Great, Queen Isabella of Spain, William the Silent, and Gustavus Adolphus. Similarly the royalty of mediocre ability came from certain family strains. The descendants of Jonathan Edwards include an extraordinary number of distinguished individuals. Other statistical investigations have exhibited the prevalence of low intelligence and debased moral character in certain notorious families, such as the Jukes and the Zeros. In the case of the Kallikaks, the progeny of one man by two women of different degrees of intelligence, one of whom in fact was feeble-minded, displayed an amazing diversity of intellectual and moral character, one line being distinctly respectable, the other predominantly disreputable.

Another significant line of investigation is the measurement of the intelligence of school children. Here again it appears that children of the same parents normally exhibit a close resemblance in mental traits, as contrasted with unrelated children taken at random, who present no considerable similarity in these respects. Both in their performance of intelligence tests and in their accomplishment in school subjects "siblings," as they are termed, are usually, though far from invariably, alike. In technical language their correlation in point of abilities is relatively high, whereas that of unrelated children is so low as to be negligible. Especially is this true of twins, who resemble each other most closely both in intelligence quotients and in their ordinary modes of behavior. Further, numerous studies of the population of schools for

the feeble-minded have revealed the fact that approximately two-thirds of this class have a sufficient family record of the deficiency in other individuals to indicate that it is a hereditary trait, outcropping more or less frequently from generation to generation. And finally, there is the more subtle but equally conclusive experimental evidence that rapidity of learning depends on initial ability. Those who profit most from the same amount of practice are the ones who start with the best initial equipment, which is primarily a matter of heredity. All these considerations combine to emphasize the truth that family relationship is a predominant source of individuality.[7]

To many investigators the statistical and experimental evidence seems to indicate clearly the superior importance of heredity as compared with environmental influence in determining ability. This inference is somewhat open to question, however. We must not ignore the fact that the eminent have usually been reared in an environment very favorable to the development of their capacities. They have been stimulated at close range by the high personal example of their elders, and provided with opportunities for similar self-expression. Likewise the debased and degenerate individuals owe their worthlessness not only to inborn nature but to the vicious conditions with which they are surrounded. So too the measurements of the intelligence and of the scholastic accomplishments of children reveal a combination of innate ability and the effects of instruction. It is difficult if not impossible to find any trait which does not show the result of formal or informal education as well as original tendency. As a rule the latter constitutes the basis and general

[7] For a convenient review of details on all the above counts, see Starch, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. VI.

form of behavior, while this is directed in some particular way by environmental conditions. Hence it is dubious whether we ought to regard either kind of causation as the more weighty. If we abstract from an individual's actual performance the general power and intelligence which make it possible, then we must acknowledge that these basic qualities are inborn. If we look at particular details of accomplishment, they are obviously learned. It is true that to a considerable extent original nature selects its own environment, takes advantage of its special features, and thus rears the structure of its own individuality; but it is equally true that environment provides the stimulation, instruction, and encouragement without which accomplishment would be impossible. On the whole it is better to say that one owes his general abilities and tendencies to heredity, and the special or particular form which they assume to surrounding conditions, than to attribute superior importance, especially in any numerical measure, to either coöperative factor.

But acknowledging all this, it remains true that the predominant influences upon the child are exerted by his family. From the outset he breathes the atmosphere of his home, aristocratic, degenerate, artistic, scientific, or religious, as it may happen to be, and he develops accordingly. He observes innumerable examples of social and unsocial behavior, modes of expressing or repressing feeling, characteristic attitudes and habits; and he takes these into his own mental system by conscious and still more by subconscious imitation, with the natural depth of early impressions, and with consequently pervasive effect upon later life. Such influences are subtle, but they are none the less profound. The outside forces of the school, the church, the playground, and the shop do much to determine the intellectual and social nature of the individ-

ual, but they operate on a basis and within limits already established by the family.

There is a profound difference between the social influence of the father and that of the mother upon a child. In the early years of the child's life the mother's presence is more constant, her example more prevalent than that of the father. The latter, by reason of his occupation, is usually a more distant and infrequent associate. Hence the child learns his ways of behavior and his ideals of personal conduct primarily from his mother, whereas he acquires other phases of his social being, especially his contacts with the outside world and his conceptions of external accomplishment, in imitative reaction to the "father model." [8] One parent commonly signifies tenderness, perhaps also pettiness, the other a sterner or rougher but juster authority. One is devoted to the internal routine of domestic life, the other to external and apparently larger accomplishment. The mother's concern with household matters which seem little because of their familiarity stands in contrast to the father's less obvious and hence supposedly more momentous affairs. The two parents almost inevitably present different habits and standards of conduct to the child, and in consequence the latter develops different sides of his nature according to the relative depth and extent of the parental influences. If he grows up in close association with one parent only, the result upon his social character is likely to be strikingly unbalanced. The excessively "mothered" boy is an example.

In further consequence there is normally a considerable difference of parental influence upon the boy and the girl. Each tends to acquire appropriate sex character-

[8] For a more extended discussion of this whole matter see Bernard, *Social Psychology*, Chap. XXII.

istics, attitudes, ideals, and taboos. From the outset they learn to be protecting or tender, domineering or submissive, considerate or inconsiderate, fussy or brutal, after the elder manner. The difference may be indicated briefly by saying that the child usually "takes after" the parent of the same sex, especially in relation to the other. Ordinarily, too, the appropriate behavior is both consciously and unconsciously encouraged by the parents, who like to see in their children the distinctive traits which they idealistically attribute to the other sex. The innumerable ways in which masculinity is bred into and effeminacy bred out of boys, while precisely the reverse is true of girls, need no detailed exposition here.

Lastly, we may observe that family influence operates among children toward one another, and no less importantly from children toward parents, in the making of individuality. The association of children is peculiarly effective in eliciting and developing the instincts which underlie social life. Matters of common social interest, especially on the playground, produce the most effective stimulation and restraint, encouragement and correction. Accordingly, self-assertion and submission, self-reliance and coöperation, and a host of other active and emotional forms of behavior take root and grow in this soil and atmosphere. Much valuable discipline is conveyed through the channels of child companionship. The younger learn the social ways of the older, and the latter acquire a corresponding sense of social responsibility. The "only child," brought up among elders who usually pay too much or too little attention to him, offers a striking illustration of the need of association with one's own special kind. Similarly the childless ordinarily differ somewhat from parents in social respects because of the lack of certain social stimulations, restraints, and re-

sponsibilities which only the presence of children can give.

The external sources of individuality, such as the school, the church, and the shop, supplement in important ways the influences which have been enumerated in the foregoing pages. They take effect, however, upon a basis which is normally preëstablished within the family. The possibility of intellectual and spiritual education, of moral instruction and general social cultivation, depends largely upon existing family relationships.

CHAPTER X

LEADERSHIP

The Social Function of Leadership.—Many of the topics of social psychology point more or less directly to that of leadership. Among the questions which they raise are the following: What is the basis of leadership? Is it instinctive or acquired through experience? What are its different forms? How is it related to social organization and control? Is it requisite for social progress?

It appears that groups which are more than mere collections of individuals usually have definite leaders. Animal swarms, packs, and herds follow particular individuals whose behavior sets the pace or example for the rest. In some cases the leadership is casual and transitory, in others permanent. Ordinarily it does little more than take the initiative in movement, as in escape from enemies or the search for fresh feeding grounds. Sometimes it displays distinct authority, constraining behavior and suppressing insubordination. The older seals that guide the annual migrations between the breeding and feeding places, the strongest fighters of the herd or pack, the shepherd dog that guards and drives the flock, are typical illustrations. In highly evolved societies the leaders make plans, direct action, give decisions, punish offenders, and so on. Human groups almost universally exhibit the function. It characterizes the family, the community, and all the secondary and subordinate groups which develop with advancing civilization.

Leadership is requisite for social stability. Orderly group ways are not perfectly ingrained, as a rule; almost

inevitably the impulses of the individual clash with them. Some insect societies, it is true, display a high degree of organization, in which every member automatically does his part. Under favorable conditions in human society harmonious action may be carried on with comparatively little authoritative direction. But wherever there develops internal strain or external maladjustment, the group needs the example or the authority of a leader. Hence in general the function is required for the maintenance of social unity and order.

Leadership is indispensable to progress. Social advance does not take place spontaneously in the group as a whole. Someone has to step forth and take the lead, pointing the path ahead and the new goal. In political life, in art, in religion, and elsewhere the onward and upward movement is first made by a few whose superior gifts enable them to show what may be attained. This progressive leadership is always dramatic, and sometimes tragic. Its novelty inevitably incurs suspicion, and its disturbance of social peace brings swift resentment. Often the leader suffers persecution until, perhaps after his death, the worth of his ideas gains recognition. Again and again the slow crawl of civilization has eventually come into line with proposals which it had persistently rejected. Many a social commonplace of to-day, such as public education and governmental control of industry, was originally regarded as wild-eyed insanity.

Leadership is a matter of degrees, ranging from slight, casual, transitory predominance or mere "headmanship" to the permanence of genius and the scope of world power. Hence everyone may become in some measure a leader. There are few who have not been regarded, at one time or another, as worthy of imitation or obedience. In some circle, large or small, and in some special

field of social interest, one is looked upon as superior, and sets the example or gives the order which others follow. So the big boy rules the smaller ones, and the girl with personal charm and initiative attracts a following. So too in every occupational or recreational group there is someone whose words carry authority or whose ways are copied. Special capabilities, flashes of ingenuity, and steady wisdom eventually come to the surface of life, and win the approval of associates. The major leadership in human affairs belongs to those whose extraordinary powers place them distinctly above the mass. Human history is largely the record of great men, their ideas and their deeds.

There are two principal types of leadership which we may term the intellectual and the executive. The former includes advances in science and philosophy, novel productions of imaginative art, fresh moral and religious teaching. It is essentially the excogitation of new ideas, theoretical, aesthetic, or practical. Emanating from it, scientific discoveries spread widely among the intelligent; so, too, great artists found schools; and from time to time some man of God revivifies the religious interest of society. Executive leadership is the practical arrangement of human relations and the command of men. It makes plans, organizes subordinates, and gives orders. The political life of the city and the nation depends upon this type, as does the operation of industry and commerce, and the activity of innumerable social groups having recreational or philanthropic aims. The two types frequently blend in the individual, but they may be quite separate. The artist or thinker is often rather helpless in practical dealing with men, and the forceful executive may possess only an average equipment of ideas. It is a commonplace fact that many of the important achievements of

society have been the work of persons of second-rate intellectual capacity but extraordinary power of will.

Further, let us note the distinction between attraction and compulsion in leadership. The former sort receives voluntary acceptance; it enlists a following by its inherent truth or personal charm. The latter operates on a basis of force and fear. Some leaders in practical affairs win the spontaneous loyalty of their subordinates by their sympathy and enthusiasm; they seldom resort to devices of authority. Others maintain themselves and accomplish their aims only by sheer command. A man or woman of superior executive talent may combine a fascinating personality with forceful domination.

All human leadership is ultimately personal. It often appears to come from organizations, such as the church, the political party, and the labor union. Indeed it would seem that the size of social groups and the huge social tasks of the present day necessitate an organized leadership, in which particular personalities may be quite inconspicuous, or may derive their power from the organization. Boards, councils, and committees are requisite; and their enactments may not bear conspicuous evidence of the determining touch of any single mind. But always we may find at the center of such institutional control, if we look carefully, the intelligence or authority of some one or a few individuals.

Characteristics of the Leader.—What are the essential qualities which distinguish the leader and upon which his function depends? First, of course, *superior power.* This may be physical or mental, intellectual or practical, power of thought or of will. In animal groups it is the strongest which dominates. Among children likewise the qualities of strength and energy tend to put their possessors to the fore. Boy gangs and some maturer associations,

such as athletic teams and certain labor organizations, are usually led by the physically superior. Statistical investigations have shown that leaders in various executive fields are slightly above the average in height and weight. There is a suggestion of compelling power in large or muscular physique which in addition to other traits is of considerable advantage. Diminutive stature is likely to be a handicap to the executive, though it may be offset by other qualities, as in the case of Napoleon and Sheridan, and because of its accentuation of these may even become an asset.

Mere physical superiority is never sufficient, however. Leadership, in general, is a quality of mind rather than of body; or rather it is a complex of mental qualities, among which intelligence, insight, the ability to plan, initiative, and firmness are of primary importance. Most leadership is a combination of imagination and will, the readiness to undertake what in others would remain mere fancy. Vision and drive are the outstanding traits of great leaders.

Superiority, we should observe, gains effectiveness through prestige, the open or tacit acknowledgment of it by society. Sometimes, indeed, it seems largely inflation, the result of self-advertisement and uncritical public esteem. Many eminent figures shrink when one comes into close contact with them. Yet at bottom there is always to be found some distinctive excellence which wins admiration. In the spheres of science and art the superior power may fail of immediate recognition. Some of the world's great thinkers have gone to their graves in obscurity and neglect. But sooner or later their superiority received acknowledgment, and was perhaps enhanced by its tragic history, so that it shone the more brightly for all time. There is a general disposition in society to idolize and idealize those whom it accepts as its leaders.

Certain qualities of leadership deserve special emphasis. One is self-confidence. Not only superior power but the assurance of being right is requisite to supply the courage and determination which persist in the face of obstacles. Such assurance has served to carry discoverers and inventors over mountains of active and passive resistance. The inhibitory effect of ridicule and persecution is so great that a correspondingly forceful conviction on the part of the leader that his idea is sound or his plan feasible is needed to brace him against criticism and send him on his way. This quality may coexist with a good deal of occasional uncertainty and self-distrust. He has dubious moments, but at the critical time he dismisses his doubts and fear, and pushes firmly ahead.

Such self-assurance invites submission. Timid and perplexed as most persons are in an unfamiliar or difficult situation, they naturally accept the confident leader at his own estimate of himself. Hence calmness of utterance and firmness of tone command respect. The cool assumption of superiority has often served to dispirit opposition as well as to energize effort. Empires have grown around the core of self-confidence. Great commercial corporations arrogate to themselves an unquestioned supremacy. In lesser matters also persons who have found themselves placed in positions of authority have been astonished to discover how acquiescent was their following. In the field of literature controversial writers, who naturally express themselves in a positive manner, carry uncritical conviction to a multitude of readers. Negatively, too, the same principle holds. The loss of self-assurance foreshadows the waning of leadership. When Joan of Arc became doubtful of herself, her fate was sealed.

Leadership in practical affairs often depends not so much upon superior intellect as on distinctly social qual-

ities, such as commanding force, eloquence, and personal charm. "Social intelligence" consists of sympathy, tact, a quick intuition of the mind of others, and a ready faculty of giving directions and suggestions. Politicians possess it in relation to their following, as also do many successful executives in various fields. Combined with constructive ideas, these qualities distinguish the great leaders of men in statecraft and religion. Especially noteworthy is that peculiar charm of personality which fascinates those who come in contact with it, and which sometimes covers a multitude of defects. In an idealistic setting it becomes a most effective agency of social progress because it dis-arms criticism and propagates interest and enthusiasms. It is said that few persons could come in close contact with Theodore Roosevelt without being won over to his idealism. At worst the trait wins a blind and self-sacrificing loyalty to a bad cause.

Particular mention should be made in this connection of the gift of eloquent speech. In some fields, especially those having a political character, no quality is more requisite than readiness of tongue. So dependent upon verbal stimulation are we from early infancy, so responsive to ingratiating and to forceful utterance, that the disposition to accept leadership at its word-value is deeply ingrained in all of us. Hence politicians of small intellectual ability and of doubtful moral character are able in this way to secure a large following. In many organizations leadership tends to pass into the hands of the member with the most impressive speech, not necessarily with the soundest ideas. Some persons—the labor leader "Mother Jones" is a striking illustration—have the extraordinary power of inflaming their hearers to the point of reckless action by their impassioned utterance.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the leader

is *insight*. He can lead only as he appeals to some responsive trait of human nature; upon his discernment of this trait his success fundamentally turns. At the lowest level he must detect fear; at the highest an idealistic yearning, only half-conscious, it may be, which he can stimulate into active realization of its implicit aim. Animal instincts, ungratified desires, dim perceptions of truth, vague apprehensions of beauty, blind strivings toward moral betterment, such are the materials out of which he fashions his following.

In its least admirable form this quality constitutes that paradoxical figure, the leader who is essentially a follower; who, knowing how precarious is his position, practises the art of ascertaining what his party wants, and then moving toward it. At worst this method is unscrupulous demagoguery. In many cases its lack of independence and initiative merits contempt. Yet the leader who desires to retain power must incidentally keep his ear to the ground, and sensitively apprehend the sentiment with which he must inevitably work.

In its best manifestation this insight reaches depths of human nature so profound that their possessor is hardly aware of them. Then the leader elicits what is most worthy in his followers, shows them what they really desire, and draws them on to its attainment. Often the process is lengthy and discouraging. The deeper needs come only gradually to clear recognition; and hardened custom obstinately refuses to give way. Sometimes it requires the martyrdom of the leader to reveal the truth, and vitalize it in society. Idealistic leadership often has a tragic development. Perhaps accepted at first with ignorant enthusiasm, it presently loses favor, seems hard and disappointing, is subjected to ridicule, dethroned, and consigned to oblivion—only to live again as humanity reflects upon it and acknowledges its worth.

The Origin of Leadership.—Whence comes the leader? Is he born or made, a product of heredity or of environment? It has been maintained by some that leadership is primarily a response to environmental needs, perhaps only an average capability developed by education. Given a certain complex of unsettled social or cultural conditions, it is said, the leader steps forth to master them. But for the need he would have remained unknown. On the other hand it is asserted with equal positiveness that the advent of leadership is mainly independent of surrounding conditions, which at most are merely the occasion of its inevitable appearance, and which indeed it fashions to its own purpose. Coming from some strain of heredity, it proceeds by its own momentum to place itself above its environment, and gradually draws the latter to its own level.

Probably here as elsewhere with respect to the problem of the relative importance of heredity and environment, both views have a measure of truth but are exaggerated in their emphasis. The fact that the leader readily manifests such superior power would certainly seem to indicate that he possesses a corresponding superiority of innate capability. In extraordinary instances it appears that the impulse of this endowment, stimulated perhaps by some accident of circumstance, is sufficiently strong to realize itself creatively, even against discouraging obstacles. Thus great men occasionally rise from the most lowly surroundings, meeting and conquering difficulties by penetrating intelligence and indomitable will. But in general there must be appropriate conditions for the exercise of their ability, else it lies dormant. Doubtless many more persons possess the capacity of leadership in some field than ever demonstrate it. In any case the special form of the function, as a matter of detail, is due to

environmental conditions. It is not only quite conceivable but altogether likely that if Abraham Lincoln, born as he was, had happened through some vicissitude of early childhood to be reared in different surroundings, say those of an aristocratic Southern home, his part in American history would have been very different. His accumulation of experience through youth and early manhood would have cast him in some other rôle.

Many statistical studies have been made in order to ascertain to what extent extraordinary distinction is hereditary. Members of royal families, leaders in statecraft, eminent men of science, artists and other groups have constituted the material for such studies. The general conclusion reached by several investigators is that heredity is the major factor in the development of superior power. Great men of all sorts seem to run in families, a few of which appear to have supplied an astonishingly large number of distinguished figures. Genealogical investigation reveals hereditary strains which link the leader to others of his kind.[1]

We must not overlook certain qualifying facts, however. In the first place, the world's great have usually been reared in families and communities which supplied appropriate conditions, example, instruction, and encouragement, for their development. From early childhood they

[1] Sir Francis Galton ascertained that a group of nearly a thousand eminent men had *in toto* over five hundred relatives of similar eminence, whereas the same number of men taken at random from the population at large would have only four such eminent relatives. He concluded:

"1. That men who are gifted with high abilities . . . easily rise through all the obstacles caused by inferiority of social rank.

"2. Countries where there are fewer hindrances than in England, to a poor man's rising in life, produce a much larger proportion of persons of culture, but not of what I call eminent men.

"3. Men who are largely aided by social advantages are unable to achieve eminence, unless they are endowed with high natural gifts."

For a summary of this and other investigations see Starch, *Educational Psychology*, Chap. IV.

received conscious and subconscious impressions that the social or cultural milieu to which they belonged called for distinguished accomplishment. Continual contact with the superior and observation of their characteristic behavior helped to direct their own activity along lines of superior performance.

Secondly, we find that powerful figures occasionally emerge from the obscurity of humble birth, and attain eminence through the coöperation of circumstances. Focussing some public interest, desire, or need, perhaps by accident rather than by intention, they almost automatically assume the functions of leadership. Here again let us note the impressive fact that the leader is often constituted by the faith of followers quite as much as by original ability. Some conspicuous deed, some real or supposed superiority—it may be largely fictitious—suffices to elevate an individual to the level of command. The mass, with ingrained submissiveness and "hero-worship," insists on his becoming a leader whether he will or no, seeks his opinion on all subjects, acclaims and eulogizes him, demands his nomination to political office, and votes for him overwhelmingly, often without much knowledge of his real character or consideration of his fitness for the position. If he is a sort which can take ready advantage of this enthusiastic following, he can ride successfully for a while on the crest of its wave. Instances of this kind assure us that education and social environment combine strongly with inherited power in the production of greatness.

In some cases the special form which leadership assumes may be regarded as a "compensating" trait. A person who has been baffled in some aspiration, or perhaps is afflicted with some infirmity of nature such as lameness, facial irregularity, or defective speech, concentrates his energies on something which he can do well, and by dint

of hard work achieves outstanding success. Thus a physical weakling practises extraordinary shrewdness in making suggestions to his playmates; and the socially timid attains leadership in art or science.

Superior ability is less specialized than is commonly supposed. Within any one of the great fields of human performance, such as that of mechanical cleverness, science, art, or social organization, substantially the same qualities of intelligence, temperament, and character are needed, whatever the special pursuit. Given certain requisite capacities of a fundamental sort, such as muscular coördination, accuracy of sense-perception, and physical energy—capacities which are essential to the particular technique of an occupation—the leader in one division of the field might have held a similar position in various others if circumstances had happened to turn his interest thereto. The industrial magnate might have been a great general, the distinguished painter would have become equally distinguished in sculpture, the world-renowned authority in this science would have attained like renown in that, had their educational environment and stimulation been different.

Executive Leadership.—We have noted the distinction between the leadership of ideas, scientific, aesthetic, or moral, and the executive leadership which is skillful in managing social enterprises. In the long run these types prove to be equally important, but in a pragmatically minded society, interested principally in the accomplishment of organized economic and other social projects, the latter is more immediately in demand. Let us observe some of its characteristic features, and problems connected with it.

In its best form executive leadership combines vision of aim, quick perception of the needs of a situation, an

intelligent grasp of details, an authoritative will, ability to get along smoothly with superiors and subordinates, energy, firmness, and patience. Successful administrators of large organizations exhibit these qualities in high degree. Where others are baffled by the complexity of a practical problem, and stand helpless before social disorder, they grasp the principal features of the matter quickly and firmly, and proceed to organize its various parts and energies toward the desired end. They concentrate on what is fundamental and essential, and leave to subordinates the accomplishment of minor details. They know how and when to command, persuade, and appeal. Most of all they inspire those with whom they are associated to coöperate earnestly in the task.

The commonplace of practical wisdom that there is always room at the top applies to this kind of leadership. Every field of human enterprise needs able executives and has difficulty in finding the right persons for the work. Institutions composed of excellent subordinates may develop internal friction and fail of accomplishment mainly because there is no outstanding figure at the head, whose clearness of purpose and firmness of touch give steadiness to the whole. Sometimes we see one unsuccessful administrator follow another, each perhaps possessing zeal, intelligence, and power, but unable in some important respect to perform the functions of executive leadership. When the right one is found, no compensation seems too large to pay for his efficiency. Furthermore, such positions are precarious. A sudden change of conditions may lead to erratic action, the incessant strain of responsibility may undermine self-confidence, the pressure of discontent among subordinates may unbalance judgment, with the result of destroying executive efficiency. Many a social administrator skates on thin ice.

What is the source of this extraordinary power to direct the affairs of men? Like other traits it is both innate and acquired. Based on inborn self-assertiveness, it early begins to learn the art of imposing its will upon others. It learns how to relate individuals to different parts of a project, how to command, how to meet dissent and insubordination, how to save energy by silence while persisting in action, and so on. Continually gaining new ideas of method in directing operations, discovering possible refinements of organization and subtleties of control, perhaps aided also by established position and the docility of society toward the strong, it assumes more and more competently the offices for which it is fitted by inborn nature. Fundamentally its power is due to heredity, but no less genuinely is it a product of experience.

Training for executive leadership comes in part through the crudely organized projects of childhood and the more complex coöperative performances of youth. Especially in group sports and social clubs there is opportunity for the development of administrative efficiency. School life, including that of the college and university, affords many facilities for the practical as well as the intellectual education of social leaders. Athletic and fraternal organizations are potential breeding-grounds of skillful executives. Military training produces one form of efficient leadership, though the atmosphere of military command differs from that of the institutions of civil life, so that the successful military officer is not necessarily qualified for civil administration. In the latter case, to a greater extent than in the former, tact and persuasiveness must occasionally replace the use of sheer authority and rigid discipline.

The shortcomings of the school in the training of leaders are its failure to inculcate sound ideas of social aims and

human relations, without which executive leadership is likely to become narrow and group-selfish, and its lack of mature example and direction which should serve as a pattern for juvenile imitation. Perhaps this is inevitable since teachers, in general, are intellectual specialists rather than persons of wide social interests and practical affairs; but it is nevertheless unfortunate that the period of professional training does not produce a more studied ability to lead. As a matter of fact, youth frequently conducts its organized enterprises quite as efficiently as do its scholastic elders. Yet it occasionally needs the pattern of maturity and the counsel of older heads in order to learn methods and avoid difficulties. Military organization has the advantages of presenting a graded scale of exemplars for those who desire to learn. Its rigidity and social aims, however, limit its value as training for leadership.

We may question also whether our industrial and professional systems do not entrust their leadership too exclusively to individuals of long experience and proved conservatism. The advantages of this method are obvious, but it fails to confer upon younger members the needed responsibilities and opportunities for independent decision, without which real leaders cannot be trained. The result is stability rather than progress; and the stability is likely to be temporary, since inevitable changes of conditions necessitate appropriate responses in administration. Younger executives will perhaps make more mistakes in detail, but they will learn more quickly through experience, will more easily adapt themselves and the system to altered conditions, and in the long run will make more progress.

Organized Leadership.—The functions of leadership in practical affairs must usually be exercised through

organization. The huge extent of the "public" of to-day and the impossibility of bringing all parts of it into personal contact with a leader make it necessary to use systematic methods of presenting causes and winning allegiance. Further, the continuation of a cause which was originally due to a single leader calls for the organized coöperation of a group. Social projects are so complex, also, that they can be carried on only in a way which formally relates their different features. So the church, the school, the press, labor unions and commercial associations, political parties, and a multitude of lesser bodies, all attain their objectives by organized effort.

All leadership, as we have remarked, is ultimately personal, the ideas and acts of a particular individual. Hence there is always to be found in organizations a single person or a little group which is the center of the system, and whose thought and labor determine the behavior of the whole. The organization reflects their interest, their wisdom, and their character. But it is also true that its own established character tends to affect them in various ways which are of psychological interest. Let us note several important implications of organized leadership.

First, it constitutes under favorable conditions a tremendous extension of power. Not only does the labor of subordinates multiply that of the leader; it also leaves him free to devote himself to the functions which are most vital for the welfare and success of the group. He can devise plans with the assurance that they will be executed. His determination is strengthened by the consciousness of support. Secondly, organization tends to accentuate its own importance, and the necessity of keeping it running smoothly, even to the extent of losing sight of its original purpose. Formal aims are minimized in com-

parison with internal harmony, and with secondary objectives which develop in the course of time. Many organizations seem to reach a point where their real interest is in their own perpetuation and in social enjoyment rather than in their professed purposes. Sometimes the internal strain and creaking of the various parts is such as quite to distract attention from the main aim, and to necessitate frequent administrative adjustment. All this calls for a certain type of leadership, usually very different from the original sort.

Third, the leaders of an organization feel the responsibility of their position so deeply that they tend to become cautious and conservative. They cannot ignore the traditions of the group or display much originality without jeopardizing their leadership. Both the formal traditions and the informal sentiment of the organization lessen their independence. Hence the party leader sticks faithfully to the traditional ideas and practices of his party. The ministry of the church is for the most part addicted to intellectual conformity. Editorial writers find themselves limited to safe and sane utterances which do not offend their readers or their advertisers. It is ludicrous to observe how thoroughly the individual sometimes succumbs to social pressure and loses his independence of thought upon taking office, how completely he changes his mind with respect to public questions as the organized group spirit takes possession of him. This does not necessarily imply insincerity, but rather a new consciousness of the conditions of effective leadership, the futility and danger of pressing forward too hastily, the importance of avoiding conflict and chaos within the organization. He feels that public sentiment must point unmistakably in the new direction before he can safely leave the accustomed path.

Finally, there is a danger in large organizations whose purposes affect the political and economic structure of society, that the leaders will become subservient to the class interests of wealth and power. The social ramifications of the cause may bring officials into such close and agreeable personal relations with these classes as to take them out of sympathetic touch with their constituency. Also organized operations are expensive, and the requisite pecuniary resources may come in considerable measure from individuals who desire first and foremost to maintain their own class supremacy, and who expect a *quid pro quo* for their contributions. Meanwhile the rank and file of the group, satisfied with certain formal accomplishments and unaware of the trend of authority, fail to hold officialdom to its duty. So even a devoted and energetic leader may find himself increasingly enmeshed in a restraining web of social and financial relationships.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we see that each of the principal organizations which constitute society has its special advantages with regard to social leadership and also its dangers and defects. The school, the church, and the press, to take three outstanding illustrations, reach large numbers of the population in ways which are peculiarly effective. The school, including the college and university, envelops the individual at the time when he is most suggestible to new ideas, and conveys its instruction with the assurance of scholarship. The church speaks with moral conviction, and clothes its doctrines with an impressive sanctity of form. The press supplies the public with fresh information and comment which define and solidify opinion. In every case we observe enlightenment and the spirit of progress struggling against formalism, conservatism, and subserviency to selfish interest. Now the truth bursts forth

with power and promise; now it seems hopelessly obscured by mists of tradition and prejudice. So society follows along devious paths, with much inner conflict and perhaps some real advancement in welfare.

Similar comments might be made upon the leadership of political parties, commercial bodies, labor unions, and the innumerable host of minor organizations which prosecute social purposes of one sort and another. In general they display the characteristics which have already been noted, a set of ideas and sentiments about social welfare, a reinforcing of individual activity in some social direction, a restraint of originality, and a conservative trend occasionally disturbed by a resurgence of the spirit of freedom and progress.

CHAPTER XI

MALADJUSTMENT

General Character; Principal Types.—Maladjustment is the failure to sustain harmonious social relations. It is a matter of many forms and degrees. In some cases the maladjusted individual cannot take adequate care of himself in a normal social environment, and hence requires special assistance and protection. Sometimes he is a helpless victim of abuse. In many instances he is abnormally inclined to personal conflict with those around him. In still others he shows a persistent effort to outwit social or legal authority in the attainment of desire. Stupidity, timidity, irritability, quarrelsomeness, criminal inclinations, insanity of numerous kinds—long and varied is the list of social defects. From idiocy to the keenest criminal intelligence, from petty fault-finding to homicidal mania, the scales of maladjustment run through innumerable degrees and shadings of mental irregularity. Any inability to attain normal human happiness in association with one's fellows, or disposition to inflict needless suffering upon others, may be regarded as falling within this general category.

The condition of maladjustment is collective as well as individual. There are groups, classes, and organizations, whose poverty or social position or collective purposes are sources of social strain. Antagonism between capital and labor, conflicts of science with ecclesiasticism, opposition of traditional and advanced ideals of womanhood, political tyranny and revolution, international enmity

and war, all reveal maladjustment on a huge scale. Group maladjustment is of course a summation of individual cases. But we should also observe that the individual case may be highly accentuated by group membership. Social limitations are exaggerated by class consciousness. Persons who are otherwise agreeable enough, or at least endurable, become insufferable as representatives of maladjusted groups, for example a gang of juvenile mischief-makers, or a self-constituted and supercilious aristocracy. Organization may release impulses which are socially disruptive. In the last analysis, however, maladjustment like other aspects of social psychology is an individual phenomenon.

It is due in varying measure to peculiarities of instinctive and emotional endowment, lack of intelligence, and faulty education. Often it has a definitely innate basis, *i.e.* some deficiency or excess of physical or mental function which must be attributed to original nature. In large part it is the result of environmental influences, overstimulation, bad example, injustice, and so on. In some cases the general pressure of surrounding social life produces occasional or periodic states of mental rebellion, like recurrent disease. The organized institutions of society, such as schools, churches, courts, legislatures, and even the family, incidentally create a good deal of maladjustment by attempts to restrain the individual will or force it into channels to which it is opposed. This coercion may be necessary for the welfare of society, but it inevitably produces much social friction. In addition to such causes we must reckon the books, magazines, and newspapers which in various ways stir up antagonisms and provoke outbursts. Much of this "literature of discontent" makes a specific business of fomenting maladjustment. Further it should be noted that the failure of the

individual to harmonize himself with his social environment sometimes takes highly reflective forms, such as the studied criticism and imaginative reconstruction of society, or the shrewd calculation of wrong-doing, and expert defiance of law. In every case internal and external factors combine to produce personal unhappiness and instability of social life.

Maladjustment is not always due to pathological conditions in the individual. Often it consists simply in a lack of adaptation to a particular kind of social environment, which may itself be at fault in failing to provide normal opportunities for self-expression and development. Thus excessive restraint of youthful nature results in the runaway pursuit of adventure or in secret romance. Inadequate facilities for play are in considerable part the cause of juvenile criminality. The moneyless youngster surrounded by fascinating moving pictures is not unlikely to steal and sell small articles in order to gratify his natural liking for pictorial amusement. Here we have social rather than strictly individual pathology.

On the other hand, much maladjustment may be regarded as analogous to disease. Its various types may be thought of psychologically as falling into the principal categories of general mental deficiency, or some special excess or lack of mental function, or a failure to harmonize divergent interests, or inability to sustain a satisfactory sentiment of self-respect. At worst they are dangerous forms of insanity. Commonly they are petty disharmonies of social contact, exasperating habits, of laziness, chronic fretfulness, bumptious egotism, and so on. Some have as their mental root a profound division between two incompatible desires of the self, neither of which is relinquished. The "divided self" is essentially out of harmony with its environment. Many are expressions of

conscious or subconscious inferiority, which the self is unwilling to acknowledge, or from which it seeks to escape through defensive or compensatory actions. Like diseases, these troubles call for expert diagnosis and treatment.

Minor Maladjustments.—The maladjustments which are most common are not seriously pathological, yet they are sufficient in many instances to interfere seriously with the harmony of social life. The failure to get along smoothly with one's associates, especially in the organized institutions of society, is universally prevalent in various degrees. Most of this friction is so slight and transitory that it hardly deserves mention, but a considerable amount of it is intense and persistent enough to call for psychological study. Headstrong impulses and unrestrained temper, chronic selfishness, fault-finding, and disagreeable personal habits, oversensitiveness, self-pity, and so on, are the sources of nine-tenths of human unhappiness. Such traits may hardly be regarded as mental disease, yet their effect is often quite as bad. They embitter existence to an extent wholly disproportionate to their essentially trivial character.

Most of these disharmonies are clearly related to the sentiment of self-appreciation; they express a lack of balance between the tendencies of self-assertion and submission. In some cases they are due to the awareness of bodily defects, in others to conscious social inferiority. Physical ugliness or disfigurements, and environmental repressions from which the individual cannot escape, tend to produce a constant mental background of alienation, or chronic bumptiousness of effort to compel respect. The bearer of these burdens is continually reminded of them. Settling as habits of thought and feeling and behavior, they keep their victim poignantly estranged from or at odds with his social environment.

Here we have what is known both technically and popularly as the "inferiority complex." Strictly speaking, this much-abused term signifies a persistent feeling of social subjection, which expresses itself in varied, and sometimes indirect and puzzling, efforts to escape from the unfortunate plight or to compel respect. The source of this condition may be as insignificant in itself as a facial blemish, red hair, an undersized physique, awkwardness of movement, or a stammering tongue, but it attains importance in the mind of the bearer because it subjects him to real or fancied contempt. Without any physical defect, too, one may feel a constant social inferiority, as one whose desires, opinions, and abilities are not worth considering. In such an unfortunate the belittling comparison of himself with others, or smoldering resentment against the injustice of the matter, settles deeply in the mind and instigates all sorts of attempts at adjustment.

These efforts are partly defensory and partly compensatory. They are designed both to enhance one's self-respect and to command the respect of others. So the physically inferior person struts or assumes a solemn pomposity of manner, or turns assiduously to intellectual pursuits, or cultivates some special artistic ability. The tongue-tied develops athletic skill, the timid practices brusqueness of speech, the unbeautiful resorts to studied effects of dress and cosmetics. More subtly, the victim of an inferiority complex may indulge in much day-dreaming of himself in fancied positions of social eminence, or as retaliating upon his tormentors. Or he may exaggerate his social importance by emphasizing his very defect or helplessness, and by making covert appeal for sympathy. On the whole the introvert tends toward internal adjustments, the extrovert toward objective

achievement, in compensation for felt inferiority or defense against social depreciation.

Maladjustments appear incipiently in childhood, especially where the sprouting will fails to receive appropriate recognition and discipline. Neglect, contempt and ridicule, inadequate opportunities for self-expression and the arbitrary thwarting of the natural desires of childhood, on the one hand, and on the other the evils of overstimulation, too much attention and pampering are unwise modes of treatment which sow the seeds of later maladjustment. During adolescence the enlarged horizon of ambition and the increasing self-sufficiency of approaching maturity create friction with elders, perhaps intensified by the disinclination of the latter to allow youth the needed experiences of shifting for itself. Sex relations also involve much difficulty of adjustment at this time, and the failure to develop a rational combination of normal sex association and specific restraint is likely to lead to later neuroticism or demoralization. These natural conditions and tendencies of unformed selfhood call for more sympathetic insight and wiser ministration than they ordinarily receive. In most cases, of course, the individual manages to get along, and perhaps ultimately escapes into a more favorable environment, though often with a lifelong burden of disheartened, or nervously unstable, or morally perverted character. The marital and occupational maladjustments so prevalent in society are to a great extent outgrowths of unsettled difficulties of early years. Domestic disharmony and industrial conflict are in no small measure the result of defective education in self-assertion and self-control.

It is a noteworthy fact that most of the troubles which prevent human beings from getting along comfortably with one another are of a trivial sort in their original mani-

festations. A right attitude toward them at the start would have made lifelong difference in the attainment of happiness. But the basic trait of self-regard, unwisely directed, took a permanently wrong slant. The unsuccessful effort to dominate, or the experience of petty injustice or of ridicule, left a rankling discontent which followed lines of resentment and retaliation, of covert insubordination and defensive gesture, lines which led from bad to worse until they constantly charged the social atmosphere with stormy tension. The accumulation of pin-pricks produced a pervasive and settled rancor which rendered happiness impossible, but only because the individual had not learned to meet them with indifference.

Another important psychological fact is the tendency of maladjustment to ramify beyond the particular social setting in which it appears. Thus domestic trouble leads to difficulties with neighbors or with employers. The real source of friction in a shop or a school may sometimes be found in the unsocial character of the individual's home life, the irksome restraints or chronic antagonisms in which produce cantankerous reactions elsewhere. Spite and persecution in the domestic circle leave a smoldering sentiment of retaliation which irrationally but automatically works off against other persons. Often the real causes of a child's difficulties in school are to be sought in family circumstances which breed bad general habits of social intercourse. Both in children and in their elders the effects of neglect, of nagging, and of brutality are felt far beyond their original manifestations.[1]

Accordingly the current efforts in schools, colleges,

[1] General Goethals, writing about the difficulties encountered in building the Panama Canal, remarks that an extra rocking-chair in the house of a particular workman would interfere perceptibly with the progress of the work. The houses, built by the canal administration, were presumably alike in equipment, and any superiority of one, however trifling, made trouble in the domestic atmosphere of others which affected attention to the job.

department stores, and factories to render skilled attention and aid to individual need is a most important social advance. Habit-clinics, personnel directors, and everyday investigations of minor psychiatrical difficulties are becoming common features of organized institutional life. There is some danger of too much attention to such difficulties, too much sympathy with faults which need more summary treatment. Excessive concern may exaggerate the evil in particular cases. To a considerable extent the individual sufferer must learn to make his own adjustments. Yet he usually needs help in doing this, help which in countless instances he can obtain only from someone trained for the task. Hence the directors of large scholastic and industrial groups are discovering the desirability of providing such assistance. Just as the responsibility for medical attention to disease or physical injury is taken as a matter of course, so the necessity of maintaining mental as well as bodily health is receiving increasing acknowledgemnt. Vastly important as is the former, it is no more significant for human accomplishment and happiness than is the trained psychological ability to smooth out the roughness of everyday social life.

Psycho-neurotic Disorders.—An extensive category of social maladjustments is that of the psycho-neuroses, namely neurasthenia, psychasthenia, and hysteria. Physiologically these are functional disorders of the nervous system. Psychologically they are irregularities of cognition, feeling and emotion, and volition, manifesting themselves as difficulties of social adjustment, the failure in some respect to adapt one's behavior to the requirements of social life. Their symptoms are extremely varied, often bafflingly subtle. We shall note only the principal ones.

Neurasthenia has for its central feature an excessive fatiguability, partly real, partly imaginary. The feeling

of weariness which obsesses the neurasthenic is largely "false fatigue," quite without adequate basis of physical exertion, but it is nevertheless a genuine and troublesome mental fact, sufficient to constitute a serious handicap in the effortful business of life. Irritability is also a characteristic feature. A person of this type is supersensitive, especially to social stimulation, sometimes finding it unendurable, sometimes an irresistible intoxication of excitement. Under favorable conditions he or she is alert, agreeable, even fascinating. But the inevitable pressure and annoyances of daily life tend to produce moodiness and crankiness, a disposition to disagree and to criticize, or a nervous frailty which exalts the slightest misfortune and is forever seeking sympathy. Unreasonable fears and worries, unhealthy self-pity and futile self-condemnation are also the burden of the neurasthenic mind. These and other symptoms may be regarded as expressions of intense self-consciousness, emotionally quick and assertive, but weak or unsteady in accomplishment. Many of them are easily understood as "defense-mechanisms," or subconsciously directed efforts to assert or maintain or protect one's individuality. Thus the predominating fatigue-consciousness may be a subtle apology for failure to face the buffetings of life. The nervous explosion which attracts sympathetic or distressed attention is felt as a display of power.

While neurasthenia has a physical basis in the nervous, muscular, and glandular systems, there are many contributing causes. Improper food and drink, insufficient sleep, and sexual abuse not infrequently play a part in producing it. In some cases it is a by-product of bodily disease. Excessive physical and especially social stimulation in early childhood may serve to establish the irritability-fatigue neurosis. There is also reason for thinking

that unwise restraint of natural inclinations occasionally engenders a lasting and spreading neurasthenic tendency. The symptoms are essentially habitual, however. The neurasthenic usually enjoys and cultivates his weakness, finding such satisfaction in his peculiar behavior that it constantly settles as a bad habit. Hence a cardinal rule for dealing with persons of this type is to pay kindly attention to their needs but not to encourage or humor them in exhibiting their symptoms.

In many instances the nervous disorder focusses in some peculiar quirk of mind, some obsessing bit of mental imagery, idea, feeling, or persistent impulse, which is essentially undesirable. Thus a phantom face or the inexpugnable thought of something disgusting may become an unqualified nuisance. There is a long list of irrational fears, such as the fear of open spaces, or of closed places, of dirt, of germs, and dozens of other things, which occasionally manifest annoying fixity and intensity in the stream of consciousness. General or special "anxiety neuroses" perhaps belong in this group. The individual knows that they are irrational, but he cannot control them. They are probably due in most cases to some particular experience, possibly in childhood and long since forgotten, sometimes the casual reading or hearing of an accident, which gave rise to a bad imaginative or emotional habit that refused to be dislodged. The psychasthenic impulsions, such as kleptomania, pyromania, and exhibitionism, are also bad habits, outgrowths of a particular experience and of general nervous and psychic instability. Many psychasthenic traits are interpretable as symbolic expressions of repressed emotions and tendencies to action. They are eliminated by discovery of their origin, and appropriate reëducation.

Hysteria was recognized in ancient times as an abnor-

mal excitement, expressing itself in spasmodic laughter and weeping—what is today commonly called "hysterics." These are only the more familiar items in a long list of symptoms of the greatest variety, including other muscular spasms and contractures, false paralysis of limbs or vocal muscles, apparent anaesthesia to all kinds of sensory stimulus, even those normally producing intense pain, amnesia, illusions and hallucinations, the simulation of disease, somnambulism, fugues, *i.e.* the running away and wandering about in a somewhat dissociated mental condition, and varied and more or less extensive alterations of personality. A particular case may be characterized by any or all of these symptoms, which in the severer forms of the disorder appear and disappear in baffling sequence.[2]

The physiological basis of hysteria is the lack of nervous integration, as in the preceding types of psycho-neurosis. Particular emotional experiences and mentally unhealthy conditions of social life furnish the instigation and contributory causation of the malady. Sometimes the roots are to be found in a self-assertive interest which is thwarted by family relationships or by religion. This is in fact essentially a disorder of the self-conscious personality in relation to social environment, a failure to adapt one's self to social circumstances. It ranges from heightened emotional excitement with spasmodic muscular movements to the most complicated dissociations of self-consciousness. Childish tantrums sometimes present elementary features of it. The emotional storm and stress of adolescence occasionally seek an outlet in this way. Many famous personages of history have unquestionably been of hysterical nature, and have even owed their fame

[2] Many religious cures of apparent bodily infirmities, such as paralysis and blindness, are undoubtedly to be explained as the temporary or permanent removal of hysterical symptoms.

to hysterical behavior, which seemed, as in the case of Joan of Arc, to indicate supernatural power.

The more severe cases proceed from some kind of inner conflict. When a person naturally endowed with nervous instability develops such conflict, for example between strong desire and moral inhibition, or between deep affection and the knowledge that it is unrequited, or between profoundly incompatible aims and interests, casual restraints may produce hysterical symptoms. The mere fact of conflict is not in itself sufficient, for conflicts within and without are inevitable, and most of them are settled in ways which preclude hysteria—indomitable persistency of purpose, or submission, or a rational adjustment of the conflicting interests. Nor is the "repression," about which so much is said in contemporary psychology, necessarily to blame. Much impulsiveness must be and is properly repressed without inducing hysterical consequences. The latter come through the unyielding persistence of both of the incompatible emotions or desires, and the failure to maintain a self-conscious unity in the matter. The result is a form of behavior, or perhaps many of them, which symbolically express one of the competing interests, but escape the inhibitory influence of the other. So the distraught individual exhibits a blindness or paralysis which serves to relieve him of an intensely disagreeable duty,[3] or runs away from the social scene which produced the conflict. In extreme cases the personality splits into two or more fairly complete personal systems, manifesting different characteristics, and thus relieving the conflict by surrender of unified selfhood.

Insanity.—What we ordinarily call insanity, or the "psychoses," as they are termed in technical parlance,

[3] Hysterical dissociation is a matter of degrees. In many instances the hysteric is patently using his symptoms as a means of arousing sympathy and overcoming resistance.

are the more extreme forms of mental disorder, those which are characterized by the greatest abnormalities of mental function, resulting in loss of intelligent self-control and social adaptation. Usually the ideas, emotions, and impulses of insane persons constitute a grave danger, constant, periodic, or occasional, to themselves or to others. In general there is such inability to take care of one's self, or to live a normal social life, that special attention, guidance, and restraint, are necessary. Insanity was anciently regarded as due to the presence of supernatural spirits, especially demons, which invaded the victim and produced his queer behavior. It is still looked upon commonly as an essentially peculiar kind of mental being, a psychic entity, mysterious and awful. Psychology shows that it is nothing but the exaggeration, deficiency, or perverted combination of mental functions and processes which are in themselves essentially normal.

The principal types of psychosis possessing interest for social psychology are dementia praecox, manic-depressive insanity, and paranoia.[4] These are grand divisions of a vast domain, still an imperfectly charted wilderness of obscure and baffling facts, through which various psychiatric theories and practices are cutting explorative paths. Some authorities believe that the predominating causes are organic bodily defects, especially in the tissue and connections of the nervous system. Much recent speculation traces the causation to distinctly psychic conditions, and regards insane behavior as indicative of conscious maladjustment, from which the individual subconsciously seeks escape.

Dementia praecox is the early and progressive degenera-

[4] Certain types of insanity, particularly epilepsy, paresis, and senile dementia, are mainly the expression of organic physiological conditions. Some epileptoid seizures show distinctly psychic origin. All types involve disorders of social consciousness.

tion of mental function, exhibiting itself primarily as a loss of interest and volitional energy, secondarily as a weakening of intellectual and emotional processes. The well-advanced patient of this type shows continual apathy, without ambition or hope, or even ordinary ability to make decisions in small matters. The stream of ideation is feeble, dull fancy with little or no rational synthesis. Such emotions as appear are weak and inappropriate, irrelevant joys and sorrow, traces of unintelligent fear and suspicion. Speech is thick, conversation incoherent. Cases differ considerably in their special features, but the underlying apathy and loss of mental power are universal. The disorder usually appears in early life, chiefly in late youth or early maturity, and progresses to a stage in which the victim is hopelessly incapable of normal social intercourse. There is considerable evidence in favor of the theory that the disease is a dissociative rather than a genuine lack or annihilation of mental function, differing profoundly in this respect from feeble-mindedness, and is essentially a subconscious retreat from the pressure of social life.

Manic-depressive insanity is the alternation of acute excitement and mental depression. Either phase may exist by itself, but the combination is so frequent as to constitute a distinct type. Mania is characterized by a rapid flow of ideas, constant motor activity, especially speech, and heightened cheerfulness, easily turned to violent anger. Attention is constantly on the jump, and there is much erratic movement, with no continuity of effort. Deliberate purpose, reflective judgment, and self-restraint are lacking. The antithetical condition ranges from mild melancholia, brooding and cheerless, to approximate stupor. Hallucinations and delusions about self and associates are common, and these may lead to

homicidal attacks. In general, however, the disease is less hopeless than the other types of psychosis. Patients not infrequently recover.

Paranoia is a perversion of cognitive thought. The patient entertains most absurd delusions about himself and his relations to others, elaborating these in crookedly rational fashion, and resisting with shrewd or excited argument every attempt to dispel them. Especially characteristic is the belief that he is persecuted by his family and acquaintances, that the latter are continually and wickedly trying to injure him. These ideas are accompanied by further false interpretations, very commonly "delusions of grandeur." The victim is harried because he is a person of importance, one of royal lineage, or great wealth, or a savior of mankind, whose power is feared. Or he has made some invaluable discovery or invention which his enemies seek to steal. The danger that such delusions will lead to attack is obvious. In women paranoia sometimes takes the form of utterly untrue accusations directed at men of high character. Probably the root of every case is a failure of the self to realize its aims and ambitions, some feeling of inferiority which the individual tries to "rationalize" away. In many instances the resulting delusion is sufficiently mild so that the individual continues to live in society without dangerous eccentricity of behavior. The severer cases are hopeless, and require isolation.

Insanity is a widely prevalent form of maladjustment in contemporary society. Statistics seem to show that it is increasing, though the figures in part merely indicate improved diagnosis. Also many cases such as were formerly cared for in private isolation are now segregated in asylums. The hospital records frequently reveal a family history of mental instability, the inheritance of

which is supplemented by such contributory factors as alcohol, drugs, sexual excess, overwork, and various environmental strains. The psychological essence of the matter is very commonly a will unable to hold its own against the pressure of surrounding society. So many of the special forms prove to be abnormalities of self-regard, indicative of inner conflict, that we are justified in laying emphasis upon the psychic as distinct from the bodily basis.[5]

Feeble-Mindedness.—Another large class of maladjustments is that of subnormal intelligence. In general the feeble-minded are not able to live without more than usual assistance, or to compete with normal individuals in the life of society. This is a matter of many degrees, ranging from an almost utter lack of even sense-perceptual function to a mentality barely and uncertainly distinguishable from the normal. The condition is due for the most part to native defect of nervous or glandular constitution.

The higher grades of feeble-mindedness constitute the category of the moron. In this type the mental age, as indicated by test, may reach eleven or twelve years. Physical defects of a minor sort are frequent, though not always conspicuous. The approximation of the high-grade moron to normal intelligence, appearance, and behavior, is often so close that his deficiency escapes detection, especially if he is well-trained within the limits of his ability. In the lower grades the mental condition is that of unmistakable dullness. Perception may show sensory acuity, but lacks penetration and interpretative depth. The as-

[5] Peculiarly interesting is the fact that insanity in the army is three times as prevalent as in the civilian population. This high rate is explained partly as selection of the mentally unstable, partly as the effect of certain physical causes which accompany military life, partly as the result of army discipline. Some individuals yield easily to the latter, and even find in it a satisfactory channel of self-expression. Others maintain a subconscious rebellion which, aided perhaps by other factors, produces insanity.

sociative functions work superficially and mechanically, with little fixity of purpose or independence of control. Abstract thought lies beyond the mental reach, hence problems which call for reasoning present insuperable difficulty. A characteristic feature is the easy lapse of mental alertness. Voluntary attention cannot be sustained; the mind is quickly confused and becomes erratic in performing tasks which demand it. Emotional appreciation and response lack the flavor of intelligence, usually refinement and delicacy also. The simple and boisterous sense of humor is easily touched by crude jokes and by trivialities of unexpected happening. The moron is affectionate, jealous, or vindictive, but not in any subtle way. His occasional criminality is that of ignorance and passion, blind impulse, unable to comprehend the more distant consequences of conduct. On the other hand his kindly disposition toward associates and fidelity to simple duty may go far toward compensating for his lack of intelligence.

Unfortunately the circumstances of his life usually conspire to impress his inferiority upon him consciously. The inevitable discovery of incapacity in comparison with others, supplemented too commonly by caustic ridicule, produces an inferiority-consciousness which operates as a deep and pervasive influence in his experience, producing a constant inhibition to effort and a feeling of helplessness. Yet the mental condition is far from hopeless. In general morons are teachable, and may even attain a considerable degree of practical efficiency. Certain kinds of task, mostly of a routine sort, in household, farm, and factory, lie within their range of intelligence; and they may be so successful in these, and so well disposed socially, as to deserve respect as useful members of society. The social problem with regard to them is fundamentally that of

appropriate education. They need, especially in the lower grades, to be segregated for training in order that they may receive sympathetic treatment and may escape as far as possible the harmful suggestion of their inferiority. Where this is impossible, intelligent and kindly instruction may nevertheless serve to make them self-supporting and socially acceptable.

The next lower grade of subnormal intelligence is that of imbecility. This shows distinctly less ability to learn, amounting at most to the acquisition of simple motor skills, such as piling wood or folding towels. Voluntary attention in any high degree is impossible, and the associative functions underlying perception are conspicuously deficient. There is slight comprehension of significant relationships of persons and things, and obedience to simple command. Meaningful speech is limited to single words or the simplest sentences. The volitional nature may be docile or stubborn, but is stupid in either case. Suggestibility is great enough to lead to cruel or disgusting behavior without understanding its social significance. The higher emotions such as intelligent sympathy and shame are wholly lacking. Altogether the type is that of a child, perhaps with strong animal impulses but without sufficient intelligence to afford safe self-direction under ordinary social conditions. The mental age runs to six or seven years.

Feeble-mindedness of the kinds just described is accompanied or relieved in a few cases by extraordinary facility in some mental function. This may be sensory, for example, a distinctly superior acuity of vision or hearing. In some instances it is mnemonic, an unfailing fixity of memory by impression, lacking in comprehension of meaning but photographically accurate in detail. An individual of this sort can repeat whatever he hears

verbatim, or carry unfailing memory images of a multitude of trivial happenings. In the moron such superiority may issue in some special form of occupational skill which confers dignity upon the possessor and enhances his self-respect.

Another variant type, more significant for our consideration, is the so-called "moral imbecile." This kind of person may not show conspicuous deficiency of intelligence, but rather a total absence or an absurd perversion of sympathy, and an utter lack of conscience in social relations. As a child such a pervert is likely to enjoy torturing animals and smaller children. Later he or she commits the foulest, most atrocious crimes, seemingly without the slightest inner repugnance, as in the case of a nurse girl who caused the death of several babies because their crying annoyed her. On the other hand the same individual may be foolishly sentimental over trifles. The condition is probably the result of innate abnormality of instinct and emotion, as well as of defective moral training. Careful examination is said to reveal accompanying deficiencies of intelligence, though these may be comparatively slight.[6]

Idiocy is the mental limitation which never advances beyond the functions characteristic of the first two or three years of normal individual and social life. This type is very commonly marked by more or less grotesque physical defects, especially facial, by extremely poor coördination of movement, frequently by paralysis and epilepsy. Speech is limited to a few words at most; other vocal expression consists of inarticulate noises, babble, grunt, and yell. The conscious functions, sensory and

[6] A recent instance of this type, widely reported in the newspapers, was that of a young man who grossly abused and eventually murdered several boys. He conducted his own case in court, and showed considerable skill in cross-examining witnesses.

associative, remain at a hopelessly low level, so that learning is impossible. Such emotions and social attitudes as manifest themselves, *e.g.* fear, anger, and affection, are almost utterly unintelligent. Such impulses as laughter or destructiveness are quite meaningless and uninhibited. The general picture is that of crude animality and undeveloped infancy, often in a large but helpless body. Since the mental condition is permanent and hopeless, it should not be allowed to exist for even the few years of its ordinary natural term. In spite of the protests of misguided sentiment about the sacredness of human life, society ought to find a scientifically safe and humane way of relieving itself of these burdens at the outset of their existence.

PART III

THE SOCIAL ORDER

CHAPTER XII

CLASS, CROWD, AND ORGANIZATION

Group-Mind.—The term "group-mind", means collectively the common or related ideas, feelings, and impulses which pervade the group. Individually it signifies not only the existence of these mental states, but also the awareness of belonging to the group, and the consequent determination of behavior. Group-mindedness exists in infinite variety, according to the special nature of the group. In this chapter we shall consider certain typical and fundamental forms of it, namely, those which characterize the class, the crowd, and the organization.

To what extent animals possess such consciousness we can only surmise. In swarms of fishes, flocks of birds, and the highly organized societies of ants and bees, the common or differentiated reactions are executed so mechanically that it is impossible to tell whether there is any awareness of the group as a whole. Presumably the feathered or finny member of a tribe has little or no social perception extending beyond his immediate neighbors. Probably the insect citizen of a hive has slight grasp of the full social significance of his perfect coöperation. The wolves in a pack and cattle in a herd may have a more inclusive comprehension, but even here it is doubtful whether the brute mind apprehends the entire group except in the simplest way. Social psychology in this field is limited to a description and explanation of behavior in objective terms.

In mankind the individual relates himself consciously to groups as wholes. He is clearly aware of belonging

to his family, his nation, his church, his club, his union, and so on. This higher order of group-mindedness is one of the most important phenomena with which social psychology has to deal. It not only gives the individual a feeling of security and power, but it elevates his life above the plane of mere animal association. It is a factor of individual development, a directive and controlling influence of the most effective sort, a source of comfort and happiness, of morality, and of religion. Though it may be hypertrophied in intensity and perverted in expression, it nevertheless supplies essential elements of social culture. Among primitive peoples it provides the individual with the most pervasive motives of self-regulation, since he must constantly make his actions conform to the ways of his people. While the advance of civilization brings an increase of reflectiveness and independence, this tends to produce social chaos except as it subserves conscious ideals which embrace the whole group.

We might proceed to consider the mental traits characterizing the various special forms of group which constitute society, such as the family, the clan, the community, the army, the guild, and the church. Instead of following this path, however, let us take a more abstract view of the subject, and observe the fundamental types of association which these special forms illustrate. From this point of view there are, as we have already indicated, three principal kinds of group which deserve psychological study, the class, the crowd, and the organization. These overlap, as when a social class is organized, or an organization displays crowd excitement, but they may be distinguished abstractly.

The particular differences between these types will be considered in the subsequent sections of this chapter. In every case the individual mind is profoundly affected

by its group environment. It is stimulated, harmonized in feeling, concerted in action, unified in thought. Its power is increased or diminished, its character refined or debased, by its group associations. Persons sometimes astonish us, and perhaps also themselves, by exhibiting as members of groups abilities which no one suspected them to possess. So different from their more familiar selves do they become, indeed, as to suggest that a transcendent being of some sort is acting through them. The psychological fact is, of course, that a new social environment calls into operation latent powers which would otherwise have remained inactive.

When we speak of the group-mind, therefore, we properly mean, not a transcendent mentality which includes or becomes immanent in the individual, but simply the collection of individual minds, feeling, thinking, and acting together. Their interactive behavior may be the expression of some transcendent being with a mental unity of its own, but this concept belongs to metaphysical speculation rather than to social psychology. The scientific fact, and an exceedingly important one, is that the individual as a member of a particular group manifests traits quite different from those which characterize him apart from such membership.

Class and Caste.—Perhaps the most fundamental form of social group is the *class*. By this term we mean a number of individuals who regard themselves as essentially alike in certain respects, and who differentiate consciously between their own kind and others. Professor Giddings, it will be recalled, finds in such "consciousness of kind" the very essence of society.[1] However we may feel about this simplification of social phenomena by tracing them

[1] This is the "we-group" consciousness, which serves in much popular psychological writing as an explanation of social phenomena.

to a single root, there can be no doubt that class consciousness is a basic trait of the social mind. It colors thought and feeling and action, and by making one constantly aware of himself and known to others as a member of this or that class it profoundly affects social behavior.

Class consciousness is found in varying degrees in all sorts of groups, both organized and unorganized. It characterizes members of a family, friends, citizens in a community, workers at a trade, adherents to a church. It is an inevitable mental differentiation between old and young, employer and employed, rich and poor, town and gown, well bred and ill bred, aristocracy and commonalty, soldiers and civilians. How differently the teacher or artisan or business man feels among associates of his own occupation, as contrasted with his self-consciousness in the society of others. Races and religions have it in especially deep form. Organizations often possess it as a distinctive trait, for example the class feeling of a labor union or of a patriotic society. Republican and Democrat, clergy and laity, freshman and senior, conservative and radical—the subtle nuances of "my kind" are innumerable.

Class consciousness ordinarily involves some degree of social valuation. It has a tinge of pride or of humility, a feeling of superiority or inferiority to individuals in other classes. Every college has a tendency to look down upon at least some of its academic neighbors. Protestant and Catholic, Baptist and Methodist, each takes satisfaction in the spiritual elevation of his kind. The citizen of Massachusetts or Texas or California glories in his citizenship to the disparagement of less fortunate Americans. The true Briton carries the whole empire on his shoulders. Within the teaching profession there is sometimes an absurd superciliousness toward teachers in lower grades. The officials in a large bank are separated from their

clerks by a yawning social chasm, as are army officers from privates and "non-coms." Just what this superiority really consists of, the possessor might have difficulty in demonstrating, but the awareness of it nevertheless functions in various practical ways. Its queerest and most paradoxical form is perhaps found in the peculiar pride of the low caste in being "untouchable." Humility itself may give rise to self-conscious superiority.

Like other kinds of group consciousness, this one is a powerful determinant of social behavior. The individual feels compelled to do what is done by his class, and is strongly inhibited from following the ways of others. The latter may be distinctly better, but to imitate them would be to put himself outside the pale. In a highly stratified society the transition from one class to another is practically impossible for most persons. Their social education has from the earliest childhood filled them with inhibitions against acting "out of their part." The lines of conduct laid down by the tradition of their own kind are like deep grooves in which they must move.

There can be no doubt as to the value of class consciousness in certain respects, however questionable the modes which it sometimes assumes. Imparted by education, formal and informal, by example and precept, it is capable of giving a strength to individual character which can hardly be derived from any other source. Properly conceived it constitutes the soil for the growth of abstract sentiments which underlie social idealism. Not only tasteful usages but also the concepts and practices of honor, of generosity, of loyalty, of faithful performance of duty, are bred into the young through the medium of respect for and pride in their class. Some of the best forms of "morale" are specialized developments of class consciousness. The courage of the soldier in the face of

danger, the devotion of the physician, the clergyman, and the social worker to their laborious tasks, the impartiality of the judge, all such traits are in a measure matters of class idealism. Masculine chivalry, womanly delicacy and tenderness belong in the same category. In a few souls it assumes the broad gauge of humanitarianism, of democracy, of sympathy with all things human. In general, however, it is stronger and more effective when the limits of the class are narrow and it is defined concretely in terms of certain modes of behavior.

The dangers in class consciousness are equally manifest. Too often it assumes a superiority of social worth to which it has no real title, and holds in contempt everyone outside its own social set. The superciliousness of a self-constituted aristocracy is as irritating as its selfishness is intolerable. Cultivated aesthetic taste become the criterion of respectability, displacing far more significant moral standards. On the other hand the class antagonism of those at the bottom of the social scale in wealth and cultivation is no less open to condemnation. It is difficult to say which is the more baneful to society, the arrogance and injustice of class-conscious capitalism, or the spite of the equally class-conscious industrial worker who sees in wealth and culture only a target for incessant attack. On both sides the limited social interest obscures fundamental truths and virtues. Its loyalty to its own group is accompanied by ruthless unfairness toward those whom it chooses to regard as its social enemies. Aided by organization and using the instruments of government these economic classes are waging a war which is the most important social issue of to-day.

To utilize the potencies of moral idealism within class consciousness, to use it as a medium for the cultivation of abstract social sentiments of the highest value, to hold

in check its dangerous propensities, to turn its discords into harmony, are ever-present tasks and problems of contemporary society.

Caste is class consciousness in its most rigid form. It is mainly if not exclusively hereditary; and awareness of this fact tends to establish unyielding social barriers. In any caste system personal example and specific instruction produce distinctive forms of behavior, so imperative upon the individual that to act otherwise is a social sin approximating religious impiety. In the extremely stratified system of Hindoo castes the touch or even the shadow of an individual of lower status is pollution. To some extent this stratification gives rise on its higher levels to the finest standards of taste and elegance, but its unyielding rigidity prevents social advance. Impulses to progress are smothered by the ultra conservative social routine. New modes cannot be adopted if they happen to conflict with caste custom. Established privilege resents and prevents social changes; content with its own position it makes the free selection of individual talent impossible. Hence a caste system dooms itself to social stagnation.

The Crowd.—Probably more has been written about the crowd-mind than about any other particular topic of social psychology. Crowd behavior is so conspicuous both in animal and in human life, and it has played such a dramatic part in human history, that some writers have regarded it as the typical fact with which social psychology has to deal. The elaborate work of Le Bon has popularized this idea by exhibiting with much vividness the prevalence of crowd motives in civilized society. While most contemporary observers find crowd mentality a less comprehensive and illuminating principle they yet regard it as an important social phenomenon.

The term crowd signifies for our present purpose an assemblage of individuals in one place, an assemblage having a common interest and some degree of emotional excitement. Crowd traits sometimes appear in society at large, but the particular fact with which we are concerned is the assembled group thrown by common stimulation into somewhat excited activity. Not every assemblage is a crowd. The passing throng in a city street is not ordinarily a crowd, though it may become one at the sound of a fire alarm. Similarly the seething mass of humanity in a railway terminal becomes a crowd only as it focalizes at the gateways. The transition to crowd-mindedness is characterized by attention to a common object, increasing nervous excitement, lowered intelligence, extreme suggestibility, and tendencies to spasmodic and violent action. Animal swarms, flocks, packs, and herds often display crowd traits, for example the stampede of frightened cattle. In human society the phenomena range widely from the good-natured crowd at a baseball game to the angry mob bent on lynching its victim. While audiences and congregations are usually too passive or too habit-ridden to be regarded as crowds, they occasionally develop emotional excitement, and get out of control, so that they act in the crowd manner. In any case the mood is essentially transitory. A surge of common impulse sweeps quickly over a throng, expends itself in unorganized reactions, and subsides as quickly as it rose. Mobs are notoriously fickle. Yet it should be added that crowd behavior may be protracted by deliberate leadership, which is able to inject repeated stimulations of excitement into the group-mind.

The suggestibility of the crowd deserves special comment. Strained attention, heightened emotion, and limitation of free bodily movement are most favorable condi-

tions for the acceptance of suggestions. Reason subsides; the critical intelligence of even the more thoughtful minds is smothered under a wave of feeling. Few persons are sufficiently self-contained to *think* in a crowd, or have the requisite degree of counter-suggestibility to resist the crowd impulsion. Almost any suggestion, even that of criminal sort such as destruction of property or taking of human life, is likely to be accepted with astonishing readiness. In its more extreme forms the phenomenon approximates hypnosis. In some notable instances, indeed, crowds have experienced common hallucinations. The suggestibility follows predetermined lines, however. Crowds do the kind of thing which human nature in general is predisposed to do, or toward which special social conditions, such as tyrannical restraints, racial antipathies, and powerful instinctive desires naturally lead. The most conspicuous illustrations are the panicky flight from fire or earthquake, the violence of food riots, and the vindictive passion of lynching. Fear and anger are notorious crowd-breeders. Suggestion is the spark which touches off an inflammable impulse. Originating in some leader, it is multiplied by sheer numbers until it becomes irresistible, even to those who are habituated to self-control. Rational and moral inhibitions give way to the imperious suggestion of escape or destruction.

The moral character of crowds is generally low. At best it flames into unthinking pity or generosity, or the execution of crude justice. At worst it descends to shocking depths of brutality. Skillful exhorters take advantage of the lapse of critical acumen in their audiences to obtain support for philanthropic causes, but the acquiescence is often too unintelligent to endure. Lawsuits have been brought to recover watches and jewelry which were recklessly thrown into collection plates under such sugges-

tive influence. At the other moral extreme, many crowds are essentially criminal in intent and deed. They gather with the express purpose of breaking the law. Persons who are accidentally engulfed therein are swept along in the tide until they take active part, their moral scruples disappearing with the increasing assurance that everybody around them is doing the same thing.[2]

Crowd behavior is a release and intensifying of certain fundamental "drives" which are innate endowments of animal and human nature. Basic emotions are given free play, ordinary inhibitions are removed, repressed impulses burst into furious action. The flood of group-emotion sweeps the individual away from his mental moorings; self-restraint yields to the massive pressure of the behavior of all around him. The abrogation of his normal intelligence may be so extreme that in subsequent reflection he can hardly recognize the performance as his own. Yet at bottom whatever he does under crowd conditions proceeds from some disposition or fundamental tendency of his own nature.

The fact that the motives which actuate crowds are ordinarily restrained lends itself readily to psycho-analytic theory, which sees in the passionate behavior of the crowd the exercise of "unconscious desires" for freedom from social restrictions. Participation in crowd action is thus

[2] "We may sum up the psychological character of the unorganized or simple crowd by saying that it is excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments; extremely suggestible, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgment, incapable of any but the simpler and imperfect forms of reasoning; easily swayed and led, lacking in self-consciousness, devoid of self-respect and of sense of responsibility, and apt to be carried away by the consciousness of its own force, so that it tends to produce all the manifestations we have learnt to expect of any irresponsible and absolute power. Hence its behavior is like that of an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation, rather than like that of its average member; and in the worst cases it is like that of a wild beast, rather than like that of human beings." McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 64.

interpreted as the effort of the fundamentally unsocial ego to break loose from the restraint of civilization, even to the extent, it may be, of destroying and killing. The "unconscious mind" cleverly outwits the moral censorship of civilized nature by rationalizing its unsocial deeds on the ground that society, *i.e.* everybody in the immediate vicinity, approves them. Apart from the metaphysical fiction of an unconscious mind, fundamentally at odds with civilization, there is a good deal of truth in this interpretation. Unquestionably we feel the irksomeness of social restraints, and occasionally like to tear ourselves free from them. On the whole, however, it seems simpler and truer to say that a crowd environment highly accentuates emotional impulses which would be inhibited under ordinary conditions.

Crowd mentality may be induced in audiences, especially those which are closely packed, since the restraint of physical movement and the fixation of attention upon the speaker are favorable conditions for emotional suggestion. Clever orators know how to appeal to the deep and universal sympathies of human nature in ways which produce passionate response. Tone of voice, choice of words, the skillful blending of humor and pathos, of entreaty and command, most of all the personal example of the speaker himself, all these influences take automatic effect in the listeners until the whole mass is welded together mentally in an intense fervor of emotion. The process is gradual, and may be performed successfully in the face of initial antipathy. Individual distrust and criticism are eventually submerged beneath the weight of common acceptance. The critical mind feels itself helpless against the pressure of sentiment around it. There is relief in yielding to the universal movement, in being swept along on the social tide, and at length in tak-

ing active part in the crowd response which ensues. Under such conditions an audience composed largely of persons lacking cultivated self-control may be converted into a genuine crowd, and incited to acts of destructive fury. Marc Antony's oration over the body of Caesar affords a classic literary illustration of the method.

The phenomena of religious revivalism offer especially interesting examples of group behavior approximating that of the crowd. Here the conditions are peculiarly favorable. The personal power of a noted evangelist, working upon the common interest in religion and particularly in one's own religious welfare, provides the focal point of attention. Physical proximity *en masse*, customary forms of worship, the rhythmic lilt of song, and the devout obeisance in prayer combine to suppress independence of mind. The emotional charge in the atmosphere is intensified by an impassioned sermon, and by the general expectancy of results. Overt response by a few is followed quickly by others until the service becomes a swelling tide of active "conversion." [3]

Organization.—When one man holds a drill while another strikes it with a sledge hammer, or when an executive dictates to a stenographer, we have a simple instance of organization. In such cases there is a common purpose, some degree of common thought and feeling and coöperative action. Each individual does his part in conscious relation to the other. On a small scale there is a group-mind,—not a transcendent being who drills through a

[3] The methodical devices which evangelists use are skillful. A musical leader performs the preliminary task of unifying the group by means of the vigorous rhythm of the revival hymn. Parts of the congregation sing separately and then together. Solemn prayer focuses attention upon the idea of personal deliverance from sin. The sermon is addressed to the deepest emotions of selfhood, and culminates in a powerful appeal. The path of response is paved by various devices of encouraging song and friendly assistance until individual resistance breaks down, and an increasing throng flocks to the altar.

rock or composes correspondence, using two human instruments for the purpose, but simply the influence of one mind upon another in the execution of a common task.

So with larger organizations. They are characterized by definite relationships among the members of the group, relations preconceived and preëstablished for the accomplishment of a common purpose. This purpose may be particular, specific, or general, the construction of a building, the maintenance of a business, or merely the enjoyment and perpetuation of good fellowship. It may be clear or hazy, coercive or voluntary. The functions of membership and participation may come to be regarded as ends in themselves rather than as means to an end. There may be much or little subordination of individuals to one another. But in any case an organization is constituted by *ideas*, both of purpose and participation in the attainment of it, whereas the class and the crowd rest on a basis of feeling and emotion. Hence an organization has permanence, in contrast to the transitory nature of a crowd, and a definite aim in distinction from the sentiment of likeness which makes a class.

The social life of animals shows various degrees of organization, ranging from coöperation in the rearing of young to specialized functions of leadership in flocks and herds. In some species of insects there is an amazing refinement of specialization. The army ants, for example, as described by Beebe, have a most intricate functional organization, in which the various tasks are adjusted to one another with perfect biological usefulness. There are builders, repairers, foragers, guards, and so on, all cooperating zealously in one grand community. To what extent the individual members are aware of their total organized effort we can hardly form an intelligible con-

ception, but that their behavior may be regarded as in some sense expressing an inclusive social idea we cannot doubt.

In human society the basic organization is that of the family, with its purposes of maintaining domestic life, and its inner relationships of procreation, protection, nourishment, education, and service, relationships defined for the most part by instinctive nature itself. More distinctly artificial are organizations arising from the need of food, territorial occupancy, and the political interests relative thereto. Government calls for a wide variety of subordinate organizations, legislative, executive, and protective. Religion has created huge organized bodies rivalling the proportions and power of political empire. Occupational pursuits lead to guilds, unions, and professional associations. There is at present a tendency to combine these in higher organizations of world-wide inclusiveness and influence, crossing the boundary lines of nationality and religion. In addition to such large-scale illustrations we observe a multitude of groups devoted to lesser purposes, infinitely various in aim and method of accomplishment, but all displaying the same essential characteristics, and all entering organically into the total life of contemporary society.

Underlying all these phenomena we may discern the fundamental drives of gregariousness, tinged with some degree of class consciousness, and taking some specialized form of constructiveness, pugnacity, or play. The particular modes of expression are of course largely imitative. An organized group carries on the traditions of its past, or copies the behavior of similar groups. Above this level there is a great deal of reflective thought, especially on the part of leaders whose function it is to maintain and develop the welfare of the organization. Most of the membership

in large groups is inert and unreflective, but when the leaders stop thinking the group dies.

The essential traits of organization, as we have seen, are common purpose and differentiated individual function in the accomplishment of it. In addition there are other features which, though not indispensable, are more or less characteristic and significant. Regular assemblies, a ritual, badges or certificates of membership, and periodical literature all play a considerable part. A knowledge of the history of the group may give firmness to loyalty. Perhaps most important in many cases is the traditional and cultivated antagonism to other groups, either friendly competition or deeper hostility. In general, fighting organizations are the strongest. Colleges, businesses, churches, and empires thrive on conflict. Where outer opposition is lacking, inner rivalry of service may suffice. The vital point in any case is that the entire membership is brought into some kind of active relation to the intrinsic purpose of the group; otherwise a few individuals carry the whole burden. Very commonly all these accessories and practices are combined to express the idea of the organization, intensify its self-consciousness and the feeling of obligation to it, and thereby to give it permanence.

The trait of organizability is one in which there are large personal differences in degree and mode, differences due both to innate factors and to training. A gregarious liking to be with one's kind, a certain submissiveness, together with persistence in effort for group ends, these form a blend to which the early discipline of the home, the school, and other associations imparts steadiness and intensity. In its most superficial form it is conspicuously observable in the habitual "joiner" who derives an ever-recurring thrill of satisfaction from the acquisition of new group relationships. More deeply

it characterizes those persons who give themselves readily to systematic coöperation and work smoothly in social harness. Such ones identify themselves with the purpose as well as with the outer forms and machinery of organization, and take faithful part in its accomplishment. In some it takes the form of command, the directive authority of the leader, while in others it consists of obedience to orders; but in all it implies the identification of self-interest with group interest. It flowers in "morale," or loyalty under strain. Most organizations, it is true, have a large proportion of inert membership, individuals who are merely on its roll, or who perhaps pay dues, but who are feebly inclined to do anything else. Much fewer are the members possessed of an active sense of responsibility for the group welfare. Yet in everybody there is some potentiality of alignment, and on occasion a conscientious performance of duty. Hence the advance of civilization shows an increasing wealth of organized effort.

The prevalence of organization in contemporary society hardly needs comment. The life of a modern community involves scores, that of a huge city thousands of distinct groups, each of which has its own special character and purpose. We breathe a social atmosphere of municipal, state-wide, nation-wide, and even international organization. Local clubs, and federated clubs, churches and church federations, unions and federated unions, in these we live and move and have our being. World congresses of religion, international associations of labor and philanthropy, the League of Nations and the World Court, all exhibit the organizing bent of human nature.

Under such conditions it is but natural for childhood and youth to develop the same interest. Schools of all grades and kinds have open or secret societies—class

organizations, fraternities and sororities, athletic teams, literary and scientific clubs, professional orders, and so on. Even childhood with its deep-rooted tendencies of gregariousness and play learns early by imitation to form clubs, gangs, and teams, and to define individuality in terms of organized group relationships.

While it is a commonplace to remark that the social life of to-day is thus highly organized, it is perhaps not so common to consider critically the value of such organization. We take satisfaction in membership, and see the potency of combined effort, but ordinarily do not inquire further into the worth of this form of human experience. Even when we feel the requirements to be irksome, or the constraint of behavior disagreeable, we do not reflect deeply upon the ultimate question involved. To what extent is organization worth while? On this point psychology has something to say.

The essence of the matter is that organization produces important developments of individuality, developments which may be either for the better or for the worse. Membership, as we have already noted, carries with it in some degree an enhancement of the individual's self-conscious significance. He becomes aware of himself as an instrument of group purposes; he feels an added power within himself because the group is supporting him. An affront to him calls for group retaliation, and an insult to the group, even though it does not touch him personally, yet impinges on his larger selfhood and excites his indignation. How bold, how industrious, how socially sensitive, all in connection with his group relationships, is the loyal member of a college fraternity, or a labor union, or a church. Acts which would be quite impossible to him as an isolated person are made easy by the drive of organized energy behind and through him. Ideas which he

would never form, emotions which he would scarcely feel, become habitual as features of his group consciousness. All this may serve to deepen and enrich his ideals, to elicit latent capabilities, to make him a bigger and better member of society than he would otherwise be. Organization may increase richness of selfhood within the individual as well as the summation of power in the group as a whole.

The moral potency of this enhancement of individuality is manifest. Men and women obviously gain character through the opportunities and responsibilities which their membership involves. As players on an athletic team, or brothers in a fraternal order, or participants in a philanthropic project, they learn lessons and form habits which are socially valuable, not merely with respect to the team or the fraternity but also to society at large. Most organizations have good purposes which reach beyond their own limits, and impose upon their members a régime which in some respects has general ethical value. College administrators know that the very complexity of social organization which occasionally makes trouble for them serves in some degree to save the institution from moral chaos which would be worse. If students were not engaged in these enterprises, they would probably in many cases be doing something far more objectionable.

On the other hand there are several dangers which are implicit in the practice of organization. One is social divisiveness. Many organized groups, aiming primarily at their own advancement, tend with increasing numbers and power to become sources of privilege and corruption. Labor unions during a strike and commercial associations possessing surreptitious control of government alike show a disposition to secure their own ends in defiance of public welfare. Secret societies in college sometimes set deliber-

ately about the task of breaking down the social order, and frankly profess the pernicious doctrine of "fraternity first." In such cases the individual members are emboldened to oppose authority because they know that they cannot be dealt with as individuals; confident of safety they turn easily to lawlessness and depredation. The very fact that a group interest is involved serves to cast a false semblance of rectitude over an immoral act.

Hardly less objectionable is the tendency of organization to suppress or "iron out" the individuality of its members, to make them conform to type so that they lose the finer personal qualities of character. One then takes on the stamp of his group, surrenders his independence of thought, and is afraid to act in other than the approved ways. Some achievements seem to be essentially solitary; they must not be hampered by group ways. There is a real danger that the increasing organization of contemporary social life will tend to flatten character, discouraging the cultivation of initiative and producing a tedious regularity of behavior. One of the worst illustrations is found in the school system which by constant emphasis upon uniform methods and standards effectively squelches any sparks of pedagogical inspiration in the teacher. The point to be observed is that when an individual joins an organization his independence of mind becomes subjected to critical restraint. Before he can gain sufficient standing and power to modify the system he finds himself hopelessly enmeshed in it, a perfectly "regular" political partisan, a thoroughly "safe" member of an employers' or workers' association, a blind and bigoted churchman. One who joins a social club may have his "clubbiness" enhanced, but he too often tends to become that peculiarly smooth and useless product, the clubman. Even though an organization does not direct ener-

gies toward unsocial ends it nevertheless may prevent its membership from seeking higher social ideals.

Further, since it embodies an idea it tends to perpetuate this in conservative indifference to changing conditions. Progressive adaptations to social environment are rejected. The duties of administration call for men of strongly executive mind, often the very men who lack the mental elasticity and vision to discern new needs. Officialdom naturally fears the disrupting effect of new modes, and regards proposals of change as heretical. Being in power, it identifies its own will with the essence and welfare of the institution, somewhat after the manner of ownership; and this evil is the more subtle because of the sincere loyalty of the leaders to the purpose of the group. The result is a kind of social petrifaction, or dry rot, in which the vitality of the organization comes to an end.

Finally we must not fail to note the tendency to excessive expenditure of time and energy in maintaining the form and running the machinery of the organization rather than in constructive work. Offices and sub-offices multiply; innumerable committees waste hours in consultation; formal meetings and endless talk distract attention from productive effort. The outcome is absurdly incommensurate with the labor involved. In fact, the need of many a present-day organization is to divest itself of superfluous machinery, emphasize its main purpose simply, and free individual energy for the attainment of it.

The Public, ranging from the proportions of a small community to those of a nation, is composed of all the individuals who have an interest in matters affecting their collective life. It includes various organizations and classes, and on occasion crowds. It possesses, indeed, a vague class-character of its own, and sometimes a compre-

hensive organization. Under certain conditions it exhibits *in toto* the characteristic features of the crowd. Its collective or group consciousness in relation to whatever excites its interest is termed public sentiment or opinion, and is manifested as approval or disapproval.[4] This public consciousness is a most powerful determinant of individual behavior and social processes. Always a factor in local matters, it becomes, with the spread of learning, literary communication, and democratic sentiment, a predominating influence upon national and international affairs. When focussed upon any occurrence it is superior to the purposes of particular organizations and classes, though these not infrequently play a leading part in molding it. So effective is it that the methods by which it may be formed and controlled, unified and intensified, constitute an important part of social psychology as a practical art.

[4] For a fuller discussion of public opinion see Chapter XV.

CHAPTER XIII

CUSTOM AND FASHION

General Characteristics.—There are two especially comprehensive forms of social imitation, namely, *custom* and *fashion*, the continuance of the long-established order of society and the acceptance of its transitory ways, or in a word the imitation of the past, and of the present.[1] These traits assume the ideational character of tradition and convention. The principle of fashion appears occasionally in the trivial form of the fad, and the intensified excitement of the craze. There is a certain correspondence between these social phenomena and the types of group considered in the preceding chapter. Fads and crazes are obviously like the behavior of the crowd. They shade into the less superficial and excitable forms of fashion which imply some reflective tinge of class consciousness, and these into practices of longer standing, customs which usually depend in some degree upon social organization. The essential difference between the two types of social behavior, however, lies in their time-reference. One has the flavor of the past, the other of the present.

Abstractly the above distinction holds true, but as matters of concrete fact these forms of social imitation merge into each other. Customs are more or less plastic, and may be modified conventionally by the addition of novel features, as in the gradual enrichment of custom-

[1] For an extensive treatment of these topics see Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chaps. VI–XV. Ross uses the term conventionality as antithetical to custom, and treats fashion as a species of it.

ary ceremonies by details copied from other sources. Conversely, when popular modes of behavior prove to have lasting worth they settle as individual and social habits. According to general evolutionary principles, pleasing fashions tend to establish themselves, in the degree of their rationality and effectiveness, and pass into permanent customs. Novel Christmas greetings, fresh summer and winter sports, ingenious business methods, and the like, often show this trend. Further, convention sometimes pretends absurdly to have had a long history, and custom usually claims the authority of contemporary as well as of past usage. But however combined or confused, these two types of social imitation differ in their temporal phase. In one case society imitates the past, in the other the present.

The underlying cause of both custom and fashion is that susceptibility to prestige which we have noted as a prime condition of social suggestion. This is largely a product of education. The mere fact that things have been or are being done in a certain way is not in itself a sufficient explanation of acceptance. Only as the individual has been taught the supremacy of society does he acquire submissiveness to its ways. The docility of the child to the lessons imparted by the little group in which he lives paves the way for later obedience to the dictates of society at large, or of that part of it which he respects most. Thus he acquires a general habit of conformity, the deeply rooted strength of which is shown by the difficulty of ignoring a popular fashion or breaking a custom of long standing. He may know perfectly well that the practice is futile, or that it is properly outgrown, yet the uncomfortable feeling of being different from associates serves to bring him into line. Only a powerful strain of counter-suggestibility or an extraordinary in-

dependence of thought can effectually withstand the pressure of social example.

The acceptance is easier in the case of custom because it ordinarily comports with desire. Wedding ceremonies, for instance, are practised not only because of the social and religious sanctity attaching to them, but also because they satisfy the human inclination to "show off." Similarly the acceptance of a fashion is explained in part by our primitive liking for novelty; the elaborately useless details of fashionable etiquette often have slight justification beyond our fondness for something new. Fashion often has also a competitive tinge which is lacking in custom; one displays his superiority by being up to the minute. Both types of imitation are facilitated by rationalization. Some reason or other, plausible if not profound, can be given to justify the ways of the past, and, perhaps with less cogency, those of the present.

To some extent individuals differ in their characteristic addiction to one or the other of these modes. Some are content to wear old-fashioned clothes and continue to do things in old ways in utter disregard of the changing fashions and methods of the day. The new book everybody else is reading, the new game, the new style of architecture, stir in them no thrill of desire. Precedent and tradition have overwhelming weight in their lives. In sharp contrast to these worshippers of the past are the conspicuous slaves of fashion. The quasi-religious reverence of the former for established ways is matched by the eagerness of the latter to be always foremost in the current of popular novelty. Their garb may be unbecoming, their recreations futile,—no matter so long as they are up to date.

Common modes of social behavior belong for the most part under one or the other of these heads. Our actions,

in so far as they rise above the level of instinctive impulses, or run out of the ruts of individual habit, fall into the social grooves of custom and fashion. Work and play, the practices of home and school, of office and club and church, the duties of organized membership, and the casual associations of everyday life, all exemplify these traits. When something is to be done, the easiest course is to follow the example of those around us. Independent thought is difficult, and its result in action likely to be dangerous. The safer way is that of the group. Hence the prevalence of social imitation which all observers have noted in the evolution of society, and which has constituted the leading topic of most social psychology.

Custom and Tradition.—Custom, as distinguished from fashion, according to our definition, is a form of behavior which has descended from the past, a mode of action acquired by society and continued without substantial change. It is, in a word, a social habit. Subjectively it involves what we may term "custom-consciousness," *i.e.* the feeling of the authority of the past, and of group subordination to it. This feeling is of course ordinarily subconscious; we perform most customary actions without reflecting on their derivation or their common acceptance. Yet the mental aspect of custom is profoundly important. Let one of its specifications be ignored, or a change proposed, and at once the power of the past asserts itself poignantly within us. The deed which contravenes the older way must not be done. The customary mode has a flavor of sanctity, an essential rightness which demands respect. There are, as we have already noted, personal variations in the depth of this custom-consciousness, and consequently in the extent to which life is regulated by it. In some degree, however, it is a common human trait.

The intellectual aspect of custom may be termed *tradi-*

tion. It consists of ideas passed on from one generation to the next, ideas accepted without criticism because of the ignorance of the learner and the prestige of those who transmit them. So fundamental is belief for action that custom rests upon an underlying idea of its origin, or its purpose, or its value. Moreover a tradition, for example that elders are to be treated with special deference, or that aristocracy is entitled to certain privileges, may have a breadth and comprehensiveness which includes a wide variety of particular customs. Hence a set of traditional sentiments, more or less abstract, serves as the broad basis of social life.

Primitive culture, as historical study clearly shows, is thoroughly custom-ridden. In all the more important matters which characterize the life of society at this stage of development behavior is rigidly stereotyped, and no considerable departure from its fixed modes is permitted or even thought of. In the complex and elastic network of the contemporary social order there is greater freedom from the past, and a quickened tempo of change, yet even here we are more addicted to custom than we are ordinarily aware. Illustrations abound in every domain of our social life, in language, dress, play, in law and government, in education, and in religion. Common law is formulated custom; statutes are effective only as they pass into common observance. Administration in every field follows prescribed methods and looks with suspicion and disfavor upon departures therefrom. Modes of worship gain sanctity with age; the devout must kneel when they pray, stand when they sing, and take communion at regular times. The art of teaching, like other arts, follows customary lines from which it is hard to break away; recitation, lectures, essays, laboratory exercises, continue from year to year as the proper order of school procedure.

Speech itself is a highly intricate system of verbal customs, differing in detail in different languages, but always preserving the past. Underlying all the novelties of sartorial fashion are certain fundamental features which remain unchanged, or are altered only in the face of public disapproval. Similarly our recreations are to a great extent what we did last year and the year before that. The student of any social practice is usually astonished to discover how far back its history goes. Details are modified, but essentials remain.

The origin of most customs is hopelessly obscured in the mists of the past. Some are doubtless due to sheer accident, casual behavior which resulted so successfully or fortunately as to perpetuate itself.[2] In most cases there is probably some flavor of rationality in their beginning. For example, we are told that an Eskimo fishing expedition will not proceed if one member of the party slips and falls on the beach. Custom so decrees because on an earlier occasion such a mishap was followed by failure to catch any fish. Here, as so often happens in primitive thinking, false analogy plays a determining part. Other customs, such as sex taboos, rest on sounder, though perhaps vaguely understood reasons. In general, we may say, customs are born as accidental or deliberate methods of dealing with particular situations. The effort to establish them as customs by arbitrary fiat is usually not successful.

Why do they have so strong a hold upon us? In part, no doubt, because they give expression to human desires and promptly take root as habits. Also, institutions are

[2] In one of our American colleges the president of the senior class just before graduation formally presents his successor with a huge sledge hammer as his official gavel of authority. The custom goes back to a spring day, many years ago, when a group of students were watching the building of the college gates, and the senior president, suddenly inspired with a brilliant flash of humor, mounted the masons' staging and performed the impromptu ceremony with mock solemnity.

so manifestly greater than the individuals who compose them that the compulsion of their traditional practices is readily acknowledged. It takes hardihood of character to defy the demands of custom. In any important social situation independent action is felt to be uncertain and dangerous, whereas the way of the group in the past is *safe*. Most significant is the fact that children are brought up not only to form social habits, but to regard them as *approved* methods, having behind them the authority of society and of the past. Instinctive submission and fear take the socialized form of accepting whatever is customary, and the child grows up with a general habit of obedience to the established order.

Further, most customs are more or less rationalized. The freshman must wear his green cap because it is desirable to indicate his class, or to lessen his supposed bumptiousness. College athletics are important because the college spirit which they engender may be transformed into other forms of loyalty. The ancients ascribed innumerable customs to divine acts, which must be symbolically repeated in order to gain divine favor. Customs of hunting, of planting and reaping, of marrying and burying, have always had plenty of reasons which seemed solemnly convincing to the group, even though ludicrously inadequate to others. The very absurdity of many of our rationalizations shows how strong is the suggestion of authority in "reason."

Respect for the past is of course purely a product of education, both the informal example and the formal instruction which are received from early childhood on. Hence the individual differences in the depth of it, and also the inconsistencies of observance in one field and indifference in another. The self-assertiveness of youth often runs counter to it, and refuses to conform; while

advancing years attach to it increasing weight. Custom-consciousness deepens in those who have responsibility in ordering social affairs, since they see departures from traditional ways as fraught with danger. In conservative societies new modes can establish themselves only by pretending to be essentially traditional.

Among the more important conditions which favor the persistence of custom are geographical isolation, illiteracy, narrow education, "familism," *i.e.* the social system in which successive generations continue to live together in the same domicile, government by elders, and the stratification of society in classes fixed by heredity.[3] In part these conditions imply lack of contact with other culture, such as might raise questions about existing practices and stimulate new ideas. In part they signify simply the deepening of habit with age, and the tendency to perpetuate authority by leading the young along old paths.

Correspondingly unfavorable to the continuance of custom are free communication by travel and literary interchange, broad education, government by younger men, and withdrawal from the family roof-tree. Under such conditions new culture contacts and the greater mental plasticity of those in power combine to modify custom. How socially upsetting are the experiences of going to college, and returning with the adolescent feeling of moral independence to a home life thoroughly permeated by custom! How lightly the traveller regards the traditional ways of other peoples, or those of his own when he returns to them! When youth and enlightenment come into conflict with tradition the struggle is often bitter and the outcome tragic—either permanent estrangement of old and young or a pathetic relapse into the hated customs.[4]

[3] Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chap. XIII.

[4] An extreme illustration is the plight of the young Indian who returns from a government school to face the unyielding customs of his tribe.

The effect of war upon custom is at first a disturbance. The new social problems involved, the shock of invasion, the changed conditions incidental to conquest or defeat, jolt the mind out of its social ruts and point it toward new modes of life. Prolonged war tends however to produce a mental reaction against change, and a reversion to a more primitive state of mind, as people realize the imperative need of social stability for safety. Yet the seeds of change have been sown, and eventually they bear fruit. The Great War thoroughly upset the customary social life of all the countries participating in it. Adaptation to its needs, supplemented by the return of soldiers from its battle-fields, constituted in some cases a kind of social earthquake. Even the ensuing wave of reaction failed to restore old conditions. Political revolutions and less spectacular but more fundamental revolutions of individual habit, especially in youth, have permanently modified the social order.

Throughout the long evolution of society custom has been the chief stabilizing agency. Absurd and cruel though it has often been, it has nevertheless served to restrain the individual eccentricity of mankind, and to bring divergent impulses into harmony. In the earlier stages of social development, when individual intelligence was insufficient to guide, the alternative to custom was chaos and extinction of the tribe, and in spite of the spread of education the same alternative often confronts us today. Upon custom depends our ability to get things done quickly and smoothly, instead of stumbling along a rough pathway of trial and error. No institution, great or small, can dispense with its steadying function. It solves problems in advance, and thus affords assurance with regard to the future and leisure for refinement. Considering its "survival-value" there is little wonder that it has always been

regarded as authoritative, and that the *mores* of earlier culture have given rise to the moral consciousness of mankind.

On the other hand the limitations and defects of custom are equally obvious. Particular traditions may be good, but "traditionalism" as a prevalent state of mind is bad. Blind addiction to the ways of the past has often perverted intelligence and defied criticism. Worthless aims and brutal methods have dragged out a perfunctory existence, demanding time and energy which would far better have been spent in constructive social improvement. Under such conditions individual rights are ignored. Social evils entrench themselves in custom and obstinately withstand attack. Sometimes it seems that nothing less than a forceful revolution can break the hard surface of what Bagehot calls the "cake of custom."

The conditions of contemporary social life, however, make strongly against the dominance of custom. While organized institutions naturally settle ever more deeply in their traditional ways, new culture contacts and the spread of education steadily undermine the slavery of society to the past. Custom is continually being modified by intelligence, or restated in the rational form of law, or replaced by the changing modes of fashion.

Fashion and Conventionality.—As custom derives its authority from the past, so fashion belongs to the present. A fashionable mode of behavior is felt to be obligatory simply because it is being done; the fact that "everybody is doing it" imposes itself irresistibly upon the observant mind. This conformity to the ways of those around us is manifest in all parts of our social life, and in matters having various degrees of social importance. There are fashions not only in dress, furniture, and automobiles, but also in literature, music, and architecture. Methods of social

intercourse, of business and recreations, likewise exhibit the principle.

Fashions which possess a distinctly ideational character may be termed conventions. Such usages have some meaning or underlying idea, which corresponds to the traditional meaning of a custom. This meaning may be the real or supposed utility of the practice, or its aesthetic or moral value. Conventional opinions and sentiments of an abstract sort cover a wide range of actual practices. Thus there are conventional estimates of current happenings in the political arena, conventional attitudes of teachers and students toward each other, conventional ideas about our own community, our state and nation, and about others. The conventional view that wealth and power are reliable standards of social valuation, or a conventional code of business and professional ethics, apply to widely different situations. How prevalent and how varied in application are such notions as that manual labor is degrading, that pecuniary success is worth the greatest effort, that one's standing in his community is measured by his property, that political conservatism is respectable and radicalism disreputable, that masculine habits are unwomanly, and so on. Some of these conventional ideas and practices are of genuinely moral import, and are respected more deeply than statute law. Some are essentially trivial, the mere assumption of social superiority, or the distinction of being *au fait* in taste and elegance.

While social imitation of this sort is often of superficial worth, and may even be ridiculous, it is also true that many conventionalities have underlying ideas of profound significance, the grasp of which dignifies individual character. So a conventional mode of dress may express freedom or grace; and a popular novel may gain a wide read-

ing because it presents vividly and truthfully some deep reality of human life. Conventional faiths may proceed from depths of experience common to mankind. The conventionalities which "set" and become customs are the ones which give truly rational satisfaction to human nature.

The principal roots of fashion and conventionality are found in the suggestible tendency to imitate those around us, in the acknowledgment of the prestige of society or of certain classes in it, and in the self-assertive effort to align one's self with what is superior. Fashion commonly displays a competitive aspect which is lacking in custom. By following its dictates one classifies oneself as a superior person. Neglect signifies social inferiority. "Out of style," "behind the times,"—how absurdly serious are such condemnations. The pretense of the fashionable mode to aesthetic value may be conspicuously hollow; even while we profess to admire it we know that it is really not beautiful or tasteful, but we accept and imitate it nevertheless. We also rationalize our submissiveness, perhaps by alleging some utility in the fashion, but our reasoning is a sham.[5] Our real motive is that we cannot bear to be outside the pale of social conformity. For some persons such a feeling of estrangement is as intolerable as the thought of religious excommunication. Almost everybody feels at least slightly uncomfortable when he departs from conventional ways, so subtly effective is their implication of social superiority.

[5] It is interesting to observe how readily the fashion-follower resorts to rationalization in self-defense. For example, a recent style of absurdly baggy clothing was justified on the ground that it benefited the cloth industry. Almost every conventional idea or practice can be plausibly related to some principle of rectitude or elegance. The same rational impulse extends itself to the support of fads. The inanity of cross-word puzzles was seriously advocated as beneficial in that the practice enlarged the puzzler's vocabulary—as if the acquisition of words in geometrical relations increased rhetorical fluency and accuracy! We can always find a reason for keeping up with the procession.

Why are we such slaves? Why do we make ourselves ridiculous or suffer torture in the worship of this social deity? Why do we submit in matters of dress, for example, to the unreasonable tyranny of sartorial arbiters who impose their tasteless whims upon us for their own profit? At bottom because the profound sentiment of self-regard finds here a mode of expression. Even in our childhood we learned to look upon fashion as imperative. A critical public composed of our small associates was diabolically keen to spot any peculiarity of dress, and to heap ridicule upon us. Later a steady bombardment of clothing advertisements impressed it upon us that we are evaluated socially in terms of style. The example of our elders, the habit of "dressing up" for special occasions, the prestige-suggestion of a socially fashionable class, and the obvious social limitations of the poorly dressed, combined to make us habitually amenable to the dictates of fashion in this field.

Fashions and conventions emanate from certain "radiant points" which have sufficient social prestige to command attention. The more conspicuous sources are the individuals and groups possessing wealth, power, social position, and professional success. City dwellers set the social pace for the country-bred. Big institutions are copied by small ones. An aristocratic class acknowledged as élite presents the example of what is conventionally proper. There are scientific conventionalities, too, such as the latest biological or physical theory, statements which are glibly repeated by persons who know next to nothing about their scientific basis. Democracy itself, by its massive suggestion, establishes certain conventions. It is hard for the average citizen to vote with a minority on any question. Wherever superiority of any sort presents itself conspicuously, its modes of thought

and action spread in widening circles of popular acceptance.

It is the function of an aristocracy to set the example which establishes taste. According to the general principle of "social gravity," conventional usages spread downward from the top of society. There are exceptions, of course, as when the refined behavior is rejected because it conflicts with instinct or deeply rooted habit. Sometimes, too, a conventional mode arises in a lower social stratum because of its essential appropriateness. It may even happen, under extraordinary conditions, that social superiors give way to the silent pressure of inferior modes of life, as appears when the European-born, living in foreign lands, succumb to a native culture which surrounds them. In general, however, ideas and ideals, standards of rectitude, conceptions of science, and appreciations of art, radiate from the socially superior whose taste and intelligence are acknowledged. Foreign culture is transmitted to some extent through the medium of a travelling aristocracy.

As a rule fashions are distinctly transitory. They change rapidly, and in some matters, though this is not so obvious, run in cycles. Students of the subject have sometimes been astonished to discover that something like the novelty of to-day was commonplace fifty or a hundred years ago. Democracy tends to speed up fashion, since its assertion of equal rights and privileges encourages everyone to adopt fashionable ways. This process is facilitated by the industrial ingenuity which produces inexpensive copies of fine articles, and by the journals which spread the announcements of fashion. When high-priced novelties may be imitated so soon and so cheaply that anybody may procure something like them, there is nothing for the socially superior to do but discard them and

adopt something else. Fortunately this increasing instability of fashion brings its own corrective. Being more or less inevitably behind the times, we may come to take our shortcomings with indifference, wear and do what we please, and leave the despotism of fashion to those who like it, while we breathe the air of freedom.

Yet, in spite of the condemnation which we may justly heap upon this expensive, time-wasting, and often unaesthetic tyranny, we must acknowledge that it serves at least in some small measure a useful purpose. Not only does the novelty of changing modes add a pleasant interest to social life—for novelty is one of nature's original and agreeable interests—but it also acts as a social cement to hold the members of a group together. It supplements tradition in maintaining social order. Like tradition it exercises a certain stabilizing influence; it tells us what to do in order to be socially acceptable, defines limits of propriety, and occasionally saves us time and trouble by prescribing lines of behavior. By making us careful in matters of social intercourse it counteracts an eccentric individualism which would tend to disintegrate society. Fashions are often superficial, and sometimes vicious, but being less deeply rooted than customs they are easily changed. We are always ready for new ones. Hence they serve the purpose of social experimentation, and help us to discover modes of life which are permanently satisfactory. A really beautiful or useful fashion strikes root.

Fad and Craze.—The principle of fashion displays itself in certain forms which deserve special mention because of the strangely irrational dominance which they sometimes exercise over the popular mind. Fads are the more distinctly trivial phenomena of fashion, such as a striking trifle of dress, a queer pet, a new game, a peculiar turn of speech or bit of slang, in fact any novelty which serves

to indicate alignment with the socially alert. Public attention is easily captured by trifles which happen to touch some deep instinct or interest of human nature. Ideas, primarily held by thoughtful minds, spread in superficial form to fad proportions. So we have scientific fads such as popular psychoanalysis, literary fads like the mystery story, hygienic fads such as taking a barefoot walk in the morning.

Recalling the whims of the public a year or two after their occurrence, we find it hard to understand the eagerness with which people devoted themselves to such insignificant matters. Yet it is probably true that in every case their sudden vogue was due to the fact they gave a light and easy satisfaction to some interest of selfhood. They were not mere imitative actions, but in their small measure expressions of personality.

Fads are usually short-lived. In general they run a brief course of popularity, and presently give way to something else equally trivial. Occasionally they meet some human need, or serve to introduce some lasting improvement of social life, the further development of which is encouraged by their popular acceptation. The use of pre-cooked breakfast foods spread throughout the land as a culinary fad, but established itself firmly because of their convenience. Much of the interest in the radio is unquestionably faddish, but no one can doubt that this extension of the art of communication possesses unique educational and recreational value. In the main, however, fads have no more serious function than that of lightening the monotony of life. They are justified only by the mild and harmless satisfaction which they bring.

The craze shows a larger purpose, a more intense excitement, and a fiercer spirit of competition than the fad. Most crazes take place in the sphere of economic and

religious interest. In the former case they are abnormal manifestations of acquisitiveness functioning on an imitative level. The tulip mania in Holland in the seventeenth century, the Mississippi Bubble, the "gold rush" to California in 1849, and again to Alaska in the nineties, the repeated land booms and waves of speculation in oil, are typical illustrations. Religious crazes exhibit a misdirected idealism of personal and social character, communicated with great emotional fervor. In this category are the medieval crusades, the witchcraft delusions and persecutions, outbreaks of Mohammedans against Christians and of Christians against Jews, and many a historic "revival" of religion.

The rapid development of such epidemics shows how deep is the suggestibility and how superficial the rationality of the popular mind. The participant in a craze ignores or rejects intelligent criticism, and grasps eagerly at any shred of fact or film of reasoning which seems to support his phantasy. Crazes, indeed, exhibit the "crowd-mind" at work in society at large. Given a certain mental homogeneity, a common interest of an emotional sort, and clever instigation, the tide of excitement surges high, envelops first the more emotionally responsive, and eventually affects even the sober and thoughtful. Under such conditions one craze is likely to follow another, perhaps quite different in special character, but displaying the same general features. The aftermath of a religious craze may be an orgy of speculation.

In this connection we should note the widespread response of the public to the stimulation of newspaper reports concerning events of a dramatic sort, constituting what may be termed "newspaper crazes." Championship prize fights and other athletic contests produce a daily tale of preparations and forecasts, as well as

accounts of the events themselves, which is eagerly read from one end of the country to the other. Stories of divorce and murder trials, in all their murky detail, are devoured by a multitude. The amount of space devoted to such matters reaches almost impossible proportions, yet apparently not greater than is desired. Accordingly the press whets the public appetite for more by fostering excitement, by arranging huge contests, and by employing the most able writers to present their stories to readers. The crossing of the Atlantic Ocean by a lone aviator increased the sale of daily papers by hundreds of thousands of copies, a phenomenon which was protracted by the unprecedented popular acclaim which he justly received. In consequence certain newspaper and other interests sponsored further trans-oceanic contest-flights, several of which had tragic ending in the loss of the lives of aviators. In reading about hazardous performances the public, always eager for a thrill, participates vicariously in them, and sometimes develops an excessive appetite for such stimulation. In the case of conspicuous crimes, pugilistic battles, and divorce and murder trials, the result is often an epidemic of emotional interest which is mentally unhealthy.

Such phenomena present a practical problem to those who are concerned with the mental health of society. How can waves of popular excitement, fundamentally instinctive and emotionally powerful, be controlled or if necessary prevented? Legislation against their causes is usually undesirable, and also futile, as is argument at the moment of their outburst. Only by sane education, beginning in childhood, can the public mind be safeguarded against mental epidemics. Broadly and soundly cultivated intelligence affords the best prophylactic for craze-suggestion.

CHAPTER XIV

MORALS AND MANNERS

Social Standards.—There are certain kinds of traditional and conventional sentiment which play a most important part in social life because they serve as standards of social rectitude and express valuations of behavior. These are the sentiments which we term *moral* and *aesthetic*. When an action is called right or wrong, tasteful or tasteless, it is not merely described but is *appreciated*. The designations imply some sort of norm or principle, which exists in the mind of the observer, and which establishes the worth of conduct. Everyone has such normative sentiments. Those which constitute morals are ordinarily the more cogent, and in some form are all but universal. Ranging in infinite variety from blind acceptance of custom to the most intelligent ethical reflection, they give rise to choices of behavior, to the subjective processes of conscience, and to judgments of approval and disapproval upon the character and conduct of our fellow men. Aesthetic standards of valuation, or "manners," are usually less compelling in their application, but they are hardly less prevalent than morals, and in some persons they tend to supersede the latter as imperative modes of social behavior.

These norms, though closely related, are not identical. The moral goodness or badness of a deed consists essentially in its reference to social consequences; if it conduces to social welfare it is right, otherwise wrong. In distinction, the beauty or ugliness of an action lies

in its peculiarly satisfying completeness in itself, its status as "just the right thing to do" in a particular situation. The two types of sentiment represent somewhat divergent lines of development of feeling and judgment, both in the race and in the individual. In general they blend or harmonize in behavior, but their emphasis varies greatly in different persons, and to some extent they seem to run counter to one another. Moral rectitude and taste occasionally appear to conflict.

For the most part our normative sentiments of both types are products of example and imitation, bred into us in our childhood and youth as they have been in our forbears. Yet their operation obviously involves more or less reflection, and they must be regarded both in the individual and in the race as also products of thought. At bottom they have an ideational character. Apprehended on a large scale they suggest an implicit idealism, the precise nature of which is often obscure, but which may be expressed theoretically in intellectual terms. In other words they should not be looked upon simply as casual products of social experience, but rather as the work of the intellect, aiming in an inept and confused way at social ideals. To ascertain the rational structure of these ideals is the function of philosophical ethics and aesthetics. Our concern, psychologically, is merely to describe their operation in human society.

Morals are modes of behavior which are termed right because of their observed or supposed relation to the welfare of society. This welfare may be the actually accepted order of society, or an ideal social order, conceived as most satisfactory, even though not actual. In general, morals are ways of acting which the group accepts and approves as its own. The individual's estimate of the moral value of his own conduct, with refer-

ence to either the actual social standard or an ideal one, takes the peculiar form of feeling and judgment called "conscience." His moral evaluation of the behavior of others is expressed in praise or blame. Conformity to accepted moral standards is ordinarily expected, and receives only tacit approval. Infractions are explicitly condemned.

Morals are the outgrowth of custom. In fact they seem to the superficial observer to be for the most part nothing more than the customs of a group impressed upon individual members.[1] Ancient society early developed rigid ways of life, in economic pursuits and intimate social relations, in hunting and planting and reaping, in marrying and burying, in warfare and worship, and held that things must be done precisely in these ways in order to avoid social misfortune. Tradition maintained that customs were of divine origin, and that departure therefrom would certainly be punished by social disaster. Accordingly youth was instructed in the vital importance of conformity to custom, and the wrongness of violation. Hence when one intentionally or unintentionally committed a misdeed the "tribal self" within him became painfully active, expressing his feeling of estrangement from the tribe and his fear of human and divine punishment. Thus he tended to develop a conscience or moral judgment corresponding to the customs enforced by tribal authority. Through

[1] What the superficial observer does not see is that the origin and establishment of moral customs was a much more rational process than appears clear after the lapse of centuries. In their beginning these modes were thought to be most satisfactory for definite reasons. The thinking may have been unsound, the reasons absurd, yet the fact remains that morals have always originated or become established through reflection. Moreover there was in many cases more reason for the moral practice, for example, the taboos on touching the person of the chief, or the pregnant mother, or sacred objects, or even green fruit, than the primitive mind could apprehend. Its moral notions, however superstitious, were its approximations to the truth that social life depends on order and regularity, and avoidance of what may have bad social consequences.

the reflection of moral and religious teachers the commands and prohibitions constituting the moral code assumed in the course of time more and more general form, so that they included not only particular acts, but such comprehensive virtues as courage, generosity, industriousness, truth-speaking, and the like, of universal application. Negatively, such conduct as lying, laziness, selfishness, cowardice, and a variety of special vices came to be regarded as immoral. The moral codes of different peoples have varied widely, and in many particulars have been contradictory. The higher civilizations, even those as racially separate as the European and the Chinese, show a considerable agreement with respect to certain moral prescriptions, for example the duties of probity. The Christian and pagan morality of the Western world, however, present certain outstanding differences. The former exalts humility, self-sacrifice, compassion toward suffering, while the latter exhibits a more strenuous and worldly ideal of self-advancement, one which makes a respectable place for lordliness and ruthlessness. Some phases of individual and social conduct, such as justice, temperance, courage, and loyalty are idealized by both; but in general one system shows a predominating admiration for strength, whereas the other has more sympathetic regard for weakness. Our own moral culture is a compound of both.[2]

Contemporary social life, like all preceding stages of social development, is highly charged with moral sentiments. This of course does not mean that people behave as they ought, but rather that their deeds are constantly subjected to moral evaluation and are more or less emphatically approved or condemned. Instruction in the

[2] Nietzsche gives us an impressive literary idealization of pagan morality, personified in the "superman."

home and the school, utterances from the pulpit and in the press, as well as casual discussion everywhere, are continually pronouncing judgment upon personal conduct. Such moral pronouncements may or may not use the terminology of reflective ethics, but in any case they express moral ideas. However crude they may be, they usually represent a fundamentally sound idealism about the social order. While they often seem futile, and the evil practices which they condemn continue to flourish, there is evidence that the moral habits of society are gradually improving. In the long run we find that the public has become more sensitive to right and wrong. Intelligent views of moral conditions and moral needs develop with the spread of popular education. Pragmatic conceptions of justice, loyalty, temperance, integrity of character, and other virtues are woven more firmly into the fabric of the social mind. Human reason is forever at work to discover what is best for the individual and for the group, and to see that it is observed.

To many readers, perhaps, such dogmatic assertions will seem absurdly indifferent to facts. Social evils in wide variety so flaunt themselves in our faces that it is hard to escape an impression of their prevalence and unyielding power. We are prone, by a law of our mental nature, to pay more critical attention to social offenses, especially the murky revelations of a sensational daily press, than appreciative regard to the brighter aspects of social life; we take the latter more as a matter of course. Also, in retrospect, we tend to forget the shadows of the past, and to remember its sunshine. Constitutional pessimists and unintelligent critics of present-day tendencies idealize the past unduly. An exacter knowledge of it discloses an amount of brutality and vice which would be intolerably revolting to our more refined sensibilities.

Unquestionably there is less political and economic injustice, and a greater public concern with what remains. The tyranny of power is less flagrant, and is at least driven to subtlety by force of public opinion. Organized business exhibits a conscientious regard for service as well as devotion to profits. In the field of personal morals we cannot but acknowledge that there has been great advancement in certain respects. Drunkenness and the beastliness which follows in its train have been largely eliminated from the upper classes of society, relegated for the most part to the lowest strata, where they are punished with severity. Popular forms of gambling have been extensively outlawed or reduced to insignificant proportions. Sexual morals have been purified in some degree by education, and by the popularization of hygienic modes of life. A multitude of moral agencies which formerly had no existence now extend their aid to the weak and unfortunate, offering avenues of escape from bad environmental conditions, and healthy substitutes for vice. Undoubtedly there is plenty of moral degradation today, but at least it is not ignored as a matter of course. Much of it is being gradually eliminated.[3]

Much more significant in the long run than any general moral deterioration which has occurred is the current tendency to question the authority of traditional moral customs and ideas. Here again the war has had profoundly disturbing effects upon the social mind. Thinking people, and especially youth, are inclined to doubt whether a

[3] J. McCabe's *A Century of Stupendous Progress* contrasts moral conditions in England a hundred years ago with those of the present day, and shows clearly the advance which society has made. Undoubtedly the World War produced widespead demoralization,—brutality, corruption, and crime,—yet this is only a part of the moral picture. Society has reacted promptly against the evils, and shows no disposition to accept them supinely. On the whole it is increasingly alive to matters of right and wrong, and energetic in establishing social rectitude.

social order which produced so terrible a cataclysm is trustworthy in other respects. The fundamental institutions of law and government, property, religion, and particularly sex relations are being subjected to critical evaluation. Such inquiry may lead either to individual license or to the formation of new social ideals. Much of it is superficial or stupidly perverse; some is exceedingly penetrating. In those who still retain unquestioning reverence for moral tradition this state of affairs gives rise to the gravest apprehension, and its actual expressions are indeed occasionally shocking. Yet the spirit of the revolt is not simply depravity, but rather, at least in considerable part, an idealistic discontent with a social order which is felt to have proved itself essentially inadequate to human needs. Probably the disintegration of the moral consciousness is not so complete as it appears, but it is sufficient to raise afresh the problem of the content and form of moral instruction. More than ever society needs a soundly rational idealism which can be made the basis of moral teaching.

The cultivation of moral habits is mainly a matter of example and imitation, partly a disciplinary process of correction, public and private, but also in no small measure an educative discovery of the operation of cause and effect in the sphere of human conduct. Its basis must be established in childhood by imitative and corrective methods. Under these conditions the individual, advancing in years, may safely make increasing use of reflective intelligence in self-direction. The process, we may repeat, is essentially thoughtful. "To think," says Professor James, "is the moral act." Morality, that is to say, consists not simply in the restraint of impulse in accordance with custom or formal rules of conduct, but in the discovery of what makes for social welfare. Neither in the

race nor in the individual is it mere conformity to traditional usage, still less submission to arbitrary authority, or haphazard hedonistic wandering. There is an implicit guidance by reason throughout, sadly imperfect, but nevertheless in some degree genuinely intelligent. In the last analysis the truly moral is the rational. Socrates' dictum that the wise man cannot do wrong may not be absolutely true, but it certainly points toward the ideal. The mind naturally tries to clarify the direction of behavior, believing rightly that intellectual clarity conduces to moral rectitude.

For thousands of years philosophers have sought to define the ideal of "the good" which is rationally implied by moral distinctions, and which, if clearly apprehended, would afford a basis for moral prescription. Ethical theory remains a somewhat wordy controversy, but it contains one significant point of agreement. Whether the ideal is found in the application of ultimate principles of moral reason, or in the hedonistic calculation of the consequences of action, or in following the trend of the evolutionary process of nature, or in experimental attack upon social evils, in any case it can be attained only by dispassionate thought.

Morale is the moral tone and characteristic behavior of a group with respect to the group aims.[4] It involves two principal factors, namely, consciousness of group purpose and discipline in the attainment of it. These factors function more or less effectively in the face of difficulty. Where morale is high the individual endures a degree of nervous strain under which he would otherwise give way. Hence we find its best illustrations in organizations which have well-defined ideals and a traditional régime. Armies, churches, schools, labor unions, exhibit the quality in

[4] For an elaborate discussion of this topic see G. S. Hall, *Morale*.

various degrees. A nation shows its morale conspicuously in time of war, less obviously but not less genuinely in time of peace. The morale of an industrial group carries it through difficulties, enables it to face dangers unflinchingly, and to surmount obstacles which tend to disintegrate it. Many religious organizations, from the Roman Catholic Church to little sects of the faithful holding steadfastly to some peculiar creed, display a high level of this trait.

Academic illustrations are numerous. Not only athletic teams, but entire student bodies, particular classes, whole faculties and special departments are to a greater or less extent habituated to the morale of their work and play and social order. Sports present the most striking examples. A losing team may maintain its morale and finally snatch victory from defeat when its all-but-victorious opponent "breaks." Groups of teachers or students, such as departments, fraternities, and similar organizations, show a more or less unified and steady loyalty to the educational or social causes which they represent. The "honor system" of a college is successful only as the morale of the institution serves to prevent individuals from cheating or letting others cheat, and to bring offenders to justice.

There are certain specific conditions which are favorable to morale, and certain methods by which it is produced. Fundamentally important is homogeneity of the group, some "consciousness of kind" on which individuality is based. Race and nationality, common traditions and sentiments, economic, political and social equality, all lend themselves to the development of morale. A people with a distinguished national history, or a class-conscious group of aristocrats, is likely to exhibit it powerfully. No such special resemblance is indispensable, however, except

that of common sentiment or purpose. This may weld diverse constituents into a homogeneous unity, which forgets its differences and stands firm under pressure. When the United States began to participate in the World War its various foreign-born populations and its widely separated social classes displayed a remarkable capability of morale based on the common feeling of citizenship in a free country. Counterwise, conscious diversity of character and divergence of purpose are destructive of it. Individualism, caste, and privilege are unfavorable to its growth.

Accordingly, morale depends upon the inculcation of community feelings and group ideals. The methods by which this is accomplished are various. Insignia such as uniforms and badges have some value in making the wearer realize his responsibilities as a member of a group. It is a remarkable fact that a bit of metal or cloth may, by reason of its historic significance, take deep effect upon the will, strengthening it far beyond its ordinary manifestation of power. Specific instruction, both formal and casual, with regard to group aims and interests also serves to communicate the requisite ideas and emotional fervor. The utterances of leaders, hortatory literature, and the common talk of associates combine to produce a characteristic moral tone in the whole group. This assertion assumes, of course, that the instruction is sincere and rationally acceptable. It occasionally happens that the presentation of group sentiments which a discriminating mind knows to be fictitious, or a cloak for covert selfishness and privilege, has precisely the opposite effect to what was intended. Morale depends upon common honesty.

Most important are the examples or personal behavior in the older and more seasoned members of the group. In any organization there are certain individuals, officers

and privates, priests and laymen, foremen and workmen, whose habitual attitudes radiate a steadying effect throughout the whole body. Their obvious devotion to a cause or a task tends to instill a like sentiment into the minds of their fellows. Their regular practice of duty and unflinching firmness in emergencies constitute standards toward which all are inclined to strive. The morale of a college depends most largely upon the personal example of a few upper-classmen. If they are cynical or indifferent toward its professed aims, such will be the prevailing atmosphere of the institution.

Further, some measure of regular training is requisite. Drill, ritual, the methodical performance of prescribed tasks, all serve to develop in the mind that steady obedience to group ideals which is essential to morale. Those who exhibit the trait in its best form are the ones who have accustomed themselves to such individual and collective routine as their membership calls for. It cannot be attained all at once, much less imposed directly by external authority, but must grow within the mind by the cultivation of habit, and this in the service of a conscious social idealism. Just as the ideals themselves are ineffective without the aid of habituated practice, so the latter derives its power from its aims. Incidentally a good deal of corrective discipline, with severe punishment for infractions, may be necessary in establishing morale among those who lack a cogent appreciation of the importance of social ideals. Army units, ships' crews, work-gangs, and the like, maintain their morale only through the rigorous enforcement of subordination to a common purpose, and stern suppression of individualistic waywardness.

At the same time it is interesting to observe that the serious moral temper of a group depends in some degree upon the habit of turning occasionally to the lighter fea-

tures of life. The more highly moralized it is, the greater its need of incidental play. Groups possessed of devotion to duty are also addicted to expression of this lighter spirit, perhaps a rough but friendly humor, games and recreations, any kind of entertainment which tends to balance the sterner efforts of the will and helps to maintain its steadiness of moral purpose. In time of war, especially, it is necessary to make frequent use of amusement devices which take the attention away from suffering and danger, and which possess the recreative function of mental rest. In this way quite as genuinely as in the contemplation of ideals one gathers strength to meet the incessant strain and the critical emergencies of the struggle.

The vital importance of morale came to our attention with fresh insistence during the World War. Early in the conflict it was seen that victory would depend not only on numbers, equipment, and military skill, but also in no small measure on ability to endure, both in the field and at home, the tremendous strain of the conflict. Hence every effort was made to maintain the morale of one's own side and to destroy that of the other. Constant oral preachments, all kinds of appropriate literature, an unprecedented use of impressive posters, the imposition of regular tasks upon everybody,—such measures became the order of the time. Nation-wide organizations enlisted the services of and assigned special duties to all civilians, men, women, and children. Disloyalty received the severest physical and social punishments. Each side made insidious efforts to sow seeds of self-distrust and distrust of leaders among the enemy, particularly by dropping leaflets of demoralizing information from airplanes. Censorship and propaganda vied with each other to control or to pervert the intelligent judgment of civilian and soldier. There is no doubt that the cessation of the struggle

by the Central Powers was due to disintegrated morale quite as much as to the diminution of military resources.

The effectiveness of morale has led some students of society to look to it as a possible reënforcement of or substitute for the traditional morality whose apparently waning strength in our time seem to them to constitute a grave danger to the social order.[5] It is held that discipline in the aims and habits which are instrumental to the welfare of particular groups affords a remedy for the enfeebling of conscience. Concreteness of purpose and regularity of practice which membership involves give definite, substantial meaning to what are too commonly regarded as vague and futile abstractions. Duty assumes a new importance and compels observance in the light of a group aim. Virtues acquire solidity. Whether there is not also a sacrifice in some degree of the universality of application which is essential to morality in its highest form may be seriously questioned, but there can be no doubt that some of the most effective moral instruction and practice comes by way of morale.

Manners.—Much human behavior is of a sort which, though it does not quite belong to the categories of morals, yet calls for appreciative acknowledgment as possessing social value. Courtesy, grace, dignity, taste, and tact are qualities which characterize individuals and groups in their social relations, and which impart a peculiar agreeableness to social intercourse. Conversely, awkwardness, rudeness, and vulgarity seriously detract from social enjoyment. In their formal aspect good manners are determined by customary or conventional etiquette. But they are not essentially formal, or dictated by any external social authority. The best manners are often quite spontaneous; they arise from quick apprehension of a social

[5] Cf. G. S. Hall, *op. cit.*

situation, to which they are peculiarly adapted as a pleasing individual response.

Though the realm of manners verges on that of morals, and their specific form may be the same, there is a real distinction between them. The former are essentially matters of aesthetic perception rather than of the consideration of social consequences. The essence of moral action lies, as was pointed out, in its rational relation to social welfare. The peculiar feature of good manners is their immediate satisfactoriness, their instantaneous and adequate charm. Such traits may accompany a highly developed moral sense, or an utter lack of it. There are persons in whom good morals and good manners are harmoniously conjoined, whose sound discrimination between good and evil is always expressed with perfect courtesy and tact. But it is no exaggeration to say that virtue may be aesthetically repulsive. There is a kind of hardness of moral character which offends us because it is unlightened by the grace of good breeding. Some individuals habitually exhibit a bluntness and lack of finesse in their adherence to moral principles which considerably lessens their social acceptability. Some have such a bleak devotion to duty that it is hard to get along with them. Counterwise, a scamp or a villain may be personally fascinating. Deference, grace of speech, tasteful discrimination sometimes cover a multitude of moral defects. Even vice may assume such delicacy that it escapes merited condemnation.

Like other social practices, manners spread imitatively until they include whole groups. Children naturally copy the harshness or gentleness of their parents, and the coarseness or refinement of their small associates. Politeness of bearing and address in teachers tends to produce similar behavior in pupils. An athletic team

displays courtesy or discourtesy toward its opponents according to the character of its leadership. An entire office staff can be rendered intolerable by the ill-mannered example of its executive head. Professional groups, such as doctors, clergymen, actors, and commerical travellers, acquire habitual manners which distinguish them so clearly that we can often tell what is one's occupation by observing his casual behavior. Whole peoples are differentiated to some extent, not only by their customary forms of etiquette, but by the prevalence or absence of social taste in their everyday life.

In an aristocratic society manners become highly refined as distinctive characteristics of special classes. The formal rituals of the table and the dance, for example, assume an almost religious importance. Punctilious observance is absolutely requisite; only by unfailing correctness can one preserve one's social standing. A *faux pas* covers the unfortunate who commits it with deeper shame, and casts a darker shadow in memory, than a moral fault. A "social error" seems worse than a sin. In such a society, too, the manners of one class toward another are extensively formalized. Firm authority lightened by gracious condescension, on the one hand, and on the other humble deference, or at least the appearance of it, are prescribed and accepted class traits. In truly democratic societies manners take a simpler and more natural form, cruder but perhaps fully as courteous in spirit. With the development of stratified social classes, based on distinctions of wealth and power, the general tendency is to place increasing emphasis upon formalities of behavior and to practise them as marks of social superiority.

An especially interesting part of this subject is what we may term sex manners, that is to say, the characteristic behavior of the sexes toward each other. This is

a compound of gallantry or coquetry, domination and submission, protection, tenderness, comradeship, and mutual aid, combined in varying proportions, but constituting a blend which is noticeably different from the characteristic social behavior of each sex toward its own kind. The combination of traits enhances sex charm, and imparts a peculiar agreeableness to social relations. It is noteworthy that pleasing sex deportment serves to atone for shortcomings in other respects. A good deal of pettiness, selfishness, unfairness, and even dishonesty is ignored or condoned if it assumes a mask of social polish. We tend to evaluate all our associates, and especially those of the opposite sex, quite as much by the respect or affection which they habitually manifest toward us as by deeper qualities of moral character. Lack of good manners is a most fertile source of disharmony. There is no greater strain on the marriage relation, apart from actual infidelity, than the descent from the artificially attentive regard of courtship to the indifference, or nagging, or quarrelsome habit which develops in some cases through the irksomeness of constant association or the inevitable restraints of married life.

The importance of manners, indeed, lies in their everyday and unfailing application. Distinctively moral situations, especially those of critical importance, are comparatively rare; opportunities for courtesy, tact, and good taste are frequent. Also, we are so keenly appreciative of the personal attitudes of others toward us that our responses to their behavior are determined in no small measure by the precise form which such behavior takes. The manner of an action may make it either ingratiating or repellent. The same words may express friendliness or an insult. The tone of a question may invite a courteous reply or a curt rebuff. Some persons habitually put us at

our ease, others put us on the defensive. The effect of our behavior, often in minor and occasionally in major matters, is due mainly to considerations of manners. These perform in an indispensable way the peculiar function of lubricating social machinery.

The obvious dangers which beset the cultivation of manners are excessive formality and limitation to special groups. They are too commonly designed and employed to produce an artificial social effect and to reflect distinction on the user rather than to express a universal spirit of good will. It is remarkable how easily some persons who are punctiliously regardful of etiquette within their own circle lapse into rudeness outside it. Fortunately there are not a few whose unfailing grace of speech and action presents an attractive exemplification of this phase of social idealism. Their words and deeds are simple and straightforward, yet always considerate of the feelings of those to whom they are addressed. They seem to possess a sympathetic intuition of the minds of others, and without the sacrifice of sincerity or candor invariably say and do just what promotes social harmony. Where such breeding has its roots in moral character and intelligence, it becomes one of the most beneficial influences upon the group in which it appears.

Are Standards of Conduct Changing?—In conclusion let us return briefly to a question which emerged earlier in the chapter in connection with the concept of morals. Are the standards of conduct which regulate social behavior undergoing modification? To many thoughtful persons it appears that a profound and extensive alteration of traditional morals is taking place. To what extent is this true?

We may dismiss, as has already been done, the easy answer that society is rapidly becoming demoralized and

degenerate. In part, no doubt, the changes which are in progress are distinctly for the worse, a breaking down of moral restraints, a spreading wave of lawlessness, a deepening temper of irreverence. In other part, however, there are equally indubitable improvements in the social order. By and large, society has a more sensitive conscience with regard to hypocrisy, to injustice, to any kind of tyranny which interferes with individual rights. It is concerned as never before with the promotion of health and sane enjoyment of life, with an equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity. Altogether the current change cannot be regarded simply as a relaxation of moral standards or a weakening of the moral fiber of society.

The changes which we have to note are of a different kind. In the first place there is a diminished respect for absolute or *a priori* ideas of morality. Principles of rectitude are less accepted as having been established by unquestionable authority, human or divine. This attitude is not exactly defiance of such authority and its moral dicta; rather is it an increasing indifference, an ignoring of what is regarded as mere tradition or superstition. Second, there is more emphasis upon certain aesthetic standards of conduct, upon manners which give direct satisfaction or are held to be essentially appropriate to a situation. The concepts involved in such behavior are those of taste, decorum, dignity, grace, and beauty, though the meaning of these terms is far from clear, and is certainly not precisely what it has been in the past. On the whole there is more freedom, less rigid formality, in the aesthetic standards of to-day. Third, there is a growing disposition to regard the reflective calculation of the consequences of conduct, in individual happiness and social welfare, as the final adjudication of its moral char-

acter. Whatever satisfies the intelligence in these respects is right.[6]

The foregoing remarks apply especially to youth. It is becoming a commonplace that the younger generation, to an unprecedented extent, is forming its own opinion as to what kinds of behavior are right and wrong. This independence of judgment produces a good deal of what many older people term immoral, and what many others would probably classify as socially improper. Dress and manners exhibit a freedom which looks to the critical eyes of elders painfully like immodesty and bad behavior. Youth's lack of concern with what parents have held as imperative occasionally makes the latter gasp, or explode. Yet one who is intimately and sympathetically acquainted with youth can hardly doubt that its self-direction is as thoughtful as that of youth has ever been. Much of its wildness is only skin deep, the excess activity which follows release from restraint. Underneath it is a genuinely rational attitude toward life.[7]

[6] Following a suggestion of Professor Avis Carlson that the standard of rectitude in the younger generation is passing from the moral to the aesthetic in character (*Harper's Magazine*, Jan., 1928), two investigators questioned three groups of persons composed respectively of college students, parents, and grandparents, concerning their motives of conduct in relation to certain specific situations. (Anderson and Dvorak, in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Oct.–Dec., 1928.) The grandparents were most inclined to make use of absolute categories of right and wrong, the parents less so, and the students much the least of all. These differences were reversed with regard to aesthetic and prudential standards. Deference to public opinion was more nearly the same in all groups. The investigators comment with critical wisdom on the answers, remarking that the students will probably exhibit a more absolutistic attitude when they themselves are grandparents, and also that their expressed preference for the rational as the reliable guide of life is no doubt in part "rationalization." Yet this preference, though occasionally misguided in direction, is nevertheless sincere, and indicates the line along which the moral instruction of youth must proceed in order to be effective.

[7] Professor Coe wisely remarks that "the great and deadly rashness of youth takes the form of hasty acquiescence in things as they are or seem to be," which he finds still much too prevalent. (*The Motives of Men*, p. 202.) See also Chapter V in his genial discussion, *What Ails Our Youth?*

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL CONTROL

Restrictive and Directive Control.—The maintenance of social order depends upon agencies which are able to restrain erratic individualism, and to direct behavior into channels of coöperation. In any society such agencies are found in the powerful and the intelligent,—the aged who know customs and traditions, priests who represent divine authority, rulers whose physical strength or command of it in others holds the populace in subjection. These persons embody the institutions of government and religion, which are at all times the chief regulative forces in society. Children are reared in the home and school in the shadow of these institutions, and thus acquire the habits of social submission and coöperation which are carried over into adult life.

Submission and coöperation are always imperfect, however. While the individual develops as an essentially social being he remains one whose impulses occasionally run counter to the interests of the group to which he belongs. He is naturally selfish as well as unselfish, and his instinctive drives are as often opposed to the welfare of society as they are concordant with it. Moreover his acquired traits are not wholly desirable. He picks up bad social habits as readily as good ones, more readily, it would sometimes seem. The process of education, working on his native equipment, produces the villain as easily as the saint. To which sad truth we must add the equally sorrowful fact that his most distinctly social traits them-

selves, his sympathy, coöperation, and loyalty, occasionally assume group forms which are highly troublesome. As a member of a gang, a party, or a sect, he may become a nuisance or a calamity, all the worse for the perverted social idealism which dominates him. Altogether he is full of tendencies which call for restraint and guidance. Hence arises the problem of social control.

In one of its principal phases the problem is distinctly that of prevention and correction of unsocial behavior, the restraint of individuals whose casual whim and passionate desire are reckless of social consequences, who disobey commands, disregard usages, and break laws. Equally fundamental is the constructive aspect of the idea, the methodical direction of human nature along social lines, the creation of interests which will automatically unify and consolidate the discrepant tendencies of associated mankind. Social control often means not so much restraint as the art of stimulating latent forces in the mind, suggesting desirable aims, securing approval and aid in the enterprises of leadership. To a great extent it consists of adroitness in influencing public opinion. These two phases of the subject are closely related. Constructive control is dependent in some degree upon checking individual waywardness, but it is no less true that the latter automatically gives way to new and attractive aims. A positive social ideal is the best corrective of unsocial tendencies.

In its broadest extension the idea of social control includes processes which we have already considered, namely, the social pressures of class and crowd and organization, of custom and fashion, of morals and manners. Others which may be reckoned in the same general category are those of physical force, punishment, law, public opinion, and the special modes of censorship and

propaganda. The psychologist is interested in the mental dynamics of these processes, the forms of inhibition and devices of suggestion by which they operate in society.

Looking at the matter analytically, we see that social control must work through the positive and negative interests which supply the motives and the inhibitions of all action. Commands and prohibitions, rewards and punishments, praise and blame, respect and ridicule, all depend for their effectiveness upon the fundamental traits of submissiveness, fear, shame, pride, ambition, and the like. The processes of social suggestion by which control is accomplished operate by touching some emotional or active spring within the mind. Especially fundamental are fear and the satisfaction of coöperative achievement. In the last analysis these are the foundation stones of social order.

These motive forces may respond either to external authority or to inner ideals. The most effective control is that of a common idealism which produces morale. Hence if it is true—though this is doubtful—that the external controls of society are weakening, it is all the more important that inner ones be assiduously cultivated. Accordingly we see that it is the task of education to develop in childhood and youth the requisite social ideals —ideals which the individual voluntarily accepts, and in the light of which he restrains his own waywardness. This means not only the formation of right habits, it signifies also an intelligent comprehension of the aims of society, and of those abstract sentiments which are necessary to social order and progress. The possibility of social evolution depends upon the cultivation of these inner forces.

Let us not make the mistake of supposing that social control, either external or internal, is necessarily benefi-

cial. There are bad laws as well as good ones. The administration of "justice" often errs, and is sometimes a mockery. Punishment may be imposed in ways which do irreparable harm. Public opinion is too frequently prejudiced and harmful, and the propaganda which produces it is in many an instance distinctly malicious. Education may take pestilently wrong directions, such as class antagonism and race hatred, and may strengthen a group morale, the aims of which are extremely iniquitous. Organized religion, with all its idealism and corrective power, has been to a considerable extent privileged and tyrannical. Psychological principles and methods, as we have observed, are facile tools for the execution of evil as well as good purposes. We need, it is true, a clear comprehension and perfected technique of social control, but above all we need a soundly ethical ideal of society.

Force and Punishment.—The original and ultimate form of social control, as applied to individuals who oppose the authority of leaders or the interests of the group, is force. In all societies, both of animals and of human kind, the older and stronger impose their will upon the recalcitrant by means of physical power. From the little circle of the family to the complex arrangements of society at large, the maintenance of order depends in considerable measure upon superior size and strength. Custom and law, even the most highly moralized and idealistic forms of control, must now and then resort to primitive methods. Ordinarily, of course, the possibility or threat of punishment is sufficient; but almost all government at least occasionally has to exercise force, using whatever instruments are at hand for the purpose.

The arch-inhibiters of action, apart from fatigue, are the distraction of attention, and pain. While the former has distinct advantages, and is the preferable mode of

control, the latter is final. If sufficiently intense it renders action impossible. Whether it takes the form of physical agony, or the more subtle suffering of shame, it is the only means, in some cases, of putting an end to objectionable behavior. Since there are persons who will yield to no other restraint, society cannot dispense with its inhibitory function.

Yet we must acknowledge also that the use of physical force in dealing with offenders is almost always unfortunate. As President Morgan says, "Reliance on physical force in human relations tends to debase character. It promotes arbitrariness, cruelty, contempt for finer methods. Examine any social relation based on the direct use of physical force, and we see traits which all decent men deplore. The teacher or parent who relies on whipping children, the policeman or the sheriff 'getting his man,' the soldier killing with his bayonet—all these bring into use emotions and qualities civilization is trying to outgrow. The lynching bee is brutalizing, military rule tends to be arbitrary, life at police headquarters puts severe strain on fine character, and the public executioner is not admired. Men whose lives are spent in the immediate exercise of physical force tend to lose some of the qualities society holds in highest regard." Yet, as the same writer observes, "Every stable society has force as its ultimate support." The social desideratum is the establishment of conditions, educational, legal, and moral, such that the need of force is reduced to a minimum.

Let us consider the subject of punishment in the light of these principles. The infliction of punishment has its roots in the injured self-regard which instinctively takes expression in resentful and pugnacious attitudes toward the offender. Its essential feature, psychologically speaking, is the associative synthesis of the penalty with the

offense in the offender's mind. Whatever its special form, physical pain, restraint of action, the imposition of toil, or social disgrace, if it is real punishment it must be taken in conscious relation to the offense. Its motives are partly vindictive, partly preventive, partly corrective, and its modes range from simple, instinctive brutality to the most exquisite refinements of torture and the deliberate practices of scientific penology. From the mother cat's boxing the kitten's ears, and the dog's retaliation on the thief of its bone, to the elaborate contemporary schemes of penalistic reform, these features are present in various degrees.

Punishment, both among animals and by mankind, is originally vindictive or retaliatory—the angry re-assertion of authority by the injured individual or group. This primary motivation may be accompanied by more or less preventive and reformatory purpose, but the intensest feelings in the mind of the punisher are usually those of injured selfhood and anger, and the foremost intention is to inflict suffering in payment for a real or fancied injury. Punishment which is exclusively or predominantly vindictive, however, is notoriously objectionable. Few thoughtful persons in civilized society to-day regard this as its proper purpose. Vengeance is too likely to be blind. It commonly takes the form of sheer force, and like force in general, as a means of social control, it is apt to be exaggerated, and to obscure reason. The victim loses sight of the real issue in his feeling of helplessness and resentment. Simply to whip a naughty child, or expel a reprobate from college, or imprison a thief, or electrocute a murderer, just because our own feelings are outraged, is certainly no adequate way of dealing with the offender. Something more is needed in the mind of both parties, and according as this need is met the vindictive motive fades into the background.

Hence jurists are in agreement that punishment, as a method of administering justice and maintaining order in society, should be divorced from the popular desire for retaliation. Whether this emotional root of punishment can be entirely severed is perhaps psychologically questionable, but certainly it needs much better guidance by reason than it ordinarily receives. Broadly speaking, vindictive punishment does not work.

From the point of view of social psychology the principal function of punishment is that of protecting society by means of the deterrent effect of the penality, the linking of which with the idea of the act tends to inhibit repetition. As a matter of fact, however, the result is often not so simple. New and fascinating opportunities for wrong-doing, increased shrewdness in avoiding detection, experience in successful evasion and observation of it in others,—these and other factors greatly diminish the preventive effect of punishment. Statistical inquiry seems to show that the form which punishment actually takes often leads to recidivism. Social disgrace, ostracism from respectable society, intensified resentment against authority, corruption of the mind through intimate association with other offenders,—such conditions may far outweigh the inhibitory influence of a penalty. It is especially important to observe that deterrence depends much more upon the prospective certainty and justice of punishment than upon its severity. The failure of police and courts in this respect greatly encourages crime.[1]

Social idealism rightly maintains that punishment

[1] Authority necessarily presents something of a challenge to insubordination, and accordingly the failure of punitive authority naturally promotes defiance. Attempts have been made to discourage crime by reiterating to the criminally minded, by means of billboard posters, the assertion "You can't win." If the prospective criminal understands the facts, as he commonly does, he knows that he has at least as good a chance of escaping punishment as the law has of detecting and convicting him.

should function not merely to protect society but also to reform the offender, to produce a better character as well as to eliminate a danger. Such reform depends upon certain conditions. In the first place the penalty must be understood as just, that is to say the natural and appropriate consequence of the offense. The victim must see that it is not simply an act of revenge on the part of a ruling power, or even an arbitrary means of self-protection instituted by society, but something designed for his own good, a way of helping him to reestablish himself in society and to regain his self-respect. Further, he must receive such education, intellectual and industrial, as will enable him to fit himself harmoniously into the social order. These conditions, it must be acknowledged, are not easily supplied. Anyone who has had to punish refractory children or strong-willed youth knows how hard it is to devise penalties which will serve as stepping stones to a higher moral level. The difficulty is of course much greater when one is dealing with offenders whose character is more or less hardened, and whose perversity of opinion and habit stubbornly resists change. Yet it remains true that the ideal of punishment is reform. Sometimes the first step is a considerable measure of forgiveness, which produces a mental attitude favorable to the reconstruction of the self.

Finally, the trend of scientific penology and penal practice is that of investigating the nature of the male-factor psychologically and sociologically, to discover the precise inner and outer causes of his offending, and his capability of reform. His intelligence and temperament, his social and cultural background, are matters of vital importance in relation to his punishment, if the latter is to achieve its purpose. This investigative attitude is quasi-

medical rather than strictly punitive, but in the long run it is probably most advantageous.

Law.—The most primitive societies are under the domination of rulers whose will, backed by physical power, demands obedience. But the arbitrariness of this process is tempered and guided by the influence of custom, to which the rulers themselves conform, and which they zealously impose upon the tribe. Custom, sanctioned by superstitious belief as to its divine origin, is the characteristic control in primitive society.

With the further development of civilization custom becomes formulated in some part as law, which derives authority from its source in political organization, and carries the implication of appropriate enforcement. Such legal control is extended by deliberate enactment, embodying the reflection of those whose age, wisdom, and physical prowess entitle them to respect. The outcome is an intricate system of legislation expressing the social intelligence of man, having in some degree the moral flavor of "justice," often claiming divine approval, and always relying upon the ultimate support of physical force.

Most persons think of social control primarily in terms of law. Whatever is needed is to be obtained, whatever is wrong may be corrected, through its agency. And perhaps it is true that there is no characteristic of advancing civilization more vital than respect for law. The acknowledgment of the authority of a formulated social idea, as distinct from mere obedience to personal command, is profoundly important. The deeper note of compulsion in the thought that a law must not be broken becomes, when taken into the mind of the multitude, a tremendously steadying force. We need not delude ourselves as to the extent to which such respect for law actually prevails. All societies contain numerous

lawless persons, and are throughout more or less indifferent to legal requirements. Undoubtedly many, and perhaps all of us on occasion, are willing to ignore, to evade, or to defy the law, regarding it as an arbitrary imposition, and paying no more attention to it than is necessitated by the danger of penalty. But for its instruments of punishment it often would not amount to much. Yet in spite of this acknowledgment it remains true that the very idea of law tends to create respect for itself, and to assume a superior place in the list of agencies of social control. The social inheritance of centuries has established in the mind more deeply than appears on the surface of behavior the spirit of conformity to regulation.

It needs little reflection, however, to see that the problems of social control cannot be solved simply in terms of law, even with its supplementary agency of punishment for infraction. Not only are there many forms of misbehavior which lie inconveniently beyond its scope —matters of morals and manners for which no exact legislation is practicable; but there is also the deeper difficulty of adjusting enactment to the actual nature of society. Laws which are unjust, which are in advance of public sentiment, which cannot be enforced, which are so intricate and so innumerable that the average person cannot comprehend them, all indicate the need of other controls. Laws dealing with freedom of speech, with the use of alcoholic beverages, with the driving of automobiles, show in different ways and degrees how hard it is to maintain order in society in respect to these matters. It is so easy to attack an unsatisfactory social condition by making a law that we often blind ourselves to the question whether the proposed legislation really fits the nature of society, or whether it will not produce a greater evil than that which it aims to correct.

Especially dangerous is the disposition to make laws without the requisite support of public opinion, and hence without the possibility of effective enforcement. Sometimes a determined minority, employing propaganda, a lobby, and the leverage of moral sentiment, secures the passage of legislation having a moral aim. If the public mind is potentially in favor of this aim, the result may be the elevation of public opinion to a higher moral level, and the establishment of a better social habit. On the other hand if public sentiment is opposed, the outcome is likely to be the development of a covert but widespread defiance of the law, an increase of lawlessness which tends subtly to weaken the fabric of social life. A conspicuous illustration is the failure of prohibitory legislation in communities which are predominantly opposed to it as interference with individual rights.[2]

Another serious defect in this kind of control is found in the frequent inequalities of its administration. Justice is too easily evaded by wealth and power. Particular laws are twisted in application to suit special interests. The term "legal technicality" has become a byword, indicating a loophole of escape from just punishment. The consequence is that the idea of law loses its restraining force, and assumes the aspect of a game of wits and pecuniary power.[3]

Anarchistic theory asserts that the ills of society

[2] It is at present somewhat uncertain whether the indubitable moral and economic gains resulting from the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States adequately compensate for the lawlessness of spirit and practice which it has engendered.

[3] What has been appropriately termed our "sporting theory of justice" gives the accused, in proportion to his financial means of defending himself, every opportunity to evade punishment. The utterance of a noted American lawyer, "You can't convict a million dollars," an observation substantiated by many historical facts, is one of the bitterest comments ever made on American life. The readiness of courts to impose the severest penalities on indigent offenders presents a spectacle in contrast which is shocking. Strange to say, the bar has shown no determined disposition to improve this state of affairs.

flow mainly from the institutions of law and government. Human nature, says the theoretical anarchist, is sufficiently well behaved when it is let alone. Its natural orderliness and intelligence are adequate to produce and maintain a stable and progressive society. In a régime of absolute freedom there is little or no disposition to interfere with the rights of others. Coöperation does not depend on legislative enactment, nor is wrong-doing effectively punished by governmental authority. The demands of government and the imposition of law are essentially unjust, in that they restrict the natural rights of the individual, and they inevitably constitute incitements to disobedience. Hence the proper direction of progress in contemporary society is that of annihilating all such obstacles to the natural attainment of human welfare.

The absurd extravagance of this view should not blind us to the kernel of truth which it contains. Not only anarchists but many others who are quite without anarchistic prejudices observe that government often tends to become too officious and tyrannical, and that there are far too many laws for the good of society. It is an interesting and significant paradox that increase of legislation is accompanied by a compensatory increase of variegated lawlessness. In part, of course, this is simply the natural consequence of defining certain actions as unlawful. But there is a deeper and more subtle cause of the phenomenon. The self-assertive nature of mankind being what it is, it regards a law as in some degree a challenge. In so far as its reason is perceived and approved, and especially when it is supported by public sentiment, it is obeyed. But the inborn individualism of man resents restraint. From early childhood it learns that rules, in school and elsewhere, may sometimes be broken with impunity provided one is sufficiently clever. In many cases it acquires

through repeated experiences of successful evasion a settled disrespect for law. The remedy for this state of mind is not more laws, nor severer punishment, but rather the inculcation of social ideals and the avoidance of unnecessary legislation. Society undoubtedly needs many laws, but it needs even more the development of inner controls which make laws superfluous.

Public Opinion.—It is a commonplace of social science that public opinion is for most persons an extremely powerful if not the supreme agency of social control. To it their thoughts and feelings as well as their acts conform, not only in respect to political questions, but in various other kinds of social matters. Just what, then, is the precise character of this controlling force? What are its sources, how does it operate, and what is its value?

Public opinion is the opinion of a community or larger group about questions relating to its social life. It is not simply the opinion of the public, but is opinion about public affairs. It applies chiefly to moral, economic, and political matters, and to others only as they are regarded as affecting the welfare of the group. Problems of Sunday recreation and of civic progress, of taxation and immigration, of national defense and international treaties, lie or may come to lie within its scope. Religious interests have for the most part passed out of its field, though in some places we still find sectarian sympathies and antipathies woven into its texture, for example in the opposition to a candidate for political office because of his religious affiliation, or the regular choice of school teachers who belong to a particular denomination. Subjects which possess more strictly individual interest, or which are not felt to have social importance, escape its domination. There is little or no public opinion about styles of domestic or even civic architecture. Any topic of general interest,

however, may give rise to it. Ordinarily it is not a purely intellectual state of mind, but expresses emotional approval or disapproval. In its affective aspect we term it public sentiment.

The "public" which holds it need not be the whole, but only a part, and in some cases not a very large part of the community or body politic. Its extent may be determined by geographical lines, as in matters relating to the negro in the south, or to the Japanese on the Pacific Coast. Public opinion is sometimes the opinion of a minority, if this is active and the majority are indifferent. In many instances it takes the form of an unreconciled conflict of the opinions of various groups, and we say that "public sentiment on the subject is divided." In any case it reduces to the ideas and feelings of a considerable number of individuals about questions which are supposed to have social importance.

The agencies by which public opinion is formed are numerous and varied. Of first importance is the methodical and informal instruction of childhood and youth, for basic likes and dislikes, beliefs and attitudes, are planted like seeds by the example and precept of elders and associates at that time. Much public opinion of later years is the outgrowth of sentiments long ago fixed in the minds of children by sheer docility. Casual conversation continues throughout life to be the principal medium in which one's views develop and take definite shape. In and out of work-hours in factories and offices, during religious services and in subsequent discussion, over dinner tables and in the leisurely moments of travel when there is nothing better to do than talk, the process of formation goes on. Listening, we accept or reject or modify; speaking, we impress others or at least confirm ourselves in our beliefs. Newspapers, magazines, and books

do their large part in presenting the materials and the comments from which we construct our ideas about public affairs.

The process is predominantly one of imitative feeling rather than independent and critical thought. Sir Robert Peel called public opinion "that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs."[4] Without descending to this depth of pessimism we must acknowledge that it is usually not a profoundly thoughtful matter. Bryce remarks that out of twenty persons holding a certain view, nineteen have accepted it rather passively from others. It is almost always based in part on prejudice, and is often only the special form which an underlying prejudice assumes in relation to a particular question. Reasons, if considered at all, are accepted or rejected uncritically. It is the twentieth person who makes it what it is, and he does so because he *thinks*. Though his reflection may not be effective at first, and even though he passes off the stage without apparently impressing his conclusions upon others, he is nevertheless the author of the public opinion that is to come, for sooner or later his ideas, in the measure of their truth, will compel acceptance. The process is discouragingly slow, however, and a long lapse of time may show little more than a deepening of prejudice by repeated misinformation and specious argument.

Right or wrong, public opinion is a powerful determinant of behavior. Private conduct conforms to it; political action is swayed by it. Even where it is ignored or defied it sooner or later makes itself felt, and often does so without bringing to bear upon the dissenter any special means of punishment. Its quiet insistence is sufficient. So con-

[4] Quoted by Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 365.

stituted is the human mind, so responsive to subtle social stimulation and affected by social atmosphere, that we cannot openly and persistently set ourselves against the minds of those around us. The fundamental motives of submissiveness, fear, and shame bend our waywardness into line unless they are counteracted by still stronger motivation in other directions. The public, by its attitudes and overt expressions of approval and condemnation, confidence and distrust, respect and ridicule, controls the course of social development.

Its influence is especially powerful in the field of government. Autocracy is much more dependent upon it than appears at first sight, for arbitrary action which is unacceptable to the public meets a dead weight of passive resistance, if not active opposition and evasion.[5] In democratic countries it is the most important condition of successful administration. Representative government must always keep its ear to the ground.

What, in general, is the value of public opinion? We cannot blind ourselves to its basic prejudice, its usual irrationality, its frequent stupidity. Headed in the wrong direction, as it not infrequently is, it makes efforts at social reform futile. It is easily led by demagogues, short sighted, superficial in its estimate of personal character, slow to act independently even in time of danger. Yet it is usually sound at heart, and we ought to avoid the current condemnation of it as merely a product of prejudice subjected to clever manipulation by the self-interested few. In matters of public welfare it is a steadying force, holding in check the individualism which tends to disintegrate,

[5] So frank and brutal a tyranny as that of Mussolini in Italy could not endure, even with the weapon of organized Fascism, but for the fact that the public, weary of internal conflict, finds for the time a satisfactory measure of peace and hope in submission to the dictates of a strong-willed executive. This extraordinary renunciation of liberty is explained by public approval as well as by fear.

and the autocracy which would abuse society. Though it does not exhibit ideal rationality it commonly possesses more intelligence than is acknowledged by its critics, who are apt to be biassed by their own opinions, and to overlook aspects of social questions with which the public is properly concerned. In any case it represents what the public itself regards, at least for the time, as socially satisfactory. In so far as it is wrong it is susceptible of education.

Censorship and Propaganda.—The support of public opinion for public and private projects is often so indispensable, and its restraining power is so great, that special methods have been devised for controlling it. These are of two principal kinds, namely, *censorship* and *propaganda*. Censorship consists in prohibiting the publication of matter which would tend to produce undesired ideas and sentiments. Its essential feature is found not in its preventive character, however, but in the fact that it is arbitrarily exercised by certain individuals without precise legal specifications as to what is objectionable. Censorship of revolutionary utterances has probably always been practised. Censorship of obscene literature, plays, and pictures is a more recent development. Sometimes the function lies in the hands of officials, as the police or the postmaster; sometimes in unofficial or semi-official persons whose judgment is accepted by the public as final. War involves censorship of much that would pass without question in time of peace, and the Great War produced far-reaching extensions of the practice, some of which have continued in the civil life of to-day. In many American cities the police censorship of strike agitation and of socialistic speeches is extremely rigid. Occasionally it happens that patriotic and moralistic organizations are able to use the machinery of

government for their own censorial purposes. In all such cases the prohibition follows upon the arbitrary decision of an individual or group, which may or may not be authorized by law or supported by public sentiment.

Censorship is probably justifiable in some instances. The arbitrary suppression of direct incitement to lawlessness, of what is sexually indecent and demoralizing, and perhaps also of some forms of socially and economically baneful advertising, makes for public welfare. Such prevention cannot always wait upon legal formulation of just what is and what is not objectionable. But the danger in censorship, as actually performed, is far greater than its merit. Again and again the ignorant, officious, irresponsible condemnation of ideas and artistic creations, because they did not agree with established prejudices or with the censor's whims, has brought the practice into disrepute. A political treatise on communism, a scientific sociological and physiological discussion of sex, a literary depiction of the contemporary problem of divorce, may suffer from the intellectual limitation of the censor. Competent persons for the office are not easily found, or willing to accept it. Those who act in this capacity are usually not possessed of breadth or depth of mind, but are political and social busybodies who find therein a means of exalting their own small importance, or what is worse, are the tools of a sinister autocracy which seeks to stifle freedom. The taste for autocratic power grows by what it feeds on, and the result is a contemptibly petty tyranny. Against this tyranny political, aesthetic, and scientific idealism must now and then fight a strenuous battle if they are to impress themselves upon the public mind and help to constitute public opinion and sentiment.

It is to be observed also that censorship encourages a surreptitious spread of the prohibited matter, and that

in the case of what is really objectionable this is likely to be more harmful than open circulation. The very fact of censorship tends to increase interest in the forbidden thing. Self-assertive and secretive nature seizes on the unwholesome food, and is strengthened in this inclination by the covert example of others and by its own success in shrewdly evading the censor. In consequence counteracting ideas and moral influences fail to work. Sound criticism cannot direct its weapons effectively against what has been thrust into the dark. It is true that many an idea of social reform has been widely disseminated under cover of secrecy, and in spite of official prohibition and even persecution has ultimately come to light with sufficient strength to establish itself. Yet this can hardly be regarded as the better way. Liberal minds are rightly inclined to use educative rather than repressive methods in distracting attention from what is objectionable.[6]

Passing to the subject of propaganda, let us understand by the term deliberately one-sided presentation of a cause to the public, ignoring or perverting the other side in such a way as to obscure its merits and prevent fair judgment.[7] While some propaganda is distinctly and in-

[6] The problem of censorship has appeared recently in the field of college journalism, both in the form of literary indecency and in student criticism of college administration. Of course the college authorities have power to censor and prohibit, but here as in society at large liberalism is desirable, and should be the guiding principle. The two phases of the problem are somewhat different, however. With regard to the former, an educational institution certainly has the right and the duty to insist that literary filth or scurrilous irreverence shall not be published under its name, and that students who desire to express themselves in this way shall not make use of the institutional title for the purpose. In the rare cases which occur this perfectly fair condition would be a sufficient corrective, since the college name is an indispensable psychological and pecuniary factor in the matter. As for student criticism, which in general is partly sound and partly bumptious, it is noteworthy that administrative efforts to suppress it have given it wider currency than it would otherwise have had. It is wiser to ignore the criticism or to meet it with fair argument.

[7] An interesting discussion of this subject is given by Dunlap, *Social Psychology*, Chap. VIII.

tentionally maleficent, most of it is fairly conscientious—the dissemination of ideas which the propagandist regards as sound and socially beneficial. One of its original forms is religious, *i.e.* the spread of the "true faith." It plays a large part in politics, and is a common method of advancing social movements of every sort. The rectitude or the iniquity of an administration, the need of an increase or of a decrease in national defense, the merits and demerits of capitalism and socialism, the advantages and the disadvantages of prohibition, the blessings of single-tax, the horrors of vivisection, the conservation of natural resources—this, that, and the other idea or project come before us clad in a veil of philanthropy and concealing whatever is dubious in their character.

During the war the practice assumed huge proportions by reason of the necessity of maintaining military and public morale. For this purpose governments did not hesitate to suppress, to distort, and to manufacture news, sometimes deliberately deceiving the public in the most outrageous way. Minds already confused by the rush of events were further unbalanced by stories of atrocities, fictitious revelations of diplomatic affairs, vivid description of heroic struggles, and the like, all designed to focus energy in the desired direction of loyal support. A flood of striking pictures, emotional narratives, and arguments which made up in clever emphasis what they lacked in evidence and logic, swept over the land. Corresponding material was cast into the enemy's country from the air, in order to unsettle the loyalty of armies and populace. So clever and so effective, psychologically, was the manipulation of public sentiment that many experienced observers regarded it as comparable in importance to the military operations.

The general susceptibility of the public to propaganda

has been made clear, and we must face the fact that popular responsiveness to skillful engineering of opinion is a most important factor of contemporary social development. Harmful as well as beneficent projects may be "put over" by clever public address, by impressive space and pungent editorial comment in newspapers, by shrewdly fallacious argument in books and magazines,—all of which may be had at a price. Since wealth, and especially organized wealth, seeks constantly to advance its aims and to protect its interests against attack, we cannot but expect it to make use of this highly polished instrument. Government and big business have learned expert methods of manufacturing favorable public sentiment. Most sinister is the extension of propaganda into the schools, where the uncritical mind of childhood is especially susceptible to it.[8]

The psychological technique by which this is accomplished consists essentially of the processes of suggestion, in which emphasis, reiteration, the citing of real or alleged authority, and the subtle adaptation of the propagandist aim to the desires and prejudices of the public take automatic effect. Most artful is the relating of the project to sympathies and antipathies which have had lodgment, it may be from childhood, in the mind of the individual.

[8] The advent of the World War was facilitated by the governmental practice, in France, Germany, and many other countries, of instilling national hatred and pugnacious patriotism into the minds of school children. There are efforts to do the same in this country, as is shown by the absurd controversy over textbooks in history. We may note also the recent attempt of privately owned public utilities to prescribe the aim and content of public school instruction with regard to the contemporary problem of public ownership. This attempt was amazing in its proportions and thoroughness. Particularly interesting is the fact that the association of public utilities succeeded extensively in securing the adoption of textbooks written under its direction or approved by it, which explicitly favored private ownership, and in having others eliminated. Had not the effort been discovered and frustrated, it is possible that in the course of time, since lifelong ideas about public questions are formed in part through school instruction, an overwhelming public sentiment against public ownership would have been created.

Perhaps everybody has what Lippmann calls "stereotypes," *i.e.* abstract ideas such as "public safety," "protection of citizens," "justice," "progress," "destructive bolshevism," "ruthless capitalism," and the like—ideas formed uncritically in early life and never defined with precision, but deeply tinctured with approval or disapproval, and always ready for application. The art of propaganda brings a subject into the aura of such abstract sentiments, and so secures endorsement. For example, a huge manufacturing concern, threatened with a strike, publishes extensively in the daily press and in other ways a statement of its service to the country, its small profits, its philanthropic attitude toward employees, their economically impossible demands, and so on. The employees, on the other hand, set forth the difficulty and danger of the labor, the tyrannical requirements, long hours, small wages, and huge profits of stockholders. Since the public cannot verify the conflicting assertions it accepts or rejects them according to its prejudices.[9]

Is propaganda really as effective as is supposed? It certainly serves to confirm existing opinion in the mind of the multitude, which is sometimes an important accomplishment, but that is after all not the main point. To what extent does it *make* opinion? Does it convince the ignorant or settle the uncertainty of those who are in doubt? Few individuals are so simple-minded that the mere perusal of a partisan statement suffices to constitute a decisive sentiment. Bearing in mind that it usually has to face counter-propaganda, and to run the gauntlet of criticism by the intelligent part of the public, we may

[9] Not long ago an American soldier, stationed in a foreign country where the need of such soldiery has been insistently questioned, killed a native in his house and in the presence of his family. The carefully edited press report failed to indicate the cause of the killing, but designated the victim as a "bandit," and took pains to remark that the soldier bore the nickname of "parson" because of his sobriety of character.

question whether it is quite so powerful an agency as either its users or its critics take it to be. With many persons it has acquired such a reputation for unreliability that it is quickly recognized, and discounted or disregarded. While it succeeds in numerous instances in raising or obscuring an issue, and in facilitating or delaying a public reaction, we make a mistake if we look upon it as an all-sufficient means of mechanically manipulating public opinion.

The dubious character of much propaganda has given the term an evil significance. Justice and common sense call for a somewhat different evaluation, however. In the clash of human interests we cannot expect that a controversial subject shall be set forth with dispassionate fairness by either side. We can only demand that neither party shall intentionally deceive the public by false assertions. Most propaganda is sincere, and contains a considerable measure of truth. Usually it throws a light, even though a dim and partial light, upon a topic of public concern. The desideratum with regard to it is not that it be prohibited or suppressed—which is as impossible as it is undesirable—but rather that both sides of every public question should be heard, and sometimes that the pecuniary support of persistent propaganda should be brought to light.

Social Education.—As all the roads in ancient times were said to lead to Rome, from which radiated the power and enlightenment of the period, so all the topics which we have been considering lead us to the subject of education. The different methods of social control agree in one respect, namely, their dependence upon instruction. Custom and convention, morals and manners, are not inborn; they are the result of formal and informal teaching. Respect for law as an abstract sentiment has to be definitely

inculcated. Public opinion is often the product of early impressions even more than of current suggestion. The resistance to casual crazes and to systematic propaganda must be acquired by a gradual process. Social character is formed when it is most plastic. Social influences of every description take effect in line with attitudes and sentiments which have been learned long before. In short, education, including both intellectual enlightenment and moral discipline, constantly underlies the functioning of the social order. No solution for the various problems of society is so commonly offered as the simple one: teach the young.

The task of social education, as has often been pointed out in these pages, falls primarily on the home and secondarily on the school. Most important, because fundamental, is the example of older persons and the discipline imposed by them in the family. We are only beginning to understand and estimate rightly the deep susceptibility of the observant child mind to early impressions. Such social lessons as habitual cheerfulness, self-control when angry, overlooking minor annoyances, regard for the rights and convenience of others, patience with stupidity, kindness to the helpless, unselfish coöperation in daily tasks, truth-telling, honesty, and so on, are learned from example and precept at this time. Contrariwise, the nervous instability, the domestic tyranny, the habitual fault-finding and scolding, the self-indulgence and the viciousness of parents, almost inevitably produces similar behavior in children. The concrete sentiments engendered in the first few years of childhood are the indispensable basis of those abstract ones which will control later life.

The function of the school with regard to social education is to enlarge the circle of juvenile society, to impose

new forms of social discipline which are needed in the larger and more complex environment, and to clarify the social sentiments intellectually, so that they are apprehended as essentially rational rather than as autocratically arbitrary. The advancing years of school life bring new opportunities for the inculcation of habits of coöperative effort, the reciprocal development of social and individual aims, and the responsibility for participating constructively in the order of society which surrounds the school. Especially important phases of the process are the deepening of respect of the sexes for each other, and the extension of sympathy beyond the limits of the community and the nation to other peoples and races. Social education in its later stages takes scientific and philosophic form, and thereby establishes social concepts on a broad and firm foundation. Since the time of Socrates it has been sufficiently clear that good order in society depends ultimately upon an intelligent comprehension of principles of conduct.

To many critically minded observers it appears that the traditional domestic, religious, and political controls, *i.e.* those exercised by elders within the family, by ecclesiastical authority, and by government, have been greatly weakened. If this is so,—though the point is far from certain,—there is greater need of social education through scholastic agencies. In any case the extension of democracy in society, with its corollary of public education on an unprecedented scale, imposes a correspondingly increased obligation upon the school. The latter must assume, as never before, the duty of training the individual for harmonious, coöperative, and constructive citizenship.

The difficulties in the situation are manifest. One is that of sheer numbers. In many schools today the pupil can

hardly escape being regarded as a mere numerical unit, to be handled by mass and mechanical methods in the quickest and most efficient manner possible. Pressure of numbers tends to stifle the personal relation between pupil and teacher, upon which the social education of the former so largely depends. Unsocial, perhaps even vicious traits are less likely to be observed and restrained. Concerted and organized insubordination takes subtle forms and reaches unmanageable proportions, for example in the covert maintenance of secret societies which defy proscription and make a business of perpetrating obnoxious pranks. Especially baneful is the anti-disciplinary attitude of some parents, occasionally backed by political influence over school principals and superintendents, which reënforces the bumptiousness and encourages the waywardness of youth.

A second fundamental difficulty is the increasing presumption of freedom as essential to individuality. The "elective system" is only an especially conspicuous phase of an idea which has extended its operation throughout all school practice, the idea of giving the individual larger authority in the direction of his own conduct. In many matters of social significance dictatorial prescription has largely given way to individual choice. In so far as this method makes use of the sympathetic and idealistic impulses of youthful human nature it is to be commended. But with the incursion of large numbers of pupils lacking these impulses, lacking also previous social discipline and habits of thoughtfulness, there is danger of developing a social group characterized by irrational whims and prejudices rather than by adequate self-control.

Other difficulties might be mentioned. The secularization of the public school, necessary on account of sectarian differences and prejudices, deprives its moral in-

struction of the powerful sanction of religion.[10] Socially disintegrating, too, is the development of schools representing special classes in society, or permeated by class prejudices. Altogether the task of educating the youth of the nation for the right kind of social control is discouragingly complex and difficult.

Democracy, which is our predominant political system, demands universal education of a sort which produces intelligent thoughtfulness and conscientiousness about social matters. The mere fact of majority opinion is worthless, and may be harmful to society. The casting of a majority vote, or the domination of social life by unorganized public sentiment, is valuable only as it expresses a critical acceptance of collective aims. Hence the educational system of a democracy has for one of its main purposes the cultivation of the power of thinking clearly about questions of public interest. It has been emphasized in this chapter that the most powerful control is that which the individual exercises upon himself in the light of his own intelligence, and that external controls should lead to the establishment of social principles and ideals within the mind. The holder of the democratic faith cannot doubt that it is possible for the school to implant scientific ideas of social welfare, and to inculcate habits of dispassionate reflection, which will function in later life as sources and means of the most effective social restraint and advancement.

To this end the curriculum lends itself in some measure by presenting concepts of social order which serve to guide

[10] It should be added that the churches are elaborating their programs of social and moral education, and to a considerable extent are applying scientific pedagogical methods. In some places part of the school time is regularly devoted to religious instruction under the auspices of the various denominations to which the pupils belong. Even though this instruction is narrow and permeated by sectarian prejudice it is regarded as better than none, since all churches are deeply interested in social welfare, and in the application of educational methods to the moral problems of society.

individual behavior. The study of the nature, aims, and needs of society has already reached a high degree of development. Fortunately, too, it has proved possible to develop democratic method in practical ways within the school itself, so that the collective will of the group, guided to some extent by authority but possessing the right of intelligent self-determination, exercises effective control over the individual, holding him in needful restraint, and imparting to him sound ideals of social welfare.

CHAPTER XVI

SOCIAL CONFLICT

Social Unrest.—We can conceive of a social order in which all the individual members are in harmonious relations, pursuing their various aims without interference, and coöperating to maintain the welfare of the whole; an order characterized not only by constructive activity and efficiency, but also by universal good will and happiness. Herbert Spencer thought of such an order as the outcome of the process of social evolution. Many an executive has likewise imagined it as an ideal for his own organization. Now and then we discover in a limited way an approximation to this ideal, some little group which maintains internal and external relations of peace and contentment.

What we usually meet, however, is quite a different state of affairs, a condition of greater or less *social unrest.* By this term we mean a condition in which a considerable number of individuals are discontented with the social arrangements around them, and exhibit their discontent in various ways. They make continual friction among themselves and with others, indulge in criticism of and antagonism toward authority, or engage in efforts to escape from social impositions and restraints. Sometimes they merely fume and sputter. Sometimes they organize themselves in powerful groups which disseminate and intensify discontent until it reaches dangerous proportions. The phenomenon of social unrest may consist simply of tension and restlessness. It may and frequently does break out in open conflict.

It is hard to find a social institution of any sort, large or small, which is not characterized by such unrest. Family, shop, and club are all likely to be affected by it in some degree. Schools, colleges, and universities are hotbeds of friction between teachers and students, suspicion, injustice, and insubordination, antipathy to the curriculum, resentment against authority, hostility toward other schools. Churches are full of members who are at odds with one another in their zeal for righteousness, who differ more or less pointedly in their beliefs and credal interpretations, who are defiant of church government, and are occasionally in conflict with other churches. Economic organizations, both of labor and of capital, display similar traits; their main aim, indeed, would often seem to be some kind of social antagonism. Political bodies are notoriously given to creating social disturbance. Communities, cities and towns, states and nations, all are pervaded by the mental atmosphere of unrest and discord. An oppressed economic class or a subject people develops a state of mind which tends to wreck the machinery of society. Altogether we observe in society a prevalent condition of smoldering dissatisfaction, and more or less overt conflict.

The causes of this condition are found in the pugnacious and self-assertive instincts of man, in the restraints to which the social order traditionally subjects him, in the example of the restless and the operations of the professional trouble-maker, and last but not least in the failure of social arrangements to square with social ideals. Many agencies make a profitable business of fomenting discontent in the public mind; the literature of this sort spreads to enormous proportions. Rational dissatisfaction with outgrown customs and settled abuses is no small part of the matter. The efficacy of these factors is en-

hanced by modern conditions which bring different cultures easily into contact with one another, which produce large numbers of migratory laborers and loafers lacking the steadying influence of appropriate work, which afford education in desires without the possibility of gratification, which spread intellectual enlightenment without giving spiritual assurance. Social unrest is simply the total accumulation of individual restlessness, deeply rooted in human nature, intensified by teaching and reflection. Innate and environmental factors thus combine to produce a state of mind which is more or less actively inclined to disrupt the existing order of society.

Social unrest has its origin in personal maladjustment, that is to say it comes from individuals whose self-regarding sentiment is somehow thwarted or suppressed by their social environment. Such difficulty may of course be due either to the obnoxious nature of the individual himself or to the defective character of society. In either case the association of these persons in groups intensifies their feeling of social superiority or inferiority, while it also produces a consciousness of power which seeks an outlet in some kind of conflict. The latter may take the form of antagonism toward social regulation, or of efforts at social reform. In this process modern ideas of liberty, human equality, and social progress play a large part. The development of individualism as a psycho-social atmosphere has impressed upon many persons the idea that they have a right to be discontented if they fail to get what they desire, either for themselves or for society. Hence they form groups of the like-minded and proceed to stir up trouble. Incidentally it may be said that the loss of religious faith, with its powerful ideas of individual values and their ultimate survival, causes many to turn restlessly to the pursuit of aims which promise personal

gratification or enlargement. These motivating ideas work subconsciously to produce behavior which may seem at first to have no relation to them, but which nevertheless express some deep interest of self-appreciation.

Incidentally, too, let us acknowledge again the maleficent power of the deliberate or professional trouble-maker. Anyone who has engaged in institutional administration knows how hard it is to deal with a person who makes it his business to stir up disaffection among members of the group. Intelligent, perhaps diabolically clever, he spreads and deepens resentment against real or fancied injustice, focusses the inarticulate feelings of others and gives pointed verbal expression to them, suggests insubordination, displaying all the while a covert attitude of disrespect and opposition without becoming overtly offensive. In a literary way many writers actuated by grudges or grievances, or it may be simply by desire to win social recognition, continually stir up dissatisfaction and strife in special groups and in the public at large. This is especially likely to result in the case of those who possess intellectual gifts but are temperamentally unfitted to make their way successfully against the rough pressure of social life.

The various forms of conflict to which these causes give rise range all the way from mere verbal criticism, argument, and vituperation, to the most bloody violence. Divorces, schisms, strikes, sabotage, crimes, covert opposition and open rebellion, revolution, war, all are familiar phenomena in our generation. They constitute a large part of current history and are leading topics of interest in the daily press. So accustomed to them are we that for the most part we take them as matters of course, regard them as inevitable features of human society, and find them dramatically interesting.

To some extent they are doubtless inevitable. Recalling the fact that the evolutionary process in the organic world seems essentially one of struggle, on which survival depends, and the further fact that many an important social advance has been made only against determined opposition, we may be inclined to think that social progress must be accomplished through conflict. Yet we can hardly accept this as a sufficient justification of the tremendous amount of unrest and strife which burdens society. Many conflicts are nothing but reversions to the lower evolutionary levels of brutality and tyranny.[1] Others are clearly superfluous; their results, however beneficent, might have been attained in better ways. Both in extent and in form social conflict is subject to criticism on rational and evolutionary grounds. The elimination and control of it constitute a major problem for social psychology to solve.

The lines of evolutionary advance in this matter are mainly two. First, social unrest may be sidetracked or sublimated by the interposition of some new and active interest. Rulers have always known that domestic discontent could be effectively checked by the pressure of a foreign war. In a worthier way it becomes the task of government to provide appropriate work for those whose dissatisfaction finds no desirable outlet. Many an obstreperous schoolboy has been turned from a nuisance to a loyal aid by giving him an interesting social task, such as that of monitor in the school yard. Factory friction disappears where there is the feeling and recognition of individual participation in an important work of production. Academic wrangling is silenced by the apprehension of a common educational aim.

[1] As Professor Ellwood remarks, there is little hope of a higher type of social order issuing from a brutal struggle of classes or of nations.

Second, the evolutionary struggle which is inevitable should be restricted as far as possible to the field of rational discussion, from which the new order may emerge with a minimum of friction. Intelligence is nature's most advanced creation. The highest level of social accomplishment, as we have repeatedly observed, is that which is guided by thought. Accordingly when unrest appears and conflict threatens, it is the proper business of society to deal with the situation rationally, examining its causes with scientific detachment and devising a remedy which will operate with the necessity of natural law and with maximum satisfaction to all concerned. This involves deliberation and discussion by individuals and groups; it implies a studious attitude and a desire to ascertain the truth. The method has its limitations, it is true, as anyone knows who has listened to interminable and obfuscating parliamentary debate. But when the method is applied in scientific form it unquestionably makes the most rapid and substantial advancement.

Most of the special types of social conflict need not be considered here, though every one of them may be said to present an interesting subject for psychological examination. Two of them, however, namely, crime and war, are of preëminent importance with relation to the purpose of this chapter. They may be regarded as social diseases which the more enlightened peoples are trying to combat with preventive measures of intelligence and ultimately to abolish. Criminality and national belligerency are epidemic states of mind which interfere with healthy social development. To a great extent they are the results of maladjustment, of the individual and of the political group, which are susceptible of scientific analysis and treatment. Let us look at them in some detail, noting particularly their psychological features.

Crime.—Strictly speaking, crime is the violation of statute law. The term is also used commonly and loosely to indicate grave offenses against public morals, even though these are not defined by statute. The concept comprises a wide variety of misdeeds, differing so importantly in their inner motivation and outer direction that we must beware of hasty psychological as well as moral generalizations about them. The robbing of a bank is one thing, the conspiracy of political idealists to end an intolerable tyranny is another. A passionate murder is radically different from a calculated raid on a city treasury. Some crimes seem offenses against human nature, others simply the offspring of arbitrary legislation. The passing of a prohibitory law turns a previously legal form of behavior into a crime without otherwise altering in the least its moral significance. What is legitimate on one side of a state line may be punishable if done a few feet away. Evidently the wide range of crimes presents no single psychological point of identity.

Most of the more important offenses which have been treated as criminal among civilized peoples belong to two principal classes; (1) offenses aimed directly against the person, such as attacks on life, health, and happiness; unjustifiable interferences with physical, mental, and moral well being; (2) offenses relating to property, its illegal destruction and alienation in all the various forms of theft, fraud, and breach of trust.[2] These two types of crime differ somewhat in their mental conditions of intelligence and emotion. Both are interesting to the psychol-

[2] Garofalo's concept of "natural crime" distinguishes between violations of the sentiments of *pity* and *probity*. (See Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 269.)

A third, increasingly large group, consists of offenses, mostly minor crimes or misdemeanors, against laws which society had adopted more or less rationally, sometimes arbitrarily, in the interest of general social welfare. Laws relating to sexual behavior, to gambling, to the sale of alcoholic liquors, to the use of automobiles, are illustrations. Offenses of these kinds are less obviously in conflict with principles of social rectitude.

ogist, who is concerned especially with the criminality which is stupid and passionate, or deliberately anti-social, and particularly that which is habitual.

It was formerly supposed, in accordance with the investigations and theories of Lombroso, that there is a "criminal type" of human being, distinguishable by physical abnormalities, such as facial and bodily asymmetry, prognathism, irregular structure of eyes, nose, ears, teeth, and numerous other anatomical peculiarities. This view is not now accepted by scientific criminologists. Careful measurement has shown that many criminals lack these traits, that many non-criminals possess them, and that the frequency of them in the latter class is sufficient to dispose of the idea of a criminal type of physical constitution. It remains true, however, that such abnormalities are relatively frequent in criminals.

A similar statement may be made with regard to mental traits. As a class, criminals are characterized by irregularities of intelligence, emotion, and will. Several psychiatric investigations have shown that more than half the population of great prisons are mentally abnormal—*i.e.* feeble-minded, psychopathically irresponsible, and in numerous instances actually insane.[3] Deficiency of sensory acuity, excessive and uncontrolled day-dreaming, unsound ideas of the relation of the individual to society, false judgments, and quirks of reasoning commonly enter into the mental composition. The criminal believes and argues that the world owes him a living, or that the rich are all thieves. Animal cunning and human stupidity are frequently combined. Emotional instability is prominent, displaying itself in unreasoning fits of violence, and in other ways. Debased and per-

[3] An investigation of conditions at Sing Sing by the psychiatrical clinic in 1918-1919 revealed the fact that the prison population of approximately 1500 included 180 insane, 268 psychopaths, and 400 feeble-minded.

verted sexuality are extremely prevalent. Exaggerated vanity is a noteworthy characteristic, expressed crudely in the practice of tattooing, to which criminals are addicted, more intelligently in the pride taken in criminal exploits, and in false tales designed to exhibit the helplessness of the law. The less intelligent criminals are religious in a superstitious way, fearing unseen powers of nature, and believing realistically in future reward and punishment, but not relating these ideas effectively to morals. All the foregoing traits are found, of course in non-criminals. We can only say that they are relatively prevalent in the criminal class.

With regard to the cause of criminality, we can affirm at the outset and with assurance that the "born criminal" is a myth. The most that can be asserted safely is that innate physiological and mental peculiarities may constitute a predisposition to actions which are illegal,—not that crime will necessarily result, still less that there is a native antagonism to the social device of law as such. Recent physiological speculation has pointed toward abnormality of subcortical and glandular function as basic factors of criminal tendency. Whatever the truth of this, we must acknowledge that crime is due in considerable measure to mental traits which are innate. Deficiencies of intelligence and irregularities of instinct and emotion are often found to be determining factors of criminal behavior. Passionate anger, lack of normal sensitiveness to suffering, hypersexuality, perhaps also extreme acquisitiveness and disposition to dominate, may be significant parts of the individual's native endowment. Inability to understand the real significance of a criminal act, or to apprehend its consequences, is in many cases certainly a partial explanation of its commission. In general, however, these factors of inborn constitution are extensively supplemented by

deficient or perverted training. Criminality is an acquired behavior-system rather than an innate bent of personality.

Another fallacy which has been scientifically exploded is the idea that all criminals are essentially deficient in intelligence. This is far from true. Criminals of the first type mentioned above, *i.e.* those committing offenses against the sentiment of pity, are rather likely to be somewhat feeble-minded. In fact their misdeeds may be attributed in no small degree to inadequate reflective inhibition. On the other hand offenders of the second type, whose acts violate the sentiment of probity, are often found to possess superior intelligence. Forgery, burglary, fraud, call for keen mental faculties. In some cases this sort of criminal has highly expert command of tools and even scientifically technical knowledge, as well as imaginative shrewdness in making plans and avoiding detection. Some experienced observers maintain that the average intelligence level of the criminal mind, as revealed by intelligence tests, is approximately the same as that of society at large. Such predominance of feeble-mindedness as is found by examination of offenders in courts and penal institutions may be explained on the ground that these individuals are more easily caught.

Criminality is a precocious trait. A large percentage of adult criminals have records reaching back into childhood or youth. The significance of this fact is that the natural impulses of childhood, often excessive and unbalanced, have not received proper educational direction and restraint, and have settled as bad habits. Unfortunately, too, society provides an abundance of criminal example, in the deeds of adults and older children, reports of crime in the daily press, and the flood of imaginative stories and pictures which pour over the land. The moving picture is an especially powerful agency for implanting

ideas which give criminal form to natural impulse. The vivid drama of crime, unrolling on the screen, is probably warping the moral fiber of many an immature mind.[4] The tendencies which are stimulated banefully in this way often receive further encouragement through membership in gangs, in which a certain crude social idealism and morale serve to apologize for wrong-doing. Adding to all this the shocking fact that it is still the common practice of penal institutions to place first offenders in close association with hardened criminals, from whom at this highly critical moment they receive an anti-social idealism and perverted self-respect, we obtain a depressing sum-total of criminal influence constantly at work to twist the individual out of proper adjustment to his social environment. Obviously the heart of the problem of eliminating criminality is the need of moral education, including the appropriate treatment of those who have taken the first step in the wrong direction.

War.—From the point of view of social psychology war is a peculiar state of the national mind, a complicated synthesis of mental factors which calls for analysis. It is admittedly a social evil of the first magnitude. There are few persons to-day, in the shadow of the World War, who extenuate its horrors or apologize for it except as a necessity of national self-defense. We must acknowledge that it has played an extremely important part in the evolution of society, that it has bred the socially valuable qualities of courage and endurance, loyalty and coöperation, that it has served to widen the scope of social intercourse, and to enlarge mental horizons by contact with other peoples. Its stimulation of scientific discovery and invention has been a notable factor of human progress. But

[4] I recently witnessed a moving picture, unfolding a fascinating tale of highly intelligent crime, in which one of the principal actors was a dwarf with the appearance of a child. Three-quarters of the audience were school children.

with the aid of science it has become an intolerable monster which threatens civilization. Its tremendous waste of economic resources and perversion of processes of production to purely military ends constitute a grave indictment. Much more serious is its ruthless destruction of human life, both the biologically best life, deliberately selected for its intelligence, strength, and endurance, and also in increasing measure the life of helpless non-combatants. Most lamentable is the moral degradation which it inevitably involves. Its waves of passion sweep away the inner restraints which civilization has bred in the individual, and tend to depress the motivation of his behavior to the level of animal instinct. While its incidental cultivation of human virtues, such as courage and tenacity, sympathy and generosity, is unquestionable and commendable, this is far from being an adequate compensation for the suspicion, the hatred and cruelty, the injustice and tyranny, which it produces. On the whole it operates to debase mankind; its general effect is to send society down the evolutionary ladder. Whatever cultural progress it accomplishes may be attained in less harmful ways.

Like disease it presents a challenge to human intelligence. Mankind must either conquer it or succumb to it. And like disease it can be overcome only by ascertaining its causes and eliminating them. Just as the great pestilential scourges of the race have gradually retreated before the scientific attack upon the conditions which produce them, so war must give way in the degree in which its underlying factors are understood and subjected to control. As these factors are essentially mental, the problem is in part one for psychology to solve.

We may make a convenient initial simplification of the matter by distinguishing between the popular inflamma-

bility of mind which on occasion flares into belligerent passion, and the purposes of individuals and special groups who take the lead in bringing wars to pass. No intelligent person wants war if it can be avoided, but there are plenty of persons in high social station and positions of political power who desire what can be obtained only by fighting, and the mass of society can be excited to the point of clamor for war. Let us examine these lines of causation.

Latent in the public mind is a complex of tendencies, particularly fear, pugnacity, greed, and vindictiveness, which, augmented by the gregarious consciousness of group power, possess the potentiality of war-synthesis. These tendencies are organized in the systematic form of sentiments toward other peoples, sentiments which are the product of instruction, and which focus patriotic antagonism toward historic or incidental enemies. They are highly susceptible of emotional excitement by processes of suggestion. Thrown into concerted operation, with the coöperative aim of group defense and destruction of the foe, they constitute war.

The basis of war-suggestibility is laid by the instruction of childhood and youth. Early teaching with regard to national history and national enemies begins the cultivation of a hostile nationalism. The flag, the uniform, patriotic songs and speeches, warlike pictures and stories, are the primary means of preparing the mind for later war suggestion. Military training is an important factor in accustoming youth to the thought of war and to the discipline of accepting war-orders without question. In the older generation also the drama and the moving picture, the history and fiction dealing with war, deepen the sentiments which give poignancy to the constant discharge of newspaper stories about national antagonisms and real

or fancied national affronts. Altogether, the mind of the public is effectively ploughed, fertilized, and sown with the seeds of war.

It is to be noted also that the emotional discharge of the war-mind comes the more quickly as a result of social repression. Where people are subjected to continual restraint, the self-assertive tendencies welcome the opportunity to burst forth in free activity. It matters not that the freedom is largely illusory, or that the restraints of war are more burdensome than those of peace. At the moment the prospect seems one of escape from intolerable social pressure. There is an ecstatic exaltation in the act, often rationalized and glorified as idealism. Love of country, defense of hearth and home, the punishment of injustice, the relief of the oppressed, the attainment of lasting peace, such are the professed aims which help to give release to long-suppressed instinct. War is a grand method of social relaxation.

War is not a spontaneous outburst of popular feeling, however; it originates in the decisions and practices of leaders. These are influenced by public opinion, which indeed they cannot defy, but they are none the less the initiating agencies in the matter. Here as elsewhere in the field of social phenomena it is the individual who begins what society proceeds to carry out. The more immediate causes of war are therefore to be found in the aims of particular individuals and special groups, who, though they do not as a rule desire war in itself, yet pursue interests which more or less inevitably make for it. There are several of these groups which have primary importance; chief among them are the political, the military, the industrial, and the press.

First, the political group, composed of parliaments and legislatures, presidents, kings, with their prime ministers

and other advisers, have responsibility for the welfare and dignity of the nation, a responsibility which under certain conditions may seem to them to call imperatively for war. Their decision ordinarily reflects public opinion, or the surreptitious behest of powerful private interests, quite as much as it expresses their own rational convictions. With the spread of democratic sentiment and the growth of public intelligence they are perhaps less likely than formerly to initiate war arbitrarily. They are peculiarly important because only through their explicit declaration can war be formally begun.

Second is the military group, especially the high officers who are resident in national capitals. In justice to them it must be said that in general they do not desire war, but their apparent belligerency and particularly their incessant demand for increase of armament constitute a dangerous provocation. In a crisis their professional cast of mind throws their influence in the direction of warlike action rather than toward pacific measures. Closely associated with them in some countries are the large landed proprietors, who have formerly belonged to their number or are related to them by marriage, whose sons commonly enter the army as a profession, whose agricultural vassals and dependents are liable for military service, whose estates are possible prizes of war, in short whose social, political, and economic position is organically part of a militaristic system. These allied groups, the military and the landed, are most sincerely and intensely, even though often unintelligently patriotic.

Third, and perhaps more effective as an agency in precipitating war, is the group of special economic interests whose concern with trade routes, raw materials, and foreign markets brings them into conflict with like groups in other nations. For them such matters as their national

control of Constantinople as an economic gateway to the East, or Cape-to-Cairo continuity of trade, new supplies of lumber, oil, minerals, and other basic commodities, the colonization and exploitation of outlying parts of the earth's surface, taxation of imports and exports, are economic aims which sooner or later provoke national antagonisms culminating in war. In the same general economic category we may place the munition industry, the maleficent influence of which upon some governments almost passes belief. In order to increase the sale of munitions it has maintained lobbies at national capitals, both its own and others, and has used the press to fill the public mind with canards designed to produce a feeling of national danger. Strange to say, it has done this not only when there was no need of increased armament, but when the probable use would be directed against the nation which was the source of the supply. It is characteristic of the patriotism of large economic and industrial interests that it regards the government as a special servant of its own purposes quite as much as it acknowledges the duty of service. In countless instances the cupidity of these interests has been a blot on national history matched by the wastefulness of government which prostituted itself to their purposes.

Peculiarly baneful is the influence of that part of the press which makes a special business of fomenting war. Thriving on social excitement and lacking sound social ideals, it finds in every case of international misunderstanding, strain, and friction a source of profitable "news." Its absurd patriotic sensitivity, its nonsensical suspicions, its ridiculous exaggeration of trifles, its abuse of other nations, are the most contemptible phase of the whole matter. Through its perversion of public sentiment it is able to exert tremendous pressure upon government, and oc-

casionally succeeds in forcing the latter into action against its own best judgment. As an agency of the nefarious schemes of others as well as for its own purposes it fosters the public inflammability which is indispensable to the undertaking of war. Its purveying of falsely manufactured news-items and its editorial prostitution to special interests are aimed in times of national stress to excite rather than to calm the public mind. The latter, educated as it has been in respect to patriotism, lacking other sources of information and guidance, and untrained to deal critically with such political matters, is susceptible in no small measure to war suggestions disseminated by the press.

If the view presented in the foregoing pages is psychologically correct, the prevention of war must come in part by restraining warlike tendencies in the public, and in part by obtaining political leadership which is strongly committed to the maintenance of peace. With regard to the public there are two main requisites, namely, a different kind of patriotic education of childhood, and full publicity of international relations. Patriotism should be inculcated with much less emphasis upon historical conflict, present danger, hostility to other nations, and the duty of military service. There are other and at least equally important ideals of loyal citizenship. The virtues which characterize the war spirit may be acquired in other ways. As Professor James has pointed out, there is possible a "moral equivalent of war" in the conscription of youth to fight against physical nature, and overcome the obstacles which it opposes to advancing civilization. The deserts, the swamps, the forests, and the oceans are potential battlegrounds in this respect. The pugnacious instinct of man does not require exercise against human enemies, but may be directed toward constructive aims

and practised in morally valuable forms of behavior. Further, there is need of better information of the public concerning international issues. Official concealment, private propaganda, newspaper sophistication have been potent influences in determining the political ideas of society, and must give way to truth and frankness. Were the public properly instructed, there would be no need of a popular referendum, as is sometimes advocated, to decide between war and peace. Manifestations of public opinion in response to its enlightenment would be a sufficient influence upon government.

These remarks should not be regarded as counsels of perfection having little practical bearing upon the actual state of affairs. To a great extent the opportunity of appropriate political education lies in the hands of parents, teachers, clergymen, editors of religious and secular journals, who are intelligently interested in avoiding war. They are accomplishing much in this respect. As a result the social mind fortunately shows signs of outgrowing the notion that war is necessary as a defense against inevitable aggression, or the establishment of liberty and justice against malevolent assault. It has become an ironical commonplace that every war is "defensive" for both parties, *i.e.* that the real causes and motives lie obscurely in the background. Society is already well advanced on the road of escape from the suggestion and rationalization of war.

On the side of leadership, it is evidently desirable to have in office men who have at heart the interests of peace, who will yield neither to the vociferous clamor of the rabble nor to the covert pressure of selfish groups. Here again the opportunity of advance is real. In the election of presidents and legislatures their attitude toward war should be a decisive consideration. Only those who com-

mit themselves frankly to the cause of peace, who show a spirit of friendliness toward other nations, who are explicitly opposed to aggression by their own as well as by other governments, and are zealous in the use of rational means of settling disputes, only these deserve political support. There are indications that the public is beginning to demand such qualifications in candidates.

It is especially important to observe that political machinery will not in itself serve to prevent war unless there is a predominant public and official sentiment in favor of peace. Even a league of nations will not in itself suffice so long as its constituent members are actuated by nationalistic purposes which bring them into conflict. Governments which are animated by the spirit of nationalistic aggrandizement, by motives of suspicion and hatred and vengeance, will hardly succeed in adjusting their difficulties rationally. They will seek, as they are now too often doing, to use the league for the advancement of their own interests rather than for the attainment of international justice. Undoubtedly both the present League of Nations and the World Court are agencies which are facing in the right direction, yet they should not blind us to the fact that the principal requisite for world peace is a new kind of national mind. Our prospect in this respect is not without hope. Through the clouds of national animosity which darken the political atmosphere of the world there are some rays of light, perhaps the dawning of a new day.

CHAPTER XVII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

The Idea of Progress.—The conception of social progress is comparatively recent. Social change has always been recognized, of course; and the achievements of particular groups, such as their territorial expansion, increase of wealth, and introduction of new forms of culture, have been obvious facts of history. The idea of a general forward and upward movement of society, however, is for the most part of late origin. It has developed in connection with evolutionary theory, that is to say within the last two or three centuries. Many thinkers of former times conceived of the social order as degenerating from an originally perfect state, and becoming constantly more corrupt until a critical point was reached, when a tremendous cataclysm would give rise to a new social harmony. The view that we are actually making advance in our social relations toward some ideal condition belongs to contemporary thought. Here it is widely prevalent.

Just what "social progress" really means, however, and whether it is possible, are profound problems which belong to philosophy rather than to scientific psychology. The conception seems to imply an ideal goal toward which society is or ought to be steadily moving. But perhaps there is no such goal; and perhaps, if there is one, we are not moving in that direction. Possibly every apparent step forward is offset by losses in other respects. The extension of liberty might seem to encourage license, the development of law to provoke crime, the spread of pop-

ular education to lower its intellectual quality, the invention of textile machinery to increase unhealthy child labor, and so on. Whether there is a net gain in such matters, or whether society is merely stumbling along without really advancing, is a problem which social psychology fortunately does not have to solve. Its questions are: (1) What do human beings think that the aims of society ought to be? and (2) what differences do we find with regard to the method of attainment of these aims?

Precisely what is the goal, or the direction of social advance, is a subject about which there is good deal of difference of opinion. Yet we may observe a common inclination to think of progress as characterized by certain definite trends. It means to most persons an extension of the material comforts of life, more and better food, clothing, houses, automobiles, and the like. Further, it means the spread of aesthetic refinement—the development of social taste and of the appreciation of art. Certainly it is to some extent the establishment of moral values. Many hold that it consists largely in the elimination of vice and crime, the attainment of political honesty and efficiency, of industrial justice and international peace. To the ethical mind it essentially involves the extension of individual freedom and its exercise in orderly ways. Fundamentally, some kind of conscious satisfaction or happiness is universally regarded as the proper aim of social effort. Progress is not mere change; nor is it usually thought of as merely a quantitative process, the increase of commodities or lessening of suffering. It is a *qualitative* achievement, involving not simply more, but higher and better satisfactions.[1]

In the exact delineation of the idea there are two

[1] For a clear and compact historical statement of the principal lines of human progress, see W. Libby's *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization.*

principal lines of cleavage. One separates the material and the spiritual aspects of life. For some persons progress is fundamentally economic, *i.e.* the increase of goods, upon which all the so-called higher satisfactions depend. For others this material attainment is, if not irrelevant, at least of subordinate importance. Their ideal is in some instances intellectual and aesthetic, the acquisition of learning and appreciation of beauty; in others essentially moral, the practice of virtue, which may be attained quite as surely, perhaps more so, in poverty. Secondly, we find the aristocratic view that social progress is the perfection of life for a few select individuals, somewhat at the expense of the mass, opposed by the prevalent democratic faith that the ideal is a universal diffusion of comfort and culture.

This conflict of conceptions has important bearing upon the social process, for though they are usually modified or reconciled in practice, they remain sufficiently distinct to guide conduct in quite different directions. Particular individuals and groups in human society seek to make progress in sharply conflicting ways. Fortunately the psychologist, as we have already remarked, is not under the necessity of determining the respective merits of the antithetical ideals. His task is rather to describe and explain the various attitudes toward them which he finds.

Conservatism and Progressivism.—A peculiarly fundamental difference of mental attitude, with respect both to the nature of the social ideal and to the proper method of attaining it, is indicated by the terms "conservative" and "progressive." The former type of mind is characteristically disinclined toward social change. It regards the customary order as essentially satisfactory, and much better on the whole for all concerned than innovations are likely to be. It believes in constitutional forms, estab-

lished rights, and traditional usages. Of course it cannot but acknowledge the existing evils of poverty, injustice, and corruption, and it desires to see them eliminated from society. But in its view the method of correction is properly slow, and extreme care should be taken to preserve the solid and substantial foundations of the social order. Hence the conservative mind is timid and countersuggestible toward change of traditional forms. One of its characteristic traits, as found in political life, is that of meeting with instant dissent all proposals of legislation which promise to unsettle customary ways. The very fact that a measure seeks to effect an important social change insures for it an exceedingly cautious and critical reception. The best type of conservative is socially well bred, classic in taste, generous toward the needy, and orthodox in preference for religious forms, though perhaps not in theology. He believes in political and social aristocracy, and in the desirability of an economic class which has special privileges and responsibilities. The education of youth, according to his ideas, should take pains to reveal and emphasize the value of the legacy of the past. Progress should be made, of course, but always with methodical deliberation, and along lines which have approved themselves as safe.

The progressive, on the other hand, welcomes change. Not only does he take the defects of the traditional order more seriously; he has a greater liking for novelty, a greater readiness to modify and experiment. His imagination presents a picture, brilliant in tone though not always clear in outline, of what may be attained by altering existing social conditions. In his efforts to accomplish results he is much more willing than is the conservative to make compromises and accept half measures. Whereas the conservative feels that change is dangerous, the pro-

gressive looks upon it as a happy relief. So he approves of new movements in art, in education, and in religion; and receives with a welcoming cheer political and economic proposals which give the conservative mind a shock of apprehensive dismay. He acknowledges that social inheritance, like biological heredity, carries on from generation to generation a wealth of the most valuable culture, but he also observes that customs grow stale and unfit, in which case it takes an exasperatingly long time to eliminate them unless society goes about the task with adventurous determination. Hence he rides forth in knightly fashion against the entrenched forces of what he regards as evil, and gives and takes hard buffets, filled not only with eagerness for reform, but with the joy of battle as well. Altogether he is a zestful person.

Conservatism and progressivism are matters of degree. The more extreme sort of conservative is the "reactionary," whose social preference constantly reverts toward past conditions, especially those of autocratic and arbitrary authority. Correspondingly, the more thoroughgoing progressive is the "radical," who is ready to tear down existing social institutions and practices, and to go to the very roots of society in order to build a better social system. The terms "radical" and "reactionary" are commonly applied as epithets by conservatives and progressives to each other, in order to accentuate their differences. As a matter of fact, however, the more intelligent conservatism and progressivism are not far apart. There is a resemblance between their ideals of social welfare; and, what is especially significant, both believe firmly in legislation as the proper method of political development. Furthermore, the reactionary and the radical, as is frequently pointed out, are alike in that they both demand autocratic authority in government, and are ready to sub-

ordinate law to force in the accomplishment of their aims.[2] In short, the four types of character under discussion here may be thought of as the corners of a square, the sides of which represent various degrees and blends of characteristic traits.

The main antithesis of mental attitude, namely, approval of the past and enthusiastic vision of the future, still confronts us. How shall we explain it? Partly, no doubt, as the result of thought. One observes social conditions and reflects upon social values, and comes to the conclusion that the customary and traditional order is sound or unsound. But to a great extent conservatism and progressivism are imitative phenomena. Home atmosphere, the example and casual discourse of elders, the influence of eminent or fascinating figures in public life, dogmatic utterances in newspapers, magazines, and books, combine to impress one attitude or the other upon the suggestible mind of childhood and youth. An industrial city breeds progressives, a rural community conservatives, mainly because the two kinds of sentiment are respectively dominant in the different environments. To such influences habit lends its unfailing aid, with the result that later reflection and reasoning move along lines determined by prejudice. It is particularly noteworthy that property interests and political responsibility tend both imitatively and reflectively to produce conservatism of mind, and that the feeling of economic injustice and political helplessness spreads, through example and argument, thus multiplying progressives and radicals.

But there appears to be a still more fundamental line of explanation. Certain persons, by their characteristic behavior, give us an impression of being "naturally"

[2] A tragic illustration is found in the similarity of the "white terror" and its "red" counterpart in recent European history.

conservative or progressive. Their constant desire for novelty, or for the safe and sane paths of custom, seems to us peculiarly deep, and suggests that possibly it has its roots in the inborn nature of the individual. A clue to the understanding of this matter is found in the results of an investigation by Münsterberg of the industrial problem of monotony. Incidentally he discovered that one's personal reaction to monotony, according to which it is felt as agreeable or disagreeable, depends in part on a basic facility of adjustment to new conditions, which varies measurably in different individuals. Moore, using the questionnaire method, selected two groups of college students whose opinions in social and political matters were in one case distinctly radical and in the other distinctly conservative. These persons he tested in point of reaction time, quickness of decision, and suggestibility to social pressure. The results were illuminating. The conservatives reacted on an average more slowly by fifteen per cent than did the radicals. They were also considerably slower in making decisions in situations which called for novel adjustment, and were more docile with respect to majority opinion.[3] The difference may be summed up by saying that some persons naturally make adjustments to new stimuli with relative difficulty, and hence are fundamentally inclined toward conservatism. Others react quickly and easily to changed conditions, and accordingly tend to become progressives.

We must not accept without reflection the tempting inference that conservatism and progressivism are nothing but complex manifestations of fundamental mechanisms of the psychophysical system. As a matter of fact the opposed types of opinion are formed in large part by environmental example and by thought. Conservatively

[3] *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Oct., 1925.

minded individuals differ among themselves, as do radicals, in these fundamental respects. But it is probably true that social sentiments are determined in some degree by simple inborn traits, which affect the absorption of teaching, and perhaps tip the beam of decision in concrete cases.

Since these traits presumably conform to the curve of normal frequency, most of us occupy an intermediate position with regard to them. Our innate facility of adjustment is such as to permit development in either direction in special matters. Hence tides of public sentiment, the forcefulness of leaders, prevalent static or evolutionary conceptions, and the accumulated influences of our own thinking, combine to produce complex and even inconsistent results in personal character. We are conservative in some respects, progressive in others; or we shift from one class to the other under pressure of some new example or argument. The life of society is a ceaseless struggle between these opposed tendencies, operating in individuals in various degrees according to special conditions.[4]

Freedom and Authority.—A further antithesis which is profoundly significant with respect to human progress is that between liberalism and authoritarianism. The former term, though much used, is seldom defined.[5] It is taken here, in accordance with its derivation, to indicate *the*

[4] On the whole, maturity and advancing years tend increasingly to conservatism; youth is more progressive, though it may be exceedingly tenacious of its own customs. Much learning in any field makes against the progressivism of radically new ideas, since its accumulated assurance casts doubt upon whatever disagrees with it.

[5] This term has a special meaning in contemporary British politics, where it is opposed to conservatism. In the United States it has a more generic but also vaguer significance. Here it is the progressive who faces the conservative in the political arena. As a matter of fact, however, the English liberal and the American progressive, though not precisely of the same mental stripe, bear a close resemblance to each other. We are concerned in this chapter with general traits of mind rather than with political alignments.

belief in freedom as an essential principle of social welfare. At first sight this meaning might not seem sufficiently distinctive, since nowadays almost everybody would profess such a belief. But the true liberal goes farther in this direction than do the majority of his fellows. He is characteristically opposed to compulsion except as a last necessity. Like the progressive he welcomes change as a remedy for existing evils, but unlike him he is disinclined to resort to legislation in the matter. He has faith that the natural sympathies of mankind, together with intelligence in control of selfish impulses, will accomplish more than coercive measures. Incidentally he is willing to endure a good deal of temporary discomfort in the hope and expectation that society will reach an adjustment of its difficulties without resorting to force. Though in no sense an anarchist in his repugnance to law, and though eager to adopt legislation which really promises social betterment, he yet maintains that individual freedom, giving opportunity for intelligent self-direction and sympathetic coöperation, is the very heart and soul of social idealism and the pathway of social progress.

The attitude of mind which is antithetical to liberalism holds that most persons are incompetent to direct their own conduct without authoritative guidance. This dictatorial spirit is found in every department of social life. Growing out of the natural authority of parents over children, and deepened by the disciplinary tradition of the school, it extends its view over the fields of education, industry, moral and religious practice, and political government. Sometimes it is frank in its repudiation of the principle of freedom, utterly tyrannical, merciless in imposing its arbitrary will upon hapless and helpless inferiors. Elsewhere and more subtly it maintains that true freedom is found only in conforming to what is best

for society, as determined by those in authority. This belief, it is important to observe, is found not only in persons who desire to exercise the ruling hand, but also in a multitude who find that their lives are most peaceful and prosperous under authoritative direction. To them individual self-direction seems identical with lawlessness and social chaos.

Here again we observe that the opposed views exhibit extreme forms—the belief in absolute tyranny, on the one hand, and in theoretical anarchy on the other. Moreover, these extremes present a conspicuous resemblance in their disregard of law and disposition to make occasional use of violent coercion. Both tendencies rationalize themselves in idealistic terms of benevolence and philanthropy, but both appear to have the same mental root, namely, a basic disinclination to accept social restraint. We need not consider them in detail. The intermediate liberal and authoritarian positions, however, call for examination.

Liberalism as a reflective mental attitude is found among intelligent peoples the world over. It has reference not only to politics and government, but to morals, religion, education, and other interests as well. With regard to morals, it is reluctant to interfere with individual conduct unless this is manifestly harmful to the individual himself or to others. In religion it makes large room for freedom of thought, and is utterly opposed to the authoritative imposition of dogmatic orthodoxy. In education it seeks to dispense with petty rules and to trust the good sense of the pupil and the pressure of group sentiment to maintain order. Everywhere it endeavors to substitute good example and the rational presentation of aims and ideals for sterner methods of dealing with waywardness. And everywhere, too, it is inclined to be

patient with individual error, provided this is due to lack of insight and not to malevolence.

Sometimes, we must admit, this easy-going habit of mind is merely an neamic unwillingness to grapple with life's problems, or a deep timidity which shrinks from facing personal antagonism. But in its best estate it is a reasoned social philosophy, based on the presuppositions that human nature is fundamentally and essentially reasonable and harmonious, and that the largest possible extension of free play for these qualities produces the maximum of happiness. Its obvious weakness is its failure to estimate at their real intensity the human characteristics of irrationality and selfishness. Freedom is so often and so terribly abused! Autocracy is so powerfully and perhaps so conscientiously persistent! Hence the liberal occasionally grows weary of trying to advance his idealism against the stupidity and obstinacy of mankind, and retreats into a sour isolation of spirit.

Liberalism prospers under peaceful conditions. In time of social stress it weakens before the encroachment of authority. War especially tends to nullify it in all matters which are closely related to the main aim, victory over the enemy. Class struggle, industrial conflict, and religious dissension likewise tend to suppress the free spirit in the interests of group supremacy. Under such conditions the effort of each party to win involves the sacrifice of individual liberty. Hence it is the fate of the liberal at such times to be squeezed, perhaps almost out of existence, between the contending forces. Under less strenuous conditions he is able to satisfy the demands of group loyalty, and at the same time to disseminate his sentiments of rational freedom.

Thus there goes on in society a continual struggle between the social modes of freedom and those of author-

ity with regard to the direction and rate of social progress. In general the authoritarian party is conservative, and has the advantage of being effectively organized, so that it is likely to win any overt conflict. Liberals are more distinctly progressive, but are less unified in their aims. Their individualistic sentiments often lead them to quarrel with one another instead of fighting a common enemy. It is an interesting paradox that authority has the organized power to make social progress, but too often lacks progressive moral purpose; whereas liberalism possesses the purpose but lacks the concerted power. On the whole liberals accomplish less by organized partisan warfare against conservative authority than by burrowing into the vitals of authoritarianism along lines of educational enlightenment.

Aristocracy and Democracy.—The history of social development shows a general though irregular trend from autocratic rule by a few individuals toward a state in which the mass of society determines in large measure form of the social order. This trend, which is most obvious in political government, is also manifested in other fields of social interest. Let us consider it briefly in relation to the idea of social progress. Our concern, of course, is not with specific political or other social arrangements, but rather with the mental conditions which underlie these, in other words with a psychological comparison of aristocracy and democracy.

Aristocracy, in the proper meaning of the term, is the domination and control of society by the supposedly "best" individuals within it. As a matter of fact these are not always the most intelligent, or of the highest moral character, but are usually those who happen by reason of birth or wealth or conspicuous achievement of some sort to be intrenched in power. They are dis-

tinguished by superior education and refinement of taste rather than by deeper social values. Their rule tends to be more or less autocratic and irresponsible. It ranges from the most extreme tyranny to a considerable degree of dependence on the consent of the governed, perhaps even using democratic forms and catering to democratic sentiment. But in the last analysis it asserts and maintains its own authority. If dislodged from political control, it continues to display a characteristic social exclusiveness.

Self-conscious social superiority and the possession of economic and political privilege naturally make aristocracy highly conservative. Occasionally it manifests a progressive spirit. Guided by moral principles or influenced by economic or other pressure, it has here and there liberated slaves, established schools, promoted science, and improved economic conditions for the mass of society. Its ranks have numbered many figures characterized by high-minded devotion to public welfare. As a governing class it has sometimes developed ideals of loyalty and public service which have lifted the whole group to a higher level. But in general it exhibits a different disposition. Its class consciousness, material comfort, and irresponsible authority lead it to ignore the economic limitations and moral rights of others. Its first concern is to maintain its supremacy, and hence it looks with extreme suspicion upon progressive ideas. Like all autocracy it naturally tends to abuse of power, and hence provokes rebellion.

The spread of democracy has been due in no small degree to such abuse of power. The essential meaning of the term, indeed, is that the public has an authoritative voice in the determination of its own political and social arrangements. In broader usage it includes any

tendency toward social equality. For our present purposes it signifies that the rank and file of society exercise a determining influence upon government and other social functions.

But is democracy essentially more progressive than aristocracy? Are not its intrinsic characteristics, its limitations and defects, equally unfavorable to progress? It is charged with lack of intelligence, with susceptibility to whim and caprice, with a "tyranny of the majority" even harsher than that of the opposing type of social order. Its preponderant mediocrity of culture and uncritical responsiveness to emotional suggestion tend inevitably to produce a welter of blind and conflicting social movements rather than a real advance. The demagogue and the determined and energetic minority, acting with skillful art or organized effort, can usually impose their own will on the mass. The latter is also conservative, it is said, and worse, stupidly and obstinately conservative, except when swept by whim or passion into some unjust or futile modification of traditional ways. The outcome at best is a depressing prevalence of disorder, at worst an intolerable chaos.

The current attack on democracy especially emphasizes its intellectual mediocrity, and hence its inability both to comprehend social issues and to select desirable leaders. Ordinary observation, we are told, shows that the average citizen is mentally incompetent to grasp the complex and subtle nature of social life, or to form trustworthy opinions with regard to its needs. Most of the population, even in highly educated countries, drop out of school in childhood, largely because of inability to continue intellectual work successfully. Precise mental tests, such as those used in the army, seem to show that the average adult possesses a "thirteen-

year-old-mind," from which it is absurd to expect any considerable amount of social wisdom, or reliable judgment concerning social questions. Interested by necessity almost exclusively in his own immediate concerns and economic welfare, he is not capable of intelligent action in matters which reach beyond them. Multiplying him by thousands or millions does not essentially change this fact. His influence upon social development remains blind, passionate, mediocre in ideals and accomplishments.

The focus of his influence, to continue the indictment, is the democratic leader. Both in the sphere of politics and in other fields such as art and letters, democracy implies that certain individuals receive popular approval and support in their expression of public sentiment and popular taste. In government it means the election of representatives who are supposed to execute the will of their constituents. In other matters it is a preferment of those persons who specialize in what the public likes. Democratic leaders give articulate expression to the feelings and ideas which are in the mind of the populace, and at the same time unify and intensify this common mentality.

Reminding us that the public, on the average, is of low-grade intelligence and uncultivated taste, critics observe further that human nature always prefers to follow individuals whom it feels to be mentally akin to itself. Accordingly a democratic society chooses the windy orator, or the passionate demagogue, or the genial, hand-shaking, back-slapping aspirant to public office,—anybody who by word or manner conveys the impression of belonging to its kind. The qualities of intelligence and character most highly esteemed by the average citizen, it is said, are not scientific penetration, or wisdom, or solid virtue, but shrewdness, a ready wit, kindliness, and energy. The

individual who possesses these in superior degree easily wins a following.

The political consequences of democracy, says the critic, are seldom found to be that conscientious and competent government, responsive to the intelligent will of the people, to which democratic theory points. Sometimes the result is hasty, ill-considered action, riding a wave of irrational public sentiment which crushes tyrannically whatever lies in its path. In some cases the democratic order consists of warring factions which effectually block one another. Too frequently it produces a certain type of demagogue who keeps himself in office by catering artfully to his constituency while at the same time he makes himself the tool of powerful private interests whose economic aims depend upon political control. In time of stress the public can always be deluded into support of an individual or an issue, irrespective of merit. It is pointed out that political democracy has failed in numerous instances in which it has been adopted; and that in others where it has apparently succeeded, it has been to a considerable extent an outward form rather than a reality. The representatives of the people have often done not what their constituents desired but what they were told to do by party leaders who were the instruments of special interests. This may or may not have been for the best, but it certainly is not true democracy. Were the people really to control their government, it is alleged, the latter would be hopelessly mediocre in character and futile in performance.

And in the fields of literature, science, and art,—to extend the indictment still further,—the case is equally bad. Here popular judgment and taste are worthless. Hence the trend of democracy in these matters is toward banality and superstition. Shallow sentiment predomi-

nates over reason; the chosen exemplars are not the intellectual and aesthetic élite, but the plausible purveyors of emotionalism and pseudo-science. Popular opposition to biology, popular fondness for jazz music, for crude pictures, for flashy fiction, are exhibits in the case. Ignorant prejudice and raw feeling demand a leadership of their kind, and tend to discourage if not altogether to suppress the best culture.

It is not sufficient to reply, however truly, that aristocracy has other and no less serious defects. The apology for democracy, if it is to be acceptable, must show that democratic virtues outweigh democratic vices. Since the gravamen of the charge is that a democratic constituency is of such mediocre mental quality that it not only follows leaders of its own ilk, but may be swayed into folly by propaganda in its choice of men and issues, these criticisms should be met explicitly.

The apologist would maintain that the moral sentiment of a democratic people is ordinarily sound; that it is opposed to social privilege and individual license; that while it is subject to waves of passion, in the long run its currents of feeling flow in the direction of human welfare. Furthermore, democratic intelligence is not so low as the critic declares. However lacking in the technical learning of schools, it is fundamentally correct in its comprehension of social affairs. Given the ordinary amount of education, its understanding of human nature and of the main issues of society is adequate. Its limitations, as revealed by mental tests, have little to do with actual experience, social intelligence, or wisdom of life, but consist for the most part of inaccuracy or rustiness in mental operations of a scholastic type. Its intelligence is of a practical kind. Though occasionally deceived, it cannot be permanently duped. In times of emergency, especially, its choice of

leaders is thoughtful and reliable. Its very failures point not toward the aristocratic tyranny which is its inevitable alternative, but toward the type of education which will effectually frustrate the efforts of the demagogue and the propagandist. Acknowledging that it has no absolutely clear title to political preferment, one may yet hold to it as an object of political faith and a field for political experimentation.

Whatever the respective merits of these controversial views, one thing is certain: the success of democracy depends on education. It has no magical potency to produce social progress. Society must be taught to make use of it deliberately and justly. Moreover, the kind of education which is requisite involves a studied comprehension of social ideals, and appropriate training for performing one's duty as a citizen. Under these conditions we may hope for its success. In any case we cannot pass a final judgment upon it until those who are engaged in it have been properly educated for their task.

Main Directions and Conditions of Social Progress.—The extreme forms of aristocratic and democratic sentiment differ most profoundly in that their outlook with regard to progress is in absolutely different directions. The former holds that the ideal society is one in which the specially gifted individuals, those most highly favored by nature, are developed at the expense of others. To put the matter simply, they are worth more, in any rational scale of human values, than the rest of society. Accordingly their superiority entitles them to privilege. The mass of society properly exists as a substructure supporting the excellence of a few noble, cultivated and powerful persons. Such a social order involves a good deal of stratification, but this is the price which must be paid for human perfection. It is not injustice, but rather the ultimate recti-

tude of nature itself. Provided the strata are not rigid castes, but are open to all whose merits and achievements compel recognition, there can be no final objection, it is maintained, to the resulting form of society. The aristocrat may even assert that the populace is better off under this arrangement than it would otherwise be, but this argument is not necessary to the position, the essential feature of which is the belief that the ungifted many exist for the sake of the gifted few, and that in a conflict of interests the welfare of the few properly predominates. Their perfection is social progress.

The thoroughgoing democrat, on the other hand, visions the ideal society in terms of equality. In his view any form of social privilege is essentially unjust, and the idea of sacrificing the welfare of a multitude to that of a favored few is morally intolerable. He also believes that a democratic order will actually produce the best culture,—not the excessively cultivated aestheticism of a self-conscious aristocracy, but a more wholesome art, rising to ideal heights from a solid basis of common humanity,—not specialized science as a tool of privilege, but general scientific enlightenment as a means of health and happiness of all. Such justification, however, is secondary to the main democratic contention that the welfare of the mass of society is more important than the cultivation of a select class.

Obviously the antagonism between these views runs deeper than argument. It presents an ultimate choice of the social will. The aristocratic position is expounded elaborately by Nietzsche, and it is held not only by his professed followers but also by many who have little or no acquaintance with his writings. Stated baldly it scarcely wins approval, but we may say without exaggeration that it is actually the deepest social sentiment of a considerable

number of powerful and privileged individuals in the upper ranks of society. Qualified in various degrees by humanitarianism it yet finds subtle modes of political and economic expression, and determines in some measure both the action of the individual and the course of social development. The contemporary reaction against democracy looks in this direction.

Whatever the social ideal, there are two conditions which are fundamentally requisite for the attainment of it. In the first place the individual, whether aristocrat or democrat, must be educated for his part in the social order, appropriately trained to occupy the position and perform the functions for which he is fitted as leader or follower. And in the second place, society, whether democratically or aristocratically minded, must make use of scientific method in order to advance toward its goal. Nature's method of learning by trial and error is altogether inadequate in this field; its slow pace and wastefulness are intolerable. Nor is the principle of imitation sufficient, for often the novelty of social conditions, difficulties, and problems is such that there is no existing solution to imitate. Only by using the most careful observation, reflective analysis, and experiment can society make satisfactory progress toward its goal.

This method, we should observe, does not itself imply any particular goal. It is potentially instrumental to an aristocratic, autocratic, individualistic order, or to one that is democratic, liberal, and socialistic. On the whole, perhaps aristocracy has been the more ready to use it in its own interest than has democracy. It remains for the latter to apply its resources of universal education and expert intelligence to the realization of its idealism. If it is to elevate society to a higher plane it must learn to select social experts for its leaders, and to place in their

hands all the instruments of science which they need for the accomplishment of its purpose. The common uncritical faith that there is in human affairs, if not a divinely ordered advance, at least an inevitable forward drift, must be replaced by a deliberate, concerted effort to bring to pass forms of social welfare which will not otherwise come. The sole pathway of democratic progress is that of an appropriate idealistic and scientific education.[6]

[6] Some philosophically minded observers see in the evolutionary process not a series of mechanical resultants of coöperating and conflicting factors, but a real and essentially unsettled battle of opposing forces, a grand struggle between aristocracy and democracy, each using the resources of science for the attainment of its ends.

PART IV

APPENDICES ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR-SYSTEMS

CHAPTER XVIII

SPEECH AND LAUGHTER

General Character of Behavior-Systems.—Social behavior tends to become organized in systems, that is to say, in groups of related movements, each of which groups possesses some degree of unity and a more or less specific function. These systems range from such performances as eating and drinking, laughing and talking, all sorts of games, dancing, vocal and instrumental music, up to the great organized institutions of society,—government, industry, education, religion, war. In some cases the organization centers in a particular object, or kind of object, or an idea, and may be regarded as the objective aspect of a sentiment. In other instances there is only the unity of a common instinctive drive, operating in widely different situations and upon different objects. Courtship, marriage, and family life, the fine arts, the studious practice of a social theory, are systems of the former type; public address, habits of travel, of play and of work are of the latter. All such systems are susceptible of psychological analysis and explanation. A survey of them is helpful to an understanding of the social life of mankind.

The roots of a behavior-system are found in some inborn interest or tendency, to which casual learning, imitation, and reflective thought give special form. The individual learns by accident or from his social environment to do a thing in a particular way, but underlying the acquired mode is some innate factor,—hunger, sex, recreation, rivalry, control, or the like. In human beings the

structure of habit is reared upon the basis of such interests largely through the function of imitation, but to some extent by critical and constructive thinking. Some behavior systems are in considerable measure products of scientific study, for example the application of chemistry or of machinery to agriculture and to the textile industry. Most of them are age-long accumulations of habit, transmitted by formal and informal instruction, modified and amplified in each successive generation.[1]

The function of these systems is to facilitate action. Modes of speech are ever ready tools of communication. Institutions of government restrain and regulate, but also aid the individual in his daily life. The behavior-system may be compared to a set of paved highways, along which the traveller goes with the assurance of reaching his destination quickly. In the main they are the same for all, but to some extent the individual can choose among them, or modify them to suit his own purposes.

We shall touch upon several of these systems in later chapters. Here we are concerned only with two of the more fundamental ones, language and laughter. These are common and basic forms of human behavior, manifesting themselves at all levels of social culture.

Language has the general and fundamental function of *communication*, including various specific usages of appeal, information, and control. It is therefore an essentially social form of behavior. No one learns to talk except in relation to associates; writers are usually addressing readers. According to our basic theory social consciousness naturally expresses itself in appropriate action, which in the case of the higher animals occasionally involves

[1] The term "habit-system" is coming into use to designate such practices. I have called them "behavior-systems" because they are not merely complicated habits, but performances which possess more or less novelty of direction.

communication, that is to say, language of some sort. This may be mere gesture, or it may consist of organized vocal reflexes. A movement of repulsion, an exclamation of surprise, a cry of distress, even a glance or an inarticulate murmur, may convey meaning to others by communicative intention. The function develops out of non-communicative vocal reflexes, which are used sooner or later to produce responses in associates. It is difficult if not impossible to ascertain just when this socially purposive impulse appears, but whenever the point is reached, then and there is the primary manifestation of the instinct of communication.[2]

The principal forms of language are the gesture, oral and written speech. Muscular movements not only of the vocal organs, but of hands, of limbs and trunk, serve to express ideas and feelings and purposes. The barest suggestion of a smile or a frown, the tilt of the nose, the twitch of an eyelid, even the instantaneous glint or "twinkle" of reflected light from the cornea, may be as genuinely linguistic as the most perfectly cultivated speech. Animals, in so far as they possess language, are limited for the most part to gesture, but their behavior in this respect is more significant than is commonly appreciated. In their own rudimentary way they talk to one another about the simple interests of their lives—food, sex, submission, danger. The bee is said to report its discovery of a honey-store by specialized movements remarkably like dancing. The higher species of vertebrates express pugnacious threats, sex desire, and parental disapproval by peculiar behavior which is intuitively under-

[2] Critics of this doctrine have undoubtedly done a psychological service in showing that language is an outgrowth of non-linguistic reflexes through a process of social conditioning. The important point which they seem to ignore is that the first transition from mere movement or sound to a *social direction* of gesture or utterance is the exhibition of an inborn disposition, the fundamental dynamic of which pervades all later acquisition of speech.

stood. In human beings the gesture becomes a highly elaborate and significant mode of conveying meaning. It supplements speech in social intercourse, and even constitutes an adequate substitute in the lack of a common tongue. The sign-language of the western frontier shows what a high level of intelligent communication may be attained through the reflective development of this method.[3]

Some of the higher species, particularly apes, use a few diverse, semi-articulate sounds which have special meaning, as food or sex or danger. Oral speech, however, is almost exclusively a human accomplishment, the product of untold centuries of evolution. The earliest words were of the nature of ejaculations, vocal explosions which came in connection with certain experiences, and which therefore became meaningful symbols of things. In some cases the sound resembles that of nature, as the liquid babble of water, or the hiss and roar and twitter of living creatures. Imitative onomatopoeia is one of the roots of language. But for the most part the primitive word was an accidental and arbitrary designation, having no essential appropriateness to what it represented.

Developing intelligence and culture manifest themselves in an expanding vocabulary, and in continual refinement of modes of speech. The lowest human groups use a very few words; the highest civilizations employ hundreds of thousands. The more advanced the social evolution, the more elaborate the grammatical structure and the rhetorical use of language. Communication always tends to as-

[3] Only one who has witnessed an expert performance of this sort appreciates the amazing effectiveness of gesture in conveying ideas. Natural objects such as rivers and lakes, mountains, plains, and forests are plainly indicated by picturesque movement. Intervals of time and distances are stated with sufficient precision by a symbolic lying down and rising, and other devices. Even abstract ideas have conventional modes of expression. For example, truth is symbolized by a pointing movement straight from the mouth. The accomplished sign-linguist talks with astonishing rapidity and intelligibility.

sume more and more definite forms, yet always retains in some degree its original vitality and plasticity.

In a general way the human individual repeats the evolutionary process in his acquisition of language. The infant naturally makes a wide variety of sounds,—cluck, gurgle, babble, grunt, and more distinctly articulate utterances,—which at first are mere spontaneous manifestations of life. Some of them, especially certain articulations, are repeated as circular reflexes, the sound serving as a stimulus for repetition of the vocal movement, until they become elementary vocal habits subject to control. Consequently when the child reaches the stage of mental development where it begins to understand the significance of words it already has a basis for uttering these. Particular sounds are thus selected and used with conscious direction toward associates. Beginning with names of familiar things and persons and expressions of desire, word after word is added to its vocabulary, infrequently at first, later with sudden profusion, as it observes and copies the speech of others. Some children invent words of their own, nouns, adjectives, and verbs, understood only by their small companions. For the most part the process is simply the imitative acceptance of current speech-forms and the use of them for the child's own purposes.

The original tendencies of appeal and control thus gain vocal instruments which are used repeatedly with increasing skill. So the linguistic attainment of the individual develops into an elaborate system, perfected in some degree through criticism in school and elsewhere, perhaps also by his own reflection. The intelligent mind creates its own system to some extent by careful choice of words and other refinements which come through the study of language. In general, however, forms of speech do not rise above the imitative level.

Written language has a somewhat similar development. Beginning in the race with pictographs and other marks representing objects, it attained in ancient times complex hieroglyphic and other idiographic form. Through the invention of the alphabet—marks arbitrarily designating elementary sounds—it became a major kind of intellectual currency in society. Communication and command are extended indefinitely by the use of writing. Mechanical printing multiplies the performance, spreading its message abroad and carrying it down the stream of time. Culture is transmitted from generation to generation in considerable part by written and printed record. Literacy has become an indispensable mark of social position.

A word is a symbol, full of significance, and shared by a multitude. Whatever happens in close connection with that word enters into its meaning, and this meaning is passed on from one individual to another, from parent to child, from teacher to pupil. Accordingly the ways of social life constantly depend upon speech. Complex human relations are created, sustained, and modified by utterances which convey meaning. Especially important is the subtle control-function of language. Such words as good and bad, beautiful and ugly, success and failure, such terms as foreigner, radical, pacifism, evolution, in fact an innumerable host of items of everyday speech, have an essential connotation of value and suggestion of appropriate behavior which serve the purposes of those who use them. "Control words" are exceedingly important instruments of ordinary intercourse and of social leadership.

Language thus exercises the most profound and extensive influence as a social agency. It unifies and divides groups, establishes and destroys order, facilitates progress and deepens custom. A common tongue binds hu-

man beings together by conveying sympathies which run deeper than the currents of individual interest. The cultured speech of the educated, the slang of youth, the brogue of the immigrant, the criminal's argot, all serve as cement in their respective classes, and as divisive factors in society at large. Failure to understand the language of other people is a partial explanation of national hostility. Anyone whose words are unintelligible is naturally regarded with suspicion or ridicule. In many historic instances the mother tongue of a national minority has been suppressed because of its potency in spreading disaffection toward government,—only to increase antagonism toward the tyranny and its language. Bilingual Belgium and trilingual Switzerland show that a nation may rise above inner differences of speech, but in general we observe that the lack of a common tongue is accompanied by lack of national unity.[4]

Laughter.—In its physiological aspect laughter is a vocal "automatism," consisting of repeated, spasmodic expulsions of the breath. The explosive "ha-ha," accompanying a rapid alternation of muscular tension and relaxation, signifies subjectively both a joyous state of mind and also, most commonly, the peculiar emotion of the ridiculous, which is predominantly agreeable, though it may concur with various disagreeable states of consciousness. Laughter may be happy or sorrowful, sympathetic or contemptuous, good-natured, ironic, nervous, idiotic. Like other deeply innate dispositions it is capable of assuming pathological form, hysterical and even wildly insane. Normally it involves an extensive bodily

[4] The idealistic dream of a universal language has gained some slight embodiment. As a practical project it still appears chimerical, in spite of the numerous persons who have some knowledge of Esperanto, and the literature which has already been produced in that composite medium. Yet it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the passing of centuries will witness an accelerated interest in the acquisition of a common speech.

stir, though social cultivation tends to reduce it to the inconspicuous proportions of a smile.

Why do we laugh? This puzzling phenomenon long ago invited psychological attention, and various attempts have been made to explain it, but it still remains something of a mystery. Both its humorous and non-humorous forms express cheerfulness and have tonic bodily effect, but this does not go far toward answering our question. What we would like to know is the peculiar character of that which we laugh at, and why it usually seems funny. Let us approach the matter along a genetic line.

Apparently this form of behavior has two somewhat distinct roots. One is the bodily satisfaction which comes from eating, warmth, sunshine, and other agreeable experiences of a simple and natural sort. This satisfaction normally expresses itself in smiling rather than in laughter, though it may lend itself to the production of the latter, as in the appreciative response to an after-dinner jest. The other root is the experience of being tickled, the primitive response to which is that of laughing. Tickling combines mild discomfort with an agreeable personal setting. If the latter does not predominate, the experience is not felt as funny. Children begin early to laugh at odd and unusual happenings, queer objects, distortions of the familiar. Such things, we may say metaphorically, "tickle" them. Adolescence develops the sense of the ridiculous toward matters which are more subtle, especially social slips and mishaps which place the victim in a helpless though not pitiable plight. Maturity retains this disposition, but may acquire through aesthetic culture a highly refined and even sophisticated idea of what is laughable, far removed from the original spontaneity and simplicity. The earlier laughter-tendencies persist, in a measure, however, especially in sympathetic association with children.

If we ask what is the essential character of the things and situations which provoke laughter, we note first that they are social, either in reality or in their resemblance to humankind. We laugh at or with other human beings, and at animals and things which look or act somewhat like humanity. An object as merely material, or a person apart from social environment, is not laughable. Secondly, they contain an element of incongruity or unexpectedness, something odd but harmless, something apparently momentous which turns out to be unimportant. The familiar, the prosaic, the harmonious, the foreseen are not funny unless they involve some contrast effect, some mental shock of difference between appearance and reality, or between what is and what has been. Third, they are suggestive. The point or relation at which we laugh is hinted rather than made explicit. In fact if a joke is explained it loses its humorous appeal.[5]

But just what is the precise character of this suggested social incongruity which thus automatically touches off the responsive laugh? Here is the heart of the psychological problem of laughter, and here we meet two important theories. One is that of Freud and the psychoanalytic school, who tell us that laughter is an escape from social repression. One laughs at that which, if taken seriously, would bring social condemnation upon the laugher. The "unconscious mind" is full of desires, principally sexual and self-assertive, usually held in check by the morals and etiquette which society has impressed educationally upon everyone. Once in a while something subtly in line with these desires presents itself in experience, some

[5] It is partly for this reason that jokes which are offered as illustrations of a theory of laughter seem so flat and unhumorous. Intellectual comprehension deadens their delicate (or indelicate) suggestiveness. Another corollary of this truth is the fact that what is very funny to one person may not be so in the least to another, because of their difference in suggestibility of that special sort.

casual occurrence or utterance with a double meaning which is suggestive of the prohibited impulse, whereupon the latter bursts forth in laughter, obtaining thereby a symbolic and vicarious satisfaction and escaping condemnation because of the general social acceptability of merriment. Certain types of joke, particularly those having a touch of indecency, odd twists of Biblical language, and the blunders of associates, lend themselves easily to such interpretation. Beyond this range of illustrations the theory depends for application upon concepts of desire-symbols which are highly dubious.

The second theory, that of Bergson, turns on the distinction between the *vital* and the *mechanical* in human behavior. According to it human life is essentially spontaneous and purposive, and hence superior to bodily mechanism, which it uses for its own ends. Occasionally some bit of mechanical behavior intrudes itself into life's activity, taking possession of the individual and making him for the moment a mere part of mechanical nature. An awkward slip of speech or of movement is a simple illustration. Such behavior produces an instantaneous tension of astonishment in the observer, which is relieved when the novel action is seen to be harmless. The relaxation of this discovery takes the form of the laugh, which is at the same time a social corrective, making the victim uncomfortable as the object of ridicule and thereby advising him to be more careful in the future. If the mechanism proves to be significant, purposively or dangerously, its comic complexion instantly fades away. Human nature evolved this peculiar biological response in its infancy, and has developed it into highly cultivated forms of amusement. The artificial production of comedy, based on the fundamental principle of thrusting an absurd mechanism of behavior into a living situation, is a major device of social entertainment.

Whatever the original and essential dynamic of laughter, we must not overlook the fact that it is due in part to certain secondary factors or special conditions. One is that of preparatory attitude. We laugh the more readily if we expect to laugh, as when we attend a comic performance on the stage, or begin to peruse the funny column of a newspaper. Stock jokes and common subjects of ridicule, such as the artless shrewdness of childhood, the bewilderment of the inebriate, the humility of the henpecked husband, the collapse of social pretense, and the like, have acquired universal comic standing, so that innumerable variations of their themes win instant recognition. And lastly, the automatism of laughing is touched off imitatively. Probably everyone has had the experience of beginning to laugh in an audience before he understood just what was the joke. Nature has made us gladly ready to laugh with those around us.

CHAPTER XIX

PLAY, ART, AND MUSIC

Play.—The countless activities designated as play are alike in only one respect, their inner motivation or play-spirit, which is simply that of doing a thing for the satisfaction which comes through the doing, either the attainment of a freely chosen end, or the pleasure of the action itself. Work is done wholly or partly from some interest or aim which reaches beyond the act, such as the demands of other persons, fear of punishment, reward, or the fulfillment of far-reaching desires. When we do things simply because we like to, the performance is pure play; and in so far as such enjoyment enters into and motivates any activity of life, the latter becomes in that degree charged with the play-spirit. Work itself not infrequently is and certainly ought to be animated in this way, as well as by proper work motives. Likewise play may involve features which are essentially laborious.

Instinctive play is seen in the activities of the kitten, the puppy, and many other species of animals. The human infant makes simple movements of a play sort, such as kicking, gurgling, creeping, and throwing, movements which bring satisfaction in themselves. Later come running and jumping, pursuing and escaping, building, and so on. The social play of early childhood is coöperative rather than competitive, imitative rather than original. Competition, together with organization, increases from the years of six or seven on, though more conspicuously in boys than in girls, who are fonder of make-believe plays.

The social environment of childhood provides varied examples of appropriate plays, as parents, teachers, and older children pass on the forms which they themselves learned. Reflective intelligence begins early to direct the processes, and to introduce variations. The acquisition of new modes goes on through adolescence, motivated by fresh interests of sex, competition, and construction. Maturity shows several distinct lines of development, principally the continuation of athletic sport, the resort to nature, as in hunting, fishing, and excursions afield, the practice of art, observation of the athletic and artistic performances of others, and intellectual games. The variety of recreations included under these heads is innumerable.

Many theories have been offered to account for the appearance of play in animal and human life. It has been explained as an overflow of bodily energy, as nature's preparation of the young for the activities of later life, as the satisfaction of specific bodily needs, as a biological recapitulation of activities which were the serious business of life in an earlier period of evolution, as a kind of echo of these activities or reversion to them by way of relaxation, and as a modified form of instinct, particularly the instinct of pugnacity. Most of these theories fit some special types of play rather than cover its whole range. They may be accepted as partial and supplementary statements of the matter, agreeing in one important respect, namely, that of regarding the play function as belonging to the nature of life itself in the higher species of creature. For our purposes it is sufficient to observe that play is a form of education for the young, and for the mature mainly a relaxation from the tension of workaday living.

Most play is social. Hence the importance of the function lies not only in its exercise and recreation of body and

mind, but also in its cultivation of valuable social traits, particularly those of obedience to rule, helpfulness, cooperation, loyalty, and other qualities of character such as alertness, intelligent discrimination, courage, and persistence, which are indirectly of social value. The elementary moral training of the individual comes partly through the medium of games in which he is compelled to subordinate his own impulses to a common aim and to obey rules. The profoundly significant lesson of group play is that of giving one's best effort to the accomplishment of a collective purpose. Persons who were brought up as children to take part in such play are apt to manifest a companionable and coöperative attitude in their nature associations. Their coöperation is spontaneous and unselfish, their competition good-natured. Hence it is not wholly without reason that some idealistically minded students of social problems have regarded play on an international scale, particularly the Olympic Games, as a valuable moral discipline for world-society, and possibly in some measure a preventive of war.

Both in the individual and in society at large the play function shows certain dangerous tendencies. One is its monopoly of interest. That which is properly the business of the child becomes also the principal occupation of many adults. Just because it is essentially enjoyable it tends to overshadow work, and to exalt the pleasure of the moment above distant but more enduring satisfactions. Its recreational function is hypertrophied and inverted, so that it assumes the position of life's chief aim, subordinating everything to its own demands. Society is burdened by an increasing number of persons who devote themselves exclusively to play, or who work mainly in order to obtain further opportunities for it. School practice sometimes paves the way for this abuse by exces-

sive development of athletic sports and other social pastimes. In consequence it sends out into a workaday world individuals who have to acquire painfully the inevitable discipline of work.

A second principal danger in play is that of moral degeneracy. As a relaxing function it easily runs into forms of unhealthy mental and physical gratification. Gambling and various vices, an intense interest in prize-fighting, addiction to indecent literature, are illustrations. Competitive plays are perhaps especially in danger of such perversion since the excitement of the contest is likely to abrogate moral restraint. Sport descends to brutality and unsportsmanlike methods, and the game is poisoned by the spirit of winning at any cost. In the lack of healthy aims and rational control play tends toward social debasement.

The contemporary social interest in play is so striking as to call for special comment. Of course society has always pursued recreation as much as it could; and in some cases, as the Greek and Roman games, has done so on a large scale. But to-day, with the increase of personal leisure and of public and private wealth, we see a diversity and universality in the function which have never before been attained. Baseball games, football games, and prize fights attract crowds of spectators numbering fifty, sixty, a hundred thousand, while still larger numbers follow the details of the contest with eager interest through the radio. Music, drama, vaudeville, offer further illustrations. The total daily attendance at moving pictures is enormous. In addition the public is enabled by the development of transportation, particularly the automobile, and by governmental provision of highways and parks, to enjoy certain outdoor forms of recreation to an unprecedented extent. Most of this play is healthy, or at least is not without

merit; but much of it is too passive—the mere witnessing of the performances of others. To encourage everyone in active and healthful play, and at the same time to keep the function subordinate to the serious business of life, is one of the major problems of society at the present time.

Art.—In the type of experience called aesthetic the individual takes some object in isolation and regards it as essentially satisfactory or unsatisfactory in itself. Such objects may be either parts of nature or the work of mankind. Creative art is the construction of objects which arouse aesthetic appreciation. Usually though not exclusively these are characterized by some element of beauty, or what is felt as such by the observer. Some art, however, is the deliberate production of the most fascinating ugliness, and some aspects of nature are aesthetically impressive without being beautiful. Gargoyles and literary "realism," storms and deserts, are examples. Classicism in art tends to conformity with established ideas and traditional models, it yields mental rest, whereas romanticism produces artistic novelty and a more active appreciation. In general art is animated by the spirit of play, the enjoyment of an experience or action in itself and apart from its relations to other matters.

Whether aesthetic appreciation, in the last analysis, is a purely individual response, or involves interpretations of experience which are common to mankind and which imply a fundamental idealism of human nature, is a question into which we need not enter. In any case art has important social aspects. It began in connection with useful things, practical interests, secular and sacred, which had relation to group life. The decoration of pottery and weapons, the forms of dancing and other religious ritual, are cases in point. While its long development has tended in some measure to give it independent status and

to refine it beyond the reach of common understanding, it has always been more or less deliberately symbolic and suggestive of common human meaning and group sentiments. "Legitimate art," says Professor Bernard, "must suggest social responses. Greek and Gothic architecture, truly great poetry and prose, music, painting, dancing, statuary, drama—all the fine arts, in fact—are agencies of social control by virtue of their power of suggestion." Accordingly art has lent its aid to the great social institutions such as the state, religion, education, commerce, and industry. National music and municipal architecture, the cathedral and the choir, the study of poetry and drama, the appeal of advertisements and manufactures to aesthetic taste, all show how prevalent is the function of art in contemporary life.

Fundamentally, art is an outgrowth of human interests which are more or less common to mankind, hence the greatest and most imperishable art has universal appeal to those who understand the cultural conditions in which it appears. Its development naturally assumes special forms expressive of the life of particular peoples, forms which are unintelligible or even repulsive to others. The beautiful in one land may be the grotesque in another. Also it flows in waves of conventionality, many of which have no lasting significance, since here as elsewhere imitative tendencies give popular currency to superficial whims. Thus a fascinating sartorial fashion may pass quickly into the limbo of utter absurdity. Still further, the more refined forms of art often serve as a medium of class consciousness for particular groups, who find therein the nourishment of a self-assured cultural and social superiority. In conjunction with distinctions of birth, wealth, and power, it produces social strata and intensifies their diversity of interest. Yet with all these limitations it also

represents feelings and ideas which characterize all humanity, so that through education it may become a unifying as well as a divisive influence.

Recent psychological theory emphasizes the "sublimative" motivation of art, that is to say, its subtle effort to express in acceptable form instinctive desires which are subjected to much social repression, especially those of sex and self-assertion. Psychoanalysts turn their peculiar intellectual searchlight upon great works of literature, of sculpture and painting, with the effect of revealing more or less distinctly the underlying causes and meaning of these achievements. Thus a romance in prose fiction or poetry is interpreted as an imaginative escape from the frustrations of the writer's own life, the Laocoön expresses the struggle of man against the overwhelming power of sex impulse, and so on. Both the world-old symbolisms of human experience and a good many other symbols which appear to have originated in the mind of the psychoanalyst lend their aid to such interpretation. Without accepting the extreme notions now current in this field we may reasonably hold that art owes its instigation and its appeal in no small measure to the common human experience of bafflement, from which one escapes into the world of imagination.

Such escape may be morally either upward or downward. There is no universal and essential connection between art and morals, and the latter sometimes assumes decadent forms which need censorship because of their insidious corruption of society. This remains true in spite of the fact that most actual censorship is a social blight of ignorance and lack of taste. On the other hand art gives concrete form to the most lofty ideals of human character, and thus exercises a powerful influence in the direction of social progress.

Music.—The various fine arts are behavior-systems which possess some degree of social significance. Based on innate capacities of emotional appreciation they are developed into elaborate forms of creative construction, forms which give peculiar satisfaction to the human mind. In general, the greater the refinement of the art, the less wide is its social appeal. The best painting, sculpture, architecture, and music win intelligent recognition from no very large part of society. But at bottom there is a common interest in such matters; and the latter have a profoundly important social character.

This truth is especially well illustrated by music. Rhythm is an outgrowth of the regular movements of the feet; musical rhythm developed in connection with dancing. Melody, in its elements, comes from sequences of vocal sound expressive of bodily feeling. Harmony has a subtler but equally subjective basis. In the evolution of culture the voice was early supplemented by the invention of musical instruments, drums and bells, string and wind instruments, which immensely enlarged the range of musical production. Here as elsewhere the art began in relation to the practical interests of life, such as religion and war, but eventually attained aesthetic independence. Throughout its long development it has been subjected to profoundly reflective and even mathematical treatment. Its highly rational forms are amazingly intricate, for example the complex and subtle organization of a symphony.

The point with which we are especially concerned is that music is a social art. By virtue of its common bodily basis and its imitative nature it helps to determine the form of social behavior and social organization. Love songs and cradle songs convey the most intimate and tender feeling. Work songs like the sailors' chanty facilitate coöperative

effort. The march, with its accentuated rhythm and stirring melody, preserves order and engenders enthusiasm. Hymn tunes deepen the common human emotions which their accompanying words express. Folk songs and national airs serve the purpose of aligning mentally the divergently minded individuals who use them. Particular groups have proprietary melodies, the singing of which is a solemn pledge of loyalty.

Music is therefore an important group function, an expressive and effective symbol of common interest and united effort. Many organizations, from college fraternities to whole nations, find in song a kind of social cement which binds individuals together and nourishes the idealism of the group. Social movements, reforms and revolutions which express themselves in song manifest a power which entitles them to serious regard, whatever their purposes or morals.[1]

There is another phase of this subject which invites our attention. What is the explanation of the fact that musical celebrities are able to attract huge audiences composed largely of persons who have little technical appreciation of the art? Partly, no doubt, the glamour of the name, the aristocratic position of such music in society, and the satisfaction of numbering one's self among the musically élite. Probably many a listener, also, has a deeply sympathetic responsiveness to the basic melody and harmony, even though he himself is incapable of such self-expression. Possibly there is in some cases, as psychoanalysis might assert, a subconscious drive of vicarious self-display, and a fanciful escape from the monotony and petty detail of everyday existence. Whatever the ex-

[1] That militant organization, the Industrial Workers of the World, has a collection of crude but powerful songs expressing its philanthropic aims and its social antagonisms. Its use of these, especially in its industrial battles, is very effective in maintaining the morale of its membership.

planation, it is certain that music touches the deeper chords of human nature.

Dancing developed early in connection with music as a form of religious worship. Peoples of primitive culture have always danced to assure or to celebrate victory, to bring rain, to offer thanks for the harvest, and in general to bring spiritual influences to bear upon the life of the group. Different nations have developed distinctive dances, which in combination with appropriate music produce peculiarly colorful effects, for example the czardas, the fandango, and the minuet. In highly civilized societies dancing has become purely a social recreation and a form of art.

The charm of dancing lies in the abandonment of the self to rhythmic motion in a pleasantly social atmosphere. Sex interest obviously plays an important part, usually decorous, sometimes questionable. Figure and interpretative dancing show the coöperation of reflective intelligence in the production of form, though much so-called interpretation is affected and unreal. As a means of cultivating grace of motion the dance has considerable value. For the most part its function is distinctly that of social relaxation, sometimes unfortunately carried to inordinate lengths.

CHAPTER XX

RELIGION AND PHILANTHROPY

Religion.—The essence of religion is the belief, expressed in worship, that there is an invisible being or principle which is superior to the realm of nature and to mankind. This belief has taken innumerable forms in the evolution of human culture, forms ranging from the crudest nature-worship or reverence of natural objects such as the sun, mountains, rivers, and lesser things, as the abode of invisible powers and the source of human welfare and woe, to the most profoundly reflective conceptions of the reality of an abstract principle of good and evil as the source of the moral nature of man. Almost all religion has been polytheistic and anthropomorphic; it has represented its numerous gods by idols which it reverenced as the symbols and residence of divinity. Its age-long, world-wide evolution has tended toward a monotheism in which the deity is characterized by ideal human qualities, truth, justice, and love, and is worshipped by the practice of these virtues in everyday life.

Religion has always been a social interest, involving various special beliefs and practices having reference to society. Ideas of the divine origin of mankind, of the divine ordering of tribal customs, of the pious duty of a nation, of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, have always been matters of religious faith. Affairs of state have been regarded as needing divine sanction. The conflict of peoples has been a conflict of their respective deities, in which each supported his worshippers.

Food-getting and eating, marriage and childbirth, sickness and death, in fact every important kind of experience belonging to the life of the individual as a member of society, has been brought in one way or another into the domain of religion. Ritual, prayer, and sacrifice have been obligatory, collectively as well as individually, in the interests of social welfare. Morals have almost uniformly been regarded as divine commands. The higher religions have been held to involve the duty of propagation, by peaceful missionary method or even by force, among peoples of less enlightenment. In these and many other ways religion has manifested a social character.

So varied and complex an interest can hardly be called an instinct. Rather is it a synthesis of instincts, emotions, and ideas, in which fear of the unknown has been a leading motive, supplemented by a certain aesthetic and moral idealism. According to Freudian theory it is a sublimation or idealization of instinct, particularly that of sex, by which society has turned to its own evolutionary account the impulses which would otherwise have kept man on the plane of the brute, or would have tended toward social disintegration. Its ideas and practices, communicated from generation to generation by the most solemn and impressive instruction, have been accepted with the docile imitativeness of the young, but at the same time modified by reflective thought in the light of advancing intelligence. The outcome is a compound of systematic theology, elaborately symbolic ritual, and the rational ordering of the moral life.

While at all times one of the profoundest and most powerful influences upon the life of man, religion has yet yielded to the relentless advance of science, which has taken a fundamentally different view of nature, and has produced a deepening disbelief in many religious ideas.

With the general evolution of culture the concept of nature as an independent, self-regulating mechanism has gained acceptance. The notion of divinely arbitrary interposition in nature has given way to the concepts of the sufficiency of natural causes and the universality of natural law. We need only mention the historic warfare of science with Christian theology. The result of the steady progress of scientific discovery and reflection has been to undermine the traditional forms of religious belief.

The new view of nature inevitably affected the idea of man. Both in his physical and in his mental being he came to be regarded as a part of nature. The history of his cultural development, as unfolded by science, showed him to be a member of the natural order, subject to natural law. His behavior was seen to be the effect of natural causes, and the older notions of divine or diabolical instigation, with consequent rewards and punishments in experience, passed to the status of superstition. Conduct, it was perceived, should be directed by intelligence rather than subservient to religious prescription. Collectively, society learned gradually that it must depend upon itself, that is to say, upon its own rational ideals and its scientific command of resources, in order to achieve social welfare.

The various adjustments and compromises between the old and the new views may be mentioned briefly. Some persons have remained untouched by the new learning, and continue to cherish in all sincerity the superstitions of an earlier day. Others have more or less formally abjured religion altogether. Between these extremes we find two principal classes: first, the philosophically minded, for whom the divine being remains as the metaphysical background of the universe, a spiritual being who is the source of moral authority and who im-

poses moral duty upon man; and second, those who do not concern themselves with the philosophical concepts or problems of religion, but find satisfaction in the traditional forms of worship. These classes overlap extensively. On the whole the former gravitates away from the collective observance of religious traditions, because these fail to square intellectually with the results of thinking. The latter are content with credal formulations and the trappings of customary worship, regarding them as symbols of the divine, and deriving from them an uncritical gratification, consisting in varying measure of aesthetic enjoyment, moral inspiration, and the satisfaction of gregarious impulses. Among Christian peoples we find a fading of sectarian differences of theology, but a maintenance of sectarian organization of religion, amounting in some degree to social stratification.

A survey of the historical development of religion shows it to have had both good and bad effects upon human society. It has served at all times to deepen social solidarity by reënforcing common purposes and restraining individual waywardness. Private and public morals have always derived from it an authoritative support. It has strengthened and perfected personal character, has purified and energized the minds of the devout so that their lives became an exemplary illumination to others. It has also been the principal vehicle of humanitarian idealism. In recent times it has devoted itself extensively to the alleviation of suffering. Philanthropic effort of all sorts, both organized and casual, has owed its strength of purpose to the belief that such was God's will. Altogether we observe here a beneficial agency of tremendous power.

On the other hand we cannot ignore the fact that religion has often opposed itself to progress. It has been predominantly conservative, and has always shown a dis-

position to condemn whatever did not conform to its accepted ideas and practices. This disposition has been deepened and its evil consequences have been enhanced by organization, which always tends to exalt its own importance and to obstruct any considerable alteration of its habit. Its organized leadership has often allied itself with the politically and economically powerful, so that it became indifferent to the needs and rights of the mass of society. Hence many good causes have found in it an implacable enemy. Its major vices, namely, superstition, bigotry, tyranny, and privilege, have unquestionably cast the darkest shadows across the pathway of social advancement. Privately, too, pride and malice, injustice and cruelty, have cloaked themselves in it and have thereby escaped merited punishment. While its idealism and its practical beneficence probably outweigh its defects, its intellectual degradation and social corruption, we can hardly wonder that some social critics and idealists are inclined to reject it altogether, and to put their faith in scientific enlightenment.

The religion of the past, as a universal view of nature and man, is fading before the advance of science, while concurrently there is a broadening and deepening of social idealism under religious auspices. Hence the more highly educated and philanthropically minded parts of society stand in a somewhat difficult position with regard to it. Can it, as a view of the universe, retain enough clearness and certainty to command respect? Can it be recast in a form which will acknowledge the truth of science without losing its essential character of individual and social subservience to an ideal being? Can personal and social idealism stand alone, without the metaphysical support which religion has traditionally afforded? Such are the problems which many a thoughtful mind to-day is

facing. Those who are most optimistic believe that a new religion, characterized by loyalty to the social ideals of human brotherhood, ideals most clearly suggested by the teaching of Jesus, is in process of formation.

Philanthropy.—Religion, as was pointed out in the preceding section, has always been a social as well as an individual interest. In its earlier stages of development it is concerned in part with tribal welfare. Subsequently, with the growth of political organization, it becomes a national function, sometimes identified with the state, and sometimes arrogating to itself the rights of supreme control, but eventually assuming a coördinate position. The advent of universal religion gives it still wider scope; it now takes an interest in all mankind, irrespective of political alignment. This development produces missionary propagation, and also, especially in Judaism and Christianity, various forms of systematic philanthropy. Care of the sick, relief of the poor, and concern with the needs of helpless children are religious duties. Hospitals, asylums, and orphanages, as well as a tremendous amount of casual charity and relief of the sick, are characteristic features of the most enlightened contemporary religion.

The efforts to relieve suffering have developed far beyond the confines of religious organization, however. Among civilized people the number of independent agencies which devote themselves to the needs of the helpless is huge. Such organizations as the Red Cross, societies for the prevention of tuberculosis and for the care of the blind, social welfare leagues, and so on, operate everywhere. The World War produced many associations of this character to help those whom it left maimed and destitute. Especially is the physical and moral welfare of the child conserved as never before. These great instruments of individual and social well-being have lately

been coördinated in large local organizations for purposes of obtaining public support. Relying partly on governmental aid, partly on assistance by churches, and partly on purely private maintenance, they cover society with a network of lines of protection and relief.

This development is an outgrowth of those fundamental interests and impulses which may be termed parental instinct, and which in the long course of social evolution have extended their operation far beyond their original object, the child in the family. Care of the helpless is therefore no transitory fashion or mere custom, but is an expression of a profoundly deep trait of human nature. The original drives of sympathy, guided by intelligence and reënforced by religious faith, now reach multitudes. Not only the wealthy, but perhaps even more the individuals of moderate means, give to the needy irrespective of race, nation, and color. A famine in India or a pestilence in China, destitution produced anywhere by volcanic eruption or by flood, invite and receive widespread coöperative attention and relief. While some of this philanthropy is sheer imitation and some is social display, most of it is essentially sincere. Society has come, to an unprecedented extent, to take kindly care of its members, not simply in their domestic, political, and other special groupings, but as human beings.

So generous is this care, in fact, that it now and then raises a question whether it is not running counter to the biological interests of society, whether it is not incidentally encouraging a voluntary and unnecessary dependence, or perhaps serving to propagate defects which should be ruthlessly eliminated from the social order. Some recipients of charity find it the easiest way of making a living. Some mental and moral defectives gain increased power of reproducing their kind. Free medical care or a gratui-

tous surgical operation may restore to society one whom, to speak candidly, it would be better off without. Is not contemporary philanthropy occasionally doing a positive harm to society, acting in a way which in the long run is injurious to social welfare?

The answer to this question is, first, that such instances are exceptional, second, that they are increasingly subject to scientific discrimination and appropriate treatment, and third, that in any case it is supremely important to generate and maintain a philanthropic spirit in society. There is no phase of human evolution more admirable than its advance in humanitarianism. A universally cultivated sympathy is the crowning glory of mankind. Supplementing the narrower sympathies of special groups, it is the central motive of the social idealism which is apparently the aim of the evolutionary process.

The point which we should particularly observe is that we have here a human trait which is a major factor of social evolution. As philanthropy becomes more widely disseminated, more thoroughly organized, and more scientifically administered, it removes impediments to social progress and liberates energies for further advancement. It also serves to show by contrast how foolish and harmful are the economic and political antagonisms which disintegrate society. Perhaps as much as any form of religious faith it foreshadows the brotherhood of mankind.

CHAPTER XXI

PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONALISM

Patriotism is the sentiment of devotion to one's country and people, a devotion which expresses itself in various forms of service, especially in fighting to repel aggression and to attain national aggrandizement. Its evolutionary roots are found in the tribal consciousness of primitive mankind, or still more deeply in the family feeling of physical kinship which underlies tribal unity, and in the feeling of ownership of tribal domain. With the political development of society it becomes varied in its manifestations, but it is always characterized by love of and pride in one's country, and usually by fear, suspicion, and hatred of political neighbors. Cultivated as a sentiment highly charged with these emotions, it is attached to such objects as a flag, songs, dress, language, deities, in fact anything which serves as a symbol of the people and the homeland. Under modern political conditions it is often taken to imply loyalty to government, and acknowledgment of the moral superiority of the state to any rights of the individual citizen.

Patriotic sentiment is instilled early and deeply in childhood and youth by the use of songs, stories of patriotic deeds in the past, and various other devices which have suggestive effect upon the growing mind. It thus becomes unreflectively the source of later action. In most persons it is fundamentally traditional, authoritative and imitative rather than rational, though it may be highly

rationalized. In general there is not much independent individual opinion in it, or deliberate and critical assurance of the justice of a patriotic cause; and what there is tends to subside with the approach of actual conflict. It is somewhat astonishing how easily even the more critically minded citizen resigns his rational independence in time of war, and becomes blindly subservient to governmental authority.

The evolutionary and social values of patriotism are unquestionable. By warding off aggression it promotes the security which is requisite for the establishment of culture. It strengthens group solidarity, and in some measure tends to produce social sympathy and to level social differences. Incidentally it fosters special forms of art and science which are closely related to the life of the people, or perhaps are of permanent advantage to society. Often it elevates the character of the individual citizen through his identification of himself with the moral principles of his people and his unselfish devotion to the welfare of his country. The peculiar essence of patriotism, in fact, is its conscious and subconscious exaltation of the self through active merging in the larger selfhood of a people. As such it may be extremely idealistic, one of the highest sublimations of individual desire. Ethical goodness is found, as Professor Royce has shown, in the sentiment and practice of loyalty to some cause which is larger than mere individual purpose. Such a cause, magnifying the character and worth of the citizen, is supplied by patriotic interest.

Unfortunately this sentiment is easily susceptible of perversion to malevolent forms and base uses. Too commonly it turns to blatant hostility toward other nations, a cultivated suspicion and hatred which make social cooperation on an international scale impossible. Frequently

it serves as a mask for political chicanery. Governmental tyranny employs it as a mask for executing nefarious purposes. Private greed covertly fattens on it. Patriotic iniquity has written many of the blackest pages in history, pages black with hatred and cruelty, with dishonesty and rapacity, with the utter disregard of that common morality which is indispensable to social order. Rightly has it been called "the last refuge of the scoundrel." Even in those who are not scoundrels it is too often interwoven with private aims which scarcely deserve its support. The identification of personal interest with patriotic service, for example in salaried office or in the sale of goods to government, may subtly warp one's judgment as to political rectitude.

Recent wars have made it unmistakably clear that uncritical patriotism is a dubious benefit to humanity. As an intensely emotional force exercised in the direction of political honesty and international justice it deserves the most careful cultivation; but as blind allegiance to the purposes of a particular government—which it has too commonly been—it merits the severe condemnation which socialists and others have passed upon it. There is too little effort to develop it as a rational ideal.[1]

Nationalism and Internationalism.—With the development of the state as the supreme political authority,

[1] And there is continual effort to present it irrationally. Let us note a few illustrations. For many years a leading newspaper has printed daily at the top of its editorial page the misguided utterance, "My country, may it ever be in the right, but right or wrong, my country!" Discussion by the Senate of the propriety of armed interference in the political affairs of a neighboring republic is abruptly ended because the military exigencies of the moment seem to make it unpatriotic. The bribery of a Cabinet official in connection with the leasing of oil-lands is extenuated on the ground that the oil could thus be obtained more readily for national defense. Several organizations make a business of manufacturing patriotic sentiment of an uncritical sort, and of condemning and persecuting all who disagree with their prejudices. Their "blacklists" of noted educators, clergymen, and philanthropists have become a monumental absurdity. We cannot simply laugh at these perversions, however. Their viciousness is effective; on occasion it produces in the public mind the desired amenability to pernicious political suggestion. Usually the vociferous patriots have private axes to grind.

patriotism takes the specific form of *nationalism*. A "nation" has been well defined as "any group of people which thinks it is one"; in other words its essential feature is a common sentiment of political unity. Its composition ordinarily includes different racial strains, oftentimes with a corresponding variety of language. In almost all cases it has a definite homeland and history, though in some instances the latter is assumed rather than real. But whatever its inner differences and uncertainties, it must have a unity of purpose to maintain its own national life and culture. The great and small nation-states of the present day are alike in this essential respect.

Nationalism as a state of mind in the individual citizen tends to exalt the importance of the state, its opposition to other states, and its superiority to the individual. The conception usually implies economic power, and hence the predominance of economic motives in national life, large authority of political leadership, the constant need of defense, the duty of military service, and the subservience of education to national welfare. In the more powerful states its political and economic interests tend to expand it to imperialistic proportions, and thus bring it into conflict with other like entities. In general it is as expansive and as pugnacious as it dares to be.

How deeply the sentiment of nationalism is ingrained in the modern mind is shown by many significant facts. Most of us think of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and other states not so much as territories or peoples as political entities and governments. The "self-determination of small nations" was taken during the Great War as one of the leading issues at stake. Conflicts between government, efforts to establish political integrity, struggles to escape foreign domination, attempts to extend political power, these are always news-items of major

interest. The contemporary dictatorship of Italy, like the former imperial government of Germany, explicitly affirms the absolute supremacy of the state over the individual citizen, and its right and duty of pugnacious opposition to other states as the ideal interest of citizenship. In such cases we find the repudiation of individual liberty generally accepted by the people. Many nations claim permanent right to the military services of their former citizens, even when the latter have emigrated to other countries and have established citizenship there. Many governments take systematic care to inculcate nationalistic sentiment in the minds of school children, through the use of patriotic exercises, which in some instances include pointed expressions of hostility to surrounding peoples. Needless to say, the writing and study of history are guided in some measure by nationalistic aims.[2]

The dangers in this world-wide wave of nationalistic feeling are manifest. While the sentiment of nationalism has great energizing influence in the individual mind, and occasionally facilitates notable accomplishments of a cultural sort, it also produces much harmful friction, and involves much waste of social energy. The political atmosphere becomes highly charged with a false sense of national peril, which encourages militaristic autocracy. Independence of thought and freedom of speech yield to propaganda and censorship. The result is a loss of individual liberty, and in the long run a depression of individual power and social culture.

Under such conditions it becomes possible for strong-willed leaders and groups to identify themselves with the state, and to use its resources for the attainment of their

[2] We have recently had in the United States an extensive and partially successful effort to eliminate "unpatriotic" textbooks from use in the public schools, and to replace them with others written expressly for the purpose of glorifying our national history and aims.

own interests. This ordinarily though not necessarily implies personal aggrandizement in wealth and power. The most insidious danger lies in the fact that such individuals and groups often feel profoundly the rectitude of their own political purposes, which reach far beyond mere selfishness, and piously regard the historic welfare and continuity of the state as divinely ordained to their keeping. Certain ideas of economic or political development take possession of them; and with the organized resources of the state under their control they proceed to put these ideas into operation, trampling ruthlessly over any resistance which lies in their path. Perhaps the subtlest and gravest menace to society is that of powerful official and unofficial rulers conscientiously identifying their own aims with the purposes of the state, and forcing the popular mind into predetermined channels of thought and feeling, rather than letting it work out its own social destiny by methods of reflection and discussion.

Internationalism signifies simply harmonious and cooperative relations among states. It need not be taken to mean the repudiation of all nationalistic sentiment. Nor does it necessarily involve any formal superstructure of government having power over particular nations. It implies mutual understanding and respect, friendliness, free communication, and commercial intercourse. We find it realized to a considerable extent by religious, industrial, and scientific organizations which understand that their interests transcend the limits of nationality. It is not to be regarded as a dream of the future, but rather as a sentiment already present in a multitude of thoughtful minds. Presumably nations will ultimately outgrow their irrational hatreds, suspicions, and conflicts through intelligent discovery that other attitudes and habits are wiser and more profitable.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

CHAPTER I

Definition, Scope, and Relations

1. Define social behavior. Mention several typical activities of everyday social life, and show that in every case they conform to your definition.

2. Define social psychology. Distinguish between the psychological study of the individual and of the group.

3. What is meant by the statement that social psychology tries to explain the "moralization" of the individual?

4. What principal modes of social thought preceded social psychology? Indicate some illustrations.

5. How did the prescientific aim and method in this field differ from those of contemporary science?

6. What general ideas about the nature and function of social science have emerged from the historic study of society?

7. What leading biological conceptions apply also to the nature of society?

8. Mention some points of contact which social psychology makes with zoölogy and with physiology.

9. Indicate some facts in the fields of economics and government which seem to you to have psychological significance.

10. State what you understand to be the distinction between sociology and social psychology. In what respects are they interdependent?

11. How does the aim of ethics differ from that of social psychology? How are the subjects interrelated?

12. Why is social psychology so closely associated with abnormal psychology? Mention a typical fact which belongs to both subjects.

CHAPTER II

The Mental Basis of Society

1. What is social as distinct from non-social consciousness? Indicate some experiences which are characterized by social consciousness in its simplest form.

2. If normal human experience is predominantly social, what should we expect to be the mental tendency of persons in solitary occupations and situations, such as the sheep-herder, the hermit, and the prisoner in solitary confinement?

3. Mention illustrations of "consciousness of kind" as a social determinant. What is the objection to regarding this consciousness as fundamental for social relationships?

4. What are the principal evolutionary stages or levels of social behavior?

5. How does human behavior differ from that of other animals in respect to these levels?

6. What is a "motive" of action? What are the most fundamental motives of life?

7. What is a "sentiment"? Show the social importance of the sentiment of self-regard.

8. Show how the motivation of a social action or institution may operate on the different levels indicated above.

9. What is meant by saying that social relations are largely subconscious?

10. What are the objections to the theory of an "unconscious mind"?

11. State precisely the different meanings of the term "group-mind."

12. What is "social intelligence"?

CHAPTER III

Social Instinct

1. What is the psychological definition of instinct? Name several instincts.

2. What are the principal classes and types of instinct? Mention illustrations of each.

3. How is instinct related to reflex action? Show that this relation characterizes the instinctive behavior of some animal.

4. What is the physiological basis of instinct? What is "maturation"?

5. Distinguish between the impulsive and the emotional features of instinct, for example, in the behavior of a creature toward an enemy.

6. What are the psychological objections to regarding an instinct as perceptually and purposively intelligent at the outset?

7. In what general ways are instincts modified? Mention a case of the extension or transfer of an instinct to a new object.

8. What are the effects of repression on instinct?

9. What is the source or origin of instinct?

10. Show why it is best for society that acquired habits are not transmitted by heredity.

11. Why do some psychologists deny that mankind has any instincts?

12. How does human instinct differ from that of the lower animals?

13. Describe in detail the operation of instinct in the social life of some animal species.

14. Indicate some institutions or general departments of human culture which may be regarded as outgrowths of particular instincts.

15. Mention some special cultural development of each of the principal social instincts.

CHAPTER IV

Social Learning

1. What practical difference does it make whether the social order is regarded as essentially instinctive or as a product of learning?

2. Define "learning." What are the fundamental modes of learning?

3. Give illustrations of inhibitory and integrative learning in the field of social behavior.

4. Show the importance of habit in everyday social life. What is meant by the saying that habit tends to convert means to ends?

5. Upon what conditions does efficient learning depend? Mention a social action, the learning of which involves all these conditions.

6. What is the foundation of social behavior, according to Allport's theory?

7. What is the "conditioning" of a reflex? Give illustrations of social conditioning.

8. What are "prepotent habits"?

9. How may Allport's theory and the theory of social instinct be modified so as to be synthesized?

10. What is the method of animal learning? Mention some experiment in this field.

11. Describe some typical instances of the beginning of social learning in the infant.

12. Explain the importance of "negative learning" in early childhood.

13. How is human learning related to the method of lower animals?

14. Show the relation of the human period of immaturity to social life.

CHAPTER V

Imitation

1. How does the imitative level of social behavior differ, in general, from that of instinct?

2. Distinguish between the conservative and the progressive functions of imitation in human society.

3. What is the essential feature of an imitative action?

4. To what extent may animal behavior be regarded as imitative?

5. Show the prevalence and importance of imitation in childhood.

6. Distinguish between the relatively mechanical and the clearly purposive types of imitation.

7. Why do human beings imitate one another? Indicate the physiological, biological, and social bases of the process.

8. What is intuition? Give illustrations of social intuition.

9. How are individual differences of intuitive power explained?

10. What is the general meaning of the term "sympathy"? How does this differ from the common usage of the term?

11. How does sympathy in human beings differ from that of animals?

12. Explain the statement that sympathy is not necessarily a moral trait.

13. What is "active sympathy"?

14. Define suggestion. Mention typical illustrations.

15. What are the principal conditions of suggestibility? What classes of persons are most suggestible?

16. Indicate some exhibition of social suggestion on a large scale.

CHAPTER VI

Social Thought

1. What is the "social function of thought"? Give illustrations from your own observation or personal experience.

2. Why is advanced thinking so often received with disfavor by society? Mention some historic illustrations.

3. What justification is there for this unfavorable attitude on the part of society?

4. What is meant by saying that thought is essentially instrumental and experimental?

5. To what extent does thinking seem to you probably to take place in the animal mind? Why is it doubtful whether animals reason?

6. Show by illustration how children learn to think socially. Why do many children fail to develop thoughtfulness?

7. Distinguish between practical wisdom and abstract reasoning in dealing with social problems, either those of college life or of society at large.

8. How does the average citizen differ from the leaders of society in respect to social thought?

9. Mention some historical illustrations of perverted social thinking.

10. Why is the practice of day-dreaming usually objectionable? What is needful to justify it?

11. What is "rationalization"? Give illustrations. To what is this tendency due?

12. Distinguish between individual and collective thinking. Which is the better method?

13. What are the dangers or defects in collective thinking? In individual thinking?

14. Show what is meant by the phrase "the scientific direction of society."

15. What are the principal obstacles to such direction?

CHAPTER VII

Social Motives

1. What is a "motive" of behavior? What are the principal theories of the nature of motivation?

2. Distinguish between conscious and subconscious motives. Indicate some instance of behavior which is subconsciously motivated.

3. What is a "sentiment"? Name several important sentiments.

4. Indicate briefly the various ways in which some human sentiment expresses itself in behavior.

5. Show how conflicting sentiments in the individual affect his mental life and action.

6. Show by example how sentiment determines opinion in politics, religion, or elsewhere. What is "social prejudice"?

7. What is an "attitude"? Indicate some common social attitudes, and show how they may be explained in terms of sentiment.

8. Assuming that volition is a compound of impulses and

inhibitions, how is it related to sentiments? What is a "socialized will"?

9. Distinguish between concrete and abstract sentiments. Give illustrations.

10. Show the importance of abstract sentiments in social life. What ones seem to you most important in this respect?

11. What special danger attaches to the formation and use of abstract sentiments? Mention an illustration.

12. What are some of the characteristic sentiments of childhood?

13. Describe the process by which a child forms such an abstract sentiment as honesty, or punctuality, or patriotism.

14. What major sentiments develop in the period of adolescence? Why are they so late in development?

15. Show the importance of the sentiment of self-regard in social life.

16. Explain the statement that personality is a hierarchy of sentiments.

CHAPTER VIII

Personality

1. Define personality. Why is the concept especially important for social psychology?

2. Show by illustration that the self is occasionally identified with the experience of material things.

3. What social relationships enter most intimately into self-consciousness?

4. What do you regard as the essence of your own real selfhood, the loss of which would most completely change your self-consciousness?

5. Name some personages in history or in fiction whose lives were dominated by a "master sentiment."

6. What is the difference between temperament and character?

7. Show how personality depends on internal physiological constitution.

8. What externally perceivable traits are most important in determining the nature of personality?

9. Indicate some environmental influences which are especially powerful in determining personality in early childhood.

10. Mention some personal traits which appear in later childhood and early adolescence.

11. What are the principal features of the development of personality in adolescence?

12. State the classical scheme of temperaments.

13. What is the difference between the classic and the romantic temperaments? Find illustrations in some field of science or art.

14. What are the introverted and the extroverted types of personality? Mention some familiar symptomatic differences of behavior characteristic of them.

15. Which are the more significant of personal character, traits of physical structure or those of behavior? Why?

16. How may we explain the fact that some persons are so accurate in "reading character" from structural traits and from handwriting?

17. What is the general direction of scientific advance in the study of personality-traits? What special direction is it taking?

18. Describe the method of measuring personality by ranking the individual.

CHAPTER IX

Race, Sex, and Family Inheritance

1. What are the principal innate factors of human individuality? Which ones seem to you most influential?

2. Explain the statement that inherited tendencies and environmental influences depend essentially upon each other.

3. What is "race"? How, in general, is nationality related to race?

4. How does the range of individual variation in any race compare with the average difference between races? Mention some particular traits which illustrate this principle.

5. What is the result of comparative measurements of the intelligence of negroes and whites? How do you explain these facts?

6. Show in some detail how the social contacts of racially different peoples are likely to affect individuality.

7. Explain the statement that the conscious individuality and social relations of the sexes are determined in part by secondary physical characteristics.

8. In what respects do early environmental influences in the home and the school commonly tend to differentiate the social attitudes of boys and girls?

9. How do the sexes compare in range of mental variation? How is this difference explained?

10. What actual differences of sex interests, ideas, and ideals seem to you most prevalent?

11. What do you regard as the probable effect of feminism upon the individuality, social attitudes, and relations of the sexes?

12. What lines of evidence show the predominant influence of family inheritance in the determination of individuality?

13. Show how environmental influences within the family tend to reinforce heredity.

14. Compare the normal social influence of the father and the mother upon the child.

15. What important contributions to individuality are derived from association with other children?

CHAPTER X

Leadership

1. Why is leadership necessary in society?

2. Indicate illustrations of leadership in animal groups, and describe the special forms which it assumes.

3. Distinguish between executive and intellectual leadership. Give specific illustrations.

4. What particular kinds of superiority are fundamental for effective leadership?

5. Show how leadership depends on prestige. On self-confidence. Do these conditions take the place of superior power?

6. Explain the statement that insight into human nature is requisite for successful leadership.

7. How do you estimate the relative importance of hereditary and environmental factors in the origin of leadership?

8. What is meant by the following: (a) Some leadership is "compensatory"? (b) The capacity for leadership is general rather than specialized?

9. What personal qualities characterize the successful executive?

10. What special kinds of experience of childhood and youth constitute training for such leadership?

11. Why is it so hard to find competent executives?

12. What is "organized leadership," and why is it necessary in contemporary society?

13. What are the general tendencies of organized leadership? Why does it show these tendencies?

14. Explain the statement that organized leadership is ultimately personal.

15. Compare the leadership of the university, the church, and the daily newspaper in relation to social progress.

CHAPTER XI

Maladjustment

1. What is maladjustment? What are its principal types?

2. Distinguish between innate and environmental causes of maladjustment.

3. What are some of the minor maladjustments which appear commonly in everyday life? To what principal sentiment are they related?

4. What is an "inferiority complex"? What are its principal causes?

5. Show how such a complex may express itself in defensory and compensatory actions.

6. Explain the tendency of a maladjustment to extend its operation beyond its original setting.

7. Indicate the typical symptoms of neurasthenia. To what extent does it constitute social maladjustment?

8. Explain the statement that neurasthenic symptoms should usually be ignored rather than treated with expressions of sympathy.

9. What is psychasthenia? Describe a typical case.

10. What are the prominent symptoms of hysteria? Show that they are essentially dissociative.

11. Under what conditions does mental conflict tend to produce hysteria?

12. How does insanity differ from the psychoneurotic disorders?

13. What are the principal symptoms of dementia praecox? Of manic-depressive insanity? Of paranoia?

14. Explain the statement that insanity is in some cases the result of inner conflict.

15. How does the moron mentality differ from the normal?

16. What is the social significance of this type?

17. How is imbecility defined psychologically? What is a moral imbecile?

18. What arguments can you offer for or against the position that society ought not to allow idiots to live?

CHAPTER XII

Class, Crowd, and Organization

1. What is the general meaning of the term "group-mind"? What are the fundamental types of group?

2. What is class consciousness? Give illustrations of groups which are characterized by intense class consciousness.

3. How, in general, does class consciousness affect behavior?

4. In what respects is class consciousness potentially valuable for general social purposes?

5. What social dangers are inherent in it? Mention some contemporary social problems which involve class consciousness.

6. What is a crowd? Mention illustrations of crowd behavior in animal and human life.

7. How is the mental nature of the individual affected when he becomes a member of a crowd?

8. What is the moral character of the crowd? How is the immoral crowd behavior of normally moral persons explained?

9. Show the relation of crowd psychology to religious revivalism.

10. What are the mental characteristics of organization? Indicate some typical organizations which show these traits.

11. Upon what conditions does strength of organization depend?

12. Why do individuals differ so much in susceptibility to organization?

13. Show how organization may have a beneficial effect upon the character of the individual member.

14. What are the principal dangers which are inherent in organization?

15. Indicate the advantages and disadvantages of social organization in college life. Is the college over-organized?

16. What is the "public"? How are the preceding types of group related to it?

CHAPTER XIII

Custom and Fashion

1. What is the general distinction between custom and fashion? Mention illustrations of each.

2. Indicate typical customs in different fields of social life, for example education, politics, and religion.

3. What is the subjective aspect of custom? What is tradition?

4. How do you explain the authority of custom in society?

5. What conditions are favorable, and what ones unfavorable to the establishment of custom?

6. Indicate the social values and the dangers in custom.

7. What fields of social life are most subject to fashion? Mention illustrations.

8. What are conventions? Illustrate.

9. Explain the subservience of society to fashion. Show how a fashion may be rationalized.

10. What are the principal "radiant points" of conventionality? What is "social gravity"?

11. Explain the effect of democracy upon fashion.

12. What social usefulness do fashions and conventions possess?

13. Why do individuals differ in their amenability to custom and fashion?

14. How do the sexes compare in their attitudes toward custom and fashion?

15. Compare youth and maturity in their regard for custom and fashion.

16. What are fads? Do fads possess any social value?

17. Mention some historical or contemporary crazes or mental epidemics.

18. Why have economic and religious interests been especially likely to develop into mental epidemics?

CHAPTER XIV

Morals and Manners

1. State clearly the distinction between morals and manners. Indicate several illustrations of each type of behavior.

2. What is the origin of morals? How, in general, has religion been related to morality?

3. What are the principal points of resemblance and of difference between Christian and pagan morals?

4. Compare the moral agencies of the present day with those of medieval and ancient times.

5. In what respects are traditional morals being questioned? Why are they subjected to criticism?

6. Compare the following methods of moral instruction in

point of effectiveness: good example, punishment for wrong-doing, oral teaching.

7. Just what is meant by the statement that the perfection of morality is found in thought?

8. What is "morale"? How does it differ from morality?

9. How does morale manifest itself in a police force? In an office or factory staff? In a college class?

10. What general conditions are essential to the development of morale? What college conditions may be unfavorable to it?

11. By what special methods is morale produced in an organization? How would you try to inculcate it in a group such as a school or shop force which you were managing?

12. Do the moral needs of society seem to you to involve anything more than is contained in the morale of particular organizations?

13. What are the motives of "good manners"? Can one possess good manners without a knowledge of formal etiquette?

14. How are aristocratic and democratic societies likely to differ in their characteristic manners?

15. Compare the characteristic manners of men and women. To what extent do they differ?

16. What is the value, and what are the limitations of manners in everyday life?

17. What general changes in standards of conduct are taking place?

CHAPTER XV

Social Control

1. State the psychological problem of social control. Distinguish between its positive and negative phases.

2. Show how external institutions of social control depend upon inner traits of individual nature.

3. What are the merits and demerits of physical force as a method of social control?

4. Define punishment. What are its principal aims?

5. Why is retaliatory punishment objectionable? Can the motive of vengeance be entirely eliminated from punishment?

6. What actual conditions in the individual and in society are apt to lessen the preventive effect of punishment?

7. State the reformatory theory of punishment. Under what conditions does it work most successfully?

8. Why does law tend to supersede more primitive forms of control? How is its power of control explained psychologically?

9. In what respects does law fail as a means of social control?

10. Why does theoretical anarchy disbelieve in law? What sources and methods of social control does it regard as more effective?

11. What is public opinion? How large a part of society creates public opinion?

12. What are the principal sources of public opinion? To what extent is it the product of thought?

13. Explain the paradox that even autocratic government is in some measure dependent on and responsive to public opinion.

14. Give illustrations of censorship in contemporary life. In what fields of social effort is it most frequently found?

15. In what respects is censorship unsatisfactory? Why does it tend to fail?

16. Define propaganda. Mention some matters of public interest which are subjects of propaganda.

17. Describe in detail the technique of propaganda. What conditions tend to limit its effectiveness?

18. Explain psychologically the ultimate dependence of social control on the home and the school.

19. What do you regard as the general tendencies of education with respect to the development of social control?

20. Show how the problem of social control is affected by the extension of democracy.

CHAPTER XVI

Social Conflict

1. What is meant by "social unrest"? Indicate some phenomena of social unrest in contemporary society.

2. What are the causes of social unrest?

3. Analyze any social unrest which you find in the school or other institution with which you happen to be connected.

4. Show the relation of modern individualism to social unrest.

5. To what extent should we regard social conflict as inevitable and valuable?

6. What is crime? What are the principal types of criminality?

7. To what extent is criminality innate? What mental traits are commonly found in habitual criminals?

8. Explain the relation between feeble-mindedness and criminality.

9. What social conditions tend to produce juvenile crime?

10. What are the principal features of the "war-mind"? Explain its tendency to rationalization.

11. Describe the methods by which war-mindedness is induced in the public.

12. What special interests in society are most inclined to precipitate war?

13. Compare the effectiveness of political and educational agencies as preventives of war.

14. What is the general influence of democracy with regard to the practice of war?

15. How do the social and moral values of war at the present stage of social evolution compare with its values in the past? How may these earlier values be established without resort to war?

CHAPTER XVII

Social Progress

1. What do you understand "social progress" to mean? What features of the idea seem to you most important?

2. Indicate the characteristic differences between the conservative and the progressive types of mind.

3. Distinguish between progressivism and radicalism. Between conservatism and "reactionary" thinking.

4. How are conservatism and progressivism explained as

personal characteristics? What is their relation to youth and maturity?

5. What is the psychophysiological basis of conservatism and progressivism? Compare this influence with that of social environment.

6. Define liberalism. Describe briefly the antithetical attitude.

7. How is liberalism related to progressivism? Why is it termed "radicalism" by its opponents?

8. What do you regard as the principal points of strength and weakness in liberalism?

9. What conditions are most favorable respectively to the growth of liberalism and the extension of authority?

10. Define aristocracy and democracy. How are these views ordinarily aligned with the others already discussed in this chapter?

11. What are the advantages and disadvantages of aristocracy as a method of social progress?

12. What are the principal psychological arguments against democracy?

13. To what extent is it true that the level of average intelligence in a democracy prevents it from functioning satisfactorily?

14. Compare democratic and aristocratic leadership in relation to social progress.

15. Show how democracy depends on education.

16. What ultimate difference is there in the aristocratic and democratic conceptions of progress?

17. What are the fundamental conditions for the realization of social idealism?

18. Show how science is related to the idealism of democracy.

CHAPTER XVIII

Speech and Laughter

1. What is a behavior-system? Mention some illustrations.

2. What is the instinctive basis of language? Show how reflex movements become elements of speech.

3. What is a word? What were the earliest types of words in the evolution of speech?

4. To what extent do animals use speech?

5. Give illustrations of words which have control-significance. How is this function explained?

6. Show the relation of language to nationality. To what extent does this constitute a problem in this country?

7. What is laughter as a physiological process? What kinds of experience originally give rise to it?

8. What is the general character of the ridiculous? Mention some stock subjects of jest and show how they exhibit this character.

9. State briefly Freud's theory of laughter. Bergson's theory.

CHAPTER XIX

Play, Art, and Music

1. What is the essential difference between play and work? Show how they may be combined in behavior.

2. Mention some distinctive play interests which correspond to differences of age, sex, and social position.

3. Indicate briefly the principal theories of the origin of play. Mention plays which illustrate these theories.

4. What are the social values of play? What plays seem to you most valuable in these respects?

5. What dangers are inherent in the play-function?

6. What is the essential psychological principle of art? What is meant by the statement that art has the motive of sublimation?

7. Mention some of the more important social aspects or functions of art.

8. What is the physiological basis of the appeal of music?

9. Show the social significance of different kinds of music.

10. In what respects does the art of dancing seem to you to possess significance for social psychology?

CHAPTER XX

Religion and Philanthropy

1. What is the essential feature of religion? How do the more highly evolved religions differ from the earlier forms in this respect?
2. What have been the principal social interests of religion? What development has taken place in these interests?
3. Show how the development of natural science has affected the character of religion.
4. What typical differences between individuals in the form of their religious consciousness can you mention?
5. What have been the principal social values and defects of religion?
6. What are the principal philanthropic interests which characterize contemporary society?
7. What are the sources of these interests?
8. How are they related to religion and to social progress?

CHAPTER XXI

Patriotism, Nationalism, and Internationalism

1. What is patriotism? What are its principal forms of expression?
2. Indicate the value of patriotism in the evolution of society.
3. What social dangers are inherent in it?
4. What is nationalism? In what respects does it differ from patriotism?
5. What is the relation of nationalism to social progress?
6. Define internationalism. To what extent does it already exist in contemporary society?

INDEX

INDEX

Abnormal psychology, relation to social psychology, 16 f.
Abnormalities of social behavior, Chap. XI.
Abstract sentiments, 140–143.
Acquired characteristics, 49.
Active sympathy, 101.
Adolescence, 146 f., 166 ff.
Aesthetic interests in society, 388–393.
Aesthetic standards of conduct, 296–302.
Aim of social evolution, 367 f.
Allport, F., 4, 54, 76, 80, 92.
Allport, G., 175 note.
Anarchism, 313 f.
Anderson and Dvorak, 302 note.
Aristocracy, 298, 361–367.
Art, 388–391.
Ascendance, 175 f.
Attitudes, social, 136.
Audiences, 255.
Autocracy, 358 f.
Average intelligence, 363 f.

Bagehot, W., 88.
Baldwin, J. M., 12, 30.
Beebe, W., 257.
Behavior systems, 373 f.
Bergson, H., 382.
Bernard, L. L., 201, 389.
Biology, relation to social psychology, 12.
Bogardus, E. S., 3.

Caste, 251.
Cattell, J. McK., 176.
Censorship, 319 ff.
Changing standards of conduct, 300 ff.
Character-reading, 178–181.
Childhood maladjustments, 238 f.; social ideas, 114.
Christian vs. pagan morals, 287.
Class-consciousness, 247–251.
Classic temperament, 171.
Classical scheme of temperaments, 169 f., 178 f.
Coe, G. A., 302 note.
Collective vs. individual thinking, 120–123.
Colvin, S. S., 69.
Communication, 374–379.
Compensatory traits, 204 f., 227 f.
Competitive socialization, period of, 165.
Conditioned reflex, 79.
Conditioning process, 70, 77.
Conflict, inner, 134 f., 167, 234.
Conflict, Social, Chap. XVI.
Conklin, E. S., 173.
Conscience, 286 f.
Consciousness of kind, 22 f., 247–251.
Conservation vs. progressivism, 352–357.
Contemporary morals, 287–290.
Control, Social, Chap. XV.
Control-words, 378.
Conventionality, 276.
Craze, 281 ff.
Crime, 337–341.
Criminal mentality, 338–340.
Crowd, Class and Organization, Chap. XII.
Crowd-mind, 251–256.
Cues, social, 83.
Custom, 266–274;
and Fashion, Chap. XIII.

Dashiell, J. F., 52 note.
Day-dreaming, 118.
Definitions of social psychology, 3–6.
Dementia praecox, 235 f.
Democracy, 124, 279 f., 329, 361–367.

Determinism of will, 161 note.
Development of personality, 161–168.
Dewey, J., 174.
Dissociated motives, 32 f.
Domination, 62.
Downey, J., 174.
Ductless glands, 158.
Dunlap, K., 53, 190, 321 note.

Education as social control, 217 f., 325–330.
Ellwood, C. A., 4, 10, 334 note.
Environment vs. heredity, 182 ff., 199 f., 212 ff.
Environmental influence upon personality, 159 f., 163–168.
Ethics, relation to social psychology, 14 f., 175 f.
Executive leadership, 215–218.
Extroverted temperament, 171 f., 175 f.

Fad, 280 f.
Familism, 273.
Family inheritance in personality, 197–203.
Fashion, 275–280.
Feeble-mindedness, 238–242.
Feminine vs. masculine traits, 190–195.
Feminism, 196 f.
Fiske, J., 85 note.
Force as social control, 306 f.
Freedom, social, 328, 357–361.
Freudian theory, of society, 33;
of laughter, 381.
Fundamental principles, of social psychology, Part I;
of study of society, 10.

Galton, F., 198, 213 note.
Gault, R. H., 337 note.
Giddings, F. H., 22.
Graphology, 180 f.
Gregariousness, 61.
Group-mind, 34 ff., 245 ff.

Habit, 72.
Habit systems of social behavior, 78.
Hall, G. S., 29.
Hankins, F. H., 185.
Heidbreder, 175.
Heredity vs. environment, 182 ff., 199 f., 212 ff.
Hypnotism, 104.
Hysteria, 233 f.

Idiocy, 241 f.
Imbecility, 240 f.
Imitation, level of social behavior, 87–91;
prevalence in society, 90;
general character, 91 f.;
criticism of, 92;
causes, 93 ff.
Imitation and Suggestion, Chap. V.
Inconsistency in personality, 177 f.
Individuality, Part II;
affected by organization, 261–264.
Individualization, period of, 164.
Infancy, 82, 83, 161, 163.
Inferiority-complex, 227.
Inflammable public, 343 f.
Inhibition, social, 70.
Inner conflict, 134 f., 167, 234.
Insanity, 234–238.
Insight, in leadership, 211.
Instinct, definition, general characteristics; 38–42;
relation to learning, 51 f.;
controversy over, 52–55.
Instinct, Social, Chap. III.
Instinctive basis of social culture, 57–60;
level of social behavior, 26.
Integration of reflexes, 71.
Intelligence, 36, 46, 82, 363 f.
Internationalism, 407.
Introverted temperament, 171 f., 175.
Intuition, 95–98, 192.

James, W., 47, 51, 72, 170, 290, 347.
Jastrow, J., 113, 117 note.
Jordan, A. M., 17 note, 191 note.
Jung, C. G., 1872 note.

Kohler, W., 113.

Language, 374–379.
Laughter, 379–383.
Law, as social control, 311–315.
Leadership, Chap. X.
League of Nations, 349.
Learning, definition, fundamental modes, 69–74;
general conditions of, 74–76;
levels of, 73 f.
Learning, Social, Chap. IV.
Levels of social behavior, 26–29.
Libby, W., 351 note.
Liberalism, 357–361.
Lippmann, W., 324.
Lotze, R. H., 170.

Maladjustment, Chap. XI.
Manic-depressive insanity, 236 f.
Manners, 296–302.
Masculine vs. feminine traits, 190–195.
Master-sentiment, 155.
McCabe, J., 289.
McDougall, W., 5, 7, 10, 40, 44, 46, 53, 56, 89, 102 note, 186, 254 note.
Measurement of personality, 173–178.
Mental Basis of Society, Chap. II.
Mental epidemics, 281 f.
Mind-reading, 96 f.
Mob-mind, 252 f.
Moore, H. T., 193 note, 356.
Moral equivalent of war, 347;
imbecile, 241;
principles, 141 f.
Morale, 291–296.
Morals, 15, 285, 291.
Morals and Manners, Chap. XIV.
Morgan, A., 306.
Morgan, Lloyd, 44.
Moron, 238 ff.
Motives, Social, Chap. VII.
Motivation, nature of, 128–131;
subconscious, 31–34, 130, 134 f.
Münsterberg, H., 356.
Music, 391 ff.

Nationalism, 404, 407.
Negro, intelligence of, 187 f.
Neurasthenia, 230 ff.
New ideas, social opposition to, 108 f.
Newspaper crazes, 282 f.

Orderly behavior, basis in sentiment, 132.
Organization, 256–264;
prevalence in contemporary social life, 258, 260 f.;
conditions of effectiveness, 258–260;
effect on individuality, 261–264.
Organized leadership, 218–222.
Ostwald, W., 170.

Paranoia, 237.
Parental influence, 210 f.
Parental instinct, 65 f.
Patriotism, 402 ff.
Paulsen, F., 157.
Personality, Chap. VIII.
Philanthropy, 399 ff.
Phrenology, 180.
Physiology, relation to social psychology, 12.
Play, 384–388.
Prejudice, social, 137 f.
Prepotent habit, 78;
reflex, 76.
Prevention of war, 347 ff.
Principles of conduct, 141 f.
Progress, idea of, 350–352, 367 f;
direction of, 367 ff;
conditions of, 369 f.
Progress, Social, Chap. XVII.
Progressivism, 353 f., 362 f.
Propaganda, 321–325.
Psychasthenia, 232.
Psychological method, 16 ff.
Psycho-neuroses, 230–234.
Public, 264 f.
Public opinion, 315–319.
Pugnacity, 54, 63.
Punishment, 307–310.
Purposive character of instinct, 45.

Race mentality, 184–189;
prejudice, 138.

Radicalism, 354.
Ranking method of measurement of personality, 176 f.
Rational basis of morality, 286, 291.
Rationalization, 118 ff;
of custom and fashion, 272, 277;
of war, 344.
Reflective level of behavior, 27 f.
Reflex, relation to instinct, 41, 54.
Religion, 394–399.
Repression, 47 f., 229 ff., 344.
Revivalism, 256.
Romantic temperament, 171.
Ross, E. A., 266 note.

Scott, W. D., 177.
Self, consciousness of, 156 f., 162.
Self-assertion, 62;
confidence of leaders, 209;
regarding sentiment, 30, 147;
restraint, 83, 84.
Sentiment, definition, general characteristics, 130, 134;
functions, 135–139;
types, 139–143;
development, 143–148.
Sex instinct, 64;
relation to personality, 167, 190–197;
manners, 299.
Social conditioning, 76–80;
Conflict, Chap. XVI;
consciousness, 19–26;
Control, Chap. XV;
Instinct, Chap. III;
intelligence, 36;
Learning, Chap. IV;
Order, Part III;
Motives, Chap. VII;
Progress, Chap. XVII;
science, 123–127, 363 f;
sentiments, 131–135;
Social standards, 284 f., 300 ff., Thought, Chap. VI;
unrest, 331–336.
Sociology, relation to social psychology, 13.
Speech, 374–379.
Spencer, H., 9.
Starch, D., 191 note, 199, 213 note.
Study of society, 6–11.
Subconscious motives, 31–34.
Submission, 62 f.
Suggestion, 102–105.
Superiority of leaders, 207 f.
Sympathy, 23 f., 98–101.

Tarde, G., 89.
Temperament, 168–173, 174 f.
Thought, Social, Chap. VI.
Titchener, E. B., 102 note.
Tradition, 269 f.
Transcendent group-mind, 35.
Trial-and-error learning, 81.

Unconscious mind, 33 f.
Unity of personality, 156 f., 177.
Unrest, social, 331–336.

Vindictiveness in punishment, 308 f.
Volition, basis in sentiment, 138 f.

Wallas, G., 73 note, 117.
Watson, G. B., 122 note.
Watson, J., 82 f.
War, 341–349;
causes, 343–347;
prevention, 347 ff.
Will-temperament, 174 f.
Woods, F. A., 198.
World Court, 349.

Yerkes, R. M., 52 note.
Youth, standards of conduct, 302.

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

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